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PREFACE
As the world economy enters the twenty-first century, job and
wealth creation is increasingly based on innovation and creativity that, in
turn, can give rise to important intellectual property rights. For many
companies and individuals these intellectual property rights may
represent their most valuable assets, or in some cases, their only valuable
assets. As a result, intellectual property rights increasingly play a critical
the role in financing.
Unlocking the job and wealth creating potential of intellectual
property assets requires putting these assets into use, and that often
requires a capital investment. Unfortunately, many entrepreneurs and
innovators lack the capital necessary to develop business and products
based on their creativity and innovation and must turn to outside sources
for funding. As part of the funding the providers of capital generally
require collateral. This poses little problem if the collateral is in the form
of real estate or tangible property. When the assets are in the form of
intangible property, specifically patents, copyrights and trademarks, t h e
creation and perfection of a security interest in the assets is significantly
more uncertain and difficult. As a result of this increased uncertainty and
difficulty, the availability and cost of capital for Information Age
individuals and organizations is negatively affected.
Pursuant to a cooperative contract between the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and the Franklin Pierce Law Center,
together with the University of Maine School of Law, the University of
New Hampshire Whittemore School of Business and the law firms of
Rath, Young & Pignatelli, Devine, Millimet and Branch, and Nixon
Peabody, a talented group of individuals was amassed to assess the
problem and explore potential solutions. This resulting report analyzes
the current situation regarding security interests in intellectual property
and proposes action that can greatly reduce the uncertainty surrounding
the use of intellectual property as collateral. While an important and
necessary first step toward a solution, the proposals in this report will
require additional research, legislative, and administrative attention for
implementation.
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Every project has a cut-off point. This report was completed in
the late spring of 2001 for submission to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. As a consequence, significant later developments are
not included. For example, the appellate decision in In re Cybernetic
Services, Inc. [239 B.R. 917 (9 th Cir. B.A.P. 1999, aff'd, 252 F.3d 1039
(9th Cir. 2001)] was handed down after the report was completed. In an
important and evolving field such as that covered by this report, it is an
unfortunate reality that some significant actions will occur after t h e
"books have been closed."
I would also like to thank each of the following individuals who
have kindly assisted in the production of this report especially my coreporter, Professor Thomas M. Ward of the University of Maine School
of Law. I would also like to thank the various institutions and law firms
for whom the project members' work for their donation of time and
supporting resources. I would particularly like to thank two alumni of
Pierce Law for their help in the project, the Project Manager, Maura
Weston, a partner at the Concord, New Hampshire law firm of Rath,
Young & Pignatelli, for her dedication and managerial talent for bringing
the disparate elements of the project into a coherent whole. A special
thanks is extended to Bonnie Boulanger, former LLM student and now an
attorney with the Salem, New Hampshire law firm of Hatem & Donovan,
who provided expert editorial support and a fresh pair of eyes at a critical
juncture.

William J. Murphy
Project Director
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PROPOSAL FOR A CENTRALIZED
AND INTEGRATED REGISTRY FOR
SECURITY INTERESTS IN

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

I.

ABSTRACT

Entrepreneurial energies are often focused on developing various
forms of intellectual property, either as part of products or processes to
produce products. These products or processes may involve a combination of
patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property.
Currently, the more relevant and valuable assets in our knowledge-based
economy are in the form of intellectual property rather then buildings and
machinery. The characterization of intellectual property as a significant
business asset should make a company's intellectual property, in turn, among
the assets most valuable and useful as collateral in obtaining financing.
Economic growth, in our knowledge-based economy, is in large part driven
by the ability to leverage the value of such assets.'
Despite the fact that in today's knowledge-based economy
intellectual property is often a company's most valuable asset, it is routinely
under-valued and under-utilized, a situation which arguably stunts economic
growth. The under-utilization of intellectual property in transactions results
from the uncertainly created by current legal structures and regulatory
regimes surrounding the use of intellectual property as collateral. This
translates into difficulties for an entity seeking to leverage the value of
intellectual property assets, creating a disincentive to do business.
Secured financings involving intellectual property are currently
caught between the statutory schemes governing intellectual property rights,
essentially a federal title system, and the UCC Article Nine state
encumbrance system. The complexity and confusion resulting from the
interplay of these two systems drives away potential financiers and prevents
companies and individuals from extracting the full value of their intellectual
See Michael A. Barr, Financing Alternatives for Dot.Coms, THE M&A LAWYER 27,
December 2000.
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property assets. This report examines the relevance of intellectual property in
financing transactions, and the present structural obstacles to leveraging the
value of intellectual property in secured transactions. This report then
proposes three statutes that would help eliminate these obstacles by creating
a centralized or integrated registry for security interests in intellectual
property and a proposed technological solution for the implementation of
that registry. [See Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.] Given the
significant value of intellectual property assets and their vital role in business
transactions, the creation of a centralized or integrated registry is paramount
to the continued vibrancy and growth of our knowledge-based economy.
Security agreements are the mechanisms that drive secured
financing. In a security agreement, the debtor grants the creditor a security
interest in an asset offered as collateral, allowing the creditor to gain
ownership of that asset should the debtor default. While security interests are
enforceable between parties to the agreement, creditors wishing to defend
against competing third party interests must notify the general public of their
security interest in the debtor's collateral. The creditor's public notification is
known as perfection. A perfected security interest assures creditors priority
over subsequent third party claims to the collateral. This process, known as
secured financing, allows creditors to retain enough control over collateral
assets to protect their value upon liquidation, while allowing the debtor to
retain title to and maximize the value of these assets.
Accessible collateral with predictable value is the lynch-pin of
traditionally secured financing since it reduces a creditor's financial risk.
However, when collateral takes the form of intellectual property a creditor's
risk may actually be increased. Historically, collateral has taken the form of
"hard assets" such as machinery and equipment, inventory, and real estate.
State rules and procedures governing creditor interests in these industrial-age
assets are well established. Creditors are experienced at valuing industrialage assets, drafting security agreements encompassing these assets, and
properly perfecting the resulting security interests. Judicial treatment of
conflicts involving multiple creditors having security interests in the same
tangible asset is relatively clear-cut and consistent. As a result, most creditors
are comfortable with the valuation and liquidity of industrial-age assets used
as collateral to satisfy debt. Problems arise when creditors seek to secure
collateral involving intellectual property rights however, because the federal
statutes governing these rights inevitably collide with the state statutory
schemes governing creditor interests in collateral. Current state perfection
rules and procedures are generally well conceived but were not designed to
handle chimera-like information-age assets. Judicial treatment of conflicts
between state and federal law and of conflicts between multiple creditors
having security interests in the same information-age asset is confusing and
conflicting. Creditors are unsure which statutory scheme governs the
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perfection of intellectual property collateral, and uncertain whether
perfection will actually secure their rights to such collateral. As a result,
creditors that might otherwise be inclined to provide funding to information
age businesses are currently discouraged from doing so because of the added
risks involved in complying with the relevant statutory schemes.
The federal statutory schemes governing intellectual property rights
are the Copyright Act, the Patent Act, and the Lanham Act. These statutes all
have a title-centered concern for the owner of intellectual property rights and
the exact boundaries of that owner's rights. In effect, these statutory schemes
are designed to work the way tract recording systems work in real estate.
Their principle function is to establish title to intellectual property rights and
to provide a recorded chronology of the transfers of ownership of these
rights. Although security interests in intellectual property may be recorded as
discretionary documents, they are ill fitted to these title-based schemes since
they reflect only an encumbrance on, and not a transfer of ownership of, the
intellectual property. Since the intended purpose of the federal schemes was
to identify the title-holder of intellectual property rights, they are
inadequately designed to accommodate mere encumbrances on those rights.
Article Nine of the UCC is a state statutory scheme that was
designed to govern encumbrances. The purpose of Article Nine is to
facilitate financing by creating a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of
security interests and by providing creditors with an efficient and streamlined
method of perfecting security interests. Creditors who comply with the
perfection requirements of Article Nine are generally protected against
subsequent third party claims. When conflicts involving multiple creditors
having security interest in the same collateral arise, Article Nine lays out
specific guidelines as to the priority enjoyed by each creditor.
Since Article Nine was designed to accommodate the financing. of
industrial-age assets, many of its provisions do not appropriately address the
issues surrounding information-age financing. For example, under the old
version of Article Nine, the proper place for filing depend on a preliminary
classification of the collateral and its situs. Information age collateral exists
in forms which are difficult to classify in industrial-age terms and which may
change during the different stages of its development.
Preemption of federal law also creates difficulties when applying
Article Nine to intellectual property. Article Nine recognizes the preemptive
effect of federal law and is designed to give way to overlapping federal
statutory schemes. It is unclear at the moment, however, to what extent the
federal statutory schemes governing intellectual property overlap with
provisions in Article Nine. Although the consensus is that Article Nine
should be applied to security interests in intellectual property, there is
disagreement as to how or when it should be applied. Courts which have
addressed the issue have only confused it by coming to varied and
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conflicting conclusions. The result of this legal complexity is that creditors
making a good faith effort to comply with statutory perfection requirements
risk complying with the inappropriate statutory scheme and losing their
interest in the collateral-the very risk which secured financing is supposed
to eliminate.
In their 1992 Preliminary Report on Security Interests in Intellectual
Property, the ABA Task Force observed that: "The current state of the law
governing security interests in intellectual property is unsatisfactory. There
is uncertainty as to where and how to file, what constitutes notice of a
security interest, who has priority, and what property is covered by a security
interest. This area of the law is further complicated by the fact that both
federal and state laws impact on these issues".2
This Report proposes three model statutes that will help to clarify the
uncertainty surrounding security interests in intellectual property collateral
by creating a centralized or integrated registry for perfecting such collateral.
The centralized and integrated registry would not supplant the existing
substantive federal or state laws, but would rather compliment them by
offering a central information forum that would be available to anyone
seeking security interest information on intellectual property. Such a registry
will retain the notice based filing system of Article Nine while also reducing
the financial risk facing secured creditors by providing them with a central
venue for perfection. Such a registry will allow practitioners, creditors and
other interested parties to conduct a single, comprehensive search to uncover
prior recorded interests and make a determination of an asset's encumbered
status.
A centralized or integrated registry will eliminate the confusion
surrounding statutory perfection requirements and will assure creditors that
compliance with these requirements will secure interests in intellectual
property collateral. Reducing the risk faced by creditors will promote the
financing and development of intellectual property and enable companies
and individuals to extract the full value of their information-age assets.

2

Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property, Business Law Section,
American Bar Association, Preliminary Report 1 (June 1, 1992). [Hereinafter referred to
as Preliminary ABA Task Force Report]. As of March 1, 1999, the Task Force had
drafted a piece of consolidated federal legislation entitled the "Federal Intellectual
Property Security Act."
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II.

MARKET TRANSACTIONS

A.

The Role of Intellectual Property in Market Transactions

The increasing rate of new business formation in the entrepreneurial
sector is testimony to systemic change in the United States economy.
Employment and gross national product ("GNP") data reveal the systemic
shift to an economy dominated by the innovative start-up. From 1954-1979,
the share of GNP represented by the Fortune 500, the 500 largest companies
in the United States, grew from 37% to 58%. The payrolls of these 500
largest US industrial corporations peaked in 1979 at 16 million jobs. Since
1979, Fortune 500 employment has exhibited a steady decline as
employment decreased by over 25% or four million jobs. In 1996 the
percentage of employment represented by the Fortune 500 was a scant 10%.
From 1979 to 1995, the invisible entrepreneurial economy generated over 24
million new jobs as the number of new business creation increased 200%.1
For today's businesses, assets in the form of intellectual property are
often more relevant and valuable than assets in the form of buildings and
machinery. "For most companies, intellectual property today is the most
important corporate asset .

.

. ..

Intellectual property has increased

dramatically in importance for corporations over the last 20 years. In 1982,
the hard assets of industrial companies were said to account for 62% of the
companies market value. By 1992, tangibles made up 38% and intangibles
62% of their value. In 2000, intangible assets and intellectual property
values are clearly the most important assets of most industrial companies
given the increased intensity of competition, increased rapidity of
technological growth and innovation, increased reliance on legal protection
of right in intellectual property and increased enforcement of ownership
sharp liability standards for infringement and
rights, and increasingly
4
misappropriation."
These intellectual property assets are directly related to wealth
generation and creating the next MOP (millionaire on paper). In the
heartland of intellectual property creation, Silicon Valley at one point was

See W.J. Dennis Jr., More than you think: an inclusive estimate of business entries,
Journal Of Business Venturing, 1997, 173-196; J. Freear, J.E. Sohl and W.E. Wetzel, The
informal venture capital market: milestones passed and the road ahead,
Entrepreneurship 2000, 1997, 47-70.
See Swiss Reinsurance Company, 2000, The significance of intellectual property assets,
risks and insurance. Swiss Re Website.
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minting 64 millionaires a day.5 The source of wealth for the top high net
worth group in the United States has shifted to self-made first generation
entrepreneurs with the growth of the entrepreneurial economy. In 1997
seventy-two percent, nearly three in four individuals, of the wealthiest
Americans were self-made first generation entrepreneurs.
This transition from an industrial, goods based economy to an
entrepreneurial, knowledge based economy is now firmly embedded in the
fabric of the United States economy. As with any systemic change, which
occurs within a relatively short time frame, this change is creating profound
implications for entrepreneurs, business owners and investors as well as
capital markets. Certain of these profound implications stem from the
increased recognition of the true value of intellectual property and its
relevance in this economy. The characterization of intellectual property as a
significant business asset, leads entrepreneurs as well as established
companies to seek methods to leverage the value of intellectual property in
transactions.
The development and commercial exploitation of intellectual
property occurs in a legal, social, political, and economic environment. This
environment has been affected by past events, and is influenced by current
attitudes, and by expectations of the future. In many industries, the speed of
change of knowledge and innovation is accelerating, especially in the socalled "new economy" of electronic commerce. Paradoxically, although the
new economy is knowledge-based, its speed of change is such that the value
of that knowledge to its owner may be very short-lived. 6 In some industries,
product life cycles are shrinking from years to months. Intellectual property
rights must be exploited increasingly rapidly if their owner is to reap a
commercial return. Thus, the ability to exploit the value of intellectual
property assets may depend upon raising adequate external financing in a
timely manner. Any delay in such transactions may have deleterious
consequences.

6

See E. Nieves, In man-rich silicon valley, romance is full of glitches, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Monday, April 10, 2000.
"For example, in a federal suit filed in Seattle [in 1999], Amazon.com accused rival
Barnes &' Noble.com Inc. of 'willfully infringing' on a patented ordering system that
allows customers to buy things with a single mouse click. Barnes & Noble.com has
called the suit 'completely without merit.' The Seattle court issued a preliminary
injunction barring Barnes & Noble.corn from using the system ....
Under fire for his company's suit, Amazon chief executive Jeff Bezos has proposed a
sharp reduction in the duration of Internet-related patent rights, which, like all other
patents, are good for 20 years from application. Such a reduction would require
Congressional or court action, as well as negotiation of new international intellectualproperty pacts." U.S. Will Give Web Patents More Scrutiny, Wall Street Journal, March

29, 2000.
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In seeking to leverage the value of intellectual property assets,
whether through debt or equity financing alternatives, economic behavior
and decision making rests on a recognition that choices have to be made
about how to use scarce resources in a manner that is efficient in its use, and
effective in meeting the goals and objectives of the society of which the
economic system is an important part. One of the key institutions in the
economic system is the market, along with the government, the legal
systems, households and firms. A market's function is to allocate scarce
resources according to the strength of the demand for them, although the
effects of market forces may be modified by the intervention of one or more
of the other key institutions. Markets provide a mechanism that strikes a
price for a good or service. In some markets, the information needed to
achieve this end is relatively straight forward. In other markets, a more
complex valuation process may be required of individual market participants,
who may not have full access to all information. At either extreme,
individuals make decisions based on these value estimates.
In deciding whether to lend money to exploit intellectual property
rights, investors must be satisfied, among many other matters, that these
rights in relation to the intellectual property will be protected. The economic
decision to use scarce resources (capital) becomes easier when risk is
reduced, creating greater efficiency for the investor or lender. Because the
ability to commercially exploit intellectual property assets is likely to depend
upon raising adequate capital, it is also likely to depend on the existence of
lower risk and efficient markets for such capital. We propose that a
centralized or integrated registry for security interests in intellectual property
will have the direct effect of creating a new capital market for the
entrepreneur by making more efficient the issuance of secured debt by
traditional lenders; and will indirectly expand primary equity and secondary
markets by creating more efficient access to information regarding the
ownership of and encumbrances on the intellectual property assets seeking to
be leveraged.
Currently the major, and often the only source of capital available
for innovators and entrepreneurs to transform their ideas and intellectual
property into viable commercial applications are private equity markets.
[See Appendix 4.] As entrepreneurial ventures grow and mature they pass
through various stages in the search for equity capital. Initially, seed
financing provides relatively small amounts of equity capital to an
entrepreneur/inventor to prove a concept and to qualify for start-up capital.
Start-up financing is equity capital for companies completing product
development and initial marketing. These companies may be in the process
of organizing or they may already be in business for one year or less. Earlystage financing is generally considered to be equity capital for the expansion
of a company that is producing and delivering products or services.
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Although the company has made progress, it is generally less than five years
old and may not yet be showing a profit. Later stage financing are funds
provided for a major expansion of the company whose sales volume is
increasing or for a venture expecting to go public within six months to a
year.
As the entrepreneurial venture grows, so does the appetite for cash.
Previous studies identified private investors, "angels", as the major source of
capital in the seed and start-up stage.7 This relatively invisible source is the
oldest and largest segment of the U.S. venture capital industry. A typical
angel deal is an early-stage round (seed or start-up) in the $100 thousand to
$1 million range, raised from six or eight investors. In contrast to the angel
population, institutional venture capital funds, the visible segment of the
private equity market, invest primarily in later stage, and consequently
larger, amounts, than their angel counterparts. 8 A typical round of financing
from a venture capital fund is a later stage deal in the $8-10 million range.
The private investor and the institutional venture capital market, while
operating primarily in different stages, are complimentary in the sense that
the informal private investor market now provides the seed and start-up
capital that spawns new ventures. As the venture grows, it begins to outstrip
the ability of individual investors to supply adequate equity capital. At this
point, professional venture capital funds may take interest in the venture,
particularly if the venture has demonstrated some success and has progressed
beyond the risk-laden seed and start-up stages of its development towards
sustainable growth. [See Appendix 4.]
Primary capital markets, such as the above described equity markets
or the more traditional debt markets do not operate in isolation, but within an
economic system. This system includes other markets, for example,
secondary markets which provide a market for those debt or equity holders to
sell their interest in securities, and to buy securities from other holders. As
financing alternatives are examined by the entrepreneur who seeks to
leverage the value of intellectual property assets, the relationship between
primary and secondary markets must be examined.

See J. Freear, J. E. Sohl and W.E. Wetzel, Angels: personal investors in the venture
capital market, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1995, 85-94; R. J.
Gaston and S.E. Bell, The informal supply of capital,Office of Economic Research, U.S.
Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C. 1988; W.E. Wetzel Jr., Angels and
Informal Risk Capital,SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 1983, 23-34.
J.A. Timmons and W.D. Bygrave, Venture Capital: reflections and projections,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2000, 1997; R. Meyer, et al, The National Census of Early Stage

CapitalFinancing, 1995; J.A. Timmons and H.J. Sapienza, Venture Capital: the decade
ahead,THE STATE OF THE ART ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 1992.
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The relationship between primary and secondary markets plays a
major role in the raising of capital. Suppliers of capital in primary markets,
specifically potential debt and equity holders, will tend to be more willing to
9
make the initial investment in the business in a primary market, if the
potential suppliers of capital know that they will be able to liquidate their
investment, in a timely and relatively low cost manner, on a secondary
market through asset securitization (such as the NYSE or NASDAQ). [See
Appendix 5.] If they have no such option, they might be inhibited from
making the investment. In the absence of a secondary market, they might be
obliged to hold their investment for the long term, with little no prospect of
being able to liquidate it. Or, they might be able to liquidate only at a high
transaction cost incurred in finding a willing buyer. These inhibiting factors,
in turn, may make the investment less liquid, less attractive, and hence less
valuable. The existence of a secondary market with efficiency attributes may
encourage, therefore, the raising of debt and equity capital on the primary
markets, and help support the growth of those firms seeking additional
funding, for example, innovators and entrepreneurs. The existence of a
secondary market relies on one's ability to retain ownership of the underlying
collateral while leveraging the value of, or future income streams from, that
collateral to raise large amounts of capital. In theory, securitization of
intellectual property assets is not different from a typical securitization
0
involving credit card receivables, mortgages and auto loans.'
Thus, regardless of whether the entrepreneur attempts to raise
needed capital through traditional debt markets, primary equity markets or
secondary markets, the examination and tracking of ownership of intellectual
property rights is paramount to the lenders or investors' ability to determine
if that particular investment or loan is an efficient use of capital. One way to
expand both debt and equity markets and consequently create more efficient
and less expensive access to capital for the inventor and entrepreneur is to
clarify the uncertainty surrounding the creation and tracking of security
interests in intellectual property assets. This premise is clarified when
current market imperfections and inefficiencies are examined in greater
detail.

10

There are many primary markets in addition to the NYSE (which can function as both a
primary and secondary market), some of which will be discussed later.
See Nicole Chu, Bowie Bonds: A Key to Unlocking the Wealth of Intellectual Property,
21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 469, Winter, 1999.
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B.

Market Imperfections and Inefficiencies

For the established firm, financial markets currently supply a
complete variety of financing instruments, with these markets being
relatively accessible the owner/manager is left to decide the optimum mix of
a financial structure based on the cost of capital, stemming from the level of
risk in the transaction. Since buildings and machinery, as opposed to
intellectual property, are the major assets of the established firm, asset based
loans can be transacted efficiently and the cost of capital is reduced.
However, for the high growth entrepreneurial firm and the early stage
innovator/inventor, this supply assumption may not hold, causing systematic
market mismatches at particular stages of development of the fast growth
firm." These systematic market mismatches can be considered market
imperfections. Most notably in the informal venture capital market, such
market imperfections are well documented.' 2 Two market imperfections,
creating risk for the investor in the intellectual property transaction are: 1)
incomplete information and 2) inaccurate values of intellectual property
assets. Solving for these market imperfections is one way to assist both the
entrepreneurial high growth firm and the early stage innovator in their efforts
to exploit the value of their intellectual property.
The market imperfection of incomplete information exists in the
early stage market and is faced by both the entrepreneur/inventor and the
investor. One issue is the lack of historical information. Information on the
value of the opportunity is incomplete in the sense that there is no historical
record or financial information on which to base a business valuation. Given
the inherent risk in the early stage of a venture's development and growth,
detailed analysis may still not fill this gap, especially acute since future
markets and consumer behavior are difficult to predict. While the existence
of certain intellectual property rights mitigates some of this risk, the
commercialization of that intellectual property is a major factor in
determining market risk and investors expected rates of return.
Another information issue is that critical information is held
asymmetrically by the investor and the entrepreneur. Detailed technical
information (especially acute for high tech ventures), and the value and merit
of the technological advancement, is usually best understood by the
See D.J. Brophy, Financing the growth of entrepreneurialfirms, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
2000, 1997, p. 5-27.
2

See J. Freear, J. E. Sohi and W. E. Wetzel, Jr., The private investor market for venture

capital, THE FINANCIER, 1994, p. 7-15; R.T. Harrison and C. M. Mason, Financingfor
the growing business: the role of informal investment, NATIONAL WESTMINISTER
QUARTERLY REVIEW, 1993, 17-29; H. Landstrom, Informal risk capital in Sweden and
some internationalcomparisons, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCING, 1993, p. 525-540.
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entrepreneur. To further complicate matters, the presence of any existing
liens or encumbrances on intellectual property rights is currently within the
sole purview of the entrepreneur. Such information is critical to the investor
in the decision-making process. Thus, to make an informed investment
decision the investor must in large part rely on information from the very
source, the entrepreneur, who directly benefits from the investment. In
contrast, the investor is in possession of market and financing information
based on experience from past investments. The entrepreneur lacks this
information and is unable to attain it within the confines of the current
transaction. Additionally, only the entrepreneur holds information regarding
his or her skills. The investor may not have knowledge about the
entrepreneur's abilities, managerial skills and commitment. This information
is, however, vital to the investor in the decision-making process.
The market imperfection of inaccurate values of intellectual property
assets stems from the difficulty in assessing such value without detailed
technological information. To divulge such sensitive information the
entrepreneur risks the appropriation of this information by the investor or
other entrepreneurs. The time to secure patent and intellectual property
information, and the cost to secure that information, also become critical
issues in the new economy. Delays in acquiring information translate into, at
the minimum, increases in transaction costs (in terms of time and money), or,
in the most severe case, the failure to seize an opportunity or loss of the first
mover advantage due to rapid developments and competition in the fast
paced new economy.
To deal with these information problems, the private equity markets
have evolved into adopting a strategy of financing stages, with information
becoming increasingly available as the stage of financing progresses.
Unfortunately, while correcting some information deficiencies, the staging of
financing creates some of its own issues. Specifically, staging requires
information to be collected and assimilated at each individual stage. The
supply of capital is stage dependent, and is derived from different sources
and types of capital providers. As a result, market imperfections such as
valuation, the determination of encumbrances on intellectual property, and
the related transaction and information issues arise at each individual
financing stage. [See Appendix 6.]
Market imperfections lead to market inefficiencies. In an efficient
market there are fully informed buyers and sellers, an open and timely flow
of reliable information and minimal transaction costs. In our current system,
where new ventures are spawned from the commercialization of intellectual
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property and capital is provided by the private equity markets, the capital
markets are anything but efficient.'3
At least two inefficiencies in the equity financing market for
entrepreneurial ventures have been identified."
These two critical
inefficiencies, stemming from market imperfections, are the "capital gap"
and the "information gap." The "capital gap" is the gap between the needs of
early stage ventures and the ability of investors to supply this early stage
capital. The "information gap" is the lack of reliable information available to
the investor. In the informal venture capital market, with the suppliers of
capital seeking a degree of anonymity consistent with the need to maintain
reasonable deal flow, and information on intellectual property equally
difficult to secure in a timely manner, information flows very inefficiently.
If one could solve for the "information gap," the cost of capital to inventors
and entrepreneurs would arguably be reduced through lower transaction costs
to venture capitalists and lenders. If one could solve for the "capital gap," a
new capital market would arguably be created through the funding of early
stage ventures by traditional lending institutions."
In the lightning speed of the new economy, where opportunities and
market niche can be lost in a short period of time, efficient financing
processes are vital to the survival of commercial ventures. Currently, the
imperfect and inefficient financing processes involving intellectual property
assets are time-consuming and cumbersome. This situation hinders the
growth of commercial ventures with intellectual property assets. Given the
significant value of intellectual property assets and their critical role in
business transactions, the creation of a structurally certain system not only
for the creation of and title to intellectual property rights, but also for secured
transactions encumbering intellectual property rights, is paramount to the
continued vibrancy and growth of the debt and equity markets which drive
the expansion of our knowledge based economy.
Inventors, entrepreneurs and investors alike would benefit by this
elimination or reduction of market imperfections and inefficiencies in the
equity and debt financing markets for entrepreneurial ventures. The ability of
13

Despite these inefficiencies, ventures based on intellectual property assets have been, and
promise to remain, at the core of the recent high-growth economy in the United States.

'4

See Obermayer, J.H., The Capital Crunch: Small High-Technology and Equity Shortages
(Cambridge, MA: Research and Planning, Inc. 1983).

is

Traditional financing options involving intellectual property (without granting an equity
position) include the outright sale or assignment of the asset to a third party who will
value it at its best use, a license to use the intellectual property granted to a third party
who can efficiently exploit the value of the property at its best use or a joint venture with
others who are already able to efficiently exploit the best use value of the intellectual
property. See THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2:1 (2000).
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the entrepreneur, inventor or business person to transact business and to
extract value from intellectual property would be enhanced. To begin to
solve for market imperfections and inefficiencies, which negatively impact
the entrepreneurs access to capital through debt and equity markets, one must
examine in detail the complex legal and regulatory structures surrounding
intellectual property rights. It is the uncertainty created by this legal and
regulatory structure which lends to the very market imperfections and
inefficiencies currently minimizing the ability to leverage the value of
intellectual property assets and consequently stunting the economic growth
of inventors and entrepreneurs.
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS AFFECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY As COLLATERAL

A.

The Federal Title System

Intellectual property can be broadly defined as any product of the
mind in which one can assert some "ownership" rights. Although significant
types of intellectual property are created and defined under state tort or
property law, and can include such diverse areas as the right of publicity or
trade secrets, the most valuable forms are patents, copyrights and trademarks,
which are defined and protected by their own separate federal statutory
schemes. The principal federal schemes protecting intellectual property are
the Copyright Act, the Patent Act, and the Lanham Trademark Act.
While the federal intellectual property statutes differ from one
another in many ways, they all share a common, title-centered concern for
the owner and are designed to delineate the exact boundaries of that owner's
rights. Conceptually, these systems are designed to work like tract recording
works for real estate.' 6 The principal function of "recording" such rights at
the federal level is to establish "title" to intellectual property rights (namely,
the carefully defined exclusive rights) and to provide a recorded chronology
of the ownership and transfer of those rights. These federal recordings may
be searched by assignor or assignee name as part of the ownership tracking.

16

THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2:4 (2000); Weinberg &

Woodward, Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactionsin IntellectualProperty:
An Agendafor Reform, 79 KY. L.J. 61, 75 (1991).
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Copyrights

A copyright protects the creator of original works of authorship. A
copyright owner has the right to exclude others from doing any of the
following five activities in connection with the copyrighted work: (1)
reproduction; (2) adaptation; (3) distribution in public; (4) performance in
public; or (5) display in public.'7 These legal rights of an author, artist,
composer or other creator of intellectual property to control the use of his or
her work by others may be transferred and owned separately. In contrast to a
patent, a copyright comes into existence as soon as the creator fixes the work
in a "tangible medium of expression." No registration is required to create
legal rights in the property, although there is a system of registration
available through the Copyright Office. Like patents, copyrights are now
exclusively governed by federal statute.'" Unlike Patents, independent
"creation" will not infringe upon another's copyright, even if the creations are
identical. Copying, or the legal equivalent of copying, is required. Because
not all copyrights are registered, the identification and tracking of copyrights
can be much more difficult than with patents.
2.

Patents

Patents generally protect the novel and nonobvious functional
aspects of useful products or processes. A patent is a grant by the federal
government to an inventor that gives the inventor the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the invention for 20 years. It does not matter if
a subsequent user of the patented product or process independently creates
the patented product or process, or is totally unaware of the prior patent. A
patent holder is always able to stop a subsequent "inventor" from using the
invention.
Patents are solely within the power of the Federal government.' The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") has exclusive authority to
prevent others from making, using or selling the patented invention for a
specified amount of time throughout the United States." There is no state
17

8

'9

20

These activities are listed in the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
17 U.S.C.§§101-1101(1994) as amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub.L.No. 105-304, 122 Stat. 2860(1998).
36 U.S.C.§1, et.seq. The Federal government's power over patents (and copyrights, but
not trademarks) is derived from the U.S. Constitution. Art. 1, Sec. 8 Cl. 8.
See, Dickerson, Symposium: From Jeans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property of
the Estate, 15

BANKR.
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patent system. It is a relatively straightforward process to identify and track a
patent since it cannot exist until the Federal government issues the certificate
and each patent is duly numbered. A patent owner may assign the entire
patent right or any lesser interest to another party, and written assignments
must be recorded with the USPTO.2 '
3.

Trademarks: The Lanham Act

Although federally granted trademarks are the responsibility of the
same federal agency charged with supervising patents, they are a very
different form of property. For the purpose of this report, they differ from
patents in three important ways: First, trademark protection is fundamentally
a state common law right, which is only enhanced and protected by federal
registration. Second, trademarks cannot stand alone as personal property.
Finally, the recording provision for federally registered marks reflects these
distinctive aspects in its very singular and narrow "assignments" scope.
Trademark rights arise under state law from the use of business
names, images, sounds, and devices in association with the source and
quality standard of a product or service of the enterprise. The existence of a
mark depends upon customer identification of it with a particular source.
Even the owner of the mark may not be able to control its creation.
Although federal law allows for the federal registration of trademarks, and
such registration elevates the degree of protection afforded an owner of a
mark, federal law does not create separate exclusive property in the
trademark in the same sense that it does for patents, copyrights and mask
works. 22
Their state law origins are not the only thing that sets trademarks
apart as "property." As the Federal Circuit has said: "Unlike patents or
copyrights, trademarks are not separate property rights. They are integral
and inseparable elements of the goodwill of the business or services to which
they pertain."" Whereas copyrights and patents can stand on their own title,

21
22

23

35 U.S.C. §261 (1994).
The Lanham Act provides that "[tlhe owner of a trademark used in commerce may apply
to register his or her trademark under this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1994). The
Lanham Act permits the potential user of a mark to file an intent-to-use application
covering a mark not presently in use. Id. § 1051(b). However, no registration can issue
on an intent-to-use application unless the mark is actually used in commerce and its use
is verified in a filed statement to that effect. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1994).
Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir.

1982).
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trademarks cannot. 4 The dependent relationship between marks and other
"good will" assets of the underlying user affects the usefulness of marks as a
commercial asset. For example, while some security interests can be taken
2
in a trademark standing alone (although not a recommended practice), ' no
effective disposition of trademark collateral at foreclosure is possible without
of the debtor's goodwill that is associated with the name or
the transfer
26
mark.
The property characteristics of a license or other contractual right to
use a trademark are complicated by the definition of the underlying right as a
designation of source. The owner/licensor of a mark must maintain control
over the nature and quality of the product for which the name or mark
designates origin. 7 Licensing without the necessary licensor control can
cause loss of the trademark. It was concern over a post-contractual
obligation to police the mark that caused Congress to omit trademarks from
the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "intellectual property." The definition is
critical to the scope of provisions added in 1988 that, in effect, allow
licensees to retain the right to use licensed "intellectual property" after2 the
licensor has rejected most of its related duties under the licensing contract. 1
Finally, the dependent relationship between marks and other assets
of the underlying user suggests that separate mortgage rights generally taken
by a lender or other financier, not an underlying user, are not included in the
federal statute dealing with the transfer of registered marks and pending
applications.

26

United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,97 (1918)("There is no such
thing as property in a trademark except as a right appurtenant to an established business
"); Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v.
or trade in connection with which the mark is employed .. ...
Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371 at 1375 ("[A] mark may be transferred
only in connection with the transfer of the goodwill of which it is part. A naked transfer
of the mark also known as a transfer in-gross is invalid."); Glamorene Products Co. v.
The Procter & Gamble Co., 538 F.2d 894 (C.C.P.A. 1976). But see NAFTA Treaty,
INFRA note 162 at art. 1708.
The first paragraph of the Official Comment to current Article Nine section 9-106
mentions trademarks as personal property within the category of general intangibles. See
U.C.C. § 9-106, cmt. 1. See also UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42) & cmt. 5(d).
Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999)("[A] trademark cannot

27

be sold or assigned apart from the goodwill it symbolizes."). See also supra note 24.
15 U.S.C. § 1055 and § 1127 (1994).

24

25

28

11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(B) & (C) (1994). See also S. REP. No. 100-505 at 6, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3204.
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B.

The State Encumbrance System

The state law governing security interests in personal property is
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). A security interest
is the contingent right to an asset (should the borrower default) created by a
security agreement. The security agreement allows a lender or creditor to
take or transfer ownership of the collateral in the event of default by the
borrower. As conceptualized within the legal framework of Article Nine, the
"security interest" is an encumbrance and divorced from "title."
In 1998, the Uniform [Model] Version of Article Nine was revised.
This report will refer to the 1998 revised text as "Revised Article Nine." As
of March 1, 2001, thirty-four states have adopted Revised Article Nine. Both
Article Nine and Revised Article Nine govern most types of security
agreements covering personal property that are both consensual and
commercial. Revised Article Nine's provisions are intended to "place
virtually all filings in a single, statewide office, facilitate electronic filing,
foster nationwide utilization of well-designed user-friendly uniform paper
forms, and make new document filing more efficient, transparent, and
uniform."29
Substantively, the Revisions expand the scope of Article Nine's
application, clarify choice of law rules governing perfection and priority,
adopt media neutral filing approaches, and more precisely set forth
provisions relating to default and enforcement.
Both the current and Revised versions of Article Nine use broad
language to describe the transactions covered." Current section 9-102(1)
brings within the Article "any transaction (regardless of form) which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property. . .. "' A "security

interest" includes "any interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
29

30

See Harry Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of
the Game Under New Part5, 74 CHI-KENT L. REv. 861 (1999).
UCC § 9-102(1). Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-109(a) & cmt. 2. The first paragraph of
the first Official Comment in the current Article proclaims that:
This Article sets out a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in
personal property and fixtures. It supersedes prior legislation dealing with such security
devises as chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens and
assignments of accounts receivable .... UCC§ 9-101, cmt. 1; U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. "Purposes."
UCC § 9-102(1). In July, 1998, the Drafting Committee working on Revised Article
Nine moved the "scope" language to section § 9-109. Draft UCC [Revised] § 9-109
(Draft For Approval, July 24-31, 1998). Revised section 9-109 contains expanded
language to include the sale of a "payment intangible" within the scope of Article Nine.
UCC [Revised] § 9-109 (a)(3).
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payment or performance of an obligation," as well as any outright sale of an
account or chattel paper that has a financing context."
Any lender or financing assignor that desires to create a security
interest in intellectual property, can currently produce an agreement that fits
just as squarely into these definitions as if the collateral were tangible
inventory or equipment. The issue with such agreements is that intangible
intellectual property rights can be divided up under an almost infinite variety
of contractual arrangements. Sometimes a secured transaction hides within
the form of another common contractual arrangement, such as an assignment
or license. The parties to the security agreement may fail to appreciate the
nature of the substantive rights created by their deal. For example, an
exclusive licensor of a patent or trademark that retains only naked legal title
to the patent for the purpose of securing the licensee's payment or
performance has essentially transferred ownership of the intellectual
33
property, and the retained interest is really only a security interest. Even if
the terms of such a license provide that the licensor may terminate "the
license" on an event of default, the licensee, as the true equitable title holder,
will be entitled to assert the rights of a "debtor" under Part Five of Article
Nine.34 Consequently it is necessary to discuss the classification of collateral
under Article Nine.
1-201(37) & 9-102(l)(b). Accord UCC [Revised] § 1-201(37)& 9109(a)(3)(Revised Article Nine also brings in the sale of payment intangibles and
promissory notes). See, e.g., In re Vigil Bros. Construction, Inc., 193 B.R. 513, 516 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 1996)(any assignment of an account falls under the purview of Article Nine,
regardless of whether the parties intend to create a secured transaction). The included
absolute transfers must be within the context of commercial financing, however. Current
section 9-104(f) excludes from Article Nine coverage: (1.) assignments of accounts or
chattel paper that arise out of a sale of the generating business, (2.) assignments for
collection only, (3.) assignments to performing assignees, and (4.) assignments in full or
partial satisfaction of prior debts. UCC § 9-104(f). Accord UCC [Revised] § 9109(d)(4),(5),(6)&(7). See also UCC § 9-302(1)(e) and UCC [Revised] § 9309(2)(automatic perfection for "insignificant" assignments).

32

UCC §§

3

THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE

3

§§ 3:3 AND 3.4 (2000);
Trademarks and
Secrets,
Trade
Patents,
Collateral
as
Property
Bramson, Intellectual
Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAW 1567, 1588 (1981). (Exclusive licensor of a patent that retains
only legal title has, in effect, assigned the patent to the "licensee").

Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)("A license of trademarks is for
present purposes functionally indistinguishable from a lease of equipment where title is
to pass for nominal consideration upon satisfaction of the debt incurred as part of a
purchase of the trademarks or equipment. The trademarks were therefore collateral as a
matter of law.")(emphasis added). The federal classifications for intellectual property are
substance-driven as well. See, e.g., Raber v. Pittway, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1313 (N.D. Cal.
1992); Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. U.S., 152 U.S.P.Q. 182, 184 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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Classification of Collateral

a)

Intellectual Property Generally

Article Nine applies specifically to secured transactions in "personal
property."35 While the term "personal property" is not expressly defined in
either the current or Revised versions of the Article, current section 9-102(2)
contains a list of examples. The list includes a reference to "general
intangibles. ' 36 Every form of personal property not otherwise defined and
labeled under Article Nine falls under the default definition of a "general
intangible.""3 The definition covers "any personal property (including things
in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments,
and money.38 The Comment to current section 9-106 confirms that the term
"general intangibles" was intended to have a broad scope. The Comment
to
Article Nine explains that "[t]he term 'general intangibles' includes
miscellaneous types of contractual rights and other personal property which
are used or may become customarily used as commercial security." 39 The
Comment also provides a nonexclusive list of general intangibles. The items
include "goodwill, literary rights and rights to performance," as well as
"copyrights, trademarks, and patents, except to the extent that they may be
35

UCC § 9-102(l)(a).

36

Id.

37

UCC § 9-106. Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42). The definition of a
general
intangible under the revisions does not include a "commercial tort claim." "Commercial
tort claims" include claims for infringement of intellectual property rights. UCC
[Revised] § 9-102(a)(13). These claims are a separate form of collateral under the
Revisions but have no status as original collateral under the current Article Nine
language. Under current Article Nine, tort claims are clearly things in action under
section 9-106, but are excluded altogether under the language in section 9-104(k). UCC
§ 9-104(k). Revised Article Nine, on the other hand, recognizes that a claim for
infringement has status as collateral apart from the underlying right infringed, special
care must be taken with original "commercial tort claim" collateral. Revised section 9108(e)(1) requires that these claims be specifically described in the security agreement.
An indication merely by category or by type is inadequate. UCC [Revised] § 9108(e)(1). Revised section 9-204(b)(2) also provides that a security interest in a
commercial tort claim cannot attach under an after-acquired property clause. UCC

[Revised] § 9-204(b)(2). See

38

39

THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCE

§§ 1:9 and 1:10 (2000).
UCC § 9-106 (emphasis added) Accord UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).
UCC§ 9-106, cmt. (emphasis added).
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excluded under section 9-104(a) because federal law or federal regulations
cover them."I
Further, "general intangibles" as defined was intended to include
newly created forms of intangible personal property when they become
significant as commercial assets.4 ' The Comment to current section 9-101
refers to "other personal property that may become customarily used as
commercial security."'42 This language suggests that the "general intangibles"
category was designed to accommodate both existing and future forms of
intellectual property. New forms of intangible property created since the date
of the Comment continue to fit comfortably within the category of "general
intangibles." One example would be, the special form of intellectual
property protection provided for "mask works 4 3 under the 1984
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act ("SCPA")." The property created by the
SCPA fits within the section 9-106 definition of a general intangible, except
to the extent that it may be excluded under the preemption doctrine
recognized in current section 9-104(a) or the filing deferral doctrine
recognized in current section 9-302(3)(a). State law definitions of intellectual
property have also been expanded to include property rights such as publicity
and data rights that did not exist when the current version of Article Nine
was drafted. 45 The issue remains, however, whether certain intellectual
40
41

42

Id. See UCC § 9-104(a); UCC [Revised] § 9-31 l(a)(1).
This open-ended approach to intangible property is also reflected generally in the Official
Comment to section 9-101: "The Article's flexibility and simplified formalities should
make it possible for new forms of secured financing, as they develop, to fit comfortably
under its provisions, thus avoiding the necessity, so apparent in recent years, of year by
year passing new statutes and tinkering with the old ones to allow legitimate business
transactions to go forward." UCC§ 9-101, cmt.
UCC § 9-106 cmt.

43

"Mask work" refers to the set of templates or "masks" that together make up the design of
a semiconductor chip. The chip manufacturer uses these masks in a photographic
depositing and etching process to build up the three-dimensional structure of the chip.
Metallic layers, insulating layers and semiconductor layers are stacked on a silicon wafer.
The SCPA does not protect the chip's functional capabilities, however. The Act only
prohibits the copying of the physical topography or design layout of a particular chip. To
date, the Act has not significantly affected the industry. Michael A. Ladra & James C.
Otteson, Chip Protection Act May Miss the Mark, NAT. LAW J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S8.
Only two reported cases have applied the SCPA since its enactment. Booktree Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Anadigics, Inc. v.
Raytheon Co., 903 F. Supp. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

44

17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988).

45

A "publicity" right, as a person becomes famous, as recognized under the law in some
states, has many characteristics of intangible property. It may survive the death of the
person whose persona is protected and it can be transferred. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
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property assets fall within the definition of "general intangibles" and are thus
subject to Article Nine. For example, is the license of intellectual property in
the hands of a licensee/debtor a "general intangible" that can be used as
collateral under Article Nine? The answer appears to be "yes" regardless of
whether the license is exclusive or nonexclusive and nonassignable.4' [See
Appendix 7 and Appendix 8.]
b)

Receivables

The various and varied rights to payment that arise when an interest
in intellectual property is transferred or licensed is a separate form of
collateral capable of separate ownership.4 7 Except perhaps for the income

46

Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 816
(1953)(assignment recognized); Douglas v._Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986)(license recognized). The Ninth
Circuit has held that the person who develops the engineering and test data necessary to
obtain a Supplemental Type Certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration has a
"property interest" in the data and in the certificate which will be protected against
appropriation and improper use under California law. G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc. v.
Kalitta Flying Service, 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992)..
Even if the licensee takes no right in the underlying intellectual property under the
license, the licensee is still entitled to enforce the licensor's promise not to sue for
infringement. This can and should be viewed as a contract right enforceable by action.
As such, it would seem to be within the section 9-106 reference to "things in action."
UCC§ 9-106. AccordUCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).
A security agreement that describes covered collateral as "rights to the payment
of
money however evidenced or arising including.. .each future account . . .general
intangible.. .and document" effectively describes income streams defined as either
accounts or general intangibles but does not reach post-petition proceeds from the
assignment of a general intangible in the form of a trademark license. The right to
payment from an intangible asset is not the same as the asset itself although both may be
section 9-106 "general intangibles." The security agreement description above did not
reach the trademark license and therefore the money due on the debtor's post-petition
assignment of the trademark license could not be saved to the secured party as
"proceeds" of pre-petition collateral under section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In re
Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, Inc., 98 B.R. 734, 736-37 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). See 11
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). Although these "rights to payment" are either separate accounts
or separate general intangibles, they are in a sense dependent on the underlying licensed
right. Unless the secured party has a security interest in the underlying right, the debtor
could interrupt or extinguish the income stream by assigning the underlying right.
"Royalties to accrue pass with the assignment of the patent to the assignee .... ." E.
Lipscomb, 6 WALKER ON PATENTS § 20:47 at 161-62 (1986). The right to receive
royalties can be separated from the underlying right by an express reservation, however.
Crom v. Cement Gun Co., 46 F. Supp. 403, 405-06 (D. Del. 1942)("Where an assignment
conveys all the assignor's right, title and interest, if the right to receive royalties is to be
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generated by the sale or licensing of software packages to some ultimate
users, these rights to payment also fall within the residual category of
"general intangibles" under current Article Nine language.48 In contrast, all
rights to payment under the terms of an assignment or license of intellectual
property are "accounts" under Revised Article Nine. 49 In Re SSE
International Corp. illustrates the way the residual definition of a general
intangible captures rights to payment that arise when a general intangible is
sold (assigned) or licensed. [See Appendix 9.]
c)

Accounts

The definition of an "account" in Revised Article Nine § 9-102(a)(2)
has been expanded from its former "goods and services" base to include a
right to payment "for property that has been, or is to be, sold, leased,
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of .... ,50 The word "property" in
Revised section 9-102(a)(2) is not defined, but "personal property" has
always included intangible property. A "right to payment" for intangible
property sold or licensed would include most royalties and other income
streams from intellectual property. As is the case under current language, the
Revision definition of a "general intangible" excludes anything defined as an
"account." An income stream from a license of intellectual property seems
therefore to be an "account" and not a "general intangible" under the
Revisions. 1 Furthermore, these rights to payment cannot be "payment

48

severed from the beneficial ownership of the patent and remain in the assignor, there
must be an express reservation or some agreement to that effect. I do not think that the
mere retention of the "license" [by which term the parties to this case apparently mean
the paper evidencing the right to receive royalties] is sufficient to make the severance..
."). See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.
1997)("Assignments of interests in royalties have no relationship to the existence, scope,
duration or identification of a copyright, nor to "rights under a copyright.").
UCC § 9-106, cmt. To the extent that the sale of some software is treated as a sale of
goods under the current language of Article Nine, the generated receivable will be
considered an account under section 9-106. UCC § 9-106. Note that "software" is
expressly classified as a general intangible under the language of the Article Nine
Revisions. UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).

49

UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2).

50

UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2) (emphasis added).

51

Compare UCC § 9-106 with UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42). See UCC [Revised] § 9-

102(a)(2).
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intangibles" because "payment intangibles" are made a subcategory of
"general intangibles" under the new definitions.""
d)

Proceeds

Tort claims, including infringement actions, are excluded from
current Article Nine under section 9-104(k). 3 Revised Article Nine also
excludes tort claims but creates an express "proceeds" exception for such
claims, up to the value of the underlying intellectual property collateral
infringed, as well as a separate exception from the general exclusion for
"commercial tort claims."-' Commercial tort claims are defined broadly to
include all business-related tort claims that do not involve personal injury or
death." This exception from the "tort claims" exclusion means that
infringement claims are potentially originalcollateral under Revised Article

52

5

55

UCC § 9-102(a)(61). UCC § 9-102(1)(a)&(b). See, e.g., In re Vigil Bros. Construction,
Inc., 193 B.R. 513, 516 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996)(any assignment of an account falls under
the purview of Article Nine, regardless of whether the parties intend to create a secured
transaction). In July, 1998, the Drafting Committee working on Revised Article Nine
moved the "scope" language to section § 9-109. Draft UCC [Revised] § 9-109 (Draft For
Approval, July 24-31, 1998). Revised section 9-109 contains expanded language. The
new section includes the sale of a "payment intangible" within the scope of Article Nine.
UCC [Revised] § 9-109 (a)(3). A "payment intangible" is defined as a "general
intangible under which the account debtor's principle obligation is to pay money." UCC
[Revised] § 9-102(a)(61). However, a "payment intangible" does not include the sale or
assignment of an income stream from the licensing of intellectual property because such
an income stream is an "account" under the expanded definition of that term in Revised
section 9-102(a)(2). UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2). Any right to payment that is an
"account" is excluded from the definition of a "general intangible." UCC [Revised] § 9102(a)(42). If the income stream from the licensing of intellectual property cannot be a
"general intangible," it cannot fall within the subcategory of a "payment intangible"
either. UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(61). As an "account," however, the sale, assignment
or other outright transfer of such an income stream will be deemed to create a security
interests irrespective of the intent of the parties. UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2) &
[Revised] § 9-109(a)(3).
UCC § 9-104(k)& cmt. 8. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27,
33 (1931). See D. CHISUM & M. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW § § 5F[l][a] (1992). When the section excludes property from Article Nine that
exclusion applies to proceeds as well, except when the language of the exclusion
provides otherwise. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-104(g)&(l).
UCC [Revised] § 9-109(d)(12).
UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(13).
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Nine.56 When infringement claims are claimed apart from underlying
intellectual property collateral, however, they require special treatment.
Revised section 9-108(e)(1) requires that these claims be specifically
described in the security agreement. An indication merely by category or by
type is inadequate." Furthermore, Revised section 9-204(b)(2) also provides
that a security interest in a commercial tort claim cannot attach under an
after-acquired property clause." Commercial tort claims raise unique issues
for secured creditors. [See Appendix 10.]
2.

UCC Article Nine: Attachment

a)

Attachment as Predicate for Perfection

"Attachment" is the concept used in Article Nine to describe the
incidents of the creation of a security interest in property of a debtor 9 in
favor of a securedparty?' To protect a security interest in a particular type
56

"Commercial tort claims" are excluded from the residual category of general intangibles,
however. UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42). Note that infringement claims should pass as
"proceeds" when the secured party holds the debtor's underlying intellectual property
right as original collateral. UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(D). However, some tort
claims that are based in federal intellectual property statutes, can arise separately from
the intellectual property res created by the statute. For example, a section 43(a) action
for unfair competition, not tied to the protection of separately recognized trademark
property would only be a "commercial tort claim." It could not be the "proceeds" of the
debtor's trademark collateral.
COMMERCE § 1:9 (2000).

5

58

59

THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN

UCC [Revised] § 9-108(e)(1). Revised section 9-204(b)(2) also provides that a security
interest in a commercial tort claim cannot attach under an after-acquired property clause.
UCC [Revised] § 9-204(b)(2).
UCC [Revised] § 9-204(b)(2).
UCC § 9-105(d):
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation
secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral .... Where the debtor and
the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of
the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any
provision dealing with the obligation, and may include both where the context so
requires. The definition of "debtor" in Revised Article Nine includes only those persons
with ownership or ostensible ownership interests in the collateral. Just owing the secured
debt is not enough. UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(28).

6

UCC § 9-105(1): "Secured Party" means a lender, seller or other person in whose favor
there is a security interest. Accord UCC [Revised] § 9-102(a)(72).
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of collateral, the security interest must attach to that collateral for that
security interest to then become enforceable against the debtor. When
perfection occurs, that security interest becomes enforceable against third
parties.
(1)

Elements of Attachment

Section 9-203 provides that a security interest attaches on the
occurrence of three events: (1) the secured 'party has given value to the
debtor; (2) the debtor has acquired "rights" in the collateral; and (3) the
debtor has signed a written "security agreement" which describes the
collateral so as to enable identification, except where the debtor has agreed to
transfer possession of the property to the secured party as collateral and the
secured party takes possession of the property under this agreement.6'
These events can occur in any order, but "attachment" will not occur
without all three. For example, if a debtor signs an agreement giving a
lender an interest in existing and properly described collateral62 in exchange
61
62

UCC § 9-203(l)(a),(b)&(c). See also UCC [Revised] § 9-203(a)&(b).
In order to satisfy the "description of the collateral" requirement in section 9-203(l)(a)
the agreement must "reasonably identify what is described." UCC § 9-110. The notice
document, or "financing statement" designed as the public record of the agreement is
subject to a slightly less stringent description standard. A financing statement is
sufficient even if does not enable the identification of specific items if it indicates the
"type" of collateral covered. UCC § 9-402(1). Under Revised Article Nine "a statement
to the effect that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property is
sufficient." UCC [Revised] § 9-504(2)(emphasis added). Revised Article Nine also
contains a more complete and categorical guide to when a collateral description in the
security agreement is sufficient. UCC [Revised] § 9-108. Revised section 9-108(b)(3)
lists identification by UCC collateral type [e.g., general intangibles, equipment, accounts]
as a proper mode of description. However, Official Comment 2 to Revised § 9-108
makes clear that the use of approved modes must still "make possible the identification
of the collateral described." Therefore, a security interest in some, but not all, of the
debtor's intellectual property (e.g., patents and patent applications) would not be properly
described in the security agreement by the phrase "intellectual property." On the other
hand, a financing statement that referred to "intellectual property" would be a sufficient
"indication by type" under current § 9-402(1) even where the security agreement covered
only the debtor's patents and patent applications. It is not clear that a simple "indication
by type," effective for the financing statement under current § 9-402(1), is also effective
under Revised § 9-504. Revised § 9-504(1) provides for two exclusive categories of
"sufficient indication." The financing statement must contain either: (1.)] a "description
of the collateral pursuant to Section 9-108;" or (2.)] "an indication that the financing
statement covers all assets or all personal property." If Revised § 9-108 (dealing with the
security agreement) does not allow for the simple non-quantitative reference to collateral
type, then the indication by type approved in current § 9-402(1) would not be sufficient
under Revised § 9-504(1) and could only work in the financing statement if it fell within
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for a loan which lender may make at some future date, a security agreement
has been executed and the debtor has rights in that existing collateral. No
attachment occurs, however, until lender makes the loan or gives "value" to
the debtor. If a lender or credit seller makes a binding commitment to loan or
sell to the debtor in connection with the executed agreement, attachment
occurs 6on
the date of agreement because a binding commitment constitutes
"value. 13 If a lender made the loan with the oral understanding that it would
be secured by property in the debtor's possession, the lender has given value
and the debtor has rights in the collateral. No attachment occurs, however,
until the debtor signs a sufficient security agreement.' Finally, suppose the

63

64

the approved supergeneric language of 9-504(2) ("all assets or all personal property").
Official Comment 2 to Revised § 9-504 states that: "[i]t follows that a somewhat
narrower description than 'all assets,' e.g., 'all assets other than automobiles,' is
sufficient for purposes of this section .... " This Comment's example of a supergeneric
description with a limitation does not make it clear that the simple "indication by type"
that currently works for the financing statement under § 9-402(1), but not the security
agreement under current § 9-203(l)(a) and § 9-110, is sufficient for a financing statement
under Revised § 9-504.
UCC § 1-201(44)(a) & § 9-105(4).
The formalities of the written agreement necessary for enforceability prior to 1977 and
necessary for both enforceability and attachment since 1977 are minimal. For that
reason, there is no longer any need for a doctrine of equitable mortgages with respect to
personal property. The doctrine served to protect those who were snared in the elaborate
and technical formal requirements which marked much of the old law of personal
property security. As the Official Comment to current section 9-203 observes: Since this
Article reduces formal requisites to a minimum, [m]ore harm than good would result
from allowing creditors to establish a secured status by parol evidence after they have
neglected the simple formality of obtaining a signed writing. UCC § 9-203, cmt. 5. The
observation in this Comment is particularly telling for the credit assignor of intellectual
Property who might expect to benefit from an equitable interest in the assigned property
by virtue of a contractual right to terminate the assigned rights for nonpayment of the
agreed price. Such a reservation by a transferor of intellectual property, intended solely
to secure the payment of the price by the transferee, should also bring the interest
reserved under Article Nine. Even if the transferor purports to retain "title" to intellectual
property by couching the transfer as a "license," the interest retained by the transferor
should be viewed as an Article Nine security interest if the nominal licensor has given the
nominal licensee all meaningful rights of ownership and use for the useful life of the
intangible right. The transaction's real purpose should suffice to bring the licensor's
retained interest within Article Nine, giving the licensee the protection of the Article's
default provisions. UCC § 9-102. Accord UCC [Revised] § 9-109(a)(1). See Wamaco,
Inc. v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)("A license of trademarks isfor present
purposes functionally indistinguishable from a lease of equipment where title is to pass
for nominal consideration upon satisfaction of the debt incurred as part of a purchase of
the trademarks or equipment. The trademarks were therefore collateral as a matter of
law.")(emphasis added).
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debtor signs a sufficient agreement and the loan is made, but the collateral
described will be acquired by the debtor sometime in the future. In that case,
the debtor's acquisition of "rights in the collateral" is the last of the three
events to occur and there will be no attachment of a security interest until the
debtor acquires those rights."
When the collateral is a form of intellectual property, this element
may be problematic. For example, even before the existence of an invention,
a present written assignment of the inventor's rights is effective to convey an
expectant interest to the assignee.' The assignee of such an expectant
interest does not acquire legal title to a patent application until the
application is filed and does not acquire legal title to the patent until the
patent issues.67 Once the inventing debtor's conception or the assignee
debtor's expectant interest is captured in a recognized form (e.g., a patent
application), the issue is whether the debtor acquires rights, not only in that
first protected form, but in any subsequent metamorphosis of that form into
another protected form of intellectual property. [See Appendix 11.]
b)

Perfection and Choice of Law

"Attachment" is a prerequisite to "perfection."69 Perfection is a status
conferred on security interests once they have attached and are properly

65

67

"

69

The phrase "rights in the collateral" does not refer to title and does not necessarily
coincide with possession by the debtor. "Rights" in goods, for example, may arise as
soon as the debtor/buyer acquires an insurable interest in them. Absent a contrary
agreement, an insurable interest can be found as soon as the goods are "shipped, marked
or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers . . " UCC§ 2501(l)(b). (emphasis added). See also, e.g., UCC § 2-716(3) (Buyer's right to replevy
undelivered but identified goods). Under Revised Article Nine, the debtor's "power to
transfer rights" in the collateral is made the equivalent of the debtor having "rights in the
collateral." UCC [Revised] § 9-203(b)(2).
19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1511-12.
Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 684 F.2d 386, 389-92 (6th Cir. 1982).
The continuation of a security interest in tangible property through various changes in
classification has been given judicial sanction. See, e.g., In re Robert Bogetti & Sons,
162 B.R. 289, 294 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) ("Once a security interest attaches to
described collateral, subsequent transmutations as to classification under section 9-109
do not defeat that security interest."); In re Walkington, 62 B.R. 989 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1986). These cases deal with changes in the use of existing tangible property, however,
not with new forms of property.
UCC § 9-303. See also, UCC [Revised] § 9-308(a).
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revealed in a duly filed financing statement.7" The choice of law rules in
current Section 9-103 points the secured party to the correct state or states in
which to file in order to perfect a security interest. Under current section 9103(3) the proper jurisdiction for filing (for perfection or re-perfection) a
security interest in a general intangible is "the jurisdiction in which the
debtor is located . . . ."I Under current section 9-103(I), the proper
jurisdiction for filing a security interest in goods is the situs of those goods.
In some circumstances neither the location of the debtor nor the situs of
goods can be particularly simple to uncover. [See Appendix 13.]
The choice of law rules under Revised Article Nine greatly simplify
interstate perfection in cases involving intellectual property. Revised Section
9-301(1) makes the law of the jurisdiction where "a debtor is located"
control perfection in cases where perfection is achieved by filing.72 This
approach eliminates the problem of distinguishing between intellectual
property in its natural state as a "general intangible," from those embodied
forms of intellectual property with sufficient "product" characteristics to be
classified as "goods.""
3.

UCC Article Nine: Priority Rules

Under Article Nine, the failure to properly file and thus "perfect" an
attached security interest in the debtor's intellectual property leaves the
secured party vulnerable under a number of specific priority rules. These
rules create exceptions from the presumptive effectiveness of the security
interest under section 9-201." The exceptions protect the lien creditor,"
other secured parties,76 and a variety of subsequent third party purchasers,77
70

In every case involving intellectual property collateral which is controlled by Article

Nine, perfection is the combination of attachment and the proper filing of the simple halfpage "financing statement." UCC §9-303 & § 9-302(1). The financing statement is
designed to give rudimentary notice that a security interest in described collateral, or
indicated "types" of collateral, exists or is contemplated. UCC § 9-402(1). Accord UCC
[Revised] § 9-502(d).
71

UCC § 9-103(3)(b).

72

UCC [Revised] § 9-301(1) & cmt. 4.

73

THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE §

74

UCC § 9-201; UCC [Revised] § 9-201(a).

75
76

UCC [Revised] § 9-301(l)(b); UCC [Revised] § 9-317(a)(2).
UCC §§ 9-301(1)(a) & 9-312; UCC [Revised] §§ 9-317(a)(1), 9-322 & 9-324.

77

UCC §§ 9-301(l)(c)&(d) & 9-306(2); UCC [Revised] §§ 9-317(b)-(d) & 9-315(a)(1).
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including subsequent assignees,78 and, to a more limited extent, subsequent
licensees. These priority rules apply to third parties that acquire an interest
in the collateral through the secured party's debtor, in other words, a
"common source." This "common source" is an important predicate for the
Article Nine priority rules. When competing lienors, secured parties, or
transferees acquire an interest in the collateral through someone other than
the secured party's debtor, the Article Nine priority rules will yield to the
derivative title predicate." For example, recording provisions applicable to
ownership rights in federal intellectual property may displace the unrecorded
title of an assignee/debtor in favor of a subsequent transferee from the
debtor's title source. Such displacement of the debtor's underlying title in
the collateral will displace the derivative rights of its secured party,
notwithstanding the Article Nine priority rules. [See Appendix 14.]
4.

UCC Article Nine: Deferral to Federal Law

a)

Complete Step-Back Provision

Current Article Nine clearly recognized the potential and actual
displacing effects of the federal recording schemes through its "step-back"
provisions." Both the current and Revised versions of Article Nine provide
for complete or partial preemption of their respective rules by a controlling
federal legislative structure. 2 Transactions involving a "security interest" in
personal property that are nevertheless excluded from the application of
Article Nine are catalogued in section 9-104. The first exclusion is for a
"security interest subject to any statute of the United States to the extent that
78

UCC §§ 9-301(1)(d)& 9-306(2); UCC [Revised] §§ 9-317(d) & 9-315(a)(1).

79

UCC §§ 9-301(l)(d) & 9-306(2); UCC [Revised] §§ 9-317(d), 9-315(a)(1) & 9-321(a)-

80

(b).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY

REPORT #1:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL

STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN

81
82

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS, Section II(b)(4)(A)
(Cooperative Contract - U.S.P.T.O. and Franklin Pierce Law Center 2000). See also J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-1 at 854 (4th ed. 1995)(The
common law "shelter" rule, that a buyer gets as good a title as its seller had, is grafted
into Article Nine through sections 1-103 and 2-403(1)).
THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCE §§ 2:65 - 2:67 (2000).
UCC § 9-104(a). Accord U.CC [Revised] § 9-109(c)(1)("This Article does not apply to
the extent that: (1) a statute, regulation or treaty preempts this article;...").
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such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by
transactions in particular types of property. '8 3 The drafters designed the
section 9-104(a) exclusion so that whenever the scope of a "statute of the
United States" triggered the exclusion, gaps in the "statute" could be filled by
looking to Article Nine. As a source of supplementary rules, the drafters
were probably thinking of Article Nine as enacted in the state having the
most appropriate contacts with the secured transaction at issue.4 The
preservation of some limited role for the Article Nine scheme was based on
the assumption that a federal statute described in section 9-104 would not
displace Article Nine completely but only "to the extent" that the federal
statute governs the rights of the parties. The Uniform Commercial Code
plays a similar, but not identical, supplementary role when federal
preemption is the displacing theory." Revised Article Nine has a more
straightforward recognition of federal preemption. Revised Article Nine
section 9-109(c)(1) provides that the Article does not apply to the extent it is
preempted by "a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States .... 9'

83

8

UCC § 9-104(a). Accord UCC [Revised] § 9-109(c)(1)("This Article does not apply to
the extent that: (1) a statute, regulation or treaty preempts this article;...").
"Thus if the federal statute contained no relevant provisions this article could be looked
to for an answer." UCC § 9-104, cmt 1.

85

When a judicial determination of complete preemption is made, Article Nine may still
remain a source of supplementary federal common law rules. The enacted law of a
particular "contact" state will often be the appropriate source for "federal common law"
rules necessary to supplement the applicable federal scheme. United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-10 at 752-54 (4th ed. 1995). When enacted state rules inform
the federal common law, the result under the preemption doctrine should be the same as
when section 9-104(a) applies. Under either approach, local law is displaced by the

federal scheme but should be consulted where the federal scheme is silent. However,
enacted state law will be ignored in formulating federal common law rules when there is

a strong overriding interest in national uniformity and otherwise applicable state law
varies from the commercial norm. Id. In such cases, the "Uniform Version" of Article
Nine, rather than the version enacted in the "contact" state, may be the best place to find
the supplementing federal common law. Allen v. F.D.I.C., 599 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tenn.
1984); F.D.I.C. v. Morgan, 727 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). The distinction may

have limited importance, however, because there is general uniformity with respect to
definitions and priority rules among the enacted versions of Article Nine.
86

UCC [Revised] § 9-109(c)(1).
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Partial Step-Back Provisions

Current section 9-302(3)(a) and Revised section 9-311 (a)(1) provide
for displacement of the Article'sfiling rules in situations where the Article is
not preempted as per section 9-104(a) and a federal statute provides a
registration scheme for the rights otherwise subject to Article Nine. The
language of current section 9-302(3)(a) provides that the filing requirements
of Article Nine are displaced if the collateral in question is subject to "a
statute ...

of the United States which provides for a national or international

registration or a national or international certificate of title ....
Whenever current section 9-302(3)(a) requires a "partial step-back"
in recognition of a national recording system, UCC section 9-302(4) makes
"compliance" with the recognized national system exclusive.8 Furthermore,
when Article Nine filing must yield, it must yield completely. The national
system becomes the exclusive equivalent.
It is significant to note the distinctions between the current and
Revised Article Nine on the issue of partial deferral. The partial deferral
language in Revised Article Nine is limited to "a statute, regulation, or treaty
of the United States whose requirementsfor a security interest's obtaining
priority over the rights of a lien creditorwith respect to the property preempt
[the Article Nine filing requirement for perfection]." '9 Only Statutes with
"requirements" that, if met, will allow the secured party to defeat the lien
creditor are treated under the Revisions as capable of preempting Article
Nine filing.
IV.

THE CURRENT CONFUSION

All three federal intellectual property Acts are primarily concerned
with defining the nature and scope of the owner's or creator's exclusive rights
in the intellectual property and with setting out the limits on and procedures
for enforcing those rights. Only a few sections in each of the Acts deal with
transfer and recordation of the property rights that they create and define.9
The recording provisions of all three federal schemes are one-dimensional in
87

UCC § 9-302(3)(a).
PROPERTY

See also 1 G. GILMORE,

SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL

§ 19.9 (1965).

9

UCC § 9-302(4) & cmt. 8.
UCC [Revised] § 9-311 (a)(1).

90

Copyright Act: 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201, 204, 205 (1994); Lanham Trademark Act: 15

88

U.S.C. § 1060 (1994); Patent Act: 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). See also Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act: 17 U.S.C. § 903 (1994).
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that they focus solely on the necessity of providing purchasers of intellectual
property with delayed constructive notice of prior consensual interests.,'
None of these schemes deals specifically with after-acquired rights,
involuntary liens, or the rights of creditors other than purchasers. The Patent
Act and the Trademark Act seem to deal only with the recording of prior title
transfers for the protection of subsequent title transferees.92 In general, the
recording provisions of these schemes protect the first transfer executed as
long as the transfer is recorded within a generous grace (look-back) period.93
Prior unrecorded transfers can remain secret yet valid as to subsequent
parties for long periods. While these provisions may be tolerable for ranking
ownership rights, their long look-back periods are hopelessly cumbersome
when determining lien priority. Lenders will not release committed funds
before ensuring that the time for protecting any potential prior interest by
recording has expired.
These lengthy federal look-back periods are exacerbated by further
"office delays" which result from the fact that transfers are deemed
"recorded" within the applicable look-back periods from the time they are
received for recording, even though the internal steps necessary to make
9
them accessible to searchers may take several months more.
Both the recording and priority provisions of these federal recording
statutes lack the vocabulary and structure to adequately address the modern
notion of a security interest. Instead, they are rooted in nineteenth century
concepts of title and formal document recordation.
The federal statutory schemes governing copyrights, patents, and
trademarks are distinct but have common omissions. Each makes some
provision for recording, priority and derivative interests (including security
interests), but none deal directly with the creation or priority of security
interests. To further confuse the matter of preemption, none of these federal
schemes refer to, or even acknowledge, the uniform state rules on security
91

92

93

94

The Copyright Act protects a "later transfer" if recorded first, and "taken in good faith,
for valuable consideration .... ." 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994). The concept of taking for
valuable consideration has been expanded by one Court to include the judicial lien
creditor as constituted by statute in the bankruptcy trustee. See National Peregrine, Inc.
v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 116 B.R. 194, 207 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
Patents: 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994)("an assignment, grant or conveyance"); Trademarks: 15
U.S.C. § 1060 (1994)("an assignment"). The recording provision in the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act applies to "conflicting transfers of the exclusive rights in a mask
work .... " 17 U.S.C. § 903 (1994). In contrast, section 205 of the Copyright Act applies
to "[alny transfer of copyright ownership." 17 U.S.C. § 205(a)&(d) (1994).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994); 15 U.S.C. 1060 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994). See also 17
U.S.C. § 903 (1994).
Bramson, supranote 33 at 1574 n.36.
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interests in Article Nine. Courts struggling with preemption are left to
decide whether the particular federal scheme parallels the Article Nine rules
to such an extent that Congress undoubtedly intended to forestall application
of state rules in favor of a particular federal rule. Because the three federal
schemes differ widely in their definitions and scope, all precedent must be
examined very carefully.
A.

IntellectualPropertyLaw: The CopyrightAct

The Copyright Act provides the most comprehensive recording
scheme of all the federal intellectual property statutes. It also presents the
broadest potential overlap with state law provisions in Article Nine. Initially,
the Act's breadth is reflected in its definition of a "transfer of copyright
ownership"." The definition in section 101 of the Act includes "assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright ...."9 This definition covers security interests,

but, standing alone, arguably does not cover involuntary lien creditors who
are often in conflict with the secured party." However, these real and
hypothetical (e.g., the bankruptcy trustee) involuntary interests, which
typically engage the secured party in a contest over priority, fall ostensibly
within the section 101 phrase "transfer of copyright ownership" by section
201 of the Copyright Act." Section 201(d)(1) provides that "[t]he ownership
of a copyright may be transferred

. . .

by any means of conveyance or by

operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property
by the applicable laws of intestate succession."99
Aside from this broad definition of an ownership transfer, the
language concerning which documents are recordable in section 205(a)
extends to any "document pertaining to a copyright."'' Both the 1962 and
1972 Official Comments to Section 9-302 refer to the Federal Copyright Act
9

96

97

A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or
any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of
effect, but not including a nonexclusive license. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
"Lien creditor" is defined under Article Nine as "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy or the like .... " U.C.C. § 9-301(3). Accord
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(52).

98

17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1994).

9

Id. (emphasis added.)

100

17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1994).
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as an example of "the type of federal statute referred to in subsection (3)(a).
. .1101
"
This Comment's reference is consistent with the language in
Comment 1 to section 9-104 which concludes that, while security interests in
copyrights are governed generally by Article Nine, filing under the
Copyright Act is "recognized as the equivalent to filing under this article."'0 2
While the Copyright Act obviously qualifies for the partial step-back under
present section 9-302(3)(a), °3 it could also fall short of the "requirements"
language added by the Revisions. If a subsequent transferee of a copyright
ownership interest protected under section 205(d) of the Act does not include
the lien creditor, a Copyright Act recording of a security interest would not
meet the "requirements" test.: Section 205(d) provides that as between two
conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded in the
manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one
month after its execution in the United States or within two months after its
execution outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such
manner of any later transfer. Otherwise, the later transfer prevails if
recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable
consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and
without notice of the earlier transfer.' 5 The current cases are split on whether
the "lien creditor" is a protected subsequent party under the Copyright Act's
section 205(d) priority rule.' ° Of course, to the extent that displacement of
the UCC generally, including the filing requirements, will ultimately by
judged under federal law, state law step-back formulae, even those with the
prestige of Article Nine behind them, will not be determinative.
NationalPeregrine,Inc. v. CapitalFederalSavings & Loan Ass'n.,'°7
a decision from the Federal District Court for the Central District of
101UCC § 9-302, cmt. 8.

1o3

UCC § 9-104, cmt. 1. Again, it should be noted that while the language of the Code
Comments has not changed since 1972, the Copyright Act of 1976 created a much more
comprehensive priority scheme for copyrights than the scheme that was in place when
the Code Comments were written. The current Copyright Act's definition of "transfer" is
very broad. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 201(d)(1) (1994).
UCC § 9-302, cmt. 8.

104

11 U.S.C. § 205(a),(c)&(d) (1994).

105

17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994) (emphasis added).

102

106

107

Compare National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 116 B.R.
194, 203-04 (C.D. Cal. 1990)(lien creditor is a protected transferee under section 205(d)),
with, In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997)(federal
recording mandated under present section 9-302(3) and (4), but state law must be
consulted to determine secured party/lien creditor priority).

116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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California, gives full preemptive effect to the broad transfer and recording
language of the Copyright Act. Peregrineconcludes that both the perfection
and priority rules in Article Nine must yield to the recording and priority
provisions of the federal Copyright Act. [See Appendix 15.]
The only decision to actually implement the partial step-back along
the lines set out in section 9-302(3)&(4) is In re Avalon Software,"°8 a
Bankruptcy Court decision from the District of Arizona.'° The Avalon
decision involves copyrightable software and rejects the total step-back
approach taken in the earlier Peregrine decision."' However, Avalon
concludes that once the displacing federal equivalent is found, "compliance"
with that statute means achieving the fullest measure of recording act
protection available under it. All collateral that is "copyrightable" must be
perfected by full compliance with section 205 of the Copyright Act. Full
"compliance" under Avalon means that a section 205(a) recording, by itself,
is not enough. The security interest must be recorded "in the manner
required to give constructive notice" within the meaning of subsection (c) of
section 205."' In order for a recording to give constructive notice under
subsection (c), the underlying copyrighted work must reasonably be
identified in the document recorded, and the underlying copyrighted work
must be registered."2 This is a nearly impossible set of requirements for
108

209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).

The partial preemption patent cases do not follow the section 9-302(3)&(4) partial stepback. These cases preserve the effectiveness of a state Article Nine-filed financing
statement for "perfection" against the bankruptcy-formed lien creditor. On the other
hand, these cases also suggest (in varying degrees) that state perfection would not be
enough against a subsequent assignee. In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920
at n.8 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999); Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging
Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 19 UCC2d 600 (D. Md. 1992), aft'd, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28605
(4th cir. 1993); City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc, 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan.
1988); In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639, 40 UCC
1393, 1398 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
110 209 B.R. at 521 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997)("In other words, if another statutory means is
109

covered by another state or federal statute, then the usual UCC methods [of filing] are
superseded, and, in the case of federal statutes, preempted.").

112

209 B.R. at 522. The idea that full compliance includes the stipulation that the recording
be "in the manner required to give constructive notice" has also been upheld in a
complete step-back case involving copyright collateral. In re AEG Acquisitions Corp.,
127 B.R. 34, 40-41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 161 B.R. 50, 57 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1993); 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)&(d) (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 205(a),(c)&(d) (1994). It can be argued that constructive notice under
subsection (c) is not technically a recording requirement. A transfer of copyright
ownership can be recorded even if it is not recorded in "the manner required to give
constructive notice." However, the recorded document is not afforded priority under
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"copyrightable" collateral, such as trade secrets, for which the debtor does
not wish to seek registration under the Copyright Act. [See Appendix 15.]
The most recent bankruptcy court decision on the subject of
"perfecting" copyright collateral is In re World Auxiliary Power Co."3 The
court in that case concluded that state law perfection under Article Nine was
effective because the copyright collateral was not registered under the
Copyright Act. Although World Auxiliary Power provides some relief to
secured creditors reeling from the holdings in Peregrine and Avalon, the
conceptual foundations for the distinction between registered and
unregistered copyrights may not hold up when the decision is reviewed on
appeal. [See Appendix 16.]
B.

Federal Intellectual Property Law: The Patent Act

The Patent Act's recording provision focuses exclusively on
transfers that carry title and ownership rights to the transferee including
patent mortgages. Because early chattel mortgage law was rooted in title
concepts, the patent mortgage has been perceived historically as having an
effect on title to the patent transferred for security.'"4 Despite the nontitle
orientation of state chattel security law under Article Nine, a patent mortgage
or collateral assignment is still conceptualized under the Patent Act as an
assignment vesting title in the assignee/mortgagee."I These instruments are
recorded as title transfers, subject to defeasance-a condition that is
officially ignored under the regulations of the Patent and Trademark
Office."'
The root of the problem is that a chattel mortgage in its original
conceptual form no longer exists. Article Nine changed the state law

subsection (d) of section 205 unless it also provides "constructive notice." Therefore, the
argument concludes, subsection (c) is a priority rule that does not trump Article Nine,
rather than a "filing" requirement that must be complied with under the partial step-back
mandated by UCC section 9-302(3)(a) and (4). Nevertheless, the Avalon Software court
concludes that a security interest in a copyright is not "completely perfected" after a
section 205(a) recording unless the copyright collateral is also registered so as to give
constructive notice within the meaning of section 205(c) the Copyright Act. 209 B.R. at
522. The Avalon Software decision is discussed infra in Section II(b)(4) et seq.
13

See Appendix 16 for a detailed discussion of the World Auxiliary Power holding.

"4

THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE §§ 2:85 and 2:86 (2000).

"

Id. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).

116

37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (2000).

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

333

characterization of all security interests."7 The concept of title was removed

from the equation."' When seen in light of the old title concepts applied to
patents, the Article Nine security interest takes the form of a conditional
promise to assign rights in the future."9 The common law historically viewed
such agreements as equitable encumbrances' 0 that fell within the nonstatutory bona fide purchaser rule, rather than the statutory recording rule for
transfers of legal title in section 261 .,2' The basis of this common law rule
protecting the bona fide purchaser against these contingent "equitable"
assignees was drawn from state law, however, and that state law changed

with the widespread enactment of Article Nine.'22 [See Appendix 17.] Under
current state law, an effective Article Nine filing protects the security
interest (previously characterized as a contingent equitable interest) in a
patent even as against a bona fide purchaser.'23 Despite Article Nine's
departure from concepts that underlie the current Patent Act recording and
priority provisions, an argument can be fashioned that Article Nine itself
"7

11

",9

120

121

122

123

UCC § 9-202. See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920-21 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1999)("Section 9-202 of the UCC provides that Article 9 applies to secured transactions
involving personal property regardless of 'whether title to collateral is in the secured
party or in the debtor.' Because transferring title no longer has significance in creating a
security interest in personal property, most security interests created after adoption of the
UCC do not involve the transfer of title.").
Id. See also UCC § 9-102, cmt. 1.
City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc, 83 B.R. 780, 782-83 (D. Kan. 1988), relying
on, In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639, 40 UCC 1393,
1398 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985)(security interest not a present assignment). See also
Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank, 1996 TTAB LEXIS 15, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098, 1100 at n.10
(TTAB 1996)(security agreement is in the nature of an agreement for a future contingent
assignment); In re 199Z, 137 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1992)(same).
Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1991)("[A] ...
provision that all rights to inventions developed during the consulting period "will be
assigned" by IDEA to Arachnid does not rise to the level of a present assignment of an
existing invention, effective to transfer all legal and equitable rights therein .... "
Arachnid had an equitable right only.)
FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991)("It is well
established that when a legal title holder of a patent transfers his or her title to a third
party purchaser for value without notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title, the
purchaser takes the entire ownership of the patent, free of any prior equitable
encumbrance.") Hendrie v. Sayles, 98 U.S. 546, 549, 25 L. Ed. 176 (1879) ("This is an
application of the common law bonafidepurchaserforvalue rule.") (emphasis added).
The Article has displaced the concept that an agreement to transfer for security creates an
equitable encumbrance. UCC § 9-203, cmt. 5.
UCC § 9-301(1)(d). Accord UCC [Revised] § 9-317(d).
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defers to the Patent Act either under the complete step-back provided under
section 9-104 or under the partial step-back for substitute filing provided for
under section 9-302(3).124
The language of section 261 of the Patent Act provides: [a]n
assignment, grant or conveyance (of a patent, patent application, or interest
therein) shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a
valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of
such subsequent purchase or mortgage. 2 [See Appendix 18.]
The regulations limit the definition of "assignments" to include
complete or partial transfer of right, title and interest.2 6 The title that must
be transferred is the entire title including the legal title.17 Although the
M.

WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE

§2:87 (2000).

124

THOMAS

125

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). The language of section 261 instructs that an "assignment, grant
or conveyance" be recorded within three months from its "date." In the case of an
assignment of an existing patent or application, "its date" is the execution date of the
assignment document. However, when "an assignment of rights in an invention is made
prior to the existence of the invention, this may be viewed as an assignment of an
expectant interest. An assignment of an expectant interest can be a valid assignment."
FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The
effective "date" of such an assignment is not the date of its execution, however, because
legal title does not pass until "the invention is made and an application for patent is
filed." Id.The three-month grace period should not begin to run until the effective date
of the assignment. Indeed, the document that created the present assignment of the
expectant interest is not recordable until it complies with the identification requirements
in 37 C.F.R. § 3.21. The original document can be made recordable once a patent
application is filed by the authorized addition of the application number. The USPTO
suggests that "an assignment be written to allow entry of the identifying number after the
execution of the assignment. An example of acceptable wording is: 'I hereby authorize
and request my attorney, (Insert name), of (Insert address), to insert here in parentheses
, filed

(Application number

126
127

) the filing date

and application number of said application when known."' Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure [hereinafter MPEP] § 302.02 (1997).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
"Assignment means a transfer by a party of all or a part of its right, title and interest in a
patent or patent application .

. . ."

37 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1994).

"The Manual of Patent

Examining Procedure (7th ed. 1998) ('Patent Manual') is published by the Patent Office
to provide a reference work on Patent Office practices and procedures. It is clear from
the Patent Manual that the Patent Office does not consider a security interest or lien to be
an assignment subject to the mandatory recording provision of 37 C.F.R. 3.11. The
recording of assignment documents is governed by section 302 of the Patent Manual.
Section 302 cites the language of 37 C.F.R. 3.11 pertaining to assignments of
applications, patents and registrations as documents which 'will be recorded.'
In
contrast, Section 313 denotes security interests as documents other than assignments and
provides that these documents, which do not affect title, 'may be recorded at the
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section provides for mortgages cast as title transfers, it was not designed to
handle the transfer of interests that do not affect title.' The Patent Act
describes even partial transfers as assignments of some part of the
transferor's title."9 If the parties express an intention to pass present title to
the secured party in the transfer document, then the regulations would
consider the transfer document (e.g., modified title-bearing security
agreement, conditional assignment, or patent mortgage) an "assignment" for
recording purposes. The deficient conditions in these documents will be
ignored by the USPTO.'3 ° However, whenever the parties intend that only a
security interest pass to the transferee/secured party, with the rights of
ownership remaining in the transferor, the transfer document is not
considered an assignment under the regulations,"' and would not be recorded
for constructive notice within the section 261 mandate for an "assignment,
grant or conveyance."'32
The USPTO regulations specify that "other documents ... affecting
will be recorded as provided in this part or at the discretion of the
...
title
Commissioner."'33 Even a plain "security agreement" is specifically referred
to as a recordable document in the Comments accompanying revised section
3.31 of 37 C.F.R. It is not clear how this new regulatory language applies to
discretion of the Commissioner.'

Documents that convey a security interest are recorded

under Section 313 'in the public interest in order to give third parties notification of
equitable interests or other matters relevant to the ownership of a patent or application."'
In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 921 at n.10 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). See
MPEP, supranote 125. See also 5 WALKER ON PATENTS, at § 19:4 @ 333-34 (1986):

128

"An assignment of a patent is an instrument in writing, which in the eye of the law,
purportsto convey the entire title to thatpatent or to convey an undivided share in
that entire title." (emphasis added.)
37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (2000).

129

37 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2000).

130

37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (1994).

131

132

133

Response to Public Comment on 37 C.F.R. § 3.56, 57 Fed. Reg. 29640 (July 6, 1992):
"Response: Section 3.56 [on conditional assignments] is applicable only to assignments,
as they are defined by § 3.1, that is, a transfer of right, title and interest in a patent or a
trademark. A security interest or a security agreement is in the nature of a lien, not an
assignment. Accordingly, § 3.56 would not apply to security interests or security
agreements which are also recordable."
See Holt v. U.S., 13 UCC 336, 338-39 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. 1973); Bramson, supra note
33 at 1584; "Such documents are recorded in the public interest in order to give third
parties notification of equitable interests or other matters relevant to the ownership of a
patent or application." MPEP, supra note 125 at § 313 (emphasis added).
37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2000).
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security agreements. Under Article Nine, security agreements transfer a
security interest to the transferee, but they do not transfer "title," unless the
parties intend that result."' It seems to follow that the recording of a
nontitle-bearing security interest is discretionary under the regulations. 33
Under their internal regulations, the USPTO has chosen to provide
assignment-like notice of security interests by giving them equal dignity with
assignments on the cover sheet.'36 The USPTO policy is a convenience for
searchers'37 but it does not expand the statutory scope of the constructive
notice.'38 The fact that a security interest filed as a discretionary document
with the USPTO is not statutory constructive notice, however, does not mean
that such a filing cannot have legal effect. A discretionary filing should
provide actual or inquiry notice to all those prospective purchasers or
mortgagees who actually consulted the USPTO record.'39
134

'35
136

137

UCC § 2-401, § 9-102 & § 9-101, Comment 9. Comment 9 to section 9-101 reads:
"This Article does not determine whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in
the debtor and adopts neither a title theory or a "lien theory" of security interests. Rights,
obligations and remedies under the Article do not depend on the location of title (Section
9-202). The location of title may become important for other purposes - as, for example,
in determining the incidence of taxation - and in such a case the parties are left free to
contract as they will. In this connection the use of a form which has traditionally been
regarded as determinative of title (e.g., the conditional sale) could reasonably be regarded
as evidencing the parties' intention with respect to title to the collateral." (emphasis
added.)
Comment to 37 C.F.R. § 3.31, 57 Fed. Reg. 29636 (July 6, 1992).
Changes in Patent and Trademark Assignment Practices - Discussion of Specific Sections
to be Changed or Added, 57 FED REG. 29634, 29637 (1992). ("Section 3.31 is added to
set out the formal requirements of the cover sheet. Section 3.31 requires that each patent
or trademark cover sheet must contain ... (3) a brief description of the interest conveyed
or transaction to be recorded (e.g., assignment, license, change of name, merger, security
agreement, etc.). .. ").
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1 supra note 80 at fn 531.

"This result is not altered by the fact that, as in this case, the Patent Office accepts the
filing of documents memorializing the granting of a security interest in a trademark. The
Lanham Act gives the Patent Office the discretion to accept various documents not
expressly described in the Act; it does not, however, expressly provide for the filing of
documents memorializing pledges of trademarks, as the Copyright Act does for
hypothecations of copyrights." In re 199Z, 137 B.R. 778, 782 at n.7 (Bankr. C.D. Calif.
1992).
'39 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994)("purchaser or mortgagee . . . without notice"). See In re
Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 921 at n.10 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999)("Because the
Patent Manual expressly 'does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations,' see Foreword to Patent Manual, it appears that
the discretionary recording is for purposes of providing actual notice rather than the
constructive notice provided through provisions of Article 9 of the UCC.").
138
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1.

Deferral to the Patent Act

While the Patent Act does not seem to qualify for application of the
"complete step-back" deferral, it is unclear whether it does provide a
"national registration" substitute that would be sufficient to qualify the Patent
Act for the "partial step-back" from Article Nine filing as set forth in UCC
section 9-302(3)(a) or for some other more limited or partial form of federal
preemption.
Unlike the Copyright Act, the Patent Act is not mentioned -in
Comment 8 to section 9-302 where examples of "partial step-back" federal
statutes are provided. Unfortunately, the Official Comments following
section 9-104, mention the Patent Act in a passing reference that raises more
questions than it answers. The Comment to section 9-104 contains a
footnote-like reference inviting readers, to "[c]ompare also with respect to
patents, 35 U.S.C. § 47.'" 0 Section 47 was the nearly identical predecessor
to current section 261 of the Patent Act. After this express reference to old
section 47, the Official Comment to section 9-104 continues with the
following language: "The filing provisions under these Acts, like the filing
provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, are recognized as equivalent to filing
under this Article. Section 9-302(3) and (4)."14 If "these Acts" refer to
enactments previously named in the Comment, other than the Federal
Aviation Act, then the drafters were implying that the recording provisions of
the Patent Act also created a system of "national registration" for purposes of
the section 9-302(3)(a) partial step-back.
If the "compare" reference in section 9-104 Official Comment 1
suggests a contrast between the Copyright Act and the stronger "title"
orientation of the Patent Act, then the proper inference recognizes the more
limited scope of recording under the Patent Act. If the "compare" language
suggests contrast, then the reference in the section 9-104 comments to "these
acts" would not include the Patent Act and instead should be taken merely as
a general reference to all present or future federal recording schemes that
mimic the Federal Aviation Act.4 2 Under this latter view of the Official
Comment to section 9-104, recording under the Patent Act would not be

1

Id.

141

Id. (emphasis added).

142

Unlike the Patent Act, the Federal Aviation Act provides for "a system of recording.. the
following: Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft
of the United States." (emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(a) (1988).
"Conveyance" is defined in the Federal Aviation Act to include an "instrument affecting
title to, or interest in, property." (emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. app. at § 1301(20).
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viewed as a section 9-302(3)(a) substitute for perfection by filing under
Article Nine.' 3
Nothing in the prior conceptual structure of state law would require
that Article Nine security interests (that do not support a title-bearing
construction) be treated as "assignments" in section 261 of the Patent Act.'"
Since the typical Article Nine security agreement is not title-bearing, very
little support exists for a state law deferral to section 261 as a substitute
5
mode of filing for Article Nine perfection.1
2.

Preemption of Article Nine Under the Patent Act

Predominantly, preemption has merely been suggested in dicta. The
suggestions have been restricted to some probable application of the Patent
Act priority rule in section 261 to conflicts between secured parties and
federal assignees. It is difficult to extrapolate any coherent theory of
preemption from the holding and dicta of these cases, however. The recent
decisions seem to revert to the pre-Article Nine conception of a transfer of
143

14

See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 923 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1999)(distinguishing patents from copyrights, aircraft and railroad equipment for
purposes of the section 9-302(3)(a) partial step-back). Revised Article Nine contains an
even tougher standard for any preemptive filing. The language in Revised section 931 l(a)(1) limits application of the step-back to "a statute, regulation, or treaty of the
United States whose requirements for a security interest's obtainingpriority over the
rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt [the Article Nine filing
requirement for perfection]."
UCC [Revised] § 9-311 (a)(l)&(b) (emphasis added).
Only statutes with "requirements" that, if met, will allow the secured party to defeat the
lien creditor are treated, under the Revision language, as capable of displacing the Article
Nine filing requirements.
Clearly the Patent Act would not have sufficient
"requirements" to trigger a partial step-back under this new language.
The argument for preemption is based on the assumption that because the Patent Act
provided for the federal filing of a patent mortgage under the "title" regime in effect
under the state laws of the late nineteenth century, present day security interest transfers
must be cast in title form and recorded under section 261. Note, Perfection of Security
Interests in Intellectual Property: Federal Statutes Preempt Article 9, 57 GEO. WASH.
L.R. 135, 151 (1988). See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 80 at
Section III(c)(1)(B).
As noted earlier, there is support for this position in the dicta of the Peregrinedecision.
See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 116 B.R. 194,
203-204 & 206 n. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1990)[a Copyright Act case that contains dicta to the
effect that the Patent Act provides a system of "national registration" that is a complete
substitute for Article Nine filing under UCC§ 9-302(3)(a)&(4)]. Contrary cases
recognizing the effectiveness, for "perfection" purposes, of the Article Nine filing on
patent collateral are discussed in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 80 at Section
III(c)(3)(C) et seq.
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patent rights for security set out in the 1890 Supreme Court decision of
Waterman v. Mackenzie. 6 [See Appendix 19.]
Recent cases indicate that a transfer for security should be formed
and recorded in its older title characterization when priority in the ownership
chain is at issue. 4 7 These cases strongly suggest that Article Nine recording
and priority rules would thus be partially preempted by the Patent Act.'48 If a
security interest is an "assignment, grant or conveyance," subject to possible
avoidance under section 261, then the Patent Act preempts Article Nine
when the contest is between the secured party and assignees-and perhaps
when between the secured party and other secured parties. At the "protected
parties" end of section 261, "purchasers and mortgagees" seem to be
expressly included within the class of takers protected against any prior
unrecorded "assignment, grant or conveyance.' 41 9 [See Appendix 20.]
C.

Federal Intellectual Property Law:
Trademark Act

The Lanham

Section 1060 of the Lanham Act contains the most abbreviated
statement on the recording of transfers in all three of the major federal
intellectual property statutes. Section 1060 of the Act provides: [a]n
assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within three months after the date thereof or prior to such
subsequent purchase.' ° Only "assignments" of registered marks and
applications to register (other than intent-to-use applications) need be
recorded to ensure protection against "subsequent purchasers."

14

138 U.S. 252 (1890).

'47

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 80 at Section III(c)(3)(C) et seq.

148

See discussion in PRELIMINARY

'49

Although the issue is not free from doubt, the secured party is probably a "purchaser"

REPORT # 1, supra note

80 at Section III(c)(3)(C)(v).

within the meaning of section 261 of the Patent Act. See discussion supra Section
III(c)(4).
50

15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). Assignments of applications to register (other than intent-touse applications) are included. 37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1997)("applications, patents, and
registrations"); 37 C.F.R. § 3.85 (1997)("certificate of registration may be issued to the
assignee of the applicant ... provided ... the appropriate document is recorded in the
Office. . . ."); 37 C.F.R. § 3.16 (1997)(Before filing an allegation of use "an applicant
may only assign an application to register a mark ... to a successor to the applicant's
business, or portion of the business, to which the mark pertains, if that business is
ongoing and existing.").
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Section 1060 does not even mention "mortgagees" as protected
subsequent parties." This stark skeletal structure is no accident. Given the
dependent and ancillary character of the trademark, it is not surprising that
section 1060 provides recording only for those transferees who are potential
users of the mark. When this characteristic is considered in conjunction with
the fact that trademarks do not share the same historical link to title-based
chattel mortgage theory with patents, it appears section 1060 was intended as
a recording act for true assignments only. Such an interpretation would
make section 1060 inapplicable to security transfers that might otherwise be
artificially conceptualized as assignments. "2
The meager case law on point adopts such logic that a security
interest in a trademark registration is a non-title bearing transaction outside
the scope of section 1060.53 None of the cases decided to date have held that
the Lanham Act preempts any part of the filing, perfection or priority scheme
of Article Nine.' 4 The reasoning of these cases suggests that a security
interest that is properly perfected under Article Nine in the appropriate state

151

52

153

154

15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). The 1988 Trademark Revision Act made extensive revisions to
the federal trademark registration system. See Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3938 (Nov. 16,
1988), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1053 et seq. (1994). An earlier version of the legislation
contained a detailed set of rules governing the recording and priority of security interests
in federal trademarks which would have preempted most of the Article Nine system. See
S. 1883, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b)-(f) (1987), 133 Cong. Rec. S 16548-49 (Nov. 19,
1987) (unenacted). A recorded security interest was given priority over "interests
subsequently granted." Id. at § 10(b). This ambitious provision was dropped from the
final enacted version of the 1988 Act. In its current form, the Lanham Act makes no
provision for security interests. Again, the dependent nature of the typical trademark
transfer, and the absence of a title-related tradition around the taking of trademarks as
collateral, make it hard to find a "security interest" within the section 1060 concept of an
"assignment."
Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984), affd, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986); In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1992). See also In re C.C. & Co., 85 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)("A
grant of a security interest is merely a device to secure indebtedness.").
See e.g., In re Together Development Corp., 227 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998);
43 B.R. at 946; 137 B.R. at 781; 85 B.R. at 486-87; In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co.,
98 B.R. 792, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re TR-3 Indus., 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr.
C.D. Calif. 1984); Li'l Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Systems, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98, 107
(N.D. Ind. 1970).
Even Peregrine,the vanguard case on complete preemption, indicated in dicta that the
Lanham Act "contains no provision for the registration, recordation or filing of
instruments establishing security interests in trademarks." National Peregrine, Inc. v.
Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 116 B.R. 194, 204 n. 14 (C.D. Calif. 1990).
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should give the secured party priority, even against a subsequent purchaser
of the trademark registration. 55
1.

Partial Preemption

One knowledgeable commentator has suggested that the parallel
administrative structure for patents and trademarks will lead Courts to follow
the patent preemption cases when trademark registrations or eligible
applications to register are used as collateral.' 6 Similarly, it must be noted
that no trademark case to date has actually tested the partial preemption
concept, which first arose, with respect to patents, in dicta in In re
TransportationDesign and Technology, Inc.'" [See Appendix 11.] Given the
administrative interrelationship between patents and trademarks, the
possibility always exists that Article Nine perfection may be insufficient
when the secured interest conflicts with the interest of a subsequent assignee
of a trademark. That possibility has prompted some commentators to
recommend dual transactional structures and dual filing (a financing
statement filed under Article Nine and an outright collateral or conditional
assignment within the mandatory recording requirement of section 1060).11"
One commentator, flying in the face of the cases to date, has suggested that
the secured party file the financing statement covering trademark
registrations with the USPTO, "or else the security interest may be
unperfected.""9
155

156

157

1

159

UCC § 9-301(1)(d); UCC [Revised] § 9-317(d).
See Marci L. Klumb, Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellectual Property:
FederalStatutes PreemptArticle 9, 57 GEO WASH. L. REv. 135, 163 (1988).
See In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639-40 (1985).
See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
18:1 at 797 (4th ed. 1997)("Until either the U.C.C. or the Lanham Act is clarified the
courts should treat either federal or state recordation of a conditional security assignment
as sufficient to perfect such a security."); B. Clark, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
I 1.8(l)(e) @ n.159 (1980); Bramson, supra note 6 at 1578-79. See also Baila H.
Celedonia, Advanced Seminar on Trademark Law 1996: Trademarks as Collateral,438
PLI/PAT. 479, 482 (April 1996)("the recording with the USPTO of the lien against
trademark registrations and pending applications is constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers for value.")
Martin E. Hsia, Pitfalls of Intellectual Property: What You Don't Know Could Lead You
To Malpractice, 1995-APR. HAW.B.J. 26,27. At least one Bankruptcy Court has
concluded that the filing of a financing statement with the USPTO will not "perfect" a
security interest in a federally registered trademark. See In re Together Development
Corp., 227 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998). Note that afinancing statement, by
itself, may not be recordable even as a discretionary recording under the regulations. It is
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If USPTO recording becomes necessary because the patent cases are
extended, the assignment categories for recording trademarks under the
regulations would be the same as those applicable to patents. In particular,
the USPTO recordation rule on "conditional assignments" applies to
trademarks as well as patents. Under 37 C.F.R. § 3.56, a "conditional
assignment" will be handled in the recording office as if it was an "absolute
assignment."'60 Any "conditional assignment" under 37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (as
distinguished from a contingent assignment or agreement to assign) is a
present assignment of the mark subject to defeasance. Although this kind of
transfer works for patents as long as the assignee/secured party bears a share
of the risks of ownership, it is an extremely problematic device when used in
connection with the taking of a security interest in a trademark.'6 ' Remember
that, unlike a contingent assignment, a conditional assignment is a present
assignment that must be accompanied by enough goodwill or other business
assets of the debtor to avoid being unenforceable as an assignment in gross.'2
a pure notice document that can be executed before any actual transfer has occurred. See
UCC § 9-402(1); U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-502(d). It does not really "affect title" within the
meaning 37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1997). The Article Nine security agreement is recordable as a
discretionary document. But a security interest filed with the USPTO would not perfect
for Article Nine purposes according to Roman Cleanser and other trademark registration
cases. If the partial preemption dicta from the patent cases gets applied to trademark
registrations, a recorded security agreement (so formed) will still not be constructive
notice within the assignment instruction of section 1060. Nevertheless, because of the
uncertainty surrounding perfection, secured lenders trying to avoid the downside risks of
forming their secured transaction as an assignment may want to file their security
agreement at the USPTO as an additional precaution, after filing the primary financing
statement in the proper state office. Although such a recording will not be constructive
notice if Transportation Design extends to trademark registrations, the discretionary
filing may provide fatal actual or inquiry "notice" to section 1060 "subsequent
purchasers" who rely on the USPTO record.
160

161

162

See 4O U.S.P.Q.2dat 1101 n.10.
The internal largess of the USPTO cannot expand the narrow constructive notice limits
on the section 1060 mandate to record "assignments." In re 199Z, 137 B.R. 778, 782 n.7
(Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1992). See also discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note
80 at Section III(d)(C); Simensky, Enforcing Creditors' Rights, supra note 143 at 57078.
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such
thing as property in a trademark except s a right appurtenant to an established business or
trade in connection with which the mark is employed ....");Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d at 1375 ("[A] mark may be transferred only in
connection with the transfer of the goodwill of which it is part. A naked transfer of the
mark also known as a transfer in-gross is invalid."); Glamorene Products Co. v. The
Procter & Gamble Co., 538 F2d 894 (C.C.P.A. 1976). But see North American Free
Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, art. 1708:11
[hereinafter NAFTA Treaty]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
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Furthermore, any license back of the trademark to the real owner would3
make the lender responsible for monitoring the licensee's use of the mark.
Without such monitoing, the license may be viewed as a "naked license,"
which results in an abandonment of rights in the mark.'1 The mark itself, not
just the validity of the transfer, may be put at risk when a present assignment
(even one subject to the condition subsequent of defeasance) is used as a
security devise.
2.

Title Document Transfer: the Clorox Case

The use of a present assignment of a trademark to create a security
interest can have disastrous consequences if the collateral assigned includes
the debtor's rights in an intent-to-use application. In Clorox Co. v. Chemical
Bank,'61 the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board invalidated a debtor's
registered trademark because the intent-to-use application from which it
issued was made the subject of an outright assignment to the bank under
terms of a collateralized loan agreement.'" It appeared the assignment
mechanism was used merely to carry out the intent of both parties that the
assigned rights serve as security for the debtor's credit obligation. The bank
clearly had no "intent to use" the mark. Nevertheless, the Clorox Court
found the unconditional assignment device itself violated congressional
policy against trafficking in or profiting from the sale of intent-to-use

163

Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, ee I.L.M. 81, art.
21.
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959). If the
licensee and licensor provide similar goods or services, the licensor might be allowed to
rely on the licensee to police and maintain the quality of the mark. See Visa U.S.A. v.
Birmingham Trust National Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert denied sub
nom., South Trust Bank of Alabama, Birmingham v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 464 U.S. 826
(1983). In other cases, a long-term relationship between the parties might justify turning
quality control over to the licensee. See Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp.,
768 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986). A security
interest between an institutional lender and a borrower who owns the mark would seem
to fall outside both of these exceptions.

164

165

'66

First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal. 1990)("[I]t is
well established that where a trademark owner engages in naked licensing, without any
control over the quality of goods produced by the licensee, such a practice is inherently
deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the licensor").
1996 TTAB LEXIS 15,40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098 (TTAB 1996).

40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1102-03.
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applications. 67 In fashioning a remedy, the Court relied on the legislative
history behind the 1988 amendments to section 1060 to determine that
cancellation of the mark, rather than simple invalidation of the assignment,
was appropriate. 6
3.

Assignments

6
Although the risks of using an absolute or "conditional assignment"' "
of a trademark outweigh any possible advantage, secured parties would be
well advised to record their Article Nine security agreements with the
USPTO, in addition to filing their Article Nine financing statements in the
appropriate state office. Great care should be taken, however, to form the
transfer as a ordinary security agreement - not a present assignment. So
formed, such a recording could cover trademark registrations and pending
"non-intent-to-use" applications. Under the recording regulations applicable

to both patents and trademarks, "other documents ...

affecting title to...

registrations, will be recorded as provided in this part or at the discretion of
the Commissioner. '0 A security interest in a trademark can be formed as a
recordable document under the joint regulations covering the recording of
both patents and trademarks.' 7' While such a discretionary recording is not
constructive notice,' 2 it may provide fatal actual or inquiry notice to section
1060 "subsequent purchasers" who rely on the USPTO record.
Presently, a typical security agreement in a mark can and should
provide for a future contingent assignment of the mark or application on the
debtor's default.' Because no present title passes, there is no absolute need
167

40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1102-03. It would not have helped Chemical Bank if they had called
the document a "security agreement" or "security interest" on the cover sheet. The Court
indicated that it would examine the substance of the agreement. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1101.
See also Changes in Practice, supra note 136 at 29639 ("The document will always speak
for itself.").

168

40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1103-04.

169

37 C.F.R.

170
'71

72

1

§ 3.56 (1992).
37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2000).
37 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.11 & 3.56 (1994); Changes in Practice, supra note 136 at 29636 &
29640. See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1, supra note 80 at Section III(c)(1)(C).
See e.g., supra note 161. Inre 199Z, 137B.R. 778,782n.7(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
A security agreement on an intangible is, in effect, an agreement to assign on the event of
a default. They are contingent assignments. On the other hand, the "conditional
assignment" referred to in § 3.56 is a present assignment subject to reverter on condition
of payment. However, there is understandable confusion. The phrase "conditional
assignment" has been used to refer to agreements to assign in the future as well.
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to transfer goodwill, and no assignment in gross results. However, if an
event of default occurs and the secured party must realize on its trademark
collateral, any present operative assignment at default, including one
provided for with a power of attorney attached to the security agreement,
would have to comply with section 1060.74 Secured creditors may try to
hedge their bets by having a present assignment with appurtenant goodwill
executed at the same time as the security agreement and instruct an escrow
agent to record it only if the debtor defaults. It should be noted, however,
that a Court following the Clorox rationale would view this scenario as akin
to an executed and recorded assignment. In the case of an intent-to-use
application, use of both would raise the same "trafficking" objection that led
the Clorox Court to cancel the registration.
4.

Subsequent Purchaser

A security interest appears to fall outside the definition of an
assignment and beyond the policy on recordable trademark assignments such
that a secured party could be a section 1060 "subsequent purchaser"
protected against some real unrecorded assignments.'" The state law rule in
UCC section 9-301(1)(d) would give priority to the prior transferee/assignee
of the mark as long as the transferee/assignee "gave value" before
perfection.1 6 Because value is broadly defined under section 1-201(44),'" it
Borrowing from respondent's brief, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in Clorox Co.
v. Chemical Bank [1996 TTAB Lexis 15, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098 (TTAB 1996)] referred to
a contingent assignment as an effective non-title bearing security device. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1101 n.10. This contingent assignment was described simply as an agreement to
assign a trademark in the future (on an event of default). In the excerpt taken from
Clorox, this same agreement to assign in the future was also referred as a "conditional
assignment." Id. So defined, this kind of "conditional assignment" is not the same as the
present assignment subject to defeasance in 37 C.F.R. § 3.56. See THOMAS M. WARD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCE §2:86 (2000) Because an agreement to assign at
the occurrence of a future event (under whatever label) is not a present assignment, it
risks neither trafficking nor the perils of an assignment in gross. Because it is not an
assignment, it should not fall within the USPTO mandate that conditional assignments be
treated as absolute. As a form of security interest, however, it should be recordable at the
Commissioner's discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2000).
174

1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§

18:1(G) § 796 (2d ed. 1984).

176

See the discussion on the meaning of "subsequent purchaser" under the Patent Act in
PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1, supra note 80 at Section II(c)(4).
UCC § 9-301(1)(d). AccordU.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d).

177

UCC § 1-201(44).

175
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seems unlikely that a prior assignee of a trademark would ever lose to a
subsequent secured party under the state law rule protecting "transferees" in
section 9-301(l)(d), whether or not the assignee/transferee ever recorded.
The secured party might seek to argue for preemption, therefore, whenever
the prior assignee fails to record within three months or prior to the
attachment of the subsequent security interest. A similarly protected
"purchaser" under the Patent Act can be defined to include a party who takes
a security interest in the whole right.' 8 Under the UCC, a purchaser includes
one who takes by "mortgage, pledge or lien . . . . "19 Courts have looked to
the Commercial Code as a source for federal common law definitions on
other occasions. 18
Finally, even if section 1060 of the Trademark Act is held to
partially preempt Article Nine as to federally registered trademarks, the
lender should still file under Article Nine. Section 1060 does not deal with
lien creditor rights whatsoever; thus, lien creditor priority will surely depend
on state law perfection.' 8' Furthermore, unregistered trademarks are wholly
178

See the discussion on the meaning of "subsequent purchaser" under the Patent Act at

179

UCC § 1-201(32)&(33). Accord UCC [Revised] § 1-201(32)&(33).

Section III(c)(4).

10

18'

When a judicial determination of complete preemption is made, Article Nine may still
remain as a source of supplementary federal common law rules. The enacted law of a
particular "contact" state will often be the appropriate source for "federal common law"
rules necessary to supplement the applicable federal scheme. United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). See J. White & R. Summers, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2 1-10 at 752-54 (4th ed. 1995) When enacted state rules inform
the federal common law, the result under the preemption doctrine should be the same as
when section 9-104(1) applies. Under either approach, local law is displaced by the
federal scheme but should be consulted where the federal scheme is silent. However,
enacted state law will be ignored in formulating federal common law rules when there is
a strong overriding interest in national uniformity and otherwise applicable state law
varies from the commercial norm. Id. In such cases, the "Uniform Version" of Article
Nine, rather than the version enacted in the "contact" state, may be the best place to find
the supplementing federal common law. Allen v. F.D.I.C., 599 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tenn.
1984); F.D.I.C. v. Morgan, 727 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). The distinction may
have limited importance, however, because there is general uniformity with respect to
definitions and priority rules among the enacted versions of Article Nine.
Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986); In re 199z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr.
C.E. Cal. 1992). See also In re C.C. & Co., 85 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)
("A indebtedness."). In re Together Development Corp., 227 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1998); 43 B.R. at 946; 137 B.R. at 781: 85 B.R. at 486-87; In re Chattanooga
Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re TR-e Indus., 41 B.R.
128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1984); Li'l Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Systems, Inc., 322
F.Supp. 98, 107 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
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creatures of state law. Under Article Nine, a trademark is a "general
intangible," which normally means that the Secretary of State's Office is the
appropriate place to file a security interest.82
Because the priority rule under section 1060 of the Lanham Act
seems confined to "assignments" and "subsequent purchasers," partial
preemption has less support under section 1060 than under section 261 of the
Patent Act.13 But because the secured party seems to qualify as a section
1060 "subsequent purchaser" that would be protected against delayed or
unrecorded assignments, the state law rule in UCC section 9-301(1)(d) would
have to yield on this point.'8 4 Under section 1060, the assignee must record
within the three-month grace period, or at least before the security interest
attaches. If not, the secured party wins if it gives the debtor new value and
has no notice of the prior assignment. Remember that even if it is viewed as
a "purchaser" for Lanham Act purposes, the secured party is unprotected
against a prior unrecorded assignment of the mark during the three-month
grace period in section 1060 as well as throughout the period of any "office
85
delay."
V.

MODEL LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE

A.

Model Technological System - Basic Elements and Premise

1.

Background

Government agencies ensure the integrity of secured credit by
providing systems for the filing, maintenance and searching of security
interests. The overall goal of these systems is to provide a means of sharing
information and ordering priority with the aim of helping lenders minimize
their credit risks. The Uniform Commercial Code is a set of laws adopted by
each state government that facilitates and regulates commercial transactions
under a standard set of legal assumptions. A portion of this code, the UCC
Article Nine Filing System, establishes the method in which states file,
182

183

194

183

UCC § 9-106, cmt.; UCC § 9-401(l)(b).

Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
See THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCE § 2:102 (2002).
15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1988): Id.
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maintain and search information regarding security interests and other
financing activities. [See Appendix 21.]
State filing offices operating within the Article Nine structure have
similar recording tasks and objectives but make use of different technologies
for carrying out these tasks. A typical first access to the Article Nine system
would involve a creditor filing a financing statement (usually form UCC-1)
within the state in which the debtor was located. This form describes the
transaction including party names, loan amount, terms of repayment, liens
against assets, etc. The legal term for registering a security interest in this
way is perfection. Other activities involve changing information (form
UCC-2) and searching (form UCC-3). State recording offices also manage
systems for the registration of some state created forms of intellectual
property. [See Appendix 22.] Trademarks, service marks and unfixed works
of authorship can be registered at the state level.
Assignments and other transfers of patents, trademarks and service
marks can be recorded with the federal government through the US Patent
and Trademark Office. [See Appendix 23.] As discussed in this report, this
federal recording system comes into structural and legal conflict with the
state filing system under UCC Article Nine. Since federal intellectual
property assets can be used as collateral under a security agreement secured
creditors should be able to both: 1) search state and federal records within a
single electronic operation and, 2) have a single reliable mode for the
"perfection" of security interests in federal intellectual property.
From the lender point-of-view, easy access to security interest
information that concerns the debtor's intellectual property assets, across all
states, would help protect them against title defects or lien rights in
intellectual property that might diminish its value as collateral.
Centralization of this information could be the premise for a notice-based
system that would help protect against a later unauthorized transfer of these
assets to assignees or subsequent lenders.
Currently, varying levels of automation among the various states
hamper efforts to centralize information on security interests. While some
states have highly interactive, web-based filing and search systems, others
continue to operate paper-based systems. Some of the states, while
maintaining electronic databases of filings, provide search services in a noninteractive way. These systems maintain UCC filings in electronic form in
databases but users who want to query the system have to file a paper-based
request for searches (along with fees). At the state offices, employees then
search the system electronically and return search results by mail or fax
printouts.
Revised Article 9 requires that all of the 50 states conform to
revisions to the UCC by July 1, 2001. While many states are working
towards meeting this deadline, not all states are expected to comply with the
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deadline due to resource constraints. What follows is a brief description of
some of the specific, technology based changes proposed in Revised Article
Nine (source: www.intercountyclearance.com):
a)

Technology Based Changes in Revised
Article Nine

(1)

Media Neutrality

Reference to paper as the medium for filing and searching has been
removed in Revised Article Nine. The deletion of this reference will lead to
conversion from the paper-based systems to electronic filing and retrieving
systems though the interactive nature of such electronic systems may vary
substantially. That is, while some states may convert to electronic databases
for storing UCC filings and amendments, the search process may not be fully
interactive, and some other states may implement fully interactive, webbased filing and search systems.
(2)

Signatures

The requirement to have wet signatures on financing documents is
removed, thus making the process of conversion to electronic databases more
feasible. The recent regulations to accept Digital Signatures using
encryption technologies can further help in providing security and privacy of
data transmission and storage.
(3)

Central filing

Dual filing requirement that currently exists in some states will no
longer exist, thus leading the way to centralized storage of all filings in each
state.
(4)

Where to file

The changes require that if a debtor is an organization, then the UCC
filing is done at the state of registration. If the debtor is an individual, then
the state of legal residence is where UCC filings need to be made.
(5)

Standard forms
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Forms for filing financial statements (UCC 1) and amendments
(UCC 3) are standardized.
b)

Possible One-Stop Shop System

The process of performing a thorough background check of a
borrower or an asset is currently quite cumbersome. The current system
requires significant resources and effort, presents a significant time delay
issue, is not automated, is not interactive, allows for the possibility of human
error, and results in great expense to the user.
Because of these issues, exhaustive searches, though desirable, are
infrequent. It is possible however, to design an automated, "one-stop shop"
system that will perform fully exhaustive, multi-state searches that will meet
the requirements of Revised Article Nine and quickly and cost effectively
present the end user with valued information.
B.

Proposed TechnologicalSystem Solutions

1.

Solution Requirements

a)

Single point entry for search criteria

A user should be able to specify informational requirements through
easy to navigate, user-friendly input screens. Items to select include
tangible/intangible asset search and which states to search.
b)

Single point electronic payment system

Payment by the user would be made to the centralized agency,
irrespective of the individual states searched. Users need only enter payment
information (i.e. credit card information) once.
c)

Interactivity

The system should prompt the user for selection of appropriate
system-generated list of choices. Search results are displayed in summary
form with an option to "drill down" for details.
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d)

Web-based interface

Access to the service should be via the internet using common
browser technology (Netscape and Microsoft Internet Explorer).
e)

Personalization

A user should have a personalized account with home page and
stored personal information. Upon initial account creation, the user's basic
information (name, address, phone, email, etc.) along with billing
information (credit card or other) are entered. The user need only login with
a password to access his account.

0

Security

The system must protect the integrity of the states' stored data from
tampering and also from unauthorized viewing.
g)

Organized presentation of
results/information

Standardized reporting formats for all information enables easy use
of the information by the users.
h)

Inclusion of all applicable data sites (state
and federal)

Reported data must reflect an exhaustive search of relevant sources.
A distinction must be made between a database search yielding no results
and a lack of results from hardware or connection problems.
C.

Ideal Technological Solution

From a technological perspective having a central database with one
interface would be an ideal solution. This model allows for easy
administration of the system-customizability, upgrading, hosting and
backup. It would also provide benefits to users through its one-stop, webaccessed, do-all search page and quick, comprehensive search results. States
would benefit by eliminating their need to maintain their individual systems.
However, the implementation of this solution may not be feasible since it
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requires that states give up ownership of their UCC filings database, which is
unlikely to happen. [See Appendix 24.]
D.

Next Best Solution

To allow states to maintain the independence of their existing
systems, this solution builds a composite database at a central location to
which the user interface can interact. Information in the composite database
is kept current through regular access to state databases and the download of
any changes. This solution affords all the benefits of the ideal technological
solution from a security interest users point of view without materially
changing each state's current practices. ' From the state's point of view,
they continue to own and operate their existing UCC filing databases, but
allow the centralized system to periodically copy their data. While this
approach does not require states to disown their UCC filing databases, there
is still significant challenge in convincing states to allow copying of the data
to reside elsewhere. [See Appendix 24.]
E.

Proposed Solution

The proposed solution provides users a one-stop search page "portal"
accessible via the web, however, all records (and their ownership and
control) continue to remain with each state. The proposed system acts as the
intermediary - taking users requests, querying appropriate state records and
returning results. [See Appendix 24.]
Not requiring each state to give up ownership of their UCC filing
database to a centralized system is a significant advantage over the
aforementioned alternative solutions (ideal and next-best). In this proposed
approach, each state will continue to maintain and operate their UCC filing
database. Further, there is not need for the states to allow copies of their
UCC filing databases to reside in a centralized system (as in the second-best
solution). Therefore, the system architecture proposed in this solution is far
superior to the previous two and poses less challenge to implement.
However, in the proposed solution architecture the development of a
web-enabled software to drive the server that remotely interacts with the 50
states database engine many not be an easy task. The centralized web server
requires a customized CGI script (Common Gateway Interface) program for
each state. The CGI script has to be developed and tested for each state. The
script program has to interact with the database engine for each state's UCC
186

Some states do not yet have electronic databases.
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filing system, provide the search criteria and receive the search results. The
web server should be able to consolidate the search results returned by
multiple states and present them to the user's browser via the Internet.
While the task of developing the functionality of remote interaction
with state-based UCC filing systems and presenting search results in a
standard format vie the Internet may be technically challenging, this is very
much a feasible approach. The advantage of this approach is that this
solution does not require the states to part with full or partial ownership of
their databases. Nor does it require states to modify their systems to meet the
requirements of a centralized system. The burden of interacting with
individual state-based systems lies with the centralized server and this task
can be accomplished.
There are two main types of users of this system. First, individuals
or groups will be looking to perform infrequent checks on a one-by-one
basis. This category of user is characterized as pay-as-you-go, inputting
basic information and payment methods each time. The second class of user
is more institutional, such as banks, credit unions or other lending agencies.
These users would have personalized accounts and sophisticated billing,
reporting and other features.
The proposed solution provides the user the flexibility of searching
one, all or any combination of states as well as the option to search for
intangible asset ownership at the US Patent and Trademark Office. As
indicated in the diagram, the heart of the system is one central web-hosted
control application. This system maintains real-time contact via the Internet
with each of the 50 states' computer systems and also the federal Patent and
Trademark Assignment Database at the USPTO. Access to the main system
is accomplished through standard web browser technology. Users must first
log-in to their account (or create a new one with a valid payment method)
before any searching can be done. Authorized users then submit information
regarding which company or asset to search in which state or states. The
request is carried out "behind the scenes" to the user where information
requests are sent to each relevant state, collected and formatted for clean,
organized presentation back to the user.
1.

Technical Requirement

This solution requires development of a web-enabled software
application. Additionally, the software must run on a web server capable of
performing the required operations and handling the expected usage volume.
Each state must have an electronic database that can be logged onto
remotely, either through the web or EDI. By far the greatest challenge to this
system is securing and maintaining real-time Internet connections to each of
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the states systems. Current state systems use varying levels of technology
(from paper-based filing cabinets to fully-functional web-enabled systems)
as well as differing technological platforms (UNIX based or Windows
based). The successful system will require hardware and software capable of
interfacing with each of the independent systems effectively and efficiently.
2.

Operational Requirements

States would only be required to continue their current practices of
maintaining their own electronic databases. This includes proper entry of
data, maintenance and backup. The software application need only be hosted
on a web server and would perform the following functions: General
Information to site visitors, Registration forms, Login page for registered
users, Search forms and Display results. Several issues need to be addressed
by the software in order to ensure effectiveness of solution. The software
must include an engine which can interact with each state database. Security
also needs to be addressed.
3.

Usage Charges and Disbursement

Pricing of services made possible through the proposed solution
requires further study. Though current attempts to perform exhaustive
security interest searches are very costly and time consuming and there are
tremendous benefits for having a quick, centralized system, it is unclear what
costs the market is willing to pay for such services. Pricing should be
flexible and fair. Users should pay for services used and states should be
properly compensated for participating. An example pricing scheme is as
follows:
10 state search = $100
25 state search = $125
50 state search = $150
Since system maintenance, upkeep and monitoring incur costs,
raised revenues are not entirely available for distribution to states.
Infrastructure costs for hardware and software systems must be accounted for
and should include measures for data backup, security, redundancy and
bandwidth. Other costs include operational expenditures such as
programming, training and administration. Further research is needed to
determine these overall operating costs. At this time, one third (or 33%) of
the raised revenues from the system are assumed to be used to cover such
operating costs.
Excess revenue will then be distributed to the states. Several
methods of distribution are possible:
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a)
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Equal portion to each state

The centralized system collects its usage fees and, less operating
costs, could distribute the proceeds equally to each of the fifty United States.
Example:'87
Search all states, fees =$150
Operating costs: 33% or $50, States: 67% or $100
$100 / 50 states = Each state receives $2 for this search
Proportional to number of stored records: Since some states are
more populous, have more commerce and thus more UCC filings, income
generated for the central system could be divided relative to this number of
filings.
Example:
Search all states, fee = $150
Operating costs: 33% or $50, States: 67% or $100
US records:
100 million, CA record: 25 million (25%)
$100* 25% = CA receives $25 for this search
b)

Proportional to number of records
returned:

This method of distribution accounts for the activity of business and
thus its operating states' UCC system burden. States from which search
results come, indicating company activity, are compensated.
Example:
Search all states, fee = $150
Operating costs: 33% or $50, States: 67% or $100
Records returned: 5, CA records 2(40%)
$100*40% = CA received $40 for this search
c)

Fixed and variable method

This method of distribution compensates states with a fixed rate for
allowing a search upon their databases and a variable rate dependent upon
actual records being found upon them.
Example:
Search all states, fee = $150
Operating costs: 33% or $50, States: 67% or $100
Fixed component: 40% or $40, Variable component: 60% or $60
Records returned: 10, CA records returned: 2(20%)
CA received 1 / 5 0 th of $40 plus 20% of $60 = $14 for this search
187

Figures and values used in examples are for illustrative purposes only and are not
intended to be recommendations. Further study and due diligence are needed to

determine actual costs.
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The final method compromises between large states, who have most
records and small states, who still need to be searched to attain an
"exhaustive" search.
F.

Conclusion

The proposed Centralized Security Interest Perfection System
("CSIPS") provides a better way to perfect security interests and benefits all.
It will help to fulfill the purpose of the current UCC and Intellectual Property
systems by making their information more accessible and useful. Users of
the system will get more complete information in a much shorter period of
time, having to access only one source.
To individual states this proposal also makes sense. They will
continue to maintain independence and sovereignty over their own
information. However, by making their information more accessible, the
number of searches are likely to increase thus increasing their revenue
stream. Initially, CSIPS is only another avenue of information access.
States' current methods of searching continue to exist. Over time, though,
the advantages in time, effort and cost savings are expected to see CSIPS
become the dominant if not only method of security interest searching.
The most notable challenge to implementing such a system is the
current lack of electronic databases in some states. Though a system can be
designed to allow for the later addition of these states, users may have a
problem as the search results are not complete. A second challenge is the
potential debate regarding the fair sharing of search revenues. A final point
to bear in mind is the potential displacement of workers who are currently
employed for the purpose of performing manual searches.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS-ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE MODELS
BASED ON RECOMMENDED SYSTEM STRUCTURES

A.

Model Acts-Basic Elements and Premises

1.

The Problem and the Three Proposed Legislative
Solutions

This report offers three alternative approaches to legislative reform
contained in three "Model Acts." Although the three offered solutions differ,
they are all aimed at establishing a reliable and economically efficient filing
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system for the "perfection" of security interests in federal intellectual
property. As discussed in this report, certainty of perfection in these
intangible assets is the key to a secured creditor's ability to hold its priority
position against subsequent security interests, subsequent unauthorized
transfers and a subsequent bankruptcy trustee of the debtor. The problem
with the current legal structure is that the federal recording statutes for
federal intellectual property have a title/tract-system premise that does not
accommodate the modem secured transaction.'88 Yet these old federal
recording statutes, viewed in the context of their history and the history of
title-based mortgages, have a degree of preemptive force that has been found,
in varying degrees, to displace the modem efficient rules for secured
financing in Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. The lower court
cases that have found preemptive force in these federal recording statutes are
discussed in great detail in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1.189

The most

significant of these cases are also noted in SECTION 2(a)(4) of each of the
three alternative Model Acts. All three Model Acts have three predicate
elements in common.
A commitment to the notice filing and perfection structure of Article
Nine.

a)
The integration of critical Article Nine financing statement
information, indexed by the name of the debtor, into the tract-type property
number system that is the premise of the federal intellectual property
recording statutes.
b)
A single unified database or web-based meta-site with
access to or ownership of all security interest filings on federal intellectual
property under one responsible agency charged with set-up and
maintenance.'9° [For a discussion of pending federal reforms See Appendix
24.]

188

PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1: supra note 80 at 1-13. See also Appendix 15 and Appendix
20

189

PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1, supra note 80 at 97-119, 136-144, 156-163.

19

See Chapter V., MODEL LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE, supra at 60-

66. The systems recommended in Chapter V. could be used to centralize all filed
information on security interests. The Model Acts contained herein call for more specific
handling of those financing statements and related filings that are designated by the
secured party as covering the debtor's "general intangibles." Financing statements used
to provide notice on specific goods (e.g., purchase money filings and equipment leases)
need not be included within this integrated web-based system.
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2.

Notice Filing

This report concludes that any viable solution must begin by
recognizing the long term value of the Article Nine notice filing model for
dealing with security interests in all forms of intellectual property and by
restoring this model to the center of the legal structures for dealing with
federal intellectual property collateral. Although the operative language is
modified slightly, all three of the Model Acts follow the suggestion of the
ABA Joint Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property and
remove security interests altogether from the existing federal tract files.'9'
3.

Integration of Financing Statement Information

For the protection of those who rely on the current property numberbased recording system for federal intellectual property rights all three
models also call for the establishment of an integrated electronic financing
statement database or web-based meta-site. This centralized point of access
will bring together state UCC notice filings made available in an electronic
format and integrate this data with the grantor and grantee information
already contained in the federal tract records. This integration will make it
possible to efficiently search UCC filings on grantors and grantees of record
who show.up under the various federal property numbers.'92
4.

A Single Database or Web-Based Meta-Site
Under a Single Agency

In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property on June 24, 1999, Q. Todd Dickinson suggested to the
Congress that a single unified database to gather and maintain security
191

192

All three models go beyond the ABA language by removing the priority provision for
security interests from the proposed amendment to section 1060 of the Lanham Act and
adding language which makes clear that security interests are outside the section 1060(a)
priority rule for assignments. PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1,supra note 80 at 183-185.
Searchers in the tract records need not worry about the notice filings of secured parties
whose debtors do not show in the federal title records. [In this context "title records" is
read broadly to include some grantee information maintained by the USPTO that is
outside the current tract assignment file. In the case of a patent, the first assignee is often
noted on the face of the patent itself.]. Under SECTION 3(b)(2) of each Model Act only
those secured parties whose debtors can hold their title priority in Federal Intellectual
Property Rights against subsequent transferees will prevail against those same
subsequent transferees.
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interest information on all forms of Federal Intellectual Property would be
more efficient than separate databases in the Copyright Office, the
U.S.P.T.O. and the Plant Variety Protection Office.'93 Our study confirms the
wisdom of this suggestion. The Model Acts create a Federal Intellectual
Property Data Center (or Filing Center in the case of Model 3) charged with
setting up and maintaining a central clearinghouse for state financing
statements and related filings that are designated as covering the debtor's
"general intangibles."
B.

Model Acts-Three Different Levels of FederalInvolvement
in Perfection and Priority

The Model Acts differ in the degree to which they call for federal
involvement in an integrated notice filing structure for security interests in
federal intellectual property. The basic skeletal differences among these
three legislative options is outlined below. Section C, infra will examine
other structural legal problems addressed by each Model Act.
1.

Model 1

Model 1 is called the "Security Interests in Intellectual Property
Restoration Act" ("SIIPRA"). [See Appendix 3.] Model 1 overrules the
lower court cases on preemption and puts all issues of perfection and priority
back under the state law in Article Nine-except for one narrow provision
that protects the federal derivative title principle.'" This Model establishes a
Federal Intellectual Property Data Center that puts all electronically available
financing statements records at a central search point to aid federal tract file
searches. However, under Model 1 (unlike Models 2 & 3) the Data Center is
provided only as a convenience to those who use the federal tract records
because secured party priority and perfection is basically linked to the

193

194

Oversight Hearings on Intellectual Property Security Registration Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.,
1st Sess. (June 24, 1999) (Statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
SIIPRA, § 3(b)(2)(B) [Appendix 3]:
(B)
A security interest in any Federal Intellectual Property Right created by a
specific debtor is subordinate to the rights of an ownership transferee of such Right
whenever such ownership transferee has priority over that specific debtor under the
applicable federal law on recording and priority that governs such Federal
Intellectual Property Right.
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applicable state law in Article Nine and the secured party's actual state law
notice filing.' 9
2.

Model 2

Model 2 is called the "Intellectual Property Security Interest
Coordination Act" ("IPSICA"). [See Appendix 2.] This Model calls for the
creation of a database or meta-site within a new Federal Intellectual Property
Data Center. However, under Model 2 the database of state financing
statements is central to a new federal subordination rule designed to protect
"ownership transferees" who rely on the federal tract records. Unlike the
ABA Task Force proposal, Model 2 has no provision for a federal financing
statement. Instead, Model 2 relies on the fact that state financing statements
are available in electronic record form in most states and should be
universally available within the next 2 years. States that allow a simple
check or mark designation on their forms to indicate that they cover "general
intangibles" can qualify state filed financing statements for central national
access within the new Data Center. 96 The incentive for states to make
possible this simple designation on their financing statements comes from
the fact that effective "posting" of these "qualified" state financing
statements to the data center is made essential to a secured party's priority
position vis-A-vis federal "ownership transferees." An indicated claim to any
of the debtor's "general intangibles" (not just the debtor's federal intellectual
property) triggers the designation because the "proceeds" definition in
Revised Article Nine (as incorporated in the Model Acts) is broadly drawn to
allow security interests in state law forms of intellectual property to carry
over into federal forms of protection.'"
With respect to perfection and priority, Model 2 starts in the same
place as Model 1 by overturning the preemption cases and restoring the state
law in Article Nine to all perfection and priority disputes involving the
bankruptcy trustee and other claimants, including other secured parties. But
unlike Model 1, Model 2 provides bona fide purchaser ownership transferees
with a critical but narrow federal basis for trumping the state law priority that
could otherwise be established by the secured party under Article Nine.
19

196

197

Searchers in the tract records need not worry about the notice filings of secured parties
whose debtors do not show up in the tract file. Under SECTION 3(b)(2) of each Model
Act only those secured parties whose debtors can hold their title priority against
subsequent transferees in the tract file will prevail those same subsequent transferees.
IPSICA, § 3(a)(9) & 3(f) [Appendix 2].
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(C); IPSICA, § 3(a)(16) [Appendix 2]
PRELIMINARY REPORT # 80, supranote 1 at 58-60.
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Under SECTION 3(b)(2)(B), the transferee of a "Federal Intellectual
Property Right" can subordinate the secured party by taking an executed
transfer for value, without knowledge of the security interest, and before the
secured party's financing statement is "posted" in the new "Federal
Intellectual Property Data Center.""'9 The transferee's right to subordinate
comes with a subsequent obligation to record in the appropriate tract file. To
hold its right to subordinate, the ownership transferee must record in the
applicable tract file within ten days of the date of its executed transfer or, if
that grace period has already run, before the competing financing statement
is posted within the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center.'9 SECTION
3(b)(2)(D) provides that this subordination rule only cuts in favor of the
federal ownership transferee, however. The secured party that avoids
subordination must still find its priority under the applicable state law in
Article Nine. Take, for example, the case of a secured party that avoids
federal subordination because the ownership transferee failed to record its
transfer within the ten-day grace period and then after the grace period ran
failed to record before the posting of the secured party's financing statement.
Such a secured party will still lose to the federal ownership transferee if the
transferee took for value and without knowledge, and the security interest
was not "perfected" on the transfer date by a proper filing under applicable
state law.200 Furthermore, the ownership transferee gets some added
protection from language in SECTION 3(b)(2)(C) that protects the
transferee's title against any secured party who claims
through a debtor
2
whose title can be avoided by the ownership transferee. 1'
3.

Model 3

Model 3 is called the "Intellectual Property Collateral Coordination
Act" [IPCCA]. [See Appendix 1.] The only difference between Model 2 and
Model 3 is that Model 3 provides for a federal financing statement similar to
the one proposed by the ABA Joint Task Force that can be filed directly with
the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center - but only as an alternative to
1

The timing aspect of this subordination rule is patterned after the priority rule for buyers
of intangibles in Revised Article Nine. See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d). The condition
subsequent of a recording in the federal tract records is added by the language of this
Model Act. IPSICA, § 3(b)(2)(B) [Appendix 2].

200

IPSICA, § 3(b)(2)(B) [Appendix 2]. This "subordination" rule departs from the
"ineffectiveness" rule proposed by the ABA Task Force in FIPSA. See the critique of
the FIPSA provision in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1, supra note 80 at 185.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d). See also U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d) (1995 Official Version).

201

See supranotes 194 & 195.

199
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the posting of a "Qualified State Financing Statement." Hopefully, the
federal financing statement will only be a short term redundancy. As state
files move toward universal and uniform electronic records the federal
financing statement provided for in Model 3 should gradually decrease in
importance and disappear.
C.

Model Acts - Other Problems and Provisions for Cure

1.

Reform of the Priority Rules for Transferees
using the Federal Tract Files

In addition to removing security interests from the class of
recordable transactions under the federal tract recording statutes, all three
Model Acts adopt the language proposed by the ABA Joint Task Force that
eliminates or sharply curtails the grace periods in these statutes. All three
Model Acts repeal the one or two-month grace period for recording in
section 205(d) of the Copyright Act. In its place all three Model Acts creates
a race-notice rule that gives priority to the first "executed" transfer of
copyright ownership if recorded in a manner to give constructive notice
"before recordation in such manner of the later transfer."2 2 "Otherwise the
later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good
faith, for value, and without notice of the earlier transfer."2 3 In a similar
fashion, all three Model Acts amend the Semiconductor Chip Act by
eliminating the three-month grace period for the first executed transfer along
with the priority rule that included it.?° Section 1060 of the Lanham Act is
also amended by replacing the current three-month grace period for
trademark recordings with a straight notice-recording priority rule protecting
bona fide purchaser "subsequent purchasers" against unrecorded assignments
whether or not they record. 25 Unlike the ABA Joint Task Force proposal,
however, security interests get no priority shelter under the new 1060 priority
rule in the Model Acts.20 A secured party that avoids "subordination" to the
202

SIIPRA, SECTION 4(a)(2) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 4(a)(2) [Appendix 2);
IPCCA, SECTION 4(a)(2) [Appendix 1].

203

204

205

Id.
SIIPRA, SECTION 4(b) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 4(b) [Appendix 2]; IPCCA,
SECTION 4(b) [Appendix 1].
SIIPRA, SECTION 4(a)(2) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 4(a)(2) [Appendix 2];

IPCCA, SECTION 4(a)(2) [Appendix 1].
206 PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1,supranote 80 at 183-185.
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ownership transferee of a Federal mark must still look to state law for
perfection and priority." 7 The amendment to section 261 of the Patent Act
under all three Model Acts reduces the grace period for recording a prior
"assignment, grant or conveyance" down from three months to ten days. "
2.

The Federal Transfer Statement

Each of the Model Acts make express provision for the recording of
a "transfer statement," in the appropriate federal tract file, on property
subject to a security interest that is foreclosed on after default. 29 If the
transfer statement contains the required information and statements and is
otherwise proper under the appropriate federal requirement, it is effective as
a transfer document between the parties and it transfers the interests of the
2
debtor and the secured party "for purposes of the public record." 1.
The transfer statement provided for in Revised Article Nine served
as a pattern for the one provided in the Model Acts."' The federal transfer
statement will clearly expedite the recordation of post-default transfers of
Federal Intellectual Property Rights to third party buyers. The transfer
statement in the three Model Acts differs in three respects from the one
proposed by the ABA Joint Task Force.
Under the ABA Joint Task Force proposal the transfer statement was
effective "for purposes of the public record"212 but it was not clear whether
the recorded transfer statement obviated the need for an actual document of
transfer signed by the debtor in compliance with the formal writing
requirements in the existing federal intellectual property statutes."
The

208

SIIPRA, SECTION 3(b)(2)(C) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 3(b)(2)(D) [Appendix
2]; IPCCA, SECTION 3(b)(2)(D) [Appendix 1].
SIIPRA, SECTION 4(c) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 4(c) [Appendix 2]; IPCCA,

209

SECTION 4(c) [Appendix 1].
SIIPRA, SECTION 3(c) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 3(c) [Appendix 2]; IPCCA,

210

Id.

211

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-617.

212

PRELIMINARY REPORT #

207

SECTION 3(c)(2)(G) [Appendix 1].

2)3

1, supranote 80 at 185-187.

15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)("Assignments shall be by instruments in writing duly executed.");
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994)("A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of
law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's
duly authorized agent."); 35 U.S.C. § 261, 2d para.("Applications for patent, patents, or
other interests therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing."); 17
U.S.C. § 903(b)(1994)("The owner of the exclusive rights in a mask work may transfer
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Model Acts make the duly recorded transfer statement "serve as an effective
document of transfer to the transferee," and, in addition, make the recorded
statement "effective for purposes of the public record." '
The Model Acts prohibit the filing of a transfer statement against
debtor's "intent to use applications," unless the transfer is to a successor in
interest under section 1051(b) of the Lanham Act. Transfer statements filed
in violation of this prohibition are ineffective.2 5 While the taking of a
security interest in an intent to use application is not "trafficking" in marks," 6
a transfer statement purports to have the effect of a recorded assignment and
would constitute "trafficking."
Because "goodwill" refers to state law collateral rights, the assets
that compose it should not be deemed transferred under a federal transfer
statement. The Model Acts delete the language of the ABA Joint Task Force
proposal that makes the recorded transfer statement effective to transfer the
goodwill of the connected enterprise. All three Model Acts provide that the
transfer statement must state that the secured party had a security interest in
the connected goodwill of the business whenever Federal marks are included
in the statement.2 7 However, the recorded transfer statement itself has no
effect on the state law collateral rights that fall within the ambit of
"goodwill."

214

all of those rights, or license all or less than all of those rights, by any written instrument
signed by such owner or a duly authorized agent of the owner.").
SIIPRA, SECTION 3(c) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 3(c) [Appendix 2]; IPCCA,

215

SECTION 3(c)(2)(G) [Appendix 1].
Id.

216

Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098, 1101 n.10 (TTAB 1996)(A security

217

interest is in the nature of a contingent assignment and is an effective non-title bearing
security device when used in connection with an intent to use application).
SIIPRA, SECTION 3(c)(v) [Appendix 3]; IPSICA, SECTION 3(c)(v) [Appendix 2];
IPCCA, SECTION 3(c)(2)(G)(v) [Appendix 1].
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APPENDIX 1 - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLATERAL COORDINATION
ACT

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLATERAL
COORDINATION ACT
106th Congress; 1st Session
In the [House of Representatives/Senate]
[H.R/S.] No.

SYNOPSIS:
AN ACT to coordinate the current federal tract recording systems covering
federal intellectual property title with the existing and developing state filing
systems for perfecting security interests in intangible personal property and
to create for that purpose a central notice filing database that will facilitate
the efficient and productive use of federal intellectual property as collateral.
DATE OF INTRODUCTION:

,2001

SPONSORS: [

TEXT.Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Intellectual Property Collateral Coordination
Act."
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SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PIJRPOSES.
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
Enterprises of all size must be able to finance their
business activities by obtaining secured credit. Secured financing is often
critical to the research and development that leads to the creation of
intellectual property. The more secure and predictable the lender's rights
and security are, the better terms the borrower can obtain. Conversely, the
risk of loss, subordination, impairment or other uncertainties with respect to
collateral inhibit the financing desired by all parties. Predictability and
uniformity of treatment with respect to intellectual property collateral further
the interests of all parties involved in related commercial transactions
whether those parties are intellectual property owners, licensees, or their
lenders.
(2)
In many cases, a company's intellectual property is
among the assets most valuable and useful as collateral in obtaining desired
financing. Increasingly, companies' assets and entrepreneurial energies are
focused on a combination of various forms of intellectual property, and the
same product or process may involve a combination of patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property. Moreover, these
intellectual property assets may be protected under the laws of other nations
and prospective financers of these assets may be located outside the United
States.
(3)
The law governing security interests in all forms of
personal property (including intangible forms) has historically been state
law. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as recently revised,
provides a uniform structure for this law between and among the various
states. However, the most important forms of intangible intellectual property
are either created or enhanced by federal statutory provisions that provide
their own recording systems for tracking title and ownership rights in this
property. Courts have struggled with the question of whether and to what
extent these somewhat dated federal recording statutes should displace the
generally well-conceived state law structure (Article 9) when the rights of
secured parties in federal intellectual property are at stake. The federal tract
recording statutes embrace security interests only as a form or variant of title
to specific items of property recorded under specific property numbers.
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Furthermore these federal recording provisions vary depending on whether
the intellectual property is patents, copyrights or trademarks.
Some federal lower court decisions have held that the
(4)
only way to perfect a security interest in a copyright, in material that is
copyrightable, or in proceeds of such material is to file the equivalent of a
copyright mortgage with the U.S. Copyright Office. These decisions include
In re PeregrineEntertainmentLtd., 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal.1990); In re AEG
Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), amended 161 B.R.
50 (9th Cir. BAP 1993); and In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997). In something of a retreat from this position, one
recent bankruptcy court decision has concluded that federal recording of a
security interest in a copyright is necessary only where the copyright is
registered. In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R. 149 (Bankr. N.D.
Calif. 1999).
The cases involving patent collateral have generally upheld secured
party lien perfection through state notice filings (Article 9) against the
bankruptcy trustee - but have uniformly suggested that the same financing
secured party must make a federal assignment filing with the USPTO to be
protected against later assignees or mortgagees who take and record patent
title instruments. See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920 at
n.8 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). See also City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric,
Inc, 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988), relying on, In re TransportationDesign
and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639, 40 UCC 1393, 1398 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1985).
The cases involve trademark collateral have found state law (Article
9) filing sufficient notice. However, this state law notice has not been tested
in the cases against an assignee of a mark who relies exclusively on the
federal assignment record. See Roman Cleanser v. NationalAcceptance Co.,
43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.
1986); In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). See
also In re C.C. & Co., 85 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)("A grant of a
security interest is merely a device to secure indebtedness.")
Because they are tract type systems that rely on
(5)
specific assigned property numbers, the federal systems for registering
interests in intellectual property, unlike the Article 9-based state filing
systems, do not provide for notice filing under the debtor's name, for generic
descriptions of collateral, or for perfection of security interests in
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subsequently-acquired property. As a result of the structural rigidity of the
current federal recording provisions, companies seeking financing and their
lenders have either had to incur the time and expense of additional and
frequent recordings and registrations that would not otherwise have been
made, or forego financing opportunities.
(6)
This Act makes substantive and procedural changes
to the law in order to provide uniformity and certainty and to facilitate
financing of federal intellectual property, consistent with the rights of owners
and assignees of interests in such property.
(b) Purposes
Based upon the powers contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3;
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and other provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, the purposes of this Act are:
(1)
To promote financing and development of federal
intellectual property assets by clarifying the methods for perfecting security
interests in such collateral, and by making all forms of intellectual property
collateral as accessible, valuable and useful as possible;
(2)
To assist businesses (and, through them, consumers
and others) in obtaining credit on the best available terms; and
(3)
To lessen the burdens on interstate commerce and
commerce between the United States and other nations by reducing legal
risks associated with the inconsistent treatment of different types of federal
intellectual property.
(4)
To provide an accessible integrated national filing
system built around an integrated database for all security interests that cover
this important federal statutory property and to enable future international
access to and integration with this system and database.
SECTION 3. SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FEDERAL LAW
(a) Definitions
The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this Act:
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(1)
The term "copyright" means any of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright under chapter 1 of title 17, United States
Code, whether or not registered under chapter 4 of such title.
The phrase "encumbering financing statement"
(2)
means either a qualified state financing statement or a federal financing
statement that is filed in the name of an entity that is or was an immediate
ownership transferor of a Federal Intellectual Property Right.
A "federal financing statement" means a notice of a
(3)
security interest which complies with the requirements of § 3(c) of this Act
and is filed directly with the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center
created under § 3(d). Unless the context otherwise requires, the term
"federal financing statement" includes the original federal financing
statement and any filed amendments, continuations and assignments.
The "Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center"
(4)
refers to the office formed within the Department of Commerce under § 3(d)
of this Act that is charged with the creation and maintenance of the file and
associated records for federal financing statements filed with the Center and
for qualified state financing statements posted within the National Integrated
Financing Statement Database.
The term "Federal Intellectual Property Rights"
(5)
means copyrights, patents, Federal marks, mask works, plant variety
protection rights and vessel hull design protection rights.
The term "Federal mark" means a mark that is
(6)
registered pursuant to the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.), or for
which an application for such registration is pending with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.
An "immediate ownership transferor" means a
(7)
person who transfers directly to an ownership transferee any right or interest
(other than a security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual
Property Right.
The term "mark" has the meaning given in section
(8)
45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127).
The term "mask work" has the meaning given in
(9)
section 901 of title 17, United States Code.
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(10)
An "ownership transferee" means a person other
than a secured party or lien creditor who acquires any right or interest (other
than a security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property
Right.
(11)
A "qualified state financing statement" means a
financing statement that: (1) complies with the requirements for filing in the
state where filing occurs, (2) contains a description of collateral that would
be sufficient to cover the debtor's Federal Intellectual Property Rights under
§ 3(c)(1)(B) if the financing statement were a federal financing statement, (3)
is designated as such and made electronically available by the filing state to
the National Integrated Financing Statement Database as provided in § 3(f).
Unless the context otherwise requires, the term "qualified state financing
statement" includes the original federal financing statement and any filed
amendments, continuations and assignments.
(12)
The term "patent" means a patent or a pending
application for a patent under title 35, United States Code.
(13)
The term "plant variety protection rights" means a
certificate of plant variety protection or a pending application for such a
certificate under chapter 57 of title 7, United States Code.
(14)
The term "person" means an individual, corporation,
partnership, limited liability company, business trust, estate, trust,
association, joint venture, government or governmental subdivision or
agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(15)
The term "posting" with respect to an encumbering
financing statement refers either to (1) the time when a federal financing
statement is filed with the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center, or (2)
the time when a qualified state financing statement is made accessible [by
internet link or other electronic means] within the National Integrated
Financing Statement Database provided for in § 3(e).
(16)
The term "proceeds" means: (i) whatever is received
or to be received by the owner or any other party from the transfer,
disposition, license (whether or not exclusive), use or other exploitation of
Federal Intellectual Property Rights, (ii) whatever rights arise out of or are
derived from Federal Intellectual Property Rights, and (iii) whatever would
be included within the definition of "proceeds" under the applicable nonfederal law relating to security interests in personal property.
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(17)
The term "state" refers to the states of the United
States and to all possessions and territories of the United States.
(18)
The term "vessel hull design protection rights"
means a certificate of registration or a pending application for such a
certificate under chapter 13 of title 17, United States Code.
Unless otherwise provided by this Act, the terms
(19)
"authenticate", "collateral", "debtor", "financing statement", "good faith",
"general intangible", "lien creditor", knowledge," "notice," "representative"
"secured party", "security agreement', "security interest", "signed" or
"signature" and "value" shall have the meanings given to such terms under
applicable non-federal law relating to security interests in personal property.
(b) Security Interests
(1)
This section applies to all security interests in
Federal Intellectual Property Rights and in the proceeds thereof which
interests are created by contract, regardless of form and nomenclature.
The creation, attachment, perfection, effect
(2)
(A)
of perfection, priority and enforcement of a security interest in a Federal
Intellectual Property Right or in the proceeds thereof relative to all
competing rights, claims, and interests therein and licenses thereof shall be
determined by applicable non-federal law governing security interests in
personal property, except as provided in subsections (b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C).
The creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection, priority and
enforcement of any right or interest (other than a security interest) in, or
ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property Right shall be determined by
the applicable federal law governing such Federal Intellectual Property
Right.
(B)
A security interest in a Federal Intellectual
Property Right is subordinate to the rights of an ownership transferee who
gives value without knowledge of the security interest, if (i) the document
transferring ownership of the Federal Intellectual Property Right to the
ownership transferee is executed before the posting of an encumbering
financing statement covering the Federal Intellectual Property Right and (ii)
such ownership transferee makes an effective recordation of the document
transferring ownership in the manner required under applicable federal law
(as amended by Section 4 of this Act) to give priority to such transferee - (a)
within 10 days of the execution date of the document of transfer, or - (b)
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before the posting of such encumbering financing statement. [The rule in this
subsection does not displace otherwise applicable non-federal law until the
effective date provided in § 6(a).]
(C)
A security interest in any Federal
Intellectual Property Right created by a specific debtor is subordinate to the
rights of an ownership transferee of such Right who takes from the same
immediate ownership transferor as the debtor whenever such ownership
transferee has priority over that specific debtor under the applicable federal
law on recording and priority that governs such Federal Intellectual Property
Right.
(D)
A security interest in a Federal Intellectual
Property Right that has not been made subordinate under either of the two
preceding subsections has priority over such ownership transferee of such
Right if and to the extent that such security interest meets the requirements
for priority as provided under applicable non-federal law governing security
interests in personal property.
(c) Federal Financing Statements and Transfer Statements
(1) (A) A federal financing statement may be filed by a
secured party or by the debtor to give notice of the secured party's interest in
the Federal Intellectual Property Rights described in the statement. The
federal financing statement shall contain the names of the debtor and the
secured party (or its collateral agent or trustee); the mailing addresses of the
debtor and the secured party; and a description, which may be general,
specific or both, indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral.
(B)
In describihg the collateral in a federal financing
statement, a general reference to "intellectual property" or "general
intangibles" shall be sufficient to describe all of the debtor's interests in all
Federal Intellectual Property Rights, including those Federal Intellectual
Property Rights subsequently created or acquired. A general reference to
"marks", "patents," "copyrights" or "mask works" shall be sufficient to
describe all of the debtor's interests in the respective sub-category of Federal
Intellectual Property Rights, including such of those Federal Intellectual
Property Rights subsequently created or acquired.
(C)
A federal financing statement may be filed at any
time, whether before or after a security agreement is entered into or a
security interest otherwise attaches, before or after a financing statement is
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filed in a non-federal jurisdiction, or before or after a Federal Intellectual
Property Right is created or a Federal Intellectual Property Right is acquired
by the debtor.
A secured party of record in a federal financing
(D)
statement may add or delete Federal Intellectual Property Rights as collateral
or otherwise amend the information provided in a federal financing statement
by filing an amendment that describes the changed information and
identifies, by file number, the original federal financing statement to which
the amendment relates. An amendment does not extend the period of
effectiveness of a federal financing statement. If any amendment adds
collateral, it is effective as to the added collateral only from the filing date of
the amendment.
A federal financing statement sufficiently provides
(E)
the name of the debtor only if it provides the individual, partnership,
corporate, or other entity name of the debtor, whether or not it adds trade
names or names of partners. Where the debtor so changes the debtor's name,
identity, or corporate structure that a filed federal financing statement
becomes seriously misleading, that federal financing statement is not
effective with respect to Federal Intellectual Property Rights collateral
acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change [plus the
period of the filing backlog at the applicable Federal agency at the time of
such change], unless a new federal financing statement or an amendment
which renders the federal financing statement not seriously misleading is
filed before the expiration of that time. A filed federal financing statement
remains effective with respect to Federal Intellectual Property Rights
described therein that are sold, exchanged, licensed or otherwise transferred
and as to which the secured party's security interest continues, even if the
secured party knows of or consents to the disposition.
A federal financing statement substantially
(F)
complying with the requirements of this subsection is effective even if it
contains minor errors or omissions as long as such errors or omissions are
not seriously misleading.

Presentation for filing of a federal financing
(2) (A) (i)
statement and tender of the filing fee or acceptance of the federal financing
statement by the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center constitutes filing
of the federal financing statement under this subsection 3(b).
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(ii)
The Federal Intellectual Property Filing
Center shall assign to each federal financing statement a file number and
keep a record of the date and hour of filing, and shall hold the statement or
other reliable record thereof for public inspection. The Federal Intellectual
Property Filing Center shall index the federal financing statement according
to the name of the debtor and shall note in the index the file number and the
name and address of the debtor and the secured party given in the statement.
(B)
A filed federal financing statement is effective for
ten years from the date of filing. The effectiveness of a filed federal
financing statement lapses on the expiration of the ten-year period unless a
continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse.
(C)
(i)
An assignment statement ,may be filed by
the secured party of record or its assignee to disclose an assignment of a
security interest in some or all of the collateral described in a filed federal
financing statement. The assignment statement must be authenticated by the
secured party of record, must indicate the name and address of the assignee
and the file number of the original federal financing statement, and must
describe the types or items of collateral covered by the assignment. On
presentation of the assignment statement to the Federal Intellectual Property
Filing Center, the Center shall note the hour and date of filing of the
assignment statement upon the record of the original federal financing
statement.
(ii) After the filing of an assignment statement
under this Section, the assignee is the secured party of record with respect to
the Federal Intellectual Property Rights collateral covered by the assignment
statement.
(D)
A continuation statement may be filed within six
months prior to the expiration of the ten-year period specified in subsection
(c)(2)(B). Any such continuation statement must be filed by the secured
party of record or its assignee, and identify by file number the original
federal financing statement. A continuation statement filed by a person other
than the secured party of record must be accompanied by a separate
assignment statement authenticated by the secured party of record and
complying with subsection (c)(2)(C), including payment of any required fee.
Upon timely filing of the continuation statement, the effectiveness of the
original federal financing statement is continued for ten years after the last
date to which the filing was theretofore effective, whereupon it lapses in the
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same manner as provided in subsection (c)(2)(B) unless another continuation
statement is filed prior to such lapse. Succeeding continuation statements
may be filed in the same manner to continue the effectiveness of the original
federal financing statement.
(E)
Whenever there is no outstanding secured obligation
and the secured party of record is not subject to any commitment to make
advances to the debtor, incur obligations or otherwise give value, the secured
party must, within 10 days after written demand by the debtor, send to the
debtor or file with the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center a
termination statement to the effect that the secured party no longer claims a
security interest under the federal financing statement. A termination
statement authenticated by a person other than the secured party of record
must be accompanied by a separate written assignment statement
authenticated by the secured party of record and complying with subsection
(c)(2)(C), including payment of the required fee. Upon the filing of a
termination statement with the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center in
accordance with this paragraph, the federal financing statement to which the
termination statement relates ceases to be effective.
(F)
A secured party of record may by a release
statement release all or part of any Federal Intellectual Property Rights
collateral described in a filed federal financing statement. A release
statement is sufficient if it contains a description of the types or items of the
collateral being released, the name and address of the debtor, the name and
address of the secured party, and the file number of the federal financing
statement. A release statement authenticated by a person other than the
secured party of record must be accompanied by a separate assignment
statement authenticated by the secured party of record and complying with
subsection (c)(2)(C), including payment of the required fee. Upon
presentation of such a release statement to the Federal Intellectual Property
Filing Center, such office shall note the hour and date of filing of the release
statement upon the record of the original federal financing statement.
(G)
With respect to any Federal Intellectual Property
Rights that are subject to a security interest (whether or not perfected) as to
which the secured party has exercised its post-default rights or remedies, the
person that is the transferee of such Federal Intellectual Property Rights as a
result of such exercise of rights or remedies may file in the appropriate
Federal record a transfer statement that:
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(i) states the name of the debtor and the name and mailing
address of the secured party;
(ii) identifies the Federal Intellectual Property Rights
transferred;
(iii) identifies, by file number either: (1) the federal
financing statement previously filed in the Federal Intellectual Property
Filing Center by the secured party covering the Federal Intellectual Property
Rights, or (2) the qualified state financing statement previously filed by the
secured party covering Federal Intellectual Property Rights that is posted in
the National Integrated Financing Statement Database.
(iv) states the name and mailing address of the transferee of
the Federal Intellectual Property Rights (which may but need not be the
secured party); and
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(v) states that: (a) the secured party had a security interest in
the Federal Intellectual Property Rights (and, in the case of Federal marks, in
the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by
such Federal marks); (b) the debtor defaulted in connection with an
obligation secured by the Federal Intellectual Property Rights and such
default has not been cured; (c) the debtor has been given at least 5 days prior
written notice of the transfer (which notice shall be deemed given if the
secured party shall have complied with the notice requirements of applicable
non-federal law in connection with the foreclosure upon, or other disposition
of, collateral other than such Federal Intellectual Property Rights); and
(d) the identified transferee of the Federal Intellectual Property Rights has
complied with all requirements imposed by federal law as a condition to the
effectiveness of a transfer of such Federal Intellectual Property Right and is
entitled to the transfer of record of the interest of the debtor in the Federal
Intellectual Property Rights transferred by reason of the secured party's
exercise of its post-default rights or remedies in accordance with applicable
non-federal law. A transfer statement that identifies an intent to use
application under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) among the Federal Intellectual
Property Rights transferred may not be filed or recorded under this section
unless the transferee is a successor to the business of the applicant within the
meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a). A transfer statement filed or recorded in
violation of such prohibition shall have no force or effect on any of the
Federal Intellectual Property Rights identified therein.
Recordation by a transferee of such a transfer statement in the
appropriate federal record and in the manner required under applicable
federal law (as amended by Section 4 of this Act) to give priority to such
transferee's interest in the Federal Intellectual Property Right shall, if the
transferee has complied with all other requirements imposed by federal law
as a condition to the effectiveness of a transfer of such Federal Intellectual
Property Right, serve as an effective document of transfer to the identified
transferee, of the interest of the debtor and the secured party in the Federal
Intellectual Property Rights transferred.
Such recordation of the transfer
statement shall also be effective for all public record purposes under the
appropriate federal recording requirement.
The Register of Copyrights, subject to the approval of the Librarian
of Congress, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, under the
direction of the Secretary of Commerce, and the Plant Vari.ety Protection
Office shall promulgate final regulations to implement the federal transfer
statement established by this subsection not later than
days after the date
-
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of enactment of this Act, and those regulations shall become effective not
later than _ days after the date of enactment of this Act.
Federal marks shall be transferable to the secured party in
(3)
accordance with applicable non-federal law and subsection (c)(2)(G) above
even though such party does not engage in or intend to enter the business to
which the Federal mark relates, provided that the secured party holds the
Federal mark only for the purpose of subsequently transferring it along with
the goodwill relating to the Federal mark, and that such subsequent transfer
occurs [prior to the dissipation of the goodwill] [within a period no longer
than __ months from the initial transfer].
(4)
Any person that files a federal financing statement,
amendment, assignment statement, continuation statement, 'termination
statement, release statement or transfer statement that the person is not
entitled to file shall be liable for damages to the debtor or secured party in
the amount of any loss proximately caused by such filing, which may include
loss resulting from the debtor's inability to obtain, or increased costs of,
alternative financing. In addition to any damages recoverable by a debtor
under the preceding sentence, the debtor may recover from such person
$1,000. A prevailing party in any action under this paragraph may recover
reasonable attorneys' fees from the non-prevailing parties.
Whenever there is no outstanding secured obligation of a
(5)
debtor to the secured party of record and the secured party is not subject to
any commitment to make advances to the debtor, incur obligations or
otherwise give value, if within ten days after written demand therefor by the
debtor the secured party fails to either file a termination statement or send to
the debtor such a termination statement, the secured party shall be liable to
the debtor for $1,000. A prevailing party in any action under this paragraph
may recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the non-prevailing parties.
Notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1338, the
(6)
federal district courts and the courts of the states shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to any civil action arising under paragraphs (4) or
(5) above.
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(d) Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center
The Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks, the Register of Copyrights and the Plant Variety
Protection Office shall establish the Federal Intellectual Property Filing
Center. The Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center shall: (1) receive
and manage the filings of federal financing statements as defined in § 3(a)(3)
and provided for in § 3(c)(1)&(2), (2) create and manage the National
Integrated Financing Statement Database provided for under the next section
and, (3) serve as a repository for such other information about Federal
Intellectual Property Rights as is necessary or useful in carrying out the
statutory or treaty obligations of the United States.
(e) National Integrated Financing Statement Database
The Secretary of Commerce shall maintain an internet accessible
information database within the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center
that contains or serves as an electronic repository for qualified state financing
statements defined under § 3(a)(1 1) and properly designated and made
available as such by state security interest filing offices under § 3(f). The
Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center shall keep, by electronic means, a
record of the date and hour when a qualified state financing statement was
posted to the Database. Qualified state financing statements "posted" to the
National Integrated Financing Statement Database within the meaning of §
3(a)(15) shall be electronically integrated by the Federal Intellectual Property
Filing Center with federal financing statements filed directly with the Center.
The database(s) maintained by the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center
shall be adequate to search and identify security interests by the name of the
debtor. The Center shall develop an electronic system to efficiently integrate
the debtor name information in such database(s) with the names of
immediate ownership transferors and ownership transferees that appear in the
applicable federal intellectual property records.
(f) Designation of Qualified State Financing Statements
(1)
In order for a financing statement filed under state
law to be properly designated as a "qualified state financing statement": (1)
the financing statement form used by the state must provide a means for the
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secured party to mark or otherwise indicate that the statement covers all or
any of the debtor's general intangibles and the original financing statement
filed must be so indicated or marked, (2) the financing statement must be
filed in electronic record form under the applicable non-federal law or
transcribed in electronic record form under state filing office guidelines that
call for such transcription to occur within no more than 5 business days after
the state law filing date for such financing statement and, (3) the financing
statement and all subsequent amendments continuations and assignments
must be made available in electronic record form so as to enable their
integration [by internet link or other electronic means] with similarly
designated financing statements from other states within the National
Integrated Financing Statement Database.
Financing statements that are properly designated as
(2)
qualified state financing statements under the preceding subsection, that
otherwise satisfy the definition in § 3(a)(1 1), and that are posted in the
National Integrated Financing Statement Database are the equivalent of a
filed federal financing statement under the priority provisions in § 3(b).
(g) Financing Statement Certificates
Upon request and tender of the required fee, the Federal Intellectual
Property Filing Center shall issue a certificate showing whether there is on
file in the integrated database referred to in § 3(e) on the date and hour stated
therein, any effective federal financing statement or qualified state financing
statement naming a particular debtor and any assignment statement thereof
and, if there is, giving the date and hour of filing or posting of each such
statement, the collateral covered, and the name and address of each secured
party therein.

(h) Availability of Record Information
If the person filing any federal financing statement,
(1)
amendment, assignment statement, continuation statement, termination
statement, release statement or transfer statement furnishes the Federal
Intellectual Property Filing Center a copy thereof, the Center shall upon
request note upon the copy the file number and date and hour of the filing of
the original and deliver or send the copy to such person. The Center may
charge a fee for such record information as specified in subsection (i).
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(2)
If the person filing any qualified state financing
statement, or any subsequent amendment, assignment statement,
continuation statement, termination statement, release statement or transfer
statement furnishes the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center a copy
thereof, the Center shall upon request note upon the copy the date and hour
when the original was posted in the National Integrated Financing Statement
Database and deliver or send the copy to such person. The Center may
charge a fee for such record information as specified in subsection (i).
(3)
Copies or reproductions of filed federal financing
statements or qualified state financing statements that have been posted in
the National Integrated Financing Statement Database and other filings
related thereto shall be furnished by the end of the fifth business day after
request and payment of the fees specified by subsection (i).
(i) Fees
The fees for filings and other recording services in the National
Intellectual Property Filing Center under this Act shall be established by the
Secretary of Commerce.
(j) Regulatory Authority
The Secretary of Commerce shall promulgate final regulations to
implement the functions of the Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center
and the National Integrated Financing Statement Database established under
this Act not later than _ days after the date of enactment of this Act, and
those regulations shall become effective not later than __ days after the date
of enactment of this Act. The Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center is
authorized to maintain a filing system utilizing electronic, voice, optical, and
other information transmission, storage, processing, maintenance and
retrieval technologies. The Federal Intellectual Property Filing Center shall
also issue such other regulations as they determine to be appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this Act, including regulations, if any, necessary and
sufficient to permit submission and retrieval of information from the
database(s) established pursuant to § 3(e).
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SECTION 4. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO STATUTES
DEALING WITH FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

(a) Copyright Act and Mask Works.
(1) Replace the existing definition of "transfer of copyright
ownership" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 with the following:
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, exclusive
license or any other conveyance or alienation of a copyright or of
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not
it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license or the grant of a security interest.
(2) Amend 17 U.S.C. §205(d) to read as follows:
(d)

Priority between conflicting transfers,- As between
two conflicting transfers of copyright ownership, the
one executed first prevails if it is recorded, in the
manner required to give constructive notice under
subsection (c), at any time before recordation in
such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later
transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner,
and if taken in good faith, for value, and without
notice of the earlier transfer. A lien creditor
(whether real or provided for in hypothetical form
under Title 11 of the United States Code) is not a
transferee for value under the preceding sentence.

(3) Add a new 17 U.S.C. §205(0 to read as follows:
(f)
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required to be recorded under section 205; and the
recordation of a document under section 205 shall
not give constructive notice of any fact relating to
the existence or priority of any security interest;
provided, however, that transfer statements
submitted in accordance with section 3(c)(2)(G) of
the Intellectual Property Collateral Coordination Act
shall be recorded and once recorded shall give
constructive notice under subsection (a) of the
contents thereof.
(4) Amend 17 U.S.C. §903(c) to read as follows:
(c)
(1)
Any document pertaining to a mask work
may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the
document filed for recordation bears the actual
signature of the person who executed it, or if it is
accompanied by a sworn or official certification that
it is a true copy of the original, signed document.
The Copyright Office shall, upon receipt of the
document and the fee specified pursuant to
subsection 908(d), record the document and return it
with a certificate of recordation. The recordation of
any transfer or license under this paragraph gives all
persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the
recorded document concerning the transfer or
license.
(2)
Notwithstanding subsections 903(a)-(d), the
provisions of section 903 shall not apply to the
creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection,
priority or enforcement of a security interest in a
mask work or the proceeds thereof; no document
creating, evidencing or otherwise relating to the
creation or perfection of a security interest shall be
required to be recorded under section 903; and the
recordation of a document under section 903 shall
not give constructive notice of any fact relating to
the existence or priority of any security interest;
provided, however, that transfer statements
submitted in accordance with subsection 3(c)(2)(G)
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of the Intellectual Property Collateral Coordination
Act shall be recorded and shall give constructive
notice under subsection (a) of the contents thereof.

(b)

Lanham Act

Replace 15 U.S.C. §1060 with the following:
§ 1060. Assignment of mark; execution; recording; purchaser
without notice
A registered mark or a mark for which an application to
register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill
of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by
the mark. However, no application to register a mark under
section 1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to the
filing of the amendment under section 1051(a) or the
verified statement of use under section 1051(d) of this title,
except to a successor to the business of the applicant, or
portion thereof, to which the mark pertains, if that business
is ongoing and existing. In any assignment authorized by
this section or by sectioni 3(c) of the Intellectual Property
Collateral Coordination Act, it shall not be necessary to
include the goodwill of the business connected with the use
of and symbolized by any other mark used in the business or
by the name or style under which the business is conducted.
Assignments shall be by instruments in writing duly
executed. Acknowledgment shall be prima facie evidence of
the execution of an assignment and when recorded in the
Patent and Trademark Office the record shall be prima facie
evidence of execution. An assignment (but not of a security
interest in a registered trademark or a in an application to
register) shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser
for a valuable consideration without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office prior to such
A separate record of assignments
subsequent purchase.
submitted for recording hereunder shall be maintained in the
Patent and Trademark Office. An assignee not domiciled in
the United States shall be subject to and comply with the

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

385

provisions of section 1051(e) of this title. Except as
provided in sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the Intellectual
Property Collateral Coordination Act, the rights and
obligations of all persons with respect to a security interest
in a registered trademark, an application to register, or the
proceeds of either, including matters of creation, attachment,
perfection, effect of perfection, priority, and enforcement,
shall be governed by non-federal law relating to security
interests in personal property.

(c)

Patent Act

Amend the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §261 to read as follows:
An assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent application
or a patent (but not of a security interest in a patent
application or a patent) shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within ten days
from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent
purchase. Except as provided in section 3(b) and 3(c) of the
Intellectual Property Collateral Coordination Act, the rights
and obligations of all persons with respect to a security
interest in a patent, a patent application, or the proceeds of
either, including matters of creation, attachment, perfection,
effect of perfection, priority, and enforcement, shall be
governed by non-federal law relating to security interests in
personal property.
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(d)-(f) RESERVED FOR CONFORMING AMENDMENTS
TO THE PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT, 7
U.S.C. §2321 et seq, THE VESSEL HULL DESIGN
PROTECTION ACT, 17 U.S.C. §501 et seq. AND
CHAPTER 180 OF TITLE 28, U.S. CODE
(ASSUMPTION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
RELATED TO TRANSFERS OF RIGHTS IN MOTION
PICTURES)
(g)

Accommodation of New Filing Technologies

All references in this Act and in the Lanham Act, the Patent Act and
the Copyright Act to filings relating to security interests shall not be limited
to paper documents but shall include electronic, voice, optical, and such
other information transmission, storage, processing, maintenance, and
retrieval technologies as shall be approved for such purposes by the Federal
Intellectual Property Filing Center, the Register of Copyrights, the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and the Plant Variety Protection
Office from time to time.

SECTION 5. REPORT TO CONGRESS
Committee
The Secretary of Commerce shall report to the
days after the enactment of
not later than
of the
this Act regarding their plans to comply with the requirements of this Act.

SECTION 6. EFFECTIVE DATES
This Act shall become effective on the date of enactment,
(a)
except that the provisions of section 3(c)(2)(G) shall not become
effective until the effective date of the regulations described therein
and the provisions of sections 3(b)(2)(B), 3(c)(1), 3(c)(2)(A)-(F),
3(d)-(i) shall not become effective until the effective date of the
regulations described in subsection 3(j)
Section 3(b)(2)(A), (C) & (D) shall apply to all security
(b)
interests in effect under applicable non-federal law on the date of
enactment.
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APPENDIx 2 - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY INTEREST
COORDINATION ACT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY INTEREST
COORDINATION ACT

106th Congress; Ist Session
In the [House of Representatives/Senate]
[H.R/S.] No.
SYNOPSIS:
AN ACT to facilitate the efficient use of federal intellectual property as
collateral by linking the current federal tract recording systems covering
federal intellectual property title with the existing and developing state filing
systems for perfecting security interests in all forms of intangible personal
property and to create for that purpose a central notice filing database for
state security interest filings that cover federal intellectual property.

DATE OF INTRODUCTION:

,2001

SPONSORS:[

TEXT:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Intellectual Property Security Interest
Coordination Act."
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SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
Enterprises of all size must be able to finance their
business activities by obtaining secured credit. Secured financing is often
critical to the research and development that leads to the creation of
intellectual property. The more secure and predictable the lender's rights
and security are, the better terms the borrower can obtain. Conversely, the
risk of loss, subordination, impairment or other uncertainties with respect to
collateral inhibit the financing desired by all parties. Predictability and
uniformity of treatment with respect to intellectual property collateral further
the interests of all parties involved in related commercial transactions
whether those parties are intellectual property owners, licensees, or their
lenders.
(2)
In many cases, a company's intellectual property is
among the assets most valuable and useful as collateral in obtaining desired
financing. Increasingly, companies' assets and entrepreneurial energies are
focused on a combination of various forms of intellectual property, and the
same product or process may involve a combination of patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property. Moreover, these
intellectual property assets may be protected under the laws of other nations
and prospective financers of these assets may be located outside the United
States.
(3)
The law governing security interests in all forms of
personal property (including intangible forms) has historically been state
law. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as recently revised,
provides a uniform structure for this law between and among the various
states. However, the most important forms of intangible intellectual property
are either created or enhanced by federal statutory provisions that provide
their own recording systems for tracking title and ownership rights in this
property. Courts have struggled with the question of whether and to what
extent these somewhat dated federal recording statutes should displace the
generally well-conceived state law structure (Article 9) when the rights of
secured parties in federal intellectual property are at stake. The federal tract
recording statutes embrace security interests only as a form or variant of title
to specific items of property recorded under specific property numbers.
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Furthermore these federal recording provisions vary depending on whether
the intellectual property is patents, copyrights or trademarks.
(4)
Some federal lower court decisions have held that the
only way to perfect a security interest in a copyright, in material that is
copyrightable, or in proceeds of such material is to file the equivalent of a
copyright mortgage with the U.S. Copyright Office. These decisions include
In re PeregrineEntertainmentLtd., 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal.1990); In re AEG
Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), amended 161 B.R.
50 (9th Cir. BAP 1993); and In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997). In something of a retreat from this position, one
recent bankruptcy court decision has concluded that federal recording of a
security interest in a copyright is necessary only where the copyright is
registered. In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R. 149 (Bankr. N.D.
Calif. 1999).
The cases involving patent collateral have generally upheld secured
party lien perfection through state notice filings (Article 9) against the
bankruptcy trustee - but have uniformly suggested that the same financing
secured party must make a federal assignment filing with the USPTO to be
protected against later assignees or mortgagees who take and record patent
title instruments. See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920 at
n.8 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). See also City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric,
Inc, 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988), relying on, In re TransportationDesign
and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639, 40 UCC 1393, 1398 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1985).
The cases involve trademark collateral have found state law (Article
9) filing sufficient notice. However, this state law notice has not been tested
in the cases against an assignee of a mark who relies exclusively on the
federal assignment record. See Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co.,
43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.
1986); In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). See
also In re C.C. & Co., 85 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)("A grant of a
security interest is merely a device to secure indebtedness.")
(5)
Because they are tract type systems that rely on
specific assigned property numbers, the federal systems for registering
interests in intellectual property, unlike the Article 9-based state filing
systems, do not provide for notice filing under the debtor's name, for generic
descriptions of collateral, or for perfection of security interests in
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subsequently-acquired property. As a result of the structural rigidity of the
current federal recording provisions, companies seeking financing and their
lenders have either had to incur the time and expense of additional and
frequent recordings and registrations that would not otherwise have been
made, or forego financing opportunities.
(6)
This Act makes substantive and procedural changes
to the law in order to integrate notice filings covering security interests from
the various states and the federal intellectual property records in order to
facilitate the efficient financing of federal intellectual property, consistent
with the rights of owners and assignees of interests in such property.

(b) Purposes
Based upon the powers contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 and other provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, the purposes of this Act are:
(1)
To promote financing and development of federal
intellectual property assets by clarifying the methods for perfecting security
interests in such collateral, and by making all forms of intellectual property
collateral as accessible, valuable and useful as possible;
(2)
To assist businesses (and, through them, consumers
and others) in obtaining credit on the best available terms; and
(3)
To lessen the burdens on interstate commerce and
commerce between the United States and other nations by reducing legal
risks associated with the inconsistent treatment of different types of federal
intellectual property.
(4)
To provide an accessible integrated national filing
system built around an integrated database for all security interests that cover
this important federal statutory property and to enable future international
access to and integration with this system and database.
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SECTION 3. SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FEDERAL LAW

(a) Definitions
The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this Act:
(1)

The term "copyright" means any of the exclusive rights comprised in
a copyright under chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, whether or
not registered under chapter 4 of such title.

(2)

The "Federal Intellectual Property Data Center" refers to the office
formed within the Department of Commerce under § 3(d) of this Act
that is charged with the creation and maintenance of the file and
associated records connected with qualified state financing statements
posted within the National Integrated Financing Statement Database.

(3)

The term "Federal Intellectual Property Rights" means copyrights,
patents, Federal marks, mask works, plant variety protection rights
and vessel hull design protection rights.

(4)

The term "Federal mark" means a mark that is registered pursuant to
the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.), or for which an application
for such registration is pending with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.

(5)

An "immediate ownership transferor" means a person who transfers
directly to an ownership transferee any right or interest (other than a
security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property
Right.

(6)

The term "mark" has the meaning given in section 45 of the Lanham
Act (15 U.S.C. §1127).

(7)

The term "mask work" has the meaning given in section 901 of title
17, United States Code.

(8)

An "ownership transferee" means a person other than a secured party
or lien creditor who acquires any right or interest (other than a
security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property
Right.
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(9)

A "qualified state financing statement" means a financing statement
that: (1) is filed under applicable non-federal law governing security
interests in personal property and in compliance with the requirements
for filing in the state where filing occurs, (2) contains a description of
collateral that would be sufficient to cover the debtor's Federal
Intellectual Property Rights under applicable non-federal law and, (3)
is designated as such and made electronically available by the filing
state to the National Integrated Financing Statement Database as
provided in § 3(f). Unless the context otherwise requires, the term
"qualified state financing statement" includes the original federal
financing statement and any filed amendments, continuations and
assignments.

(10)

The term "patent" means a patent or a pending application for a patent
under title 35, United States Code.

(11)

The term "plant variety protection rights" means a certificate of plant
variety protection or a pending application for such a certificate under
chapter 57 of title 7, United States Code.

(12)

The term "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership,
limited liability company, business trust, estate, trust, association,
joint venture, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or
any other legal or commercial entity.

(13)

The term "posting" with respect to
statement refers to the time when such
[by internet link or other electronic
Integrated Financing Statement Database

(14)

The term "state" refers to the states of the United States and to all
possessions and territories of the United States.

(15)

The term "vessel hull design protection rights" means a certificate of
registration or a pending application for such a certificate under
chapter 13 of title 17, United States Code.
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Unless otherwise provided by this Act, the terms "authenticate",
"collateral", "debtor", "financing statement", "good faith", "general
intangible", "lien creditor", knowledge", "notice", "proceeds",
"representative" "secured party", "security agreement", "security
interest", "signed" or "signature" and "value" shall have the meanings
given to such terms under applicable non-federal law relating to
security interests in personal property.

(b) Security Interests
This section applies .to all security interests in Federal
(1)
Intellectual Property Rights and in the proceeds thereof which interests are
created by contract, regardless of form and nomenclature.
The creation, attachment, perfection, effect of
(A)
(2)
perfection, priority and enforcement of a security interest in a Federal
Intellectual Property Right or in the proceeds thereof relative to all
competing rights, claims, and interests therein and licenses thereof shall be
determined by applicable non-federal law governing security interests in
personal property, except as provided in subsections (b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C).
The creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection, priority and
enforcement of any right or interest (other than a security interest) in, or
ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property Right shall be determined by
the applicable federal law governing such Federal Intellectual Property
Right.
A security interest in a Federal Intellectual Property
(B)
Right is subordinate to the rights of an ownership transferee who gives value
without knowledge of the security interest, if (i) the document transferring
the Federal Intellectual Property Right to the ownership transferee is
executed before the posting of a qualified state financing statement that
names as a debtor a person that is or was an immediate ownership transferor
of such Federal Intellectual Property Right and, (ii) such ownership
transferee makes an effective recordation of the transfer document in the
manner required under applicable federal law (as amended by Section 4 of
this Act) to give priority to such transferee - (a) within 10 days of the
execution date of the document of transfer or - (b) before the posting of such
[The rule in this subsection does not
qualified state financing statement.
displace otherwise applicable non-federal law until the effective date
provided in § 6(a).]
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(C)
A security interest in any Federal Intellectual
Property Right created by a specific debtor is subordinate to the rights of an
ownership transferee of such Right who takes from the same immediate
ownership transferor as the debtor whenever such ownership transferee has
priority over that specific debtor under the applicable federal law on
recording and priority that governs such Federal Intellectual Property Right.
(D)
A security interest in a Federal Intellectual Property
Right that has not been made subordinate under either of the two preceding
subsections has priority over such ownership transferee of such Right if and
to the extent that such security interest meets the requirements for priority as
provided under applicable non-federal law governing security interests in
personal property.
(c) Federal Transfer Statements
(1)
With respect to any Federal Intellectual Property Rights that
are subject to a security interest (whether or not perfected) as to which the
secured party has exercised its post-default rights or remedies, the person
that is the transferee of such Federal Intellectual Property Rights as a result
of such exercise of rights or remedies may file in the appropriate Federal
record a transfer statement that:
(i) states the name of the debtor and the name and mailing
address of the secured party;
(ii) identifies the Federal Intellectual Property Rights
transferred;
(iii) identifies, by file number the qualified state financing
statement previously filed by the secured party covering
Federal Intellectual Property Rights that is posted in the
National Integrated Financing Statement Database.
(iv) states the name and mailing address of the transferee of
the Federal Intellectual Property Rights (which may but need
not be the secured party); and
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(v) states that: (a) the secured party had a security interest in the
Federal Intellectual Property Rights (and, in the case of Federal
marks, in the goodwill of the business connected with the use of
and symbolized by such Federal marks); (b) the debtor defaulted
in connection with an obligation secured by the Federal
Intellectual Property Rights and such default has not been cured;
(c) the debtor has been given at least 5 days prior written notice
of the transfer (which notice shall be deemed given if the
secured party shall have complied with the notice requirements
of applicable non-federal law in connection with the foreclosure
upon, or other disposition of, collateral other than such Federal
Intellectual Property Rights); and (d) the identified transferee of
the Federal Intellectual Property Rights has complied with all
requirements imposed by federal law as a condition to the
effectiveness of a transfer of such Federal Intellectual Property
Right and is entitled to the transfer of record of the interest of the
debtor in the Federal Intellectual Property Rights transferred by
reason of the secured party's exercise of its post-default rights or
remedies in accordance with applicable non-federal law. A
transfer statement that identifies an intent to use application
under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) among the Federal Intellectual
Property Rights transferred may not be filed or recorded under
this section unless the transferee is a successor to the business of
the applicant debtor within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a).
A transfer statement filed or recorded in violation of such
prohibition shall have no force or effect on any of the. Federal
Intellectual Property Rights identified therein.
Recordation by a transferee of such a transfer statement in the
appropriate federal record and in the manner required under
applicable federal law (as amended by Section 4 of this Act) to
give priority to such transferee's interest in the Federal
Intellectual Property Right shall, if the transferee has complied
with all other requirements imposed by federal law as a
condition to the effectiveness of a transfer of such Federal
Intellectual Property Right, serve as an effective document of
transfer to the identified transferee, of the interest of the debtor
and the secured party in the Federal Intellectual Property Rights
transferred.
Such recordation of the transfer statement shall
also be effective for all public record purposes under the
appropriate federal recording requirement.
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(2)
Federal marks shall be transferable to the secured party in
accordance with applicable non-federal law and under the preceding
subsection even though such party does not engage in or intend to enter the
business to which the Federal mark relates, provided that the secured party
holds the Federal mark only for the purpose of subsequently transferring it
along with the goodwill relating to the Federal mark, and that such
subsequent transfer occurs [prior to the dissipation of the goodwill][within a
period no longer than __ months from the initial transfer.]
(3)
The Register of Copyrights, subject to the approval of the
Librarian of Congress, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, under
the direction of the Secretary of Commerce, and the Plant Variety Protection
Office shall promulgate final regulations to implement the federal transfer
statement established by this subsection not later than
days after the date
of enactment of this Act, and those regulations shall become effective not
later than _ days after the date of enactment of this Act.
-

(d) Federal Intellectual Property Data Center
The Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks, the Register of Copyrights and the Plant Variety
Protection Office shall establish the Federal Intellectual Property Data
Center. The Federal Intellectual Property Data Center shall: (1) create and
manage the National Integrated Financing Statement Database provided for
under the next section and, (2) serve as a repository for such other
information about Federal Intellectual Property Rights as is necessary or
useful in carrying out the statutory or treaty obligations of the United States.
(e) National Integrated Financing Statement Database
The Secretary of Commerce shall maintain an Internet accessible
information database within the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center
that contains or serves as an electronic repository for qualified state financing
statements defined under § 3(a)(l 1) and properly designated and made
available as such by state security interest filing offices under § 3(f). The
Federal Intellectual Property Data Center shall keep, by electronic means, a
record of the date and hour when a qualified state financing statement was
posted to the Database. Qualified state financing statements "posted" to the
National Integrated Financing Statement Database within the meaning of §
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3(a)(15) shall be electronically integrated by the Federal Intellectual Property
Data Center with all other similar statements. The database(s) maintained by
the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center shall be adequate to search and
identify security interests by the name of the debtor. The Center shall
develop an electronic system to efficiently integrate the debtor name
information in such database(s) with the names of immediate ownership
transferors and ownership transferees that appear in the applicable federal
intellectual property records.
(f) Designation of Qualified State Financing Statements
(1)
In order for a financing statement filed under state law to be
properly designated as a "qualified state financing statement": (1) the
financing statement form used by the state must provide a means for the
secured party to mark or otherwise indicate that the statement covers all or
any of the debtor's general intangibles and the original financing statement
filed must be so indicated or marked, (2) the financing statement must be
filed in electronic record form under the applicable non-federal law or
transcribed in electronic record form under state filing office guidelines that
call for such transcription to occur within no more than 5 business days after
the state law filing date for such financing statement and, (3) the financing
statement and all subsequent amendments continuations and assignments
must be made available in electronic record form so as to enable their
integration [by internet link or other electronic means] with similarly
designated financing statements from other states within the National
Integrated Financing Statement Database.
(2)
Financing statements that are properly designated as
qualified state financing statements under the preceding subsection, that
otherwise satisfy the definition in § 3(a)(1 1), and that are posted in the
National Integrated Financing Statement Database provide notice of the
underlying security interest within the meaning of § 3(b).

(g) Financing Statement Certificates
Upon request and tender of the required fee, the Federal Intellectual
Property Data Center shall issue a certificate showing whether there is on file
in the integrated database referred to in § 3(e) on the date and hour stated
therein, any qualified state financing statement naming a particular debtor
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and any assignment statement thereof and, if there is, giving the date and
hour of the posting of each such statement, the collateral covered, and the
name and address of each secured party therein.
(h) Availability of Record Information
(1)
If the person filing any qualified state financing statement,
or any subsequent amendment, assignment statement, continuation
statement, termination statement, release statement or transfer statement
furnishes the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center a copy thereof, the
Center shall upon request note upon the copy the date and hour when the
original was posted in the National Integrated Financing Statement Database
and deliver or send the copy to such person. The Center may charge a fee for
such record information as specified in subsection (i).
(2)
Copies or reproductions of qualified state financing
statements that have been posted in the National Integrated Financing
Statement Database and other filings related thereto shall be furnished by the
end of the fifth business day after request and payment of the fees specified
by subsection (i).
(i) Fees
The fees for filings and other recording services in the National
Intellectual Property Filing Center under this Act shall be established by the
Secretary of Commerce.
(j) Regulatory Authority
The Secretary of Commerce shall promulgate final regulations to
implement the functions of the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center and
the National Integrated Financing Statement Database established under this
Act not later than _ days after the date of enactment of this Act, and those
regulations shall become effective not later than __ days after the date of
enactment of this Act. The Federal Intellectual Property Data Center is
authorized to maintain databases utilizing electronic, voice, optical, and other
information transmission, storage, processing, maintenance and retrieval
technologies. The Federal Intellectual Property Data Center shall also issue
such other regulations as they determine to be appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this Act, including regulations, if any, necessary and sufficient to
permit submission and retrieval of information from the database(s)
established pursuant to § 3(e).
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SECTION 4. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO STATUTES
DEALING WITH FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(a)

Copyright Act and Mask Works.

Replace the existing definition of "transfer of copyright
(1)
ownership" in 17 U.S.C. §101 with the following:
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, exclusive
license or any other conveyance or alienation of a copyright or of
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not
it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license or the grant of a security interest.
(2)

Amend 17 U.S.C. §205(d) to read as follows:
(d)

Priority between conflicting transfers - As between
two conflicting transfers of copyright ownership, the
one executed first prevails if it is recorded, in the
manner required to give constructive notice under
subsection (c), at any time before recordation in
such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later
transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner,
and if taken in good faith, for value, and without
notice of the earlier transfer. A lien creditor
(whether real or provided for in hypothetical form
under Title 11 of the United States Code) is not a
transferee for value under the preceding sentence.

(3) Add a new 17 U.S.C. §205(f) to read as follows:
(f)

Notwithstanding subsections 205(a)-(e), the
provisions of section 205 shall not apply to the
creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection,
priority or enforcement of a security interest in a
copyright or the proceeds thereof; no document
creating, evidencing or otherwise relating to the
creation or perfection of a security interest shall be
required to be recorded under section 205; and the
recordation of a document under section 205 shall
not give constructive notice of any fact relating to
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the existence or priority of any security interest;
provided, however, that transfer statements
submitted in accordance with section 3(c)(2)(G) of
the Intellectual Property Security Interest
Coordination Act shall be recorded and once
recorded shall give constructive notice under
subsection (a) of the contents thereof.
(4) Amend 17 U.S.C. §903(c) to read as follows:
(c)
(1)
Any document pertaining to a mask work
may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the
document filed for recordation bears the actual
signature of the person who executed it, or if it is
accompanied by a sworn or official certification that
it is a true copy of the original, signed document.
The Copyright Office shall, upon receipt of the
document and the fee specified pursuant to
subsection 908(d), record the document and return it
with a certificate of recordation. The recordation of
any transfer or license under this paragraph gives all
persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the
recorded document concerning the transfer or
license.
(2)
Notwithstanding subsections 903(a)-(d), the
provisions of section 903 shall not apply to the
creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection,
priority or enforcement of a security interest in a
mask work or the proceeds thereof, no document
creating, evidencing or otherwise relating to the
creation or perfection of a security interest shall be
required to be recorded under section 903; and the
recordation of a document under section 903 shall
not give constructive notice of any fact relating to
the existence or priority of any security interest;
provided, however, that transfer statements
submitted in accordance with subsection 3(c)(2)(G)
of the Intellectual Property Security Interest
Coordination Act shall be recorded and shall give
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constructive notice under subsection (a) of the
contents thereof.
(b)

Lanham Act
Replace 15 U.S.C. §1060 with the following:
§ 1060. Assignment of mark; execution; recording; purchaser
without notice
A registered mark or a mark for which an application to
register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill
of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by
the mark. However, no application to register a mark under
section 1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to the
filing of the amendment under section 1051(a) or the
verified statement of use under section 1051(d) of this title,
except to a successor to the business of the applicant, or
portion thereof, to which the mark pertains, if that business
is ongoing and existing. In any assignment authorized by
this section or by section 3(c) of the Intellectual Property
Security Interest Coordination Act, it shall not be necessary
to include the goodwill of the business connected with the
use of and symbolized by any other mark used in the
business or by the name or style under which the business is
conducted. Assignments shall be by instruments in writing
duly executed. Acknowledgment shall be prima facie
evidence of the execution of an assignment and when
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office the record shall
be prima facie evidence of execution. An assignment (but
not of a security interest in a registered trademark or an
application to register) shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office prior to such subsequent purchase. A separate record
of assignments submitted for recording hereunder shall be
maintained in the Patent and Trademark Office. An assignee
not domiciled in the United States shall be subject to and
comply with the provisions of section 1051(e) of this title.
Except as provided in sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the
Intellectual Property Security Interest Coordination Act, the
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rights and obligations of all persons with respect to a
security interest in a registered trademark, an application to
register, or the proceeds of either, including matters of
creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection,
priority, and enforcement, shall be governed by non-federal
law relating to security interests in personal property.

(c)

Patent Act
Amend the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §261 to read as follows:
An assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent application
or a patent (but not of a security interest in a patent
application or a patent) shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within ten days
from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent
purchase. Except as provided in section 3(b) and 3(c) of the
Intellectual Property Security Interest Coordination Act, the
rights and obligations of all persons with respect to a
security interest in a patent, a patent application, or the
proceeds of either, including matters of creation, attachment,
perfection, effect of perfection, priority, and enforcement,
shall be governed by non-federal law relating to security
interests in personal property.
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(d)-(f) RESERVED FOR CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT, 7 U.S.C. §2321 et seq,
THE VESSEL HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT, 17 U.S.C.
§501 et seq. AND CHAPTER 180 OF TITLE 28, U.S. CODE
(ASSUMPTION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
RELATED TO TRANSFERS OF RIGHTS IN MOTION
PICTURES)
(g)

Accommodation of New Filing Technologies

All references in this Act and in the Lanham Act, the Patent Act and
the Copyright Act to filings relating to security interests shall not be limited
to paper documents but shall include electronic, voice, optical, and such
other information transmission, storage, processing, maintenance, and
retrieval technologies as shall be approved for such purposes by the Federal
Intellectual Property Data Center, the Register of Copyrights, the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and the Plant Variety Protection
Office from time to time.

SECTION 5. REPORT TO CONGRESS
The Secretary of Commerce shall report to the
of the

not later than

Committee
days after the enactment of

this Act regarding their plans to comply with the requirements of this Act.

SECTION 6. EFFECTIVE DATES
(a)
This Act shall become effective on the date of enactment,
except that the provisions of section 3(c) shall not become effective until the
effective date of the regulations described in subsection 3(c)(3) and the
provisions of sections 3(b)(2)(B) and 3(d) - 3(i) shall not become effective
until the effective date of the regulations described in subsection 3(j).
(b)
Section 3(b)(2)(A), (C) & (D) shall apply to all security
interests in effect under applicable non-federal law on the date of enactment.
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APPENDIX 3 - SECURITY INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RESTORATION ACT

SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RESTORATION ACT
106th Congress; 1st Session
In the [House of Representatives/Senate]
[H.R/S.] No.

SYNOPSIS:
AN ACT to facilitate the efficient use of federal intellectual property as
collateral by providing for a Federal Intellectual Property Data Center that
will gather lien information from various state filing offices and make that
information accessible to transferees of federal intellectual property and to
confirm that the traditional, practical and appropriate state law on security
interest in personal property is not preempted by the tract recording
provisions of existing federal intellectual property statutes.
DATE OF INTRODUCTION:

SPONSORS:

,2001

r

TEXT:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Security Interests in Intellectual Property
Restoration Act."
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SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
Enterprises of all size must be able to finance their
business activities by obtaining secured credit. Secured financing is often
critical to the research and development that leads to the creation of
intellectual property. The more secure and predictable the lender's rights
and security are, the better terms the borrower can obtain. Conversely, the
risk of loss, subordination, impairment or other uncertainties with respect to
collateral inhibit the financing desired by all parties. Predictability and
uniformity of treatment with respect to intellectual property collateral further
the interests of all parties involved in related commercial transactions
whether those parties are intellectual property owners, licensees, or their
lenders.
(2)
In many cases, a company's intellectual property is
among the assets most valuable and useful as collateral in obtaining desired
financing. Increasingly, companies' assets and entrepreneurial energies are
focused on a combination of various forms of intellectual property, and the
same product or process may involve a combination of patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property. Moreover, these
intellectual property assets may be protected under the laws of other nations
and prospective financers of these assets may be located outside the United
States.
(3)
The law governing security interests in all forms of
personal property (including intangible forms) has historically been state
law. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as recently revised,
provides a uniform structure for this law between and among the various
states. Despite this well conceived uniform state law structure for security
interests generally, the most important forms of intangible intellectual
property are either created or enhanced by federal statutory provisions that
provide their own recording systems for tracking title and ownership rights in
this property. Courts have struggled with the question of whether and to
what extent these somewhat dated federal recording statutes should displace
the generally well-conceived state law structure (Article 9) when the rights of
secured parties in federal intellectual property are at stake. The federal tract
recording statutes embrace security interests only as a form or variant of title
to specific items of property recorded under specific property numbers.
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Furthermore these federal recording provisions vary depending on whether
the intellectual property is patents, copyrights or trademarks.
Some federal lower court decisions have held that
(4)
the only way to perfect a security interest in a copyright, in material that is
copyrightable, or in proceeds of such material is to file the equivalent of a
copyright mortgage with the U.S. Copyright Office. These decisions include
In re PeregrineEntertainment Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal.1990); In re
AEG Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), amended 161
B.R. 50 (9th Cir. BAP 1993); and In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997). In something of a retreat from this position, one
recent bankruptcy court decision has concluded that federal recording of a
security interest in a copyright is necessary only where the copyright is
registered. In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R. 149 (Bankr. N.D.
Calif. 1999).
The cases involving patent collateral have generally upheld secured
party lien perfection through state notice filings (Article 9) against the
bankruptcy trustee - but have uniformly suggested that the same financing
secured party must make a federal assignment filing with the USPTO to be
protected against later assignees or mortgagees who take and record patent
title instruments. See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920 at
n.8 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). See also City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric,
Inc, 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988), relying on, In re Transportation
Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639, 40 UCC 1393, 1398 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1985).
The cases involve trademark collateral have found state law (Article
9) filing sufficient notice. However, this state law notice has not been tested
in the cases against an assignee of a mark who relies exclusively on the
federal assignment record. See Roman Cleanser v. NationalAcceptance Co.,
43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.
1986); In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). See
also In re C.C. & Co., 85 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)("A grant of
a security interest is merely a device to secure indebtedness.")
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Because they are tract type systems that rely on
(5)
specific assigned property numbers, the federal systems for registering
interests in intellectual property, unlike the Article 9-based state filing
systems, do not provide for notice filing under the debtor's name, for generic
descriptions of collateral, or for perfection of security interests in
subsequently-acquired property. As a result of the structural rigidity of the
current federal recording provisions, companies seeking financing and their
lenders have either had to incur the time and expense of additional and
frequent recordings and registrations that would not otherwise have been
made, or forego financing opportunities.
This Act makes substantive and procedural changes
(6)
to the law in order reverse lower court decisions holding that the federal tract
records for federal intellectual property preempt, in whole or in part, the
uniform state law on security interests when federal intellectual property is
The Act also establishes a means for the eventual
used as collateral.
integration of the federal intellectual property records with state law notice
filings covering security interests in federal intellectual property in order to
make record searches on this property more efficient and consistent with the
rights of owners and assignees of interests in such property.
(b) Purposes
Based upon the powers contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3;
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and other provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, the purposes of this Act are:
To promote financing and development of federal
(1)
intellectual property assets by clarifying the methods for perfecting security
interests in such collateral, and by making all forms of intellectual property
collateral as accessible, valuable and useful as possible;
To assist businesses (and, through them, consumers
(2)
and others) in obtaining credit on the best available terms; and
To lessen the burdens on interstate commerce and
(3)
commerce between the United States and other nations by reducing legal
risks associated with the inconsistent treatment of different types of federal
intellectual property.
To provide a Federal Intellectual Property Data
(4)
Center for the purpose of gathering electronically accessible security interest
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information from the various states to enable the integration of this
information with both federal and international records or databases.
SECTION 3. SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FEDERAL LAW.
(a) Definitions
The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this Act:
(1)

The term "copyright" means any of the exclusive rights comprised in
a copyright under chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, whether
or not registered under chapter 4 of such title.

(2)

The "Federal Intellectual Property Data Center" refers to the office
formed within the Department of Commerce under § 3(d) of this Act
that is charged with the integration and maintenance of the National
Integrated Financing Statement Database and associated records
connected with state filed financing statements.

(3)

The term "Federal Intellectual Property Rights" means copyrights,
patents, Federal marks, mask works, plant variety protection rights
and vessel hull design protection rights.

(4)

The term "Federal mark" means a mark that is registered pursuant to
the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.), or for which an
application for such registration is pending with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.

(5)

An "immediate ownership transferor" means a person who transfers
directly to an ownership transferee any right or interest (other than a
security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property
Right.

(6)

The term "mark" has the meaning given in section 45 of the Lanham
Act (15 U.S.C. §1127).

(7)

The term "mask work" has the meaning given in section 901 of title
17, United States Code.
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(8)

An "ownership transferee" means a person other than a secured party
or lien creditor who acquires any right or interest in a Federal
Intellectual Property Right that must be recorded under Federal
Intellectual Property Recording statutes in order to be protected
against subsequent transferees of such Right.

(9)

The term "patent" means a patent or a pending application for a
patent under title 35, United States Code.

(10)

The term "plant variety protection rights" means a certificate of plant
variety protection or a pending application for such a certificate
under chapter 57 of title 7, United States Code.

(11)

The term "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership,
limited liability company, business trust, estate, trust, association,
joint venture, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or
any other legal or commercial entity.

(12)

The term "state" refers to the states of the United States and to all
possessions and territories of the United States.

(13)

The term "vessel hull design protection rights" means a certificate of
registration or a pending application for such a certificate under
chapter 13 of title 17, United States Code.

(14)

Unless otherwise provided by this Act, the terms "authenticate",
"collateral", "debtor", "financing statement", "good faith", "general
intangible", "lien creditor", knowledge", "notice", "proceeds",
"representative" "secured party", "security agreement", "security
interest", "signed" or "signature" and "value" shall have the
meanings given to such terms under applicable non-federal law
relating to security interests in personal property.

(15)

An "immediate ownership transferor" means a person who transfers
directly to an ownership transferee any right or interest (other than a
security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property
Right.

(b) Preservation of Uniform State Law on Security Interests in Federal
Intellectual Property Rights
(1)
This section applies to all security interests in Federal
Intellectual Property Rights and in the proceeds thereof which interests are
created by contract, regardless of form and nomenclature.
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(2)
(A)
The creation, attachment, perfection, priority and
enforcement of a security interest in a Federal Intellectual Property Right or
in the proceeds thereof relative to all competing rights, claims, and interests
therein and licenses thereof shall be determined by applicable non-federal
law governing security interests in personal property, except as provided in
subsections (b)(2)(B). The creation, transfer, validity, enforceability,
perfection, priority and enforcement of any right or interest (other than a
security interest) in, or ownership of, a Federal Intellectual Property Right
shall be determined by the applicable federal law governing such Federal
Intellectual Property Right.
(B)
A security interest in any Federal Intellectual
Property Right created by a specific debtor is subordinate to the rights of an
ownership transferee of such Right who takes from the same immediate
ownership transferor as the debtor whenever such ownership transferee has
priority over that specific debtor under the applicable federal law on
recording and priority that governs such Federal Intellectual Property Right.
(C)
A security interest in a Federal Intellectual Property
Right that has not been made subordinate under the preceding subsection has
priority over such ownership transferee of such Right if and to the extent that
such security interest meets the requirements for priority as provided under
applicable non-federal law governing security interests in personal property.
(c) Federal Transfer Statements
(1) With respect to any Federal Intellectual Property Rights that are
subject to a security interest (whether or not perfected) as to which the
secured party has exercised its post-default rights or remedies, the person
that is the transferee of such Federal Intellectual Property Rights as a result
of such exercise of rights or remedies may file in the appropriate Federal
record a transfer statement that:
(i) states the name of the debtor and the name and mailing address of
the secured party;
(ii) identifies the Federal Intellectual Property Rights transferred;
(iii) identifies, by file number the state financing statement
previously filed by the secured party covering Federal Intellectual
Property Rights.
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(iv) states the name and mailing address of the transferee of the
Federal Intellectual Property Rights (which may but need not be the
secured party); and
(v) states that: (a) the secured party had a security interest in the
Federal Intellectual Property Rights (and, in the case of Federal
marks, in the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and
symbolized by such Federal marks); (b) the debtor defaulted in
connection with an obligation secured by the Federal Intellectual
Property Rights and such default has not been cured; (c) the debtor
has been given at least 5 days prior written notice of the transfer
(which notice shall be deemed given if the secured party shall have
complied with the notice requirements of applicable non-federal law
in connection with the foreclosure upon, or other disposition of,
collateral other than such Federal Intellectual Property Rights); and
(d) the identified transferee of the Federal Intellectual Property
Rights has complied with all requirements imposed by federal law as
a condition to the effectiveness of a transfer of such Federal
Intellectual Property Right and is entitled to the transfer of record of
the interest of the debtor in the Federal Intellectual Property Rights
transferred by reason of the secured party's exercise of its
post-default rights or remedies in accordance with applicable
non-federal law.
A transfer statement that identifies an intent to use application under
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) among the Federal Intellectual Property Rights
transferred may not be filed or recorded under this section unless the
transferee is a successor to the business of the applicant debtor
within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a).
A transfer statement
filed or recorded in violation of such prohibition shall have no force
or effect on any of the Federal Intellectual Property Rights identified
therein.
Recordation by a transferee of such a transfer statement in the
appropriate federal record and in the manner required under
applicable federal law (as amended by Section 4 of this Act) to give
priority to such transferee's interest in the Federal Intellectual
Property Right shall, if the transferee has complied with all other
requirements imposed by federal law as a condition to the
effectiveness of a transfer of such Federal Intellectual Property
Right, serve as an effective document of transfer to the identified
transferee, of the interest of the debtor and the secured party in the
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Federal Intellectual Property Rights transferred.
Such recordation
of the transfer statement shall also be effective for all public record
purposes under the appropriate federal recording requirement.
(2)
Federal marks shall be transferable to the secured party in
accordance with applicable non-federal law and under the preceding
subsection even though such party does not engage in or intend to enter the
business to which the Federal mark relates, provided that the secured party
holds the Federal mark only for the purpose of subsequently transferring it
along with the goodwill relating to the Federal mark, and that such
subsequent transfer occurs [prior to the dissipation of the goodwill] [within a
period no longer than __ months from the initial transfer].
(3)
The Register of Copyrights, subject to the approval of the
Librarian of Congress, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, under
the direction of the Secretary of Commerce, and the Plant Variety Protection
Office shall promulgate final regulations to implement the federal transfer
statement established by this subsection not later than
days after the date
of enactment of this Act, and those regulations shall become effective not
later than _ days after the date of enactment of this Act.
-

(d) Federal Intellectual Property Data Center
The Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks, the Register of Copyrights and the Plant Variety
Protection Office shall establish the Federal Intellectual Property Data
Center. The Federal Intellectual Property Data Center shall: (1) create and
manage the National Integrated Financing Statement Database provided for
under the next section and, (2) serve as a repository for such other
information about Federal Intellectual Property Rights as is necessary or
useful in carrying out the statutory or treaty obligations of the United States.
(e) National Integrated Financing Statement Database
The Secretary of Commerce shall maintain within the Federal
Intellectual Property Data Center an internet accessible information database,
or other electronic means for the coordination of information from various
databases, that contains or serves as an electronic repository for financing
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statements filed within the various states and available in electronic record
form. [Filing offices within the various states shall cooperate with the Center
in making their security interest databases available or accessible to the
Center in electronic record form.] The database or databases so maintained
or coordinated by the Center shall be adequate to search and identify security
interests by the name of the debtor. The Center shall develop an electronic
system to efficiently integrate the debtor name information in such database
or databases with the names of immediate ownership transferors and
ownership transferees that appear in the applicable federal intellectual
property records.

(f) Fees
The fees for recording services in or through the National
Intellectual Property Filing Center under this Act shall be established by the
Secretary of Commerce.

(j) Regulatory Authority
The Secretary of Commerce shall promulgate final regulations to
implement the functions of the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center and
the National Integrated Financing Statement Database established under this
Act not later than _ days after the date of enactment of this Act, and those
regulations shall become effective not later than __ days after the date of
enactment of this Act. The Federal Intellectual Property Data Center is
authorized to maintain databases utilizing electronic, voice, optical, and other
information transmission, storage, processing, maintenance and retrieval
technologies. The Federal Intellectual Property Data Center shall also issue
such other regulations as they determine to be appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this Act, including regulations, if any, necessary and sufficient to
permit submission and retrieval of information from the database(s)
established pursuant to § 3(e).
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SECTION 4. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO STATUTES
DEALING WITH FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(a)

Copyright Act and Mask Works.

(1)
Replace the existing definition of "transfer of copyright
ownership" in 17 U.S.C. §101 with the following:
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, exclusive
license or any other conveyance or alienation of a copyright or of
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not
it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license or the grant of a security interest.
(2) Amend 17 U.S.C. §205(d) to read as follows:
(d)

Priority between conflicting transfers - As between
two conflicting transfers of copyright ownership, the
one executed first prevails if it is recorded, in the
manner required to give constructive notice under
subsection (c), at any time before recordation in
such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later
transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner,
and if taken in good faith, for value, and without
notice of the earlier transfer. A lien creditor
(whether real or provided for in hypothetical form
under Title 11 of the United States Code) is not a
transferee for value under the preceding sentence.

(3) Add a new 17 U.S.C. §205(f) to read as follows:
(f)

Notwithstanding subsections 205(a)-(e), the
provisions of section 205 shall not apply to the
creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection,
priority or enforcement of a security interest in a
copyright or the proceeds thereof; no document
creating, evidencing or otherwise relating to the
creation or perfection of a security interest shall be
required to be recorded under section 205; and the
recordation of a document under section 205 shall
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not give constructive notice of any fact relating to
the existence or priority of any security interest;
provided, however, that transfer statements
submitted in accordance with section 3(c) of the
Security Interests in Intellectual Property
Restoration Act shall be recorded and once recorded
shall give constructive notice under subsection (a) of
the contents thereof.
(4) Amend 17 U.S.C. §903(c) to read as follows:
Any document pertaining to a mask work
(1)
(c)
may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the document
filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the person
who executed it, or if it is accompanied by a sworn or
official certification that it is a true copy of the original,
signed document. The Copyright Office shall, upon receipt
of the document and the fee specified pursuant to subsection
908(d), record the document and return it with a certificate
of recordation. The recordation of any transfer or license
under this paragraph gives all persons constructive notice of
the facts stated in the recorded document concerning the
transfer or license.
Notwithstanding subsections 903(a)-(d), the
(2)
provisions of section 903 shall not apply to the creation,
attachment, perfection, effect of perfection, priority or
enforcement of a security interest in a mask work or the
proceeds thereof; no document creating, evidencing or
otherwise relating to the creation or perfection of a security
interest shall be required to be recorded under section 903;
and the recordation of a document under section 903 shall
not give constructive notice of any fact relating to the
existence or priority of any security interest; provided,
however, that transfer statements submitted in accordance
with subsection 3(c) of the Security Interests in Intellectual
Property Restoration Act shall be recorded and shall give
constructive notice under subsection (a) of the contents
thereof.
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Lanham Act
Replace 15 U.S.C. §1060 with the following:
§ 1060. Assignment of mark; execution; recording; purchaser
without notice
A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has
been filed shall be, assignable with the goodwill of the business
connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark. However, no
application to register a mark under section 105 1(b) of this title shall
be assignable prior to the filing of the amendment under section
1051 (a) or the verified statement of use under section 1051 (d) of this
title, except to a successor to the business of the applicant, or portion
thereof, to which the mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and
existing. In any assignment authorized by this section or by section
3(c) of the Security Interests in Intellectual Property Restoration Act,
it shall not be necessary to include the goodwill of the business
connected with the use of and symbolized by any other mark used in
the business or by the name or style under which the business is
conducted.
Assignments shall be by instruments in writing duly executed.
Acknowledgment shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of
an assignment and when recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office the record shall be prima facie evidence of execution. An
assignment (but not of a security interest in a registered trademark or
an application to register) shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office prior to such
subsequent purchase. A separate record of assignments submitted
for recording hereunder shall be maintained in the Patent and
Trademark Office. An assignee not domiciled in the United States
shall be subject to and comply with the provisions of section 105 1(e)
of this title. Except as provided in sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the
Security Interests in Intellectual Property Restoration Act, the rights
and obligations of all persons with respect to a security interest in a
registered trademark, an application to register, or the proceeds of
either, including matters of creation, attachment, perfection, effect of
perfection, priority, and enforcement, shall be governed by
non-federal law relating to security interests in personal property.
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Patent Act
Amend the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §261 to read as follows:
An assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent application or a
patent (but not of a security interest in a patent application or a
patent) shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for value,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within ten days from its date or prior to the date of such
subsequent purchase. Except as provided in section 3(b) and 3(c) of
the Security Interests in Intellectual Property Restoration Act, the
rights and obligations of all persons with respect to a security interest
in a patent, a patent application, or the proceeds of either, including
matters of creation, attachment, perfection, effect of perfection,
priority, and enforcement, shall be governed by non-federal law
relating to security interests in personal property.

(d)-(f) RESERVED FOR CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT, 7 U.S.C. §2321 et seq, THE
VESSEL HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT, 17 U.S.C. §501 et seq.
AND CHAPTER 180 OF TITLE 28, U.S. CODE (ASSUMPTION OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO TRANSFERS OF
RIGHTS IN MOTION PICTURES)
(g)

Accommodation of New Filing Technologies

All references in this Act and in the Lanham Act, the Patent Act and
the Copyright Act to filings relating to security interests shall include
electronic, voice, optical, and such other information transmission, storage,
processing, maintenance, and retrieval technologies as shall be approved for
such purposes by the Federal Intellectual Property Data Center, the Register
of Copyrights, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and the Plant
Variety Protection Office from time to time.

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

419

SECTION 5. REPORT TO CONGRESS
The Secretary of Commerce shall report to the
Committee
of the
not later than
days after the enactment of
this Act regarding their plans to comply with the requirements of this Act.
SECTION 6. EFFECTIVE DATES

(a)
This Act shall become effective on the date of enactment,
except that the provisions of sections 3(c) shall not become effective
until the effective date of the regulations described in section 3(c)(3)
and the provisions of section 3(d)-(f) shall not become effective until
the effective date of the regulations described in subsection 3(g).

(b)
Section 3(b) shall apply to all security interests in effect
under applicable non-federal law on the date of enactment.
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APPENDIX 4 - MARKETS

A.

Market Size and Scale

As illustrated in Figure 1, founders equity provides the small
amounts of capital to begin the early stages of the proof of concept. Friends
and family may also provide some of this initial concept development
capital. However, for the inventor and entrepreneur, the angel investment
represents the first external validity test and detailed due diligence on the
innovation and the potential commercial viability of the invention.
Currently, there are approximately 400,00 angels that invest between $30$40 billion annually in around 50,000 entrepreneurial ventures. As the
venture matures and begins to develop into a viable business that is
producing products or services, professional venture capital funds become
the primary source of capital.
Figure 1

Equity Capital for Entrepreneurs
Friends

Four
nders Famil,

I

Source

Supply

Angels

Venture Funds

I

$25K

DemandI

Later

Early

I Seed/Start-Up

Stage

SIOK

$500K

I

I

$2,OOOK

--Funding Gap

C--to for V-ntuo Research - Un.voity of Nw Hampshire

Institutional venture capital investments, as shown in Table 1, have
expanded rapidly since 1994. As the table indicates, venture capital
investments in entrepreneurial ventures in the first two quarters of 2000 have
already exceeded total investments for the year 1999. Average deal size (the
amount invested per company) has also increased. These angel and venture
capital investments represent a vital component for the new economy. While
the number of start-ups that qualify for angel and venture capital investments
are relatively small (less than 60,000 companies per year) and represent less
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than ten percent of all the start-ups in a given year, most of the new jobs
attributable to small firms are created by these relatively few firms that start
small and grow fast. Since 1979, over 75% of net new jobs were created by
these high growth start-ups (Birch et al. 1993). Over the last several years,
this translates into these entrepreneurial ventures adding close to 6 million
jobs to an economy that added 7.7 million in total.
Table I

Venture Capital Funds
Year

1994

Total

Number of

Amount

Companies

$2.7 billion

Amount
per Deal

1,000

$2.7 million

1995

$3.8 billion

1,128

$3.4 million

1996

$10.1 billion

2,163

$4.6 million

1997

$12.2 billion

2,706

$4.5 million

1998

$16.0 billion

2,692

$6.0 million

1999

$35.6 billion

4,006

$8.9 million

2000 (1,2) $37.0 billion

2,855

$13
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The private investor and the institutional venture capitalist provide a
range of markets through which an innovator or entrepreneur can seek to
obtain financing to bring a product to market. It is how these markets
function that determines the cost of capital to the innovator and entrepreneur.
Markets provide a mechanism that strikes a price for a good or service. In
some markets, especially in homogeneous commodities, the information
needed to achieve this end is relatively straightforward. All market trading,
however, involves taking a degree of risk. Most U.S. government bonds,
although free of default risk, are not free of inflation risk. In other markets, a
more complex valuation process may be required of individual market
participants, who may not have full access to all information. At either
extreme, individuals will make decisions based on their value estimates. In
the stock market, this decision may be to continue to hold a particular stock,
or to sell it, or to buy. In deciding whether to subscribe or lend money to
enable the exploitation of a patent, investors would have to be satisfied,
among many other matters, that their rights in relation to the patent will be
protected.
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It seems clear, however, that the existence of markets that are
reasonably efficient, if not"perfect," permits greater and low-cost access to
the markets and stimulates interest, activity, and growth in those markets.
Economic resources are allocated through the market mechanisms at prices
that bring buyers and sellers together. Where there is a lack of information,
and high transaction costs, the progress of the market is inhibited.
B.

Scarcity, Choice and Efficiency in the Market

The discipline of economics, as noted earlier, is founded on the
principle that goods and services are scarce relative to the need for them; and
that scarcity demands a price. The relative scarcity of resources leads to the
need to choose among competing uses. For example, assume that steel is
used only in making washing machines and cars. The use of a ton of steel in
car making deprives washing machine making of that ton of steel. The cost
(the "opportunity cost") of the ton of steel to car making is the cost of the
steel in its next best alternative use, the manufacture of washing machines.
Often, this opportunity cost will be reflected closely in the market price of
steel; how closely, will depend on the efficiency of the market for steel.
Economists define efficiency as the absence of wasted resources,
such that an economy maximizes its output from a given input and a given
state of technology. In making the decisions to allocate scarce resources,
therefore, the economy, or perhaps more appropriately society, must make
three closely-related decisions:
1. How to allocate its resources efficiently.
2. What combination of goods and services to produce.
3. How much of each good and service to distribute to individual
members of society.
Using resources efficiently means maximizing output from a given
input, or minimizing input for a given output. It is necessary to long-term
economic survival, however, to produce those goods and services that
society requires. Who should receive the goods and services produced is a
distribution decision that will be left aside for the present purposes.
The efficiency benefits of specialization within an economy was first
formally identified by Adam Smith in his "Wealth of Nations," in relation to
the division of labor and using the example of pin-making:
"One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a
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fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the
head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar
business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them
into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner,
divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some
manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same
man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small
manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where
some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operation...
Those ten persons . . . could make among them upwards of forty-eight
thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of fortyeight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight
hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and
independently, and without any of them having been educated to this
peculiar business, they certainly could not each of the have made twenty,
perhaps not one pin a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth,
perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at
present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and
combination of their different operations."'
Smith, in the above passage, described how goods might be
produced more efficiently, but did not discuss the fact that efficiency may be
influenced also by which goods are produced. This aspect of efficiency may
be studied by means of the "theory of comparative advantage." People,
firms and countries differ in their ability to produce particular goods and
services efficiently, and thus may benefit by specializing where they have a
comparative advantage, and then exchanging some or all of the fruits of their
labors for other goods and services. For example, country A may be much
more efficient at producing telephones and somewhat more efficient at
producing trucks than country B. It will be more economically efficient for
A to produce telephones and B to produce trucks, and for A and B to trade in
these goods, than for country A to make both goods. Put another way, it will
be economically efficient for B to make trucks because it is comparatively
less inefficient than A in truck production than it is in telephone production
as compared to A.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776;
Dent, London, 1910, p. 5.
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Exchange, Markets and Money

Specialization gives rise to exchange. Smith introduced the concept
of exchange in another well-known passage:
"Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one
bone for another with another dog ... But man has almost constant occasion
for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect it from their
benevolence only ....

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the

brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Nobody but a beggar
chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his
2
fellow-citizens."
The institution of the market enables an exchange to occur, with one
person exchanging goods or services for the goods or services offered by
another. Negotiation between the two establishes a rate of exchange between
the quantities of the goods and services to be traded or bartered. Such a
bartering arrangement, however, requires a "double coincidence of wants,"
such that, at a given moment in time, the first person has exactly what the
second person wants, and vice versa. In practice, this is unlikely to occur,
and so the "value" of goods and services began to be expressed in terms of a
common standard or measure.
This measure, which we know as "money," is the result of market
negotiation that establishes rates of exchange between and among goods and
services. This rate of exchange in money terms may disappear as soon as the
particular exchange has been consummated. If, however, information about
the exchange becomes widely known within the market for these goods and
services, details of the exchange may be taken into account by other market
participants, thus leading to the recognition of "market" prices for the goods
and services traded.
In the extreme case, the so-called "perfect market,, 3 no single seller
is able to charge and obtain a higher price than any other; all must accept the
market price. Further, one person may accept money in exchange for goods
or services, and then use that money, now or later (in this case money
becomes a "store of value"), to buy goods and services from one or more
other persons. D.H. Robertson stated:
2

Idem, pp.12-13.

See below for a more detailed explanation of the "perfect market" concept.
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"The first great achievement of money is that it enables man as
consumer to generalize his purchasing power, and to make claims on society
in the form which suits him best ....
The second great achievement of
money is that it enables man as producer to concentrate his attention on his
own job, and so to add more effectively to the general flow of goods and
services which constitutes the real income of society . . . The third great
achievement of money is closely allied to the second ... [M]oney immensely
facilitates the making of loans and payments in advance of all kinds."
D.

Markets and Other Institutions

Markets occupy a pre-eminent place in economics.
The
"substitutes" theory in economics takes the view that markets and certain
other institutions (notably governments, the law, households and firms) are
necessary for economic activity, but that the market is the primary
institution, and other institutions are secondary.' Under the substitutes
theory, "firms, government, and other forms of organized economic activity
are deviations from and substitutes for competitive markets."6 The sequence
of arguments under the substitutes theory is that the market is the primary
economic institution, because competitive markets are the "most efficient
organizers of economic activity."' If the market fails, then an institution,
often a government, will intervene to prevent or mitigate the effects of
market failure, through such measures as welfare programs, fiscal policy, and
the regulation of financial institutions and markets: If government
intervention fails, then fundamental institutional change may be necessary to
achieve a restructuring of the relationship between government and the
economy. This restructuring may lead, for example, to deregulation, welfare
reform, and policies designed to reduce the size of the government sector.
As noted earlier, however, markets and governments are not the only
institutions involved in economic activity. Others include households, the
law, and firms. Firms exist as institutional responses to the failure of

4

D.H. ROBERTSON,

MONEY,

Cambridge University Press, 1922, pp. 4-8.

For a much more complete discussion of these issues, see J.R. Wible, "The Economic
Organization of Science, the Firm, and the Marketplace," PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES,

Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1995, pp. 35-68.

6

Wible, idem, p. 38.

7

Wible, idem, p. 40.
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markets efficiently to organize economic resources for the purposes of
creating, producing and distributing goods and services. R.H. Coase
identified three principal transaction costs in a market:
1. Information costs, that is, the costs of acquiring of information
about market prices and price movements.
2. Negotiating costs, concerned with the initiation and analysis of
contracts.
3. Short-term risk costs, that may be reduced by creating a longer
term organizational structure, that is, a firm.
Coase wrote:
"The operation of a market costs something and by forming an
organization and allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct
the resources certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has
to carry out his function at less cost ...because it is always possible to
revert to the open market."' 9

8

Known to economists as "factors of production."

9

labor and capital. The "organization" factor of production, "entrepreneurship," was
added by Alfred Marshall about 100 years ago.
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA (New Series) Vol.IV, 1937, pp. 386405, reprinted in Readings in Price Theory, AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, Allen &
Unwii, London, 1953. Quotation from the AEA reprint, p. 338.

Originally, these were three: land,

Volume 41 - Numbers 3 & 4

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

429

APPENDIX 5 - THE SECONDARY MARKET FUNCTION

THE SECONDARY MARKET FUNCTION-DEBT TRANSACTIONS

Securitization is an attractive financing alternative to equity
transactions for a variety of reasons and is a potential market for the
entrepreneurs who seek to leverage the value of intellectual property.
Securitization allows a borrower to separate its credit from the credit of the
assets to be securitized. The assets with potential to generate income are
pooled and securities are sold to finance the carrying of the pooled assets.
The securities market then analyzes the creditworthiness of the assets, rather
than the creditworthiness of the borrower. This can result in reduced risk to
the investor and lower costs of capital to the borrower.
Bissonette and Andersen set out the securitization process in four
steps:
I.

The originator identifies an asset with a reasonably predictable
cash flow, often some type of receivable.

2. The originator sells the asset to a newly formed, legally separate
entity known as a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"). The sale of
assets is structured as a "true sale." The SPV raises funds to
purchase the asset by issuing securities to investors through the
capital markets.
3. The SPV structures the securities to be sold according to such
criteria as the past performance history of the asset and the
degree of credit enhancement, leading to a credit rating and thus
the interest rate assigned to the securities. "The goal here is to
structure the securities in such a way as to provide ample
protection to the investors while still paying a profitable amount
to the originator."
4. The SPV enters into "pooling and servicing agreement" with a
third party, who agrees to service the obligations now owned by
the SPV. Often, the third party is the same entity-the
originator-that sold the asset to the SPV. The service provider
A.M. Bissonette and R.M. Andersen, Securitization: Turning Future Receivables into
24 2 7
Cash, PACESETTER MAGAZINE, Ontario Systems, Fall 1998, pp. - .
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collects payments from debtors, remits payments to investors,
reports to investors, and accounts for interest and principal
throughout the life of the securities issued.
Jason Kravitt argues that definitions such as the above are orientated
towards process rather than substance. He prefers a more fundamental
definition of securitization: "[Securitization] consists of the use of superior
knowledge about the expected financial behavior of particular assets, as
opposed to knowledge about the expected financial behavior of the originator
of the chosen assets, with the help of a structure to finance the assets more
efficiently."2
Javitt emphasizes the separation of the behavior and
characteristics of the originator from the behavior and characteristics of the
assets. The breakdown of individual, segregated, and protected capital
markets into an increasingly worldwide capital market, Javitt believes, has
driven the need to find more and more efficient means of raising capital.
With the greater use of computer technology and the information revolution,
securitization has become among the most efficient financing forms.
Computers allow the storage and retrieval of data on the historical behavior
of asset pools, thus enhancing knowledge of the subsequent behavior of
earlier asset pools from a given originator. Done correctly, says Javitt,
securitization of the asset pool can be less risky than the direct financing of
the originator. The "correct" securitizing of an asset pool requires several
structural components: the isolation of the assets, by "true sales," from the
originator to render them "bankruptcy remote" from the originator. This
ensures that the only relevant event to the financial success of the investment
is the behavior of the assets; the perfection of the asset investors' interest in
the assets; and the limitation of the investors' liability.'
Securitization is a response to market conditions, and especially to
increased market efficiency, globalization, and the increasingly rapid
dissemination of data. It has been applied to a variety of different situations
and could potentially be applied to future income stream from intellectual
property. In what follows, residential mortgages, credit card debt
outstanding, ship mortgages, Bowie bonds, ALPS, and junk bonds are
discussed. Each of these offers a somewhat different aspect of the
fundamental financial relationships among risk, return, and value. In all, the
objectives are to release the capital value of projected future income streams;
to develop secondary markets to improve liquidity; and to use portfolio
2

3

Jason H.P. Kravitt, Securitization, THE
11.
Id. at 8.
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diversification to reduce the impact of the default risk present in securities
issued by individual companies. These same goals are applied when looking
to create markets for entrepreneurs and innovators who seek to leverage
intellectual property assets.
A.

The Secondary Market Residential Mortgages

A well-known example is the secondary market in residential
mortgages. At one time, banks held residential mortgages in their own
investment portfolio. Today, many banks bundle, or "pool" and sell the
mortgages to other institutional investors seeking a well-secured medium to
long term income stream, thus immediately releasing funds to the banks for
further mortgage activity. The following table shows the change in the
composition of mortgage holders (mortgagees) fort selected years between
1980 and 1998:
Table 1: Composition of Mortgage Holders
Mortgage Debt Outstanding
($ billions)
Commercial Banks and
Savings Institutions
Life Insurance Companies,
Individuals and Others
Mortgage Pools or Trusts
Federal Agencies
Total

1980
1,465

1985
2,374

1990
3,794

1995
4,610

1998
5,782

59%

50%

44%

37%

34%

23%

25%

22%

16%

15%

10%
7%
100%

18%
7%
100%

28%
6%
100%

40%
7%
100%

45%
5%
100%

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999, U.S. Department of Commerce, Table
820, p. 525.

The shift of mortgage holders from commercial bank and savings
institutions towards mortgage pools and trusts (including federal agencies)
may be shown graphically (see Figure 2):
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Figure 2: Mortgage Debt Outstanding
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Between 1980 and 1998 the mortgage debt outstanding, in money
terms, increased fourfold (see Table 1). Yet the proportion of the debt held
by the principal mortgage initiators, commercial banks and savings
institutions, fell from almost 60 per cent to just over 34 percent. During the
same period, mortgage debt held in pools or trusts, having been sold by the
banks on the secondary mortgage market, increased from 10 percent to over
45 percent of the mortgage debt outstanding. The banks' need for liquidity
in order to take advantage of new lending opportunities provided the
motivation; the prospect of a steady and secured income stream motivated
investors; and the standardization of mortgage terms and criteria made
possible the bundling and securitization of mortgage debt for sale on the
secondary market. Similarly, bank and credit card companies sell on the
secondary markets asset-backed loans such as credit card receivables or
consumer installment loans.
The mechanism in each case usually requires the sale of the assets to
a pool or trust, in which investors buy a security interest. Often, the
originator of the loan (for example, the bank) will continue to collect
payments from the debtor, and take a processing fee, passing the net
proceeds to the investors in the security. The originator of the loan must
ensure that the credit-worthiness of the borrower and the terms of repayment
of interest and principal conform to strict standards, otherwise the loan will
not be accepted as a pooled security. The mere pooling of such assets for
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sale, however, is not always sufficiently attractive to potential investors. It
becomes necessary, therefore, to "sweeten" by the deal, at additional cost,
using "credit enhancement" techniques. Credit enhancement may take a
variety of forms, notably guarantees, credit downgrade triggers, offsetting
obligations amongst the parties, and/or additional collateral security, all with
the intention of improving the credit rating of the investment, thus increasing
its marketability and hence its value.
B.

The Secondary Marketfor Credit CardDebt

The credit card market in the U.S.A. has increased from $234 billion
of total receivables outstanding in 1990 to $356 billion in 1998.' The growth
came from continued reliance of consumers on credit cards, more acceptance
of credit cards by merchants and service providers, and a greater diversity of
cards, including affinity and co-branded cards. Eight of the top ten
institutions with credit card portfolios accounted for approximately twothirds ($240 billion) of the $356 billion credit card debt outstanding in mid1998. Over 60 percent of the $240 billion was securitized. The percentage
of debt securitized by individual institutions in the eight ranged from 49
percent to 75 per cent.'
The use of securitization as a financing tool has increased since the
first securitization deals were made in 1987, primarily in order to diversify
sources of bank funding. In the middle to late 1990s, securitization has
become the primary source of funding for specialized credit card banks such
as Fleet, Citibank, MBNA and First USA. These banks benefit from funding
at the favorable rates implied by high, AAA, grades, and use securitization to
remove debt from their balance sheets.6 Dean et al. observed "Without
securitization, some of these banks could not have grown as rapidly."7
Most credit card securitizations have used the master trust vehicle
since 1991, rather than the more cumbersome "stand alone" approach used
until then. The master trust is more flexible, in that it permits the issuer to
sell multiple securities from the same trust, all of which are secured on the
4

Michael R. Dean, Chris Mrazek, Richard C. Drason, Mark Sun, Kathy Moon and
Michelle Galvez, ABCs of Credit CardABS, THE SECURITIZATION CONDUIT, Vol. 2, No.
2 & 3, 1999, pp. 2 6 -37 .

5

Id., Exhibit 1, pp. 27-28.

6

Id. at 27.

7

Id. at 28.
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same pool of receivables - "All the accounts support all the securities."' This
enables the issuer to add new receivables to the trust, and then to issue new
securities against them, and thus avoids the costs of setting up a new trust for
each issue (as required by the stand alone trust). The master trust is a
particularly suited to credit card securitization, as credit card debt
outstanding is constantly changing in both total amount and composition. 9
From the perspective of the investor, however, the asset composition of the
master trust will be changing constantly, and with it, perhaps, the risk
complexion of the pooled assets. Every seller of credit card debts to the trust
is required both to issue securities and to maintain an ownership interest in
the trust (usually at least 7 percent), so that the seller will have a direct
interest in maintaining the credit quality of the pool.
Credit card debt, being unsecured and revolving, offers no collateral
in case of default. The ability to recover the debt in default is limited, and
this does not present an attractive investment opportunity to investors
seeking investment-grade securities. Once again, therefore, credit
enhancement is needed, and takes the form of some combination of elaborate
customer credit scoring models, "excess spread," and "reserve" accounts
financed by subordinated debt.'0 Excess spread is described in detail in
Dean, et al. Credit card debt has a high yield, around 18 per cent. This
revenue must, for example, cover the coupon payments to investors, 7 per
cent; servicing expenses, 2 percent; and defaults, 5 per cent, a total of 14 per
cent." The remainder, 4 percent, is the excess spread, and is a rough
indicator of the health of the portfolio. It may be used in a variety of ways to
enhance credit: as a safety margin of value to investors; as profit to issuers;
and/or as a "sweetener" to investors.
C.

The Ship MortgagesAct

"Throughout history, trading nations have consistently felt that a
merchant fleet was important to their economic well-being and have enacted
Id. at 28.
The average life of a credit card receivable is only five to ten months. Contrast this with
residential mortgages with average lives of around eight years.
As in the case of ALPS (q.v.), credit enhancement is achieved in part by passing the
default risk burden downstream to subordinated debt.
These figures are illustrative, although they are probably fairly close to current
experience. Default rates seem to have risen towards 6 per cent, and service costs have
increased also, reducing the average excess spread to the 2-4 percent range.
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various measures to encourage national merchant marines."' 2
In 1914, only about 10 percent of U.S. international trade was
carried in U.S.-flag ships as its merchant marine had concentrated mostly on
domestic coastal trading. Consequently, most of U.S. international trade was
carried by British, German, Italian, and French ships. At the outbreak of the
First World War in 1914, these nations were belligerents, and diverted their
merchant fleets for strategic and naval purposes. The paralyzing effect of the
withdrawal of these ships from U.S. commerce led to the 1916 Shipping Act.
This act established a five-person Shipping Board with broad powers to
encourage and expand the U.S. shipbuilding program." As a result of the
Board's activities, the U.S. emerged from the First World War with
"the world's largest merchant fleet .

.

.

Most of this fleet was

owned by the government, which had no desire or mandate to operate it in
peacetime trade beyond the five years after the war's end provided for in the
1916 act."'"
The extent of the problem may be seen in Table 2:15
Table 2

I Deliveries to Shipping Board (non-naval vessels, deadweight tonnage)
1914

11915

1916

200,000 1 200,000 /600,000

-

1917

1918

1919

1920

1921

1000 000

3,000,000

6,200,000

3 100 000

800,000

To deal with this problem, the 1920 Merchant Marine Act was
passed (the Jones Act), which provided for the transfer of the Board's fleet to
private hands in such a manner that it could be operated profitably. In the
same year, 1920, the Ship Mortgage Act was passed. Prior to this act, a ship
mortgage was held not be a maritime contract, and so could not be enforced
in maritime courts, although common law did offer very limited protection to
the creditor. F.L. Maraist wrote:
"The lack of an adequate device by which a ship-owner could
12

Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, "U.S. Shipping and

Shipbuilding Trends and Policy Choices," August, 1984, p. 3 3.
13
14

'5

Idem, p.12.
Idem, p.12. In 1920, the U.S. owned 22 percent of the world's shipping capacity,
compared to just 7 percent in 1914.
F.C. LANE, SHIPS FOR VICTORY: A HISTORY OF SHIPBUILDING UNDER THE U.S. MARITIME
5
COMMISSION INWORLD WAR II, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1951, p. . Note

that deliveries did not peak until the year after the end of the war.
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borrow on the credit of the vessel undoubtedly discouraged private financing
of vessels. In 1920, Congress, in an effort to develop a stronger American
merchant marine and, perhaps to facilitate disposal of the merchant vessels
which the federal government had acquired during World War I, passed the
Ship Mortgage Act . . . , providing for a 'preferred ship mortgage' on a
vessel and for its enforcement in an in rem proceeding in admiralty .... The
Ship Mortgage Act16has become a vital part of the financing of American
maritime shipping."
7
The Ship Mortgage contained the following main provisions:
1.

A maritime preferred mortgage can be granted only on a
"documented vessel."

2.

The mortgage must be on the whole vessel.

3.

The mortgagee must be a U.S. citizen or other designated
entity.

4.

The mortgage may include more than one vessel and may
include non-maritime property.

5.

There is no limitation on the interest rate charged.

The perfection of a preferred'8 ship mortgage requires the following
steps:
1.

The execution of a mortgage, with acknowledgement.

2.

The mortgagor "may be requiredto disclose the existence of
obligations on the mortgaged vessel and may not incur
certain liens on the vessel until the mortgagee has had a
reasonable time to recordhis preferredmortgage."

3.

The mortgage must be lodged with the Secretary of
Transportation, who must maintain "an appropriateindex of
mortgagesfor use by the public."

F.L MARAIST, ADMIRALTY, NUTSHELL SERIES, West Publishing Group, 3 d Edition, 1996,
17
18

pp. 82-83.
Idem, p.84.
There were some restrictions on the term 'preferred.' "The maritime ship mortgage is
primed by all maritime liens arising prior to the recordation of the mortgage, and by all
subsequently arising maritime liens except those securing maritime contracts.... Because
of this, the mortgagee may require that all pre-existing liens be paid before funds are
advanced under the mortgage and that no other contract liens be placed on the vessel
before the mortgage is recorded." Idem, pp. 84-85.
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The mortgagor shall use "diligence in keeping a certified
copy of the mortgage on the vessel." ,9

It seems clear that the act was intended to stimulate the private
financing of mortgages by seeking to ensure that information regarding prior
liens was made available to prospective mortgagees, who in turn were
obliged under the act to register their mortgage with the Secretary of
Transportation. Also, copy of the mortgage had to be attached to the asset
itself, as a further safeguard.
By 1922, events had overtaken the act. The demand for shipping
collapsed, and 17 percent of the world's capacity was idled, and the war-built
U.S. fleet began to be steadily out-performed by other, more modem fleets.
The 1936 Merchant Marine Act was a response to this situation. It
established the U.S. Maritime Commission to replace the Shipping Board,
and provided for the financing and-production of a U.S. made and crewed
merchant marine. The Second World War gave an added stimulus to
shipbuilding (see Table 3), based on the 1936 act. In consequence, the U.S.
merchant marine emerged from the Second World War with about 4,500
ships suited to commercial use, more than all other nations combined.
As had occurred at the end of the First World War, the end of the
Second World War saw the need to dispose of the ships that had been built to
meet the strategic requirements of the war. 0
Table 3
Deliveries in Maritime Commission Program

non-naval vessels, deadweight tonnage)
1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

250,000

500,000

750,000

8,000,000

19,000,000

16,500,000

11,000,000

The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 provided for the sale of these
ships to U.S. citizens and foreigners. Some 2,000 were sold, with a further
1,400 being laid up in the National Defense Reserve Fleet.' In addition, the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 was amended to cover foreign ship mortgages:
"After World War II, the United States sought once again to

20

ldem, p. 84, emphasis added.
F.C. Lane, op.cit., p. 5. Note that production peaked in 1943, about a year after the

21

United States entered the war, which had been in progress since 1939. Contrast this with
the First World War numbers, above.
Congress of the United States, op. cit., p.p. 16 - 17 .

9
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dismantle its merchant fleet, but found that the increasingly popular use of
foreign flags of convenience required expanding preferred mortgage status to
foreign ship mortgages ....
Congress amended the act to cover foreign
mortgages, but the procedural requirements for domestic mortgages were not
imposed. Instead, the Act viewed the foreign mortgage in the light of the
applicable foreign law."2
National emergencies were responsible for the major changes
introduced into the financing of shipbuilding in the 1920s and 1940s. Outdated laws and the consequent poor quality of available information were
unnecessarily restricting the willingness and ability of investors to finance
shipbuilding. The laws enacted strengthened the rights of the creditor, the
mortgagee, by opening up the possibility of a preferred mortgage, and
particularly by requiring that data about the mortgage be documented and
recorded in a central database held be the Secretary of Transportation. While
none of these enactments did much directly to improve the liquidity of
investors, it did encourage those investors to become mortgagees by
clarifying the extent of their risk, at least as far as default risk and prior
claims are concerned. In this sense, they provided a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the development of a secondary market that would
improve investor liquidity and reduce investor risk.
D.

The Securitization of FutureIncome Streams

David Bowie, the entertainer, was a pioneer in the securitization of a
future income stream. In 1997, Pullman and Associates struck a deal with
Prudential Investments to pay $55 million on ten-year notes to Bowie, with
the repayment backed by royalties generated from a twenty-five record
catalog of his work.23 David Pullman, whose firm brokered the Bowie deal,
believes that there is an untapped market of such deals that amounts to $100
billion of annual licensing cash flow, which translates into a capitalized
value of around $3 trillion. The object of securitization by artists such as
Bowie is to gain liquidity by capitalizing future cash flows. The assets
backing the securities, however, are tied up for around ten years, and so
cannot be used to secure future security deals until the initial deal is paid off.
Contrast this with a credit-card deal for example, which tends to be
somewhat generic and can be updated, with additional financing, on a
22

Federal Reporter, F.2d. Series, Vol. 776, 1986, West Publishing Co., p. 86.

23

Lynna Goch, op. cit.
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quarterly basis. Further, most artistic property is unsuited to long-term
securitization: 99 percent of entertainers receive 95 percent of their royalty
income within six months of the initial release of their work. Securitization
deals, therefore, are only for those artists whose work has a proven record of
long-term success. These deals are not "cookie-cutter" deals, according to
Pullman.24 Rather, as private placements not public issues, they require
intensive negotiation that is based upon substantial research and study.
Investors - mostly insurance companies - have a mixed view of
intellectual asset-backed securities. "Intellectual asset-backed securities are
illiquid. Not many people know about them. The universe of buyers and
sellers of this type of business is small," says Douglas McCoy of Conseco
Capital Markets.2 Insurance companies need to be able to adjust their
portfolios in line with changes in the market and in their liabilities. On the
other hand, they are looking for well-secured, long-term investments with
reliable cash inflows. Thus, they are willing to incorporate asset-backed
securities into their portfolios, but only to a limited extent, knowing that they
would have difficulty in disposing of any holdings rapidly' and at low cost.
E.

AircraftLeasingPortfolioSecuritization

Assets such as credit card debt and mortgages may be bundled
together and securitized relatively simply, as their terms can be standardized,
and none of them is, individually, likely to involve an amount in the millions
of dollars. For assets individually worth large sums of money, such as a
passenger jet aircraft, the terms are far more likely to be one-off and
specially tailored to the needs of specific borrowers and lenders. In the case
of aircraft leasing, the assets comprise both airplanes and leases. Commonly,
the aircraft are sold to a "special purpose entity" ("SPE"), also known as a
"special purpose vehicle" ("SPY"), which then issues new securities on the
aircraft.
"Aircraft are generally characterized as 'dangerous assets'. They are
expensive to buy and operate, they are rarely in one place for very long, they
become subject to a wide variety of laws and jurisdictions, they cause
enormous damage when they crash, and they cause pollution. Worst of all,

24

Id.

25

Id.
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people lose money on them."'26
The potential market, however, is large, and with the decline of
airline.credit quality in the last decade or so, it has proved to be increasingly
difficult for individual airlines to lease new aircraft, and then only as private
placements rather than publicly traded securities. The use of securitization
by grouping a number of airlines together and pooling their leases has
diversified the portfolio. This, in turn, has lowered risk and made the cost
more attractive to the airlines than a conventional lease, and the risk-return
characteristics more attractive to investors." William C. Bowers writes: 28
"Rather than enhancing a single corporate credit, the ratings of the
debt securities issued in a portfolio securitization are based on the existence
of a worldwide aircraft leasing market and the projected residual values of
the aircraft in the portfolio. The actual levels of the ratings depend on a
number of factors, including the age, initial value and diversity of the aircraft
in the portfolio, the diversity (both individually and geographically) of the
lessees of the aircraft and (to a much lesser extent) their credit quality, the
initial level of lease rents, assumptions as to the timing and costs of defaults
and remarketing and other relevant factors. Credit support in a portfolio
securitization is tailored to the particular needs of the aircraft and lessees
involved, e.g., . . . major maintenance costs, compliance with noise

regulations and similar factors."
The first ALPS issue occurred in 1992, amounting to $417 million of
debt and based on an appraised value of $521 million. It was subjected to a
very high degree of due diligence:
"Each country in which a lessor was located was completely vetted
from a legal standpoint, and each lease was carefully reviewed to ensure that
it met exacting legal standards. A similarly high legal standard was applied
in the actual aircraft deliveries, resulting in an extended period between

26

Robert Hallam, "Securitization," THE FINANCIER, Vol. 2, No. 3, August, 1995, p. 52.

27

THE TIMES, LONDON, Securities take off with bonds based on aircraft leases, June 15,

28

1992; and THE FINANCIAL TIMES, LONDON, Securitisation: a viable financing option International, August 24, 1994. Note, however, that in the case of the 1992 ALPS, credit
enhancement for the Senior Notes was essentially at the expense of the subordinated
debt. See Hallam, op. cit., p.58, "Packing in collateral and credit enhancement to satisfy
senior debt ratings doesn't solve problems - it merely shifts them downstream. Placing
subordinated debt is much harder than finding investors for AAA notes."
WILLIAM C. BOWERS, "AIRCRAFT LEASE SECURITIZATION: ALPS To EETCS," Winthrop
Stimson Law Office, New York, nd., p.1.
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initial funding and the transfer of the last aircraft."29
The second ALPS issue, in 1994, was an SEC registered
securitization of a portfolio of aircraft operating leases and involved almost
$1 billion of debt on an appraised asset value of over $850 million, about
twice as much as the first portfolio securitization. Twenty-seven aircraft
were leased to 22 lessees in 14 countries. There followed an issue of over $4
30
billion to finance 229 aircraft to 83 lessees in 40 countries.
The success of the ALPS issue led bankers to consider whether
securitization might be applied to an individual airline rather than a bundle of
airlines, and this resulted in the creation of the Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certificate ("EETC"). As the term implies, these securitizations are
enhancements to more traditional equipment trust certificates. The
enhancements may include: the issuer of the EETC being "bankruptcyremote" from the lessee; the existence of a direct relationship between the
expected residual value of the aircraft and the amount of funding - the lower
the funding percentage, the higher the credit rating; and the existence of a
liquidity facility to ensure the continued payment of interest on EETCs
during the repossession and remarketing of the aircraft lease following
default by the lessee. The first EETC was by Northwest Airlines in 1994,
and was followed by several others through 1997 that involved over 90
aircraft and $3.3 billion in debt.3 ' The website of Monitor Leasing and
Financial Services lists a number of recent transactions involving such
companies as Pegasus, GE Capital Aviation Services, CIT Aerospace, ILFC,
32
and Aerolease.
F.

Junk Bonds

The "junk bond" financial scandal of the 1970s and 1980s offers an
intriguing, if perverse, view of the importance of liquidity and marketability
to value. Michael Milken, the junk bond "king," believed that there was an
inefficiency in the corporate bond market. Milken discovered that many
29

Idem, p.2. Hallam, op. cit., pp. 55-56, stated that "the logistical problems in effecting

30

title transfers and the creation of security interests have to be gone through with each
Aircraft and Lease, which ..... required four months of hard work with 14 sets of
conditions precedent and nearly 100 legal opinions."
Idem, p. 2.

31
32

Idem, pp. 1-3.
www.monitordaily.com/news/aircraft.html.
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defaulted or lower-rated bonds were under-priced in the markets relative to
their risk. This under-pricing relative to risk offered the potential for a
portfolio of such bonds to out-perform a portfolio of investment grade bonds.
In an efficient market, U.S. Treasury Bonds with no default risk would have
yielded (because of a price differential) the same amount as the bonds of
companies "in distress" with their much higher interest rates but also higher
rates of default. Benjamin J. Stein wrote:
"The buyers of the bonds were helped because the bonds were
crafted to pay a yield so high that even after deducting for the defaults that
would inevitably occur, the bond buyer would still be ahead of where he
would have been if he had bought boring old Treasury bonds with their nil
default rate and their lower yields . . . . The borrowers were better off
because with the proceeds of the Drexel junk debt, they could apply their
ingenuity, their talent, and their own innovations to make their businesses
grow . . . . The American worker was better off because the companies
funded by Drexel would provide new jobs while the old, stodgy, investmentgrade American companies got smaller and laid-off workers . ... The
American consumer was better off because Drexel issuers would provide
new kinds of goods and services, such as larger and better casinos and
nationally franchised day-care centers .... America as a nation was better
off because thanks to Mike Milken the republic was more prosperous and
freer in several basic ways. Access to capital was now democratic. If any
American had a good idea, he could bring it to Milken, get it funded, and
tries his hand at capitalism ...Capital would not be provided only to rich
WASPs of old family, but on the basis of the aristocracy of talent."33
Milken had a point: Only corporations with "investment grade"
bonds (some 5 percent of the 23,000 U.S. companies with annual sales in
excess of $35 million) had access to long-term debt capital. The remaining
95 percent were either left without debt funding opportunities, or were forced
into higher cost debt financing from the banks. Post-Milken, markets in
lower grade bonds have developed, so that, at a price, high-risk companies
have easier access to long-term debt finance.'
If this inefficiency in the market existed and led to under-pricing of
high risk, "junk" bonds, then, wrote Stein:
3

BENJAMIN J. STEIN,

A

LICENSE TO STEAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MICHAEL MILKEN AND

THE CONSPIRACY TO BILK THE NATION,

34

Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992., pp. 22-23.

This section draws heavily on Stein's work.
See GLENN YAGO, How HIGH YIELD SECURITIES
Oxford University Press, 1990.

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

RESTRUCTURED CORPORATE AMERICA,

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

443

"It meant that buyers of low-rated bonds could, with some
insignificant investment of time and effort, consistently achieve higher yields
at this lower end of the bond scale than at the higher end. The increased
default rate of poor-quality bonds would not be so large as to offset their
higher yield. "Junk," in fact, would be, if carefully bought, more valuable
than gilt-edged Treasury bonds. The high interest rate of such bonds would,
over time and with a large enough sample, make up for all risk of loss and
bring the buyer out ahead of investments in high-rated, low-interest bonds."35
Milken noted that trading in junk bonds was occurring in a limited
and small-scale way, but he advanced the notion that such trading could be
done on a national scale, by creating an orderly, well-managed market. This
would enable companies to finance projects by long-term debt capital,
provided by investors willing to invest in junk bonds because they would no
longer be illiquid. Greater liquidity would have a beneficial effect upon the
risk of the bonds, and so on their interest rates.
The question was, how to create a more efficient market for such
commercial paper? One of the requirements of efficiency is that buyers and
sellers have a substantial amount of knowledge about the "product," difficult
to achieve in the junk bond market, where every bond was different in risk
and in contract terms. Milken decided that a real market was not possible,
but that there could be an "illusory" market. If A buys B's bonds at above
market price, A loses. Milken, therefore, had B buy A's bonds at above
market price, so that "In the wash, the gains and losses were supposed to
roughly tally."36 To avoid being out of balance, A and B sell on the bonds to
banks and insurance companies that they control. Consequently, it is
depositors' and policy-holders' money that is being used, not A's or B's. A
and B are content because they gained access, at a price, to long-term debt
financing that otherwise would have been unavailable. As Stein notes, "The
desire for cash, or the apparent opportunity to make money with that cash, is
so great that it simply blocks out many other concerns."37 Milken, of course,
benefited as the middleman who essentially controlled both sides of the deal.
These were not "arms length" transactions.
Why would this deception not be discovered immediately? Because,
says Stein:
"The securities bought usually had no public market, no established
35

Stein, op.cit., p. 35.

36

Id. at 68.

37

Id. at 70.

Volume 41 - Numbers 3 & 4

IDEA - The Journal of Law and Technology
prices, and could - by accounting rules, very loosely applied - count as being
worth their cost for as long as they were in the portfolio. Even if they in fact
defaulted - and this was really beautiful - the issuer could replace them with
a handful of new securities to which the buyer could assign any value he
wished. Defaults could simply be made to disappear."38
At this point in his development of an illusory market, Milken still
had to develop an answer to the liquidity problem for investors - the vast
majority of banks, pension funds and insurance companies that were not
under his control. In essence, his plan was to "securitize" the commercial
loan business, by turning commercial loans into liquid securities. In
addition, Milken promised investors that he would "take them out" of the
bonds at a moment's notice - but not always at a price they would like. 9
Milken stated, "High yield bonds are no more than securitized loans, often
with fewer [restrictive] covenants.""'
Note, however, that the junk bonds were not necessarily worthless.
Properly accounted for, as part of a well-managed and diversified portfolio,
and with adequate provisions recognized for potential losses, they were, and
are, legitimate investments. The existence of securities and markets for
securities that are below investment grade but still possess potential value,
are valid segments of the overall market for securities. Full disclosure of
realistic default rates, several market-makers, not just one, and a more direct
connection between borrowers and lenders with less pocketed by the one
middleman, might have provided a net benefit to the economy. As it was,
many institutions and individuals suffered great losses, and Milken, of
course, went to jail.

38

Id. at 68.

39

Id. at 75.
Milken, quoted in Stein, op. cit., p. 75.

40
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APPENDIX 6 - DUE DILIGENCE

At the heart of the investment decision making process for angels
and venture capitalists is due diligence. Absolutely vital to making a sound
investment, due diligence verifies any business opportunities that survive the
initial screening stage. Due diligence emphasizes understanding and
quantifying the risk of the proposed deal, rather then the upside potential.
This due diligence process is intended to be tough on investment proposals.
For angels and venture capitalists, as few as 10-15 percent of proposals make
it past the initial screening stage to the full due diligence process, and only
10 percent of those receive funding. Indeed, the whole point of this process
is to discover potential problems and to eliminate unsuitable proposals from
further consideration. This is especially important in a start-up situation,
where the venture has no track record or tangible asset base and the market
opportunity and competitive advantage of a product or service must be
verified.'
In the most formal of definitions, due diligence is the care that a
reasonable person exercises under the circumstances to avoid harm to other
persons or their property. In the entrepreneurial venture community, due
diligence is the independent investigation of an investment opportunity, and
its prospects for success, by a private investor or venture capitalist before
funding is provided. It is an intensive and thorough investigation that may
take several months to complete and the primary purpose is to understand
and minimize the risk to the investor. Due diligence should be started as
early in the investment decision making process as feasible. The investor
must also make critical decisions between the time to undertake a complete
due diligence process and the desire to make the deal under the intense time
pressure of the new economy. If the process consumes too much time, the
investor may 1) lose the investment opportunity because the entrepreneur
may pursue other investors or venture capitalists and/or 2) the critical
window of opportunity to get the product to market ahead of the competition
may be lost. Thus, time versus thoroughness is a constant conflict
throughout the due diligence undertaking. Any methods or systems that can
reduce the time to complete due diligence without sacrificing quality will
help to increase the efficiency of the external financing process and decrease
the time for the commercialization of the innovation.
See M. Van Osnabrugge and R. Robinson, Angel Investing: Matching Start-up Funds
with Start-up Companies. THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND
VENTURE CAPITALISTS, San Francisco, CA. Jossey-Bass, Inc. Publishers, 2000.
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For today's entrepreneurs, inventors and venture investors,
intellectual property is often the key asset and centerpiece of the critical due
diligence process. Unfortunately, this vital role of intellectual property has
not translated into initiatives to increase the efficiency of confirming both
ownership and prior claims. It may be said with some conviction that
intellectual property issues have been very much the "poor cousins" in the
due diligence inquiry. Investigators have been assiduous in establishing the
existence and value of tangible assets and other intangibles and in confirming
the presence or otherwise of encumbrances, but the enquiry into the extent of
the intellectual property of the target organization has been left to the often
dubious protection of a vendor or licensor warranty, dubious because of the
often illiquid status of the provider of the warranty. In the intellectual
property context, due diligence involves the investigation to verify and
establish the existence of the intellectual property asset and liability and to
determine the extent of encumbrances or restrictions on the rights to use the
property. This intellectual property due diligence will be of importance to
investors in ventures with intellectual property as the core asset and to
promoters of the investments (such as the inventor or entrepreneur). In the
first case, there will be a concern to verify assurances made by the inventor.
In the second case, there will be the necessity of ensuring that statements
made in the offering document (usually a private placement) are accurate.2
A.

Approaches to Business Valuation

Suppliers of funding require information on the value of what they
are being asked to fund. There are several ways of estimating this value.
Three methods are commonly used:3
1. Cost: what it would cost today to acquire a similar asset. While
this approach is useful in the valuation of tangible assets, it is
little used in valuing intangibles.
2. Market comparable: at what price similar assets are currently
selling. Again, this approach is useful where there is a
developed market, but is little used in valuing intangibles.
3. Projected income: what investors are willing to pay for an asset
with a given future income stream. This approach is the most
widely used in the valuing of intangibles and especially
2

Betts, I., 1997, Legal and Accounting Management Seminars Pty. Ltd., Paper Presented

March 24, 1997 at the Due Diligence Seminar: "Intellectual Property Due Diligence".
A.M. King and J.M. Henry, Valuing Intangible Assets through Appraisals, STRATEGIC
FINANCE, November, 1999, pp. 36-37.
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intellectual property.
The third approach is essentially an "economic value approach,"
especially if income is defined as net cash flow rather than accounting net
income. The difference between cash flow and accounting net income is
principally that accounting net income arises after the deduction of
depreciation expense. Depreciation expense is not a cash expense, but
spreads, or "expires," the cost of an asset over its expected useful life.
Historically, accounting net income is based upon time-matching
revenues with the. expenses incurred in earning the revenues, including
depreciation. Net cash flow is exactly what it seems, the net of cash
movements into and out of a firm. Prior to the reliance of business on costly
plant and equipment (tangible fixed assets), the two numbers, net cash flow
and accounting net income, were very similar for a given firm in a given
year. Production became more and more capital intensive, and more and
more cash was spent on plant and equipment that would last for several
years. Thus, it became clear that net cash flow was no longer providing a
good measure of the operating surplus earned by the firm, and so it was
adjusted by the depreciation charge to show accounting net income.
Yet firms grow, survive, or fail based upon their ability to generate
cash. No firm has ever succeeded in spending a single cent of accounting net
income. Checks cannot be written against accounting net income, but only
against cash balances or overdrafts at the bank. In consequence, firms
nowadays prepare three related financial statements; a balance sheet, a
"snapshot" at a particular time; an income statement, showing the accounting
net income over the year to the balance sheet date; and a statement of cash
flows, showing cash movements over that same period. Each statement
offers a different perspective on the status and condition of the firm. For
valuation purposes, however, the net cash flow is the most reliable number,
because it is less subject to manipulation than is accounting net income, and
has the merit of representing purchasing power in the marketplace. Cash is a
matter of fact; accounting net income is a matter of opinion.
1.

The Time Value of Money

Money has a time value. The sooner a benefit (cash inflow) is
received, the greater its value now. The nearer in time to the present a cash
outflow (in broad terms, a cost) is incurred, the larger the impact now. For
example, assume that someone is about to be given $100, and his or her only
option, other than spending it now, is to invest it in a money market fund at
an annualized yield of 5 per cent, and that this reflects accurately that
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person's opportunities, expressed as a "marginal rate of time preference" of
5 percent. The $100 will accumulate to $105 after one year, assuming annual
compounding. To that person, the "present value" of $105 a year from now
is $100, assuming a marginal rate of time preference of 5 per cent. That
person regards $105 in a year's time as being exactly equivalent to $100
now.' Another person, faced with the same options, but with a higher
marginal time preference rate of 8 per cent, would take the $100 now,
because the 5 per cent interest rate would not be sufficient compensation for
waiting a year.
The marginal rate of time preference is commonly described as the
"discount rate." The discount rate is the reverse of the compound interest
rate. Instead of accumulating a present figure to a future figure, it
"discounts" a future figure back to a present figure. Effectively, in the
example, 5 per cent is the "rate of exchange" between now and the future.
This recognition of the value of time has evolved into what are known as
"discounted cash flow " methods of appraising business and investment
decision data that are expected to stretch well into the future. None of these
ideas is new: compound interest was used in the Old Babylonian Period
(circa 1800-1600 B.C.) in Mesopotamia, and discounted cash flow
techniques were applied to business decision-making in the eighteenth
century.
Firms similarly use a discount rate, known also as a "hurdle rate," or
a "cost of capital." The two principal sources of finance for a firm are debt
and equity, although there are hybrids such as convertible securities, and
complications such as options and warrants. Debt is usually taken to be
long-term debt such as bonds. Interest on debt is a deductible business
expense, and the current cost of a bond may be expressed as its current yield.
Bondholders have a contractual relationship with the firm that usually
requires payment of interest. Equity holders (usually common stock holders)
are the residual owners of the firm. They have no rights to regular payments
of dividends. Any dividends paid to them are distributions of capital and are

5

6

A rate of time preference measures an individual's attitude towards current versus future
consumption of resources. The modifier "marginal" is usually added because the
individual's attitude is likely to differ according to whether it is the first or the last $100
of income.
This indifference is dependent not upon the existence or otherwise of inflation, but on the
use to which the $100 might be put between now and year from now. Inflation
expectations, and other risk factors, will modify the individual's marginal rate of time
preference.
For a detailed discussion of time discounting, see R.H. PARKER, MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, Macmillan, London, 1969, pp. 34-58.
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not tax-deductible. Bondholders, therefore, are perceived to carry a lower
default risk, and so require a lower return. Equity holders carry a higher risk
of losing their investment, and so expect a higher return to compensate them
for the added risk, commonly in the order of 4 to 6 per cent above gross debt
interest. In both cases, the expected return is an opportunity cost rate that
offers compensation sufficient to encourage the holders to hold rather than
sell their investment.
Most firms calculate their cost of capital based upon these expected
returns, weighted by the leverage ratio - the debt to equity ratio at market
values. A firm with a cost of debt of 6 per cent after tax, and a cost of equity
of 14 per cent, and with a 40 per cent leverage ratio, would have what is
called a "weighted average cost of capital" of 12 per cent:
Cost of debt (net of tax):
0.06 * 0.40 =

0.024

Cost equity:
0.16 * 0.60 =
0.084
Weighted Average Cost of Capital:
0.120
The weighted average cost of capital of 12 percent would be the
discount rate used by the firm to calculate the present value of a future cash
flow stream of firm-average risk.
2.

The Economic Valuation of Intangibles

Discounted cash calculations may be performed in a variety of ways,
but all (including spreadsheets such as Excel) are based on the formulae
given below:7
Terminal Value (TV) (compounding):

TV = (1 + r)

Present Value (PV) (discounting of irregular cash flows): PV = (1 + r)
Present Value (PV) (discounting of annuities):
PV = 1- (1 + r)Present Value (PV) (discounting a perpetuity)'

PV = 1/r

Most discounting formulae are constructed on the assumption that the first cash flow will
occur in a year from now. The formulae may be changed to recognize an immediate first
cash flow, and indeed, to assume continuous rather than discrete (annual or periodic)
compounding.
In a perpetuity, n tends towards infinity and so (1 + r) - n tends towards zero, so that we
are, in effect, left with 1/r.Very long annuities may be approximated closely by
assuming a perpetuity.
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The present or economic value of the benefit from a patent would be
by
discounting its expected future cash flows by the owner-firm's
valued
cost of capital. Thus, if it expected to earn net free cash flow of $10,000 per
year over the next 8 years, and if the firm's cost of capital were expected to
be 12 per cent over that period, the present value would be $49,676. 9 The
powerful effects of discounting may be demonstrated by the fact that the first
annual cash flow, to be received in one year from now, has a present value,
at 12 per cent, of $8,929, whereas the eighth and final cash flow has a
present value of less than half that amount, $4,039. This effect of the
discounting process has some benefit, in that the later cash flows, which tend
to be much more difficult to estimate, have a geometrically shrinking impact
on present value.
3.

Risk and Value

A cash flow stream of higher or lower than average risk would lead
to the weighted average cost of capital being increased by a risk premium or
reduced by a risk discount. The term "risk" requires some clarification.
Strictly, the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" are not synonyms:
"Uncertainty may be seen as one end of a spectrum, the other end of
which is 'certainty.' Certainty may be said to end abruptly, but uncertainty
shades into 'risk.' . . . A distinction is often made (only to be disregarded)
between risk, where the probabilities of a particular event occurring can be
assessed from knowledge and experience, and uncertainty, where the
probabilities are not susceptible to such assessment. In practice, a decision
problem is likely to contain all three elements, certainty, risk and uncertainty,
and so it rarely helpful to distinguish too clearly between the last two." '
Risk may be associated with general economic conditions, both
domestically and globally, or they may be firm-specific, or "projectspecific." A firm's average risk is already built into the firm's weighted
average cost of capital."1 Some projects, however, has as noted earlier, have
This was calculated using discount tables, which are readily available in most finance
texts.
67
to J.FREEAR, THE MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESs FINANCE, Pitman, London, 1980, p. .
Another approach is to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model. This identifies a so-called
default risk free rate, being the rate of return on six-month government bonds, and a
systematic or market risk based rate being the return on the stock market, which is
regarded as an efficient market. As the average investor may remove all firm-specific
(alpha) risk by a fairly simple diversification of his stock market portfolio, the only risk
for which he requires compensation is the systematic or "beta" risk. This notion, with its
linear definition of risk, has lead to the development of an industry based on the
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risk characteristics that are not average. The simplest way to deal with such
projects is to incorporate an additional risk premium into, or, less commonly,
to deduct a risk discount from, the weighted average cost of capital. 12 The
impact of an added premium to the weighted average cost of capital is to
reduce the present value of the cash flows. For example, using the perpetuity
formula given earlier:
PV-- 1/r
And assuming r to be 0.12, the present value of a perpetuity of 1
would be:
1/0.12 = 8.33.

Adding a risk premium of 4 per cent to 12 per cent to give a discount
rate of 16 per cent, the present value of a perpetuity of 1 would be:
1/0.16 = 6.25.

The present value of the perpetuity is reduced, therefore, by
increasing the discount rate to allow for perceived above-average risk.
4.

The Economic Nature of Intangible Assets

"Assets represent expected future economic benefits, rights to which
have been acquired by the enterprise as a result of some current or past
transaction."' 3 Assets are deferred expenses, that is, they are acquired for

12

13

calculation of "beta coefficients," which measure the degree of volatility in a stock
relative to the market, and enable a judgment to be made as to whether or not the stock is
currently valued high, low or about right. A decision to trade might be guided by this
judgment. Note, however, that some finance markets may be less efficient, and so the
approach just outlined may be less effective in these markets.
The addition of a constant risk premium into the weighted average cost of capital (the
discount rate) does not imply that risk is constant over time. Rather, it implies that risk is
increasing over time, and at an increasing rate. This is because the same absolute
percentage premium is used to reduce the present value of cash flows that are already
reduced in present value terms by the basic weighted average cost of capital. Thus the
risk premium will have an increasing impact on the present value of later cash flows.
Increasing risk may be a reasonable assumption. If, however, it is not, or if the decisionmaker wishes to make explicit risk estimates about the expected cash flows in each year,
"certainty equivalents" may be used to reduce the value of a risky cash flow to its
equivalent cash flow receivable with certainty. The certainty equivalent is rather like a
household fire insurance premium. The damage risks associated with a house fire are
largely removed by the certain payment of an insurance premium.
R.T. Sprouse and M. Moonitz, A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principlesfor
Business Enterprises, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No.3, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
BOARD, AICPA, New York, NY, 1962, p. 8.
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use, and their value is used up over time in the earning of revenue. The
"using up" of assets is recognized by means of "depreciation" charges
against revenue. Assets such as property, plant and equipment are "tangible"
assets and are depreciated over their expected useful life. Patents,
trademarks and copyrights are regarded by the accounting profession as
"intangible assets," and are written off-"amortized"--over a period defined
in the body of conventions known as "generally accepted accounting
principles." Following a discussion of plant and equipment assets, Sprouse
and Moonitz wrote:
"The . . . discussion of plant and equipment is also applicable to
patents, copyrights, research and development costs, goodwill, and the like.
In one sense, these items represent assets in their "purest" form because their
value depends directly on "future economic benefits" and not indirectly on
some physical implement or tool that is capable of providing benefits. Their
very "purity" as assets (services) makes them difficult to deal with, however,
because current or future exchange prices for them often do not exist. The
consequence is that these items are notoriously difficult to evaluate and
therefore should probably be carried at acquisition cost in the absence of
compelling evidence that their value is markedly different. "Intangibles" of
limited term should be amortized as production cost or expense over their
estimated service loves. Unlimited items should continue to be carried as
assets, without amortization.'"'
APB Opinion No. 17,' and FASB Statements No. 2,"6 No. 86," and
No. 121, 8 address the accounting treatment of intangible assets, their
impairment, and related issues. Generally, intangible assets are recorded in
the books of account at cost, including costs of acquisition, and costs needed
to make the assets ready for its intended use, such as legal fees. If
intangibles are acquired for stock or in exchange for other assets, the cost of
14
15

6

17

18

Idem, p. 36.
"Intangible Assets," Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board No. 17, New York,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1970. See Appendix 1, Page 18 for a
summary.
"Accounting for Research and Development Costs," Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 2, Stamford, Conn, Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1974. See
Appendix 2, Page 19 for a summary.
"Accounting for the Cost of Computer Software to be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise
Marketed," Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 86, Stamford, Conn,
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1985. See Appendix 3, Page 20 for a summary.
"Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be
Disposed Of," Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121, Stamford, Conn,
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1995. See Appendix 4, Page 21 for a summary.
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the intangible is the fair market value of the consideration given, or the fair
market value of the intangible received, whichever is more clearly evident.
Any costs incurred within the company, however, are expensed as they are
incurred, unless they can be directly identified, such as the legal costs of
applying for a patent. Internal research and development costs, for example,
are generally expenses as incurred, rather than being capitalized and
amortized. An intangible asset becomes "impaired" whenever the expected
future cash flows (undiscounted and without interest charges) is less than the
carrying amount of the asset. 9
a)

Patents

A patent may be regarded as an agreement between an inventor and
the federal government. Under that agreement, the inventor obtains the
exclusive right (for a limited time) to make, use, and sell his invention, in
return for making the invention public by giving the government certain
information about it.2o Generally accepted accounting principles perceive a
patent to be an exclusive right recognized by law and registered with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office. The life of the patent is twenty years from the
first filing, but the amortization should occur over the estimated useful life of
the patent, or the legal life of twenty years, whichever is shorter. "Estimated
useful life," means the period during which benefits are received. If, during
that period, legal a company incurs legal fees in successfully defending the
patent, then those fees may be added to the asset account and will then be
amortized. If patent owners contract to allow another party to use the patent
for a stated time period in return for royalties, the patent owner continues to
amortize the patent and recognize the royalties earned as revenue.
b)

Trademarks

The term "trademark" connotes names, symbols, or other distinctive
identities given to companies, products, and services, and registered with the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. There are four kinds of marks:
trademarks, service marks, certification marks, and collective marks.
Registered trademarks may be renewed indefinitely for successive twentyyear periods. Generally accepted accounting principles require that the cash
equivalent amount paid for the trademark be capitalized, along with any
'9
20

Idem. See the earlier discussion of time discounting.
See J.P. MALLOR, A.J. BARNES, T. BOWERS, M.J.

PHILLIPS, AND

BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT,

A.W.

LANGVARDT,

New York, Irwin/McGraw-Hill,

1998, pp.144-152.
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costs directly incurred in the development, protection, expansion, registration
or defense of a trademark. These costs must be amortized over the useful life
of the trademark, or forty years, whichever is the shorter.
c)

Copyrights

Copyrights represent a protection given by law to, for example,
authors of literary, musical, artistic, or other works. Copyright law protects a
copyright for the life of the author plus fifty years. Generally accepted
accounting principles require that the cost should be amortized over the
period it is expected to produce revenue, but in no case should a copyright be
amortized over a period in excess of its remaining legal life, or forty years,
whichever is shorter.
5.

The Accounting Valuation of Intangibles

The above discussion of the accounting treatment of intangibles is
essentially transaction-cost based. The accounting valuation of intangibles
bears little relationship to the value of their expected future benefits to the
firm. As in other areas of financial reporting, the accounting profession
tends towards the objective historic transaction cost that is largely irrelevant
for valuation purposes, rather than a relevant (value of expected future
benefits) but subjective valuation. There are notable exceptions, however,
such as oil and gas reporting, and'future pension obligations. The accounting
profession prefers conservative numbers and it prefers not to estimate or
certify value.
Accountants are more comfortable with an objective "hard" number,
historical cost, that may be determined by the examination of documents
supporting the transaction that gave rise to the cost. Any number of
accountants, in assessing the same evidence, will tend, independently, to
come up with the same cost number. If an intangible were acquired by an
arm's length transaction, it would appear in the balance sheet at this
objectively determined cost, and would then be amortized (see above). If the
intangible asset were acquired by means other than an arm's length
transaction, for example, as the product of the firm's own research and
development efforts, it would not be treated as an asset, but would be
expensed as incurred.2 In the firm's financial statements no attempt is made
to measure the value of the future benefits expected to be derived from
ownership of the intangible asset.
21

Except, for example, and as noted earlier, for legal and other fees in establishing or
defending a patent.
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In a recent article, A.M. King and J.M. Henry argued strongly that
generally accepted accounting principles are out of date in their treatment of
intangibles.2 The article noted that the accounting profession strives, among
other objectives, to produce financial statements that are both relevant and
reliable. Reliability is achieved by the historic cost approach based on
transactions, but at the expense of relevance. King and Henry asked: "How
can a company, such as an Internet or high-tech company provide this
relevant information if it can't discuss its intangible assets? For almost any
Internet or high-tech company, Property, Plant and Equipment ("PP&E") is
far less important than the idea, the software, the workforce, or the
distribution channel. These firms invariably also have little or no inventory.
In short, accounting doesn't capture the essence of these firms. Their real
assets - the ones current and prospective shareholders are interested in
-aren't captured by GAAP."23
King and Henry observed that the reliability issues may be resolved
through the professional appraisal of intangible assets. Major banks, they
stated, are willing now to lend on intangibles, although they may require
annual valuations. These valuations would be performed by professional
appraisers, who follow the "Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice." These standards require the ,use of one or more of three appraisal
bases: cost, market comparable, and projected income. They noted that:
"The banks tended to lend the borrowers approximately 30% of the valuation
of the intangible assets. By filing appropriate legal documents, the banks
were able to obtain a perfected security interest in these intangible assets."24
King and Henry concluded: "If the valuations appraisers perform are
reliable enough for banks to lend against, then the values are equally reliable
for disclosure in financial statements. Companies should be permitted perhaps even required - to disclose the values of their major intangible assets
. . . This information can appear in footnotes or in the Management
5
Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A"), which are reviewed by auditors.
A well-respected intermediate accounting textbook delivers a similar
message:
"In this emerging economy of knowledge, even some banks have
concluded that 'soft' assets (like computer programming know-how and
information infrastructure) can be a better credit risk than 'hard' assets (like
22

A.M. King and J.M. Henry, op. cit., pp.33-37.

23

Idem, p. 35. GAAP stands for "generally accepted accounting principles."

24

Idem, p. 35.

25

Idem, p. 36
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buildings). But how should the 'soft' assets be valued? Accountants get
little solace from former FASB chairman Donald Kirk, who acknowledges,
'There are arguments that balance sheets ignore certain intangibles, but the
reporting issues of trying to recognize them are, in my mind,
insurmountable.' It appears that the assets that really count are the ones
26
accountants can't count - yet.
A clue as to the latest thinking of the accounting profession is to be
found in the Exposure Draft issued by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB") in September, 1999. The Exposure Draft is entitled,
"Business Combinations and Intangible Assets, and part of its summary deals
generally with intangible assets: "The current 40-year maximum
amortization period for acquired intangible assets (other than goodwill)
would be replaced with a presumption that their useful lives are 20 years or
less. However, amortization of intangible assets over lives that are longer
than 20 years and nonamortization of assets with indefinite lives would be
permitted if certain criteria are met. The Exposure Draft would not change
the current requirement to write off the cost of purchased research and
development assets at date of acquisition.""
The FASB web site answers a series of "frequently asked questions,"
including the following, which deals with the expensing of "in process"
research and development costs that have been purchased as part of an
acquisition: "
"Q3.
Would the Exposure Draft change the accounting for
purchased in-process research and development assets (that is, the current
practice of writing off the cost of those assets at date of acquisition)?
No. The Exposure Draft would not change the current practice of
writing off the cost of purchased in-process research and development
("IPR&D") assets at date of acquisition. Following recent research and
deliberations on this issue-which included discussions with
constituents-the Board concluded that the accounting for purchased IPR&D
assets should not be considered separately from the accounting for other
26

27

28

D.E.KIESO

AND J.J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING, Wiley, New York, 9th
edition, 1998, p. 59 3 . The quotation by Donald Kirk is from his article, "Searching for
Nonfiction in Financial Statements," Fortune, December 23, 1996, p. 38. It might well
be argued, however, that while accountants are capable of validating a professional
appraisal of intangibles, they have, so far, chosen not to do so. FASB stands for
"Financial Accounting Standards Board."
September 1999 FASB Exposure Draft, "Business Combinations and Intangible Assets,"
Financial Accounting Standards Board Website p. 1.

Idem, pp. 3-4.
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research and development costs. The FASB may decide to undertake a
separate project at some future date that would reconsider the accounting for
research and development in its entirety. 29
The FASB seems, therefore, to be holding to the expensing of
research and development costs. Aside from a change in the normal
maximum period over which the amortization of intangible assets may occur,
and an increased disclosure requirement, there seems to be no evidence that
the FASB is contemplating any radical shift from the existing cost-based
valuation approach: 0
"Q30. How would the Exposure Draft change the accountingfor
purchasedintangibleassets other than goodwill?
APB Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets, currently limits the
amortization period for intangible assets to a maximum of 40 years. The
Exposure Draft would eliminate that 40-year maximum and replace it with a
presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset is 20 years or less.
However, intangible assets with useful lives longer than 20 years would be
amortized over those longer lives if certain other criteria are met.
The Board also believes that some intangible assets have useful
economic lives that are indefinite and therefore amortization of those assets
is inappropriate. The Exposure Draft would permit nonamortization of
intangible assets with indefinite lives if they meet certain criteria. Those
intangible assets would be reviewed for impairment annually.
The Exposure Draft also would require disclosure of information
about each significant class of intangible assets acquired, such as their fair
value at date of acquisition, the method of determining that fair value, and
their weighted average useful life. Annual financial statements would
include disclosure of the gross carrying amount, accumulated amortization
and amortization expense for each class of intangible asset, as well as the
amount and description of any intangible asset not being amortized.
B.

Initiatives to Develop a Marketplace for Intangibles

In the valuation of an entrepreneurial venture, investors consider
three interrelated components: intellectual property, the management team
and the potential market. Clearly, without the intellectual property, as
29

30

The accounting for purchased research and development assets acquired in a business
combination is addressed by FASB Interpretation No. 4, "Applicability of FASB
Statement No. 2 to Business Combinations Accounted for by the Purchase Method."
Op. cit., pp.17-18.
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exhibited in a patent, there is not a market nor is there a need for a
management team to commercialize the intellectual property. Thus,
valuation begins with the intellectual property and is interwoven throughout
the process.
The valuation of patents, one of the essential ingredients, is central to
the valuation of the entrepreneurial venture. In an attempt to place a value
on patents and to increase the efficiency of their commercialization, several
initiatives to develop a patent marketplace are currently under consideration.
Many of these initiatives include fledgling online auction based markets for
patents as indicated by the growing number of private online auctions and
exchanges for patents popping up around the country-each hoping to use
the reach of the Internet to connect universities, corporations and individual
inventors with elusive buyers.'
Executives at these online start-ups say they intend to do for patent
rights and other forms of intellectual property what Christie's and Sotheby's
do for antiques or what Nasdaq or the New York Stock Exchange do for
stocks--develop secure markets where buyers can be confident of what they
are purchasing and sellers know they will get a competitive price. These
online companies hope that the current rage for e-commerce will carry over
to intangible property--creating a booming market in inventions, trademarks
and copyrights.
While there are skeptics, several experts in both licensing of patents
and online trading believe there's an opportunity for at least a few of these
patent exchanges to succeed.32 Examples of these sites include Patent &
License Exchange (Pl-x.com), Yet2.com, PatentAuction.com, Virtual
Component Exchange and Intellectual Property Technology Exchange
(http://www.techex.com). Each of these companies has a slightly different
approach, but what they all agree on is that large numbers of patents awarded
to individuals, companies and research centers-160,000 U.S. patents this
year alone-are worthless unless they can find their way to businesses
willing to shepherd them to market. The key to these online patent
marketplace companies is to make transactions easier and more efficient,
whether as auctions or something akin to a computerized dating service that
helps buyers and sellers find one another.33
As an example of trends to arrive at marketplace valuations of
patents, the Patent and License Exchange offers a secure, anonymous, neutral
31

P. Jacobs, Marketplace of ideas selling patents online, Los ANGELES TIMES, Monday,
October 25, 1999.

32

Id.

33

Id.
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forum to buy, sell, license or resell the rights to patents around the world.
Pl-x.com aims to aggregate buyers and sellers around the globe into a
searchable database and to offer tools to process transactions cut down on
risk through providing patent validity insurance, escrow services and a
suggested pricing system. These services are intended to transform
intellectual property into a liquid asset. 4
In an effort to more accurately place value on intellectual property,
the value of the firm in ownership of, or commercializing, the intellectual
property often serves as a proxy to the value of the underlying intellectual
property. In effect, IP valuation has shifted to venture valuation, also a
difficult exercise in today's entrepreneurial economy. In this valuation small
companies are preferred over larger ones because, ironically, enterprise value
is a more accurate proxy for technology value in small, early-stage
companies-particularly those ventures that have not yet launched their main
product and have no revenue. Unlike the large mature company, the
enterprise value of a small, revenue-less company is not affected by
perceived earnings momentum (it has no sales), nor management reputation
(its management is typically new and relatively unknown). Free of these
impurities, the enterprise value of a small "pure-play" company is left as a
relatively pure measurement of the value the market is assigning to the
company's technology-its intellectual property. 5 Thus, enterprise value
(the value placed on the venture) is a closer proxy to intellectual property
value when the existence of externalities to the core business are at a
minimum. A larger, mature enterprise derives value from a variety of
sources and in such a case it is difficult to "trace" value back to the
underlying intellectual property or to disaggregate valuation to the proportion
derived directly from intellectual property.
In an attempt to gauge and track the market value of intellectual
property the enterprise value has been used. Since a company's market cap is
driven by the value of both its tangible and its intangible assets, market cap
indices do not and cannot reasonably claim to represent value creation in
intangible assets. To do so they would have to have subtracted from them the
value of their component companies' tangible assets-their book values. In
other words, the indices should be based on market caps minus book values,
a metric commonly known as enterprise value. Enterprise value is a fairly
common valuation yardstick used in securities analysis to approximate the
value of a company's technology.36
34

35
36

S. Kalin, Patentsfor Sale, HOT Topics E-COMMERCE, 1999.
A.K. Arrow, An index for our era, pl-x.com website, 1999.

Id.
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A new index, the Intangible Asset Market ("IAM") Index has been
proposed by The Patent and License Exchange, Inc. The index is intended to
fulfill three roles: as a benchmark of raw technology value in various sectors,
to provide for quantitative risk measurement of unique IP assets, and to act
as a leading indicator for shifts in stock prices of large, technology-rich
companies. As noted by the Patent and License Exchange, Inc.: The 150
companies whose enterprise values make up the five IAM Indices qualified
to become components according to a highly specific but non-traditional set
of criteria. The companies are: technology-rich, non-service businesses
heavily dependent on intellectual property; highly focused ("pure-play")
companies in a particular technology niche; minimal revenues and/or
earnings; early stage, smaller companies, with minimal infrastructure and
globally diverse.
C.

Security Interests in Intangibles

As stated previously, the early stage equity transaction includes
finding the investor (or the investment), initial screening, evaluating the
investment opportunity and conducting due diligence, negotiating the deal
and pricing and structuring deals. After conclusion of the transaction,
monitoring the investment and harvesting the venture are essential
undertakings. The consideration of intellectual property is critical in the due
diligence and valuation stage. Increasing the efficiency, in terms of both
time and money, in the due diligence phase would assist both
entrepreneurs/inventors and investors. Perfecting a lien on a patent is an
integral component of due diligence, and any decrease in the time to perfect
the lien while result in a streamlining of the transaction process.
In the lightning speed of the new economy, where opportunities and
market niche can be lost in a short period of time, any increase in the
efficiency of the process will naturally allow innovations to decrease their
time to market and contribute to the chance of the survival of the commercial
venture. In this process of increasing efficiency and decreasing the time to
accomplish technology transfer, opinions vary on both the need and the
benefactor of this reduction:
"Some patent experts are lukewarm on the idea of Internet based
patent transactions, however. Lita Nelson, director of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's technology licensing office, says an auction based
Internet model won't work well for university patents, which deal with very
early stage technology. There is no substitute for assessing technology by
meeting its developers and evaluating how it could be used, she adds. Others
agree. "It takes time and energy to understand the value of a patent," says
Kevin DeBre, a partner in the technology group of Brobeck, Phleger &
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Harrison LLP in Irvine, CA. On the commercial side, companies are
hesitant. "It is a good idea, [but] I don't know if it is a viable idea," says Brad
Friedman, senior vice president and patent counsel at Varian Medical
Systems Inc., Palo Alto, a maker of medical devices and software for
oncology. Such an exchange would appeal more to start-ups that need to
make money quickly on their intellectual property than to larger companies,
like Varian, which already has technology-transfer mechanisms in place, he
notes."
The patent process can best be surmised through an examination of
the typically commercialization process for intellectual property. Using the
electronics industry as an example:
"The problem is particularly acute in the electronics industry. About
a quarter of the 600,000 patents available for trade each year worldwide
concern electronics. And, patents in the electronics field become obsolete
faster than those in any other area. Particularly in the fast-paced computer,
consumer, and communications segments of the electronics market, the
technology landscape can change in anywhere from six to 18 months.
The existing, inefficient way of trading in patents requires several
steps. If you want to sell a patent, you'll often spend a year trying to find
somebody who wants to buy it. Similarly, buyers who are looking for a new
design or technology patent will spend a year trying to find the right one.
Next, you have to decide what the patent is worth. That takes six
months if you're lucky, and two or three years if you're not. The problem is
that a patent is essentially a right to use a technology. But what's the value of
that right? If you're selling patented core circuitry that can be turned into the
best communications chip around, you'll set a pretty high price. But a
potential buyer must assume a number of risks: risk of the patent's validity,
development risks, fabrication risks, and even the risk that someone will
infringe on the patent. The buyer naturally wants all of this factored into the
equation. Thus, the patent's price becomes the all-important indicator of the
potential reward versus all that risk. And once the parties settle on a price,
they could take another six months to close the deal."37
The table below summarizes some of the time and cost points for the
commercialization of a patent.

37

J. Child, Technology Breakthrough,

ELECTRONIC DESIGN,

pl-x.com website, 1999.
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Process

Time

Cost

Need for financing or buyer

Up to 1 year

Equity share negotiated

establishing patent value

6 months to 3 years

Up to _ the patent value

Searching lien Databases

varies

Up to $500 per state

Negotiating the Deal and -

To assist in assigning values to patents in the absence of an auction
market to establish values, an adoption of the Black-Scholes option pricing
model has been proposed. In the context of options, real options theory is
combined with data from publicly traded technology-rich companies to
compute reasonable market values for patents. In the context of the BlackScholes option pricing model: A patent, like a call option, is a right to an
asset which may or may not have future value. Patents are typically offered
for sale or license in units of related patents covering a single product line,
and they are valued based on their financial risk and reward... Patents, and
unit combinations thereof, are real options. The Black Scholes option
pricing formula, with the precise, transparent, reproducible price it calculates
for traded equity options led to the robust, liquid options marketplace we
enjoy today.. .the suggested patent values give the buyer and seller a starting
point for auctions or negotiations. Because some of its inputs are the market
prices of publicly traded stocks, the price changes daily.

D.

Insurancefor Patent Validity

Historically, market gaps or discontinuities represent an opportunity
niche for business. In the case of patent transactions, the need for a
recording system for security interests in intellectual property represents such
a discontinuity that has fostered the emergence of patent validity insurance.
The insurance, intended to achieve some reduction of the risk associated with
the acquisition of a patent, adds to the transaction cost and the cost of
commercialization technology. This additional transaction cost in turn adds
to the cost of the early stage equity investment, in terms of both the amount
of external capital required and the increase in the equity share that an
entrepreneur must relinquish. The cost of patent validity insurance can serve
as a proxy to the benefit of a recording system for security interests in
intellectual property which would in part eliminate the need for certain
provisions in the insurance. The leader in the field, Swiss Re New Markets,
a division of the Swiss Reinsurance Company, has developed a new patent
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validity insurance available with the purchase of patents and licenses. As
with title insurance for homebuyers, the insurance provides protection
against liens and ownership other than the seller. In terms of the scale of the
market for the Swiss Reinsurance Company product:
For most companies, intellectual property ("IP") today is the most
important corporate asset. But this most important asset and the associated
risks are almost completely uninsured. The corporate IP insurance market is
an emerging, new market with large potential benefit to companies whose
strength lies in innovation.
IP has increased dramatically in importance for corporations over the
last 20 years. In 1982, the hard assets of industrial companies were said to
account for 62% of the companies market value. By 1992, tangibles made up
38% - and intangibles 62% - of their value. In 2000, intangible assets and IP
values are clearly the most important asset of most industrial companies.
Driving factors behind this increase are:
•

A increased intensity of competition,

•

A increased rapidity of technological growth and innovation,

" A increased reliance on legal protection of rights in IP and
increased enforcement of IP rights,
• A increasingly sharp liability standards for infringement and
misappropriation.
The annual number of patent infringement losses exceeding US $10
million doubled since 1993, and losses of US $100 million and more are no
longer uncommon today. Exposed companies include those in the
electronics, pharmaceuticals, machinery, computer, bio-technology, medical
telecommunications,
devices and equipment, automotive, chemicals, textiles,
8
industries.
materials
building
and
goods,
toys, sporting
The concept behind the patent validity insurance is to protect the
buyer and to provide the seller with a more accessible market since the
insurance affords a degree of downside risk protection for the investor. A
patent validity coverage indemnifies the patent buyer or licensee for amounts
lost due to a later invalidation of the patent. Each ... buyer or licensee is
protected against the risk of financial loss that can arise when the purchased
38

See Swiss, Re, The significance of intellectual property assets, risks and insurance,
SWISS RE WEBSITE, 2000.
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patent is declared invalid. Invalidity could be declared, for example, if the
inventor or patent applicant failed to disclose information in the patent
application process or because of outright fraud, such as a fictitious patent or
a patent offered for sale by someone other than its owner. Coverage can be
provided for the buyers purchase price or license fees, plus tooling costs and
even for investment in developing the new product from the patent rights
acquired.
The insurance may also enhance market liquidity since the investor
or licensee can be insured for the amount of the up-front purchase price paid
for the license or patent. According to William Hoffman, associate director
of Integrated Risk Solutions: "Patent validity insurance is a win-win product.
It promotes the growth of a new market by reducing risk. Sellers as well as
buyers benefit from this coverage. Businesses with marketable intellectual
property seeking to deploy their valuable but non-performing intangible
assets benefit from the increased number of buyers who are willing, ready,
and able."
Specific insurance coverage for the buyer or seller varies. Some
features of the insurance protection include:
* A indemnity for damages for which the insured is liable to third
parties,
" A legal costs incurred in defending a patent infringement claim,
*

A legal costs incurred in defending an injunction claim,
" A legal costs in bringing an action for a declaration of
non-infringement,
" A discretionary coverage for a single lump-sum paid-up license
royalty, and
" A flexibility for providing specialty coverage for other
client-specific IP risks. 9
The valuation of intellectual property is central to the valuation
of the entrepreneurial venture.

39

See Swiss RE WEBSITE, 2000.
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7 - EXCLUSIVE AND NON EXCLUSIVE LICENSES

Both the exclusive and nonexclusive licenses seem to be forms of
personal property within the broad scope of U.C.C. sections 9-102 and 9106.' When the debtor is the licensee, not the licensor, the licensor is the
"account debtor." A licensor/account debtor is the person obligated, but the
obligation is a performance obligation rather than a monetary obligation.
The licensor "owes" the licensee/debtor forbearance from suit, as long as the
debtor abides by the terms of the license. It is this contractual forbearance,
which permits the licensee a limited use and gives value to the license as
"intellectual property" while in the hands of the licensee.' However, the
U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) and § 9-106, cmt. 1. Revised Article Nine defers to "other law"
on the issue of whether a particular debtor/licensee acquires "property" under a license of
intellectual property. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-408, cmt. 3. Cases involving private licenses
are rare. In re Stirling Gold, Bankruptcy No. 77-B-1209 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); (A
license to distribute a film is a general intangible); Section 541(a)(1) of the Code does not
make transferability a predicate to the definition of property which passes to the estate
when the petition is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). See In re Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1424, 1425
(9th Cir. 1984) ("...[Tlhe requirement that the debtor must be able to transfer the
interest...has been eliminated under the Code.") Governmental licenses such as liquor
licenses and water permits are often found to be general intangibles despite the control
that the licensor can exercise over transfer. Bogus v. American National Bank of
Cheyenne, 401 F.2d 458, 5 U.C.C. 937 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Dalcon, 120 B.R. 620, 13
U.C.C.2d 524 (Bankr. D. Ma. 1990); Lake Region Credit Union v. Crystal Clear Water,
502 N.W.2d 524, 21 U.C.C.2d 775 (N.D. 1993); Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc.,
424 N.W.2d 649, 6 U.C.C.2d 863 (S.D. 1988); Queen of the North, Inc. v. Legrue, 582
P.2d 144, 24 UCC 1301 (Ala. 1978). The result may be different if the state has
specifically excluded such a license from the definition of "personal property." In re
Sheldon, 1988 Lexis 1420 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988). For a broad definition of "personal
property" under U.C.C. section 9-102 see Travis v. Trust Company Bank, 621 F.2d 148,
150 (5th Cir. 1980). Priority between a secured lender and a nonexclusive license is not
clearly covered under the priority rule in section 9-301(l)(d).
The definition of an account debtor in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a) refers to "the person who is
obligated on an account, chattel paper or general intangible." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a).
Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(3). This language must be aimed at the person
whose obligation gives the account, chattel paper or general intangible its value. Under
the present language of Article 9, when intellectual property is licensed, both the licensor
and the licensee are left with personal property in the form of a general intangible. The
licensor owns an income stream and other contract rights on which the licensee is the
"account debtor." If this income stream is not an account, chattel paper or instrument, it
must be a general intangible. The licensee owns a right to use, and, in varying degrees, a
right to insist on the licensor's forbearance. The licensor, therefore, should be viewed as
the "account debtor" whenever the debtor is the licensee, because it is the licensor's
obligation which gives the license its value in the hands of the debtor. The definition of
"account debtor" could be read expansively, however, to cover any person, including the
debtor obligated on a general intangible. In that case, a "debtor" using a license or permit
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problem with unrestricted recognition of a debtor's licenses as collateral is
found in the debtor's reciprocal obligations to the licensor/account debtor.
Typically, the debtor is not able to transfer the license without the
licensor/account debtor's consent. The debtor may have to use the license in
a manner regulated by specific standards. For example, a franchisor of a
retail chain or the governmental issuer of a broadcast license may want to
control quality and, to that end, circumscribe certain actions of the actual
owner of the store oi the operator of the radio station. In order to assure that
the licensor's control cannot be frustrated by a third party, the licensor may
want to construe any attempted transfer, including one for security, as a
breach of the license and grounds for termination.
The current Article Nine language in section 9-318(4) invalidates
any contract term that "prohibit[s] assignment of an account or prohibits
creation of a security interest in a general intangiblefor money due or to
become due or requires the account debtor's assent to such assignment or
security interest."3 This language invalidates transfer restrictions, such as the
prohibition in the franchise agreement set forth above. However, when the
general intangible used as collateral is the income stream from the
intellectual property, for example the franchise fees, Article Nine is silent on
the validity of restrictions which benefit the licensor/account debtor when the
licensee is the debtor and the collateral is the license itself. By negative
inference from current section 9-318(4) such restrictions are effective.
Therefore, the licensor can make the creation of a security interest in the
license a breach of the agreement and thus grounds for terminating the
license. Arguably, the licensor should not be able to frustrate the licensee
debtor's legitimate interest in using a valuable license as collateral.
Permitting the licensee to create a security interest in the license does not,
until default, undermine the licensor's interest in deciding who should be able
to exercise the rights granted under the license. It is only the secured party's
unrestricted right to retain or dispose of the license on default, which
undermines the licensor's legitimate right to control the licensee's identity.
In 1992, the Article Nine Study Committee recommended that:
"The Drafting Committee ... give serious consideration to whether
Article 9 should be revised to provide that a prohibition on the assignment of
a private or governmental contract, license, or permit is ineffective to prevent
the attachment or perfection of a security interest, and the creation of a
as collateral could also be viewed as an "account debtor" in the same transaction because
of the contractual or other restraints (e.g. assignment prohibited) which the licensee
debtor owes to the third party licensor. See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-408, cmt. 5. See also
PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article, Report 178 (December 1, 1992).
U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
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security interest in the debtor's rights under the contract, license, or permit
does not give rise to a default under the contract, license, or permit
notwithstanding any agreement or other law to the contrary." Section 9408(a) of Revised Article Nine was drafted in response to the Study
Committee's recommendation. The subsection renders "ineffective" antiassignment and anti-collateral transfer language in a general intangible to the
extent that such language "prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the...
account debtor to the ...

creation ...

of a security interest."' The rule does

not, however, make anti-assignment language ineffective to thwart
assignments. Only when the language is used to prohibit transfers of security
interests does the prohibition render the language ineffective. Nevertheless,
to the extent that such restrictive language is "effective under other law," the
security interest is (1) not enforceable against the account debtor, (2)
imposes no duties on the account debtor, and (3) can be ignored by the
account debtor.6

The Revision language does not really break from prior law on this
point. The rule in Revised Article Nine generally follows an approach taken
by some courts under current Article Nine. These courts have held that a
security interest can be granted in a nontransferable governmental license,
but "limited to the extent of the licensee's proprietary rights in the license vis
a vis private third parties."' Thus, the secured party cannot realize on the
security interest in the license unless the necessary foreclosure-related
disposition has the approval of the licensor. Perhaps it also means that the
secured party can assert no rights in the license property until an approved
transfer of the property occurs. A typical security agreement prohibits the
4

PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article, Report 178 (December 1, 1992).

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-408(a). On default, Revised Article Nine section 9-607(a)(1)
provides the secured party with a broadly defined right to "collect" an account debtor's

6

"obligation." U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-607(a)(1). That post-default right to insist on an
account debtor's contractual performance should yield to the limitations on any
disposition of the debtor's license without licensor consent in Revised section 9-408(a).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-408(d). See In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A
patent license is nonassignable as a matter of "federal common law.").
In re Ridgely Communications, Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 379 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); In re
Thomas Communications, Inc., 161 B.R. 621, 625-26 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1993). There
is considerable authority for the proposition that a patent license is a personal right not
assignable absent the licensee's consent under the "applicable law" (i.e. the federal
common law of patents) in section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. In re CFLC, Inc., 89
F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996h.In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 688-90 (W.D.
Tenn. 1987); In re Patient Education Media, Inc., 1997 LEXIS 953 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
June 30, 1997). However, a bankruptcy court has permitted the assignment of a
trademark license, finding that "applicable law" was a narrow reference to personal
service contracts. In re Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R. 228, 232-34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
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unauthorized sale of the debtor's collateral. While such an unauthorized
transfer by the debtor could be made an event of default, it is not clear that a
secured party could enforce such a clause against a debtor who sought to
transfer the license with the licensor's approval. All that may be left to a
secured party with a security interest in the debtor's license is the right to the
"proceeds" of a sale that is approved by the licensor., When the account
debtor/licensor terminates the debtor's license pursuant to terms other than
those that are rendered "ineffective" by Revised section 9-408(a) and (c), the
secured party does not appear to have a basis for objection. This conclusion
seems to hold even when such a termination would be wrongful against the
debtor.'
The Official Comment to Revised section 9-408 creates a curious
limiting annotation on the statutory rule. The "ineffectiveness" language in
Revised section 9-408(a) reaches those license terms that prohibit, restrict or
require the consent of the licensor. The concept of a term that "restricts" the
debtor/licensee's ability to create a security interest has been given a narrow
(perhaps overly narrow) spin by the drafters of the Revisions in Official
Comment 6. According to this Comment, a covenant in a license that merely
"impairs" the licensee's ability to create a security interest is not rendered
ineffective. Furthermore, a non-disclosure covenant only "impairs" the
licensee who seeks to use the license as collateral-it does not "restrict.' '0
Apparently, terms in the license that prohibit disclosure can be invoked by
the licensor to prevent the licensee from furnishing a potential secured party
with information about the intellectual property underlying the license. As a
practical matter, this information is often critical to any valuation of the
license as collateral, and thus critical to the creditor's decision to go forward
with the requested secured loan.

In re Thomas Communications, Inc., 161 B.R. 621, 625-26 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1993).
9
See Capital Nat. Bank of New York v. McDonald's Corp., 625 F. Supp. 874, 42 UCC
1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
to U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-408(d), cmt. 6.
8
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APPENDIX 8 - SOFTWARE

The most troublesome categorical problem under the present
language of Article Nine arises when the secured party is financing the
supplier/licensor of software. To the extent that the sale of a software
package to a user or other consumer makes the medium of the software
predominant, it is likely to be considered a sale of goods.' If the software
provided does not involve hardware and appears to be custom-made for the
licensee, involving the licensor directly in the licensee's needs and business
patterns, the software license may be viewed as a "service" contract.2 Under
either of these scenarios, the resulting income stream produces a section 9106 "account" not a "general intangible." Otherwise, the income streams
from other more passively transmitted and typical forms of intellectual
property are "general intangibles" under current language because they do
not fit within either the "goods" or "services," predicate for an "account."
Typically, but not always, these sale or licensing income streams also fall
outside the Article Nine documentary categories of "instruments,"3 and

2

Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, affd, 443 F.2d 906
(4th Cir. 1971); Systems Design & Management Information, Inc. v. Kansas City Post
Office Employees Credit Union, 14 Kan. App.2d 266, 788 P.2d 878, 11 UCC2d 775
(1990); Wharton Management Group v. Sigma Consultants, Inc., 1990. LEXIS 54 (Del.
Super 1990), afjd 582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States
Telecommunications & Information Systems, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. 1990);
Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 147 Wis.2d 500, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1988); Data
Processing Services, Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 1329, 1 UCC 29 (Ind.
App. 1986). The sale of goods classification predominates and is used even when the
software is custom tailored. See, e.g., Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670
(3d Cir. 1991). Revised Article Nine explicitly defines "software" and places it within
the broader category of"general intangibles." U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42)&(75).
Conopco, Inc. v. McCreadie, 826 F. Supp. 855, 870-71 (D.N.J. 1993). See also Rodau,
Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY
L.J. 853, 864-74 (1986).
These income streams are generally not "instruments." Rights to payment that arise out
of assignments or licenses of intellectual property might be, but are not typically,
captured in negotiable instruments or in other documents "of a type" which are "in
transferredby delivery with any necessary endorsement or
ordinary course of business ...
assignment." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(I) (Emphasis added). See also U.C.C. [Revised] § 9102(a)(47). The author has been informed that some lawyers are advising their secured
creditor clients to require the client's debtor/borrowers to force its [the debtor's] account
debtors to sign negotiable instruments in favor of the debtor/borrower that can, in turn, be
possessed by the secured creditor. Under Article Nine, possession is a proper mode of
perfection for a negotiable instrument regardless of the debtor's location. Even if the
obligation captured in the instrument arose out of an account debtor's obligation to pay
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"chattel paper."
As the next section explains, Revised Article Nine solves the
categorical goods/intangibles problem in the current case law by defining
software as a general intangible,' and at the same time, expanding -the
for the use of intellectual property, Article Nine perfection by possession should hold as
applicable law. The decision in the Peregrine case concludes that the recording
provisions of the Copyright Act displace Article Nine perfection with respect to
copyright receivables. National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n., 116 BR. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990). However, this conclusion should not disturb
the Article Nine rule on perfection of instruments by possession for two reasons:
1. The Ninth Circuit's decision in the Broadcast Music case seems to critically
undermine the premise of Peregrinewith respect to copyright receivables. See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997)("Assignments of interests in
royalties have no relationship to the existence, scope, duration or identification of a
copyright, nor to 'rights under a copyright.'').
2. In any case, the receivables rule in Peregrineshould not reach an obligation once it is
formed by the account debtor into a negotiable instrument. Such an obligation to pay
losses much of its prior relationship with the consideration for the underlying obligation.
It is transformed into an obligation to pay separate from its source and different from its
prior intangible status as an "account" or "general intangible." See U.C.C. § 9-304, cmt.
1; U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-313, cmt. 2. Instruments held as collateral are not collected
routinely without the direct participation of the secured party. Except for temporary
purposes, including presentment for collection, instruments must be in the possession of
the secured party in order to be "perfected" against third party claims. U.C.C. § 9304(l),(4)&(5). But see U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-312(a) (Instruments can be perfected by
filing). Although a proper filing can perfect a security interest in an instruments under
the Revisions, that form of perfection still leaves the secured party vulnerable to both
ordinary course purchasers who give new value and to subsequent holders-in-due-course.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-330(a) & § 9-331(a)&(c).
"Chattel paper" is another kind of documented right to payment that has its own collateral
category under Article Nine. Rights to payment that arise out of intellectual property
transfers will generally not be considered chattel paper because under the current Article
Nine language, chattel paper must include a security interest or lease in specific goods in
support of the monetary obligation running to the debtor who, in turn, wants to use this
right to payment as collateral. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(i). See In re Latin Investment Corp.,
156 B.R. 102 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993). Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(47). However,
because certain software products are treated as "goods" under the current Article Nine
language, the documents evidencing a monetary obligation that is, in turn, secured by
these products can qualify as the obligee/debtor's "chattel paper." Chattel paper is not
created under Revised Article Nine when these kinds of documentary obligations are
secured by software because software is defined as a "general intangible" under the
Revisions. However, the definition of "chattel paper" is expanded by the Revisions to
include collateral rights in "a security interest in or lease of specific goods or of specific
goods and software used in the goods." U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(l1)(Emphasis
added). See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42)&(75).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).
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definition of an "account" to include all income streams from the sale or
licensing of intellectual property.'
The Draft version of Revised Article Nine that was approved by
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at their July
30, 1998 meeting amended the "general intangible" definition by expressly
adding the word "software" to this category of collateral.' Revised Article
Nine also includes the following definition of "software" in section 9102(a)(75): ."Software" means a computer program and any supporting
information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the
program. The term does not include a computer program that is contained in
goods unless the goods are a computer or computer peripheral!
The phrase "computer program" is critical to understanding the
scope of the new "software" definition and thus the new definition of a
"general intangible." Revised Article Nine does not define "computer
program." However, the definition of "computer program" can arguably be
borrowed from the more complete set of software-related definitions in the
proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("U.C.I.T.A."). 9
Guided by these parallel U.C.I.T.A. definitions, "software" under the Article
Nine Revisions includes "source code." 10 If "source code" can safely be
placed within the definition of a "general intangible" under new section 9102(a)(42), then Revised Article Nine overrules those cases that treat
computer source code as "goods" for Article Nine filing purposes."
6

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2).

7

DRAFT FOR APPROVAL, REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE
9 - SECURED
TRANSACTIONS § 9-102(a)(42)(National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws, July 24-31, 1998)(With Prefatory Note and Reporter's Notes). The definition of a
"general intangible" in the Proposed Final Draft of Revised Article Nine, submitted
earlier to the American Law Institute at its May 1998 meeting, expressly added only one
category of collateral- a "payment intangible" - to the otherwise residual definition.
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - REVISED ARTICLE NINE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 9-103(b) (Proposed Final Draft, April 15, 1998).

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(75). The term "computer program" is not defined in the
final version of Revised Article Nine.
Formerly proposed U.C.C. Article 2B. See DRAFT, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 2B - LICENSES § 2B-102(a)(6) (Discussion Draft, August 1, 1998).
10

See supra note 8.

1

Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, affd, 443 F.2d
906
(4th Cir. 1971); Systems Design & Management Information, Inc. v. Kansas City Post
Office Employees Credit Union, 14 Kan. App.2d 266, 788 P.2d 878, 11 U.C.C. 2d 775
(1990); Wharton Management Group v. Sigma Consultants, Inc., LEXIS 54 (1990), ffid
582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecommunications &
Information Systems, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. 1990); Micro-Managers, Inc. v.
Gregory, 147 Wis.2d 500, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1988); Data Processing Services,
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A number of cases have concluded that "software" in general and
"source code" in particular, should be treated as "goods" under the
Commercial Code. When this rule is applied, Article Nine forces the secured
party to file in the location when the goods are located to perfect its interests.
Finding find the "situs" of some physical thing or embodiment that can
reproduce itself and can thus have many locations, for example software and
source codes, can be nearly impossible to determine.
Intangible property, however, is conceptually separate from its host
embodiment. This principle has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court" and by Congress.'3 Even when this duality of property
principle is recognized, however, the distinction between intangible
intellectual property and its tangible embodiment has been difficult for
Courts to make in cases involving computer source code and software. The
arrangement of commands in a source code has meaning only as it reacts to
the physical capabilities of a particular machine. This interdependence has
led one Bankruptcy Court to conclude that source code has no abstract
existence apart from the tangible machines in which it effects tangible
changes."
Arguably the source code for any particular application acts like a
mechanical key to unlock the capabilities of the hardware. These codes seem
to be part of their host hardware. Nevertheless, this view ignores the reason
why the source code has value as collateral. The primary value of the source
code exists apart from any single machine. It derives its value from its
usefulness as a command sequence for many similar machines. Without the
ability to generate multiple copies of the source code it is a solitary hardware
component. For the owner of the source code, the essence of the work's
value is in the ability to generate multiple copies, or license others to do so.' 5
This ability and control functionally describes the protected intellectual
property captured in the work. If the real value of source codes does indeed
stem from the fact that the source codes contain a sequence of commands
and other expressions capable of making many machines more useful, it is
intellectual property separate from its embodiment, at least to the extent that
the exclusive right to control such further use can be separately owned.6
Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 1329, 1 UCC 29 (Ind. App. 1986).
12
13

1'

15

16

Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447,452 (1854).

17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
See In re Bedford Computer Corp., 62 B.R. 555, 567 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
See In re Information Exchange, Inc. 98 B.R. 603, 604-05 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
(Information Exchange may go too far in the other direction by suggesting that the
material object or copy has no separate value.)
Advanced Marketing Services, Inc. v. Dayton Data Processing, Inc., 1992 Ohio App.
LEXIS 994 p. 20 (Ohio App. 2d Dist., March 6, 1992). ("Transfer of ownership of any
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Guided by this principle, Revised Article Nine defines "software"
and classifies it as a "general intangible.' '1 7

material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does
not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object...." The
AMSI court concluded that a buyer of custom tailored software bought one copy of the
software and documentation but that such purchase was separate and distinct from the
rights of the copyright owner.)
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42)&(75). Although the definition of "software" relies on
the meaning of terms not defined in Revised Article Nine, the definition seems to include
source code.

Volume 41 - Numbers 3 & 4

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

475

APPENDIX 9 - IN RE SSE INTERNATIONAL CORP.

In re SSE InternationalCorp.' involved a contest between the trustee
and a secured creditor of the licensor/debtor over the funds collected under a
settlement agreement between the debtor and a third party/licensee who
owed money prior to the petition under a license of the debtor's "know
how."2 The secured creditor's security agreement described and therefore
reached the debtor's "accounts" but not the debtor's "general intangibles."
The secured creditor argued unsuccessfully that the pre-petition license debt
was an "account" because it was a "right to payment for goods sold or leased
or for services rendered ....

",

However, the Bankruptcy Court concluded

that the license covering know-how was neither a sale of goods nor the sale
of a service, taking the pre-petition right to payment outside the current
U.C.C. section 9-106 definition of an "account." The licensed know-how
was not treated as "goods" because it was primarily ideas and concepts.,
Know-how was an intangible, like the content of a computer program or the
content of a book, according to the Court in SSE International. The actual
software and books, on the other hand, are media for ideas. These media can
be "goods" if they are tangible, moveable and available in the marketplace.'
The Court also rejected the secured party's argument that in furnishing its
know-how, the debtor rendered a "service." A service, explained the court,
implied an undertaking to perform a "[d]uty or labor."' For the debtor to
have "served" the licensee, it would have had to utilize its know how for the
licensee's benefit. Under the license in SSE International, the debtor
provided no additional labor or assistance. Furnishing the licensee with
know-how alone was not a service according to the Court because "the
1
2

198 B.R. 667 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996).
198 B.R. at 668.

3

Id.; See also U.C.C. § 9-106.

4

If the pre-petition debt itself was collateral covered under the security agreement, the
settlement paid to the trustee should go to the secured party as "proceeds" of the secured
party's pre-petition collateral. In fact, unless the settlement money was "proceeds" of
pre-petition collateral, section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code would prevent the secured
party from claiming it or any other property acquired by the debtor or by the bankruptcy
estate after the petition was filed, even where the post-petition property is duly described
in the security agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)&(b) (1994). See In re Specialty Foods of
Pittsburgh, Inc., 98 B.R. 734, 736-37 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
198 B.R. at 669-70.

5
6

Id. at 670.

7

Id. at 671.
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debtor's initial act of creating its 'know how' was undertaken for its own
benefit rather than to satisfy a duty to [the licensee], or anyone else . ...,
The Court explained that "[flor an act of creating know how to constitute a
rendering of services, or an account generating performance, it must be
undertaken for the benefit and/or at the behest of someone else (i.e., one
cannot render services to oneself.)" 9 The SSE InternationalCourt fails to
distinguish the act of creating know how from the act of sharing that know
how with the licensee. However, its predicate requirement that service be in
some sense servile would seem to prevent even the sharing of know how
from being classified as a service. Other licenses of know how might be
more proactive in terms of the licensor's obligation than the license in SSE
International,however. If the licensor's advisory role is more hands on, the
licensee's resulting payment obligation could arguably be viewed as an
"account" under the SSE Internationaltest. The moral of the story for a
secured party financing a debtor who is licensing intellectual property is that
the security agreement should include the debtor's "accounts" and "general
intangibles" as well as the proceeds of both.'"

8

Id.

9

Id.

10 It is not enough to include both accounts and general intangibles when they are described
as "rights to the payment of money" because that kind of limitation in the description
covers only the various income streams that may be generated by licensing; it does not
cover the ownership right in the intellectual property proper (i.e., the ownership of the
exclusivity right, itself). If the intellectual property right itself is not included in the
security agreement description, the proceeds of a post-bankruptcy assignment or license
of that right will not go to the secured party even though the after-acquired income from
the assignment does fall within the "right to payment" description in the security
agreement. Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code makes after-acquired property clauses
unenforceable after the petition is filed, except when the property acquired is also the
"proceeds of collateral that was covered by the security agreement prior to the petition."
See In re Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, Inc., 98 B.R. 734, 736-37 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989).
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APPENDIX 10 - COMMERCIAL TORT CLAIMS

Because "commercial tort claims" under the Revisions have
characteristics that require special handling, secured creditors must be
careful to distinguish infringement claims offered separately as original
collateral (special handling required) from those claims that become
collateral because they are the "proceeds" of general intangible collateral
already held by the secured creditor.' The new definition of "proceeds" in
Revised section 9-102(a)(64) expressly includes "claims arising out of the
loss, . . . infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral."' Under
Revised section 9-315(a)(1), the security interest in the underlying
intellectual property collateral "attaches" to the infringement claim
"proceeds."' Even if they are not mentioned in the security agreement,
infringement claims (or "commercial tort claims") will pass as "proceeds" of
their underlying intellectual property (e.g., patents, trademarks, and
copyrights) as long as that property is effectively covered as collateral. Such
a "proceeds" claim cannot exceed the value of the underlying collateral
"damaged" by the infringement, however.
Note that even if the security interest in the underlying collateral is
perfected by a federal recording (e.g., copyright collateral) the security
interest in a related infringement claimed as "proceeds" continues to be
perfected under the Revisions if the secured party has filed a financing
statement covering the original collateral and the proceeds are collateral that
may be perfected by a filing "in the office in which the financing statement
has been filed."' Revised section 9-315(d)(1)(A) only requires that an
existing Article Nine filing "covers the original collateral," it need not
"perfect" as to that original collateral. Therefore, even if a state filing
on
original copyright collateral did not perfect as to such collateral because the
Copyright Act recording provisions displaced Article Nine, the Article Nine
filing on the copyright collateral should still serve to hold infringement claim
"proceeds."'
Secured parties considering "commercial tort claims" as collateral

2
3

4
5
6

Section 9-109(d)(12) makes the proceeds rule in section 9-315 and the priority rules in
Section 9-322 applicable to tort claims otherwise excluded from Revised Article Nine.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-109(d)(12).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(D).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(a)(2).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315, cmt. 2.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(d)(1)(A)&(B).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(d)(1)(A).
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must distinguish claims for infringement to federal intellectual property from
claims based on federal law that are unrelated to any underlying federal
intellectual property right. Under Revised Article Nine, an action under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act alleging infringement or injury to trademark
property already held as "general intangible" collateral should automatically
7
pass to the secured party as "proceeds" of the collateral. However, an
unrelated section 43(a) action for unfair competition, not tied to the
protection of separately recognized trademark property would only be a
''commercial tort claim." Such a "claim" is personal property under the
Revisions, but is not within the new definition of a "general intangible.",
Furthermore, the unrelated "commercial tort claim" could not be "proceeds"
derived from the protection of a recognized property right (e.g., a form of
9
Such an
intellectual property that qualifies as a general intangible).
as a
own
its
on
stand
to
have
would
claim"
tort
unrelated "commercial
Standing
collateral.
Nine
Article
of
form
separate and high-maintenance
alone, such "claims" may be difficult for a secured party to obtain and hold.
These claims must be specifically described in the security agreement.
Indication by category or by type is inadequate.'0 Furthermore, the Revisions
provide that "commercial tort claims" cannot be acquired by the secured
party under an after-acquired property clause." Therefore, an unrelated
section 43(a) "claim" can only serve as collateral after the cause of action
arises and after it is transferred under specific language to the secured party.
It must be noted, however, that as soon as a debtor's commercial tort claim is
settled and thus reduced to a contractual obligation, the debtor's contractual
2
right to payment becomes a "payment intangible."' Unlike a "commercial

8

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(D)("to the extent of the value of the collateral, claims
arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral .... "). See also U.C.C. [Revised] §§
9-109(d)(12) & 9-315.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).

An action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is not limited to cases involving injury
to the plaintiffs mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1999). The action lies even for
allegedly false statements about a competitor's own product. At least one court has
concluded that in this context, there is no constitutionally protected property right to be
free of false advertising. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 131 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 1997)("The only cognizable
property right that could be involved would be a right to be free of false advertising, a
right that is not an intangible property right protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.")(Emphasis added).
10 U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-108(e)(1).

9

"
12

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-204(b)(2).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-109, cmt. 15.
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tort claim," a payment intangible need not be specifically described in the
security agreement and can be acquired under an after-acquired property
clause.'

13

Id. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61)("Payment intangible" means a general intangible under which
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation").
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APPENDIX 11 - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL

The concept of "title" is more central to rights in intellectual
property than it is to rights in tangible collateral, such as goods. As Judge
Nott observed more than 100 years ago: "[t]hough the most intangible form
of property, it [intellectual property] still, in many characteristics, is closer in
analogy to real than to personal estate. Unlike personal property, it cannot be
lost or found; it is not liable to casualty or destruction; it cannot pass by
manual delivery. Like real property, it may be disposed of, territorially, by
metes or bounds; it has its system of conveyancing by deed and registration;
estates may be created in it, such as for years and in remainder; and the
statutory action for infringement bears a much closer relation to an action of
trespass than to an action in trover and replevin. It has, too, what the law of
real property has, a system of user by license."
Both legal and equitable title to a patent, for example, carry their
own distinct rights.' A parol assignment of a patent or patent application will
not convey legal title, but it is generally sufficient to convey equitable title
once the patent issues or the application is filed? Similarly, a written
agreement to assign an existing application or an existing patent vests
equitable title in the promisee.' In general, a debtor with this kind of
equitable title in an existing patent should have sufficient rights for purposes
of "attachment" under section 9-203 of Article Nine. However, these
examples of equitable rights in an existing application or existing patent that
pass under an oral assignment or an agreement to assign must be
distinguished from another very different patent law use of the phrase
"equitable title." This other use of "equitable title" arises in connection with
the present status of an assignee of an "expectant interest." Even before the
existence of the invention, a present written assignment of the inventor's
rights is effective to convey an expectant interest to the assignee.' The
assignee of such an expectant interest does not acquire legal title to a patent
application until the application is filed and does not acquire legal title to the

A.S. Solomons v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 479, 483 (1886), aft'd, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
2

3
4

5

Compare FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508, 1511-12 (Fed. Cir.
1991), with Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
1513, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See E. Lipscomb, 5 WALKER ON PATENTS § 19:4 & § 19:28 (1986).
Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513, 1517
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1511-12.
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patent until the patent issues.' The Federal Circuit has recently described
these "expectant" rights of a present assignee of future patents as "at most an
equitable title," that vests legal title in the assignee after the "invention is
made and an application for patent is filed."' This use of the phrase
"equitable title" to describe an inchoate right to property not yet in existence
should not be confused with the previous examples of equitable title to
existing intangible rights. Rights in the collateral under section 9-203 should
not arise until the patent property exists in a form capable of legal or
equitable ownership. Once the patent property has existence, however, the
prior assignee of an expectant interest gets both legal and equitable title and
sufficient "rights in the collateral" for attachment to occur.
(1)

Rights in Light of Metamorphosis of Collateral

As the discussion in the prior section suggests, a debtor's Article
Nine "rights" in patents and other forms of titled intellectual property will
depend more on the state of title rather than other evidence of ostensible
ownership. However, the concept of "rights in the collateral" under section
9-203 does not mean all rights or complete rights. Some of the section 9-203
"attachment" cases involving goods have found that the debtor had enough
pre-title collateral rights at the point in time when particular goods were
"identified" to the contract of sale under section 2-501(1).8 If one assumes
that legally titled intellectual property is "all rights," and that a recognized
form of "equitable" title to existing intellectual property may be "significant
rights,"9 then it is arguable that the existence of an incomplete, but
6

Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 684 F.2d 386, 389-92 (6th Cir. 1982).

7

FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508, 1511-12 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

8

9

See, e.g., Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8, 23
UCC 788 (App. 1978); In re Transportation Design & Tech., 48 B.R. 635, 641 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1985). "Identification" of goods to the buyer's contract under U.C.C. section 2501 gives the buyer certain specific rights in the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-502 & 2-716(3).
At least one court has concluded that these rights alone may be enough to satisfy section
9-203(l)(c). Johnson v. Conrail-Amtrak Federal Credit Union, 37 UCC 933 (D.C. Super.
1983). See also Trust Company Bank v. Gloucester Corp., 419 Mass 48, 52, 643 N.E.2d
16, 18 (1994)("These incidents [a degree of control and an insurable interest under
U.C.C. § 9-501] were sufficient to allow the defendants' security interests to attach to the
scallops and to make the plaintiffs rights subordinate to the defendants' liens in the
absence of the plaintiff having a perfected purchase-money security.").
PRELIMINARY REPORT #1:

AN OVERVIEW .OF THE CURRENT LEGAL RULES AND
STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITE INTERESTS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANALYSIS IF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS, SECTION II

(1)(3)(A). (Cooperative Contract - U.S.P.T.O. and Franklin Pierce Law Center 2000).
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recognized, preliminary form of the debtor's intellectual property may also
be "sufficient rights" to mark the point of the secured party's section 9-203
attachment.
The prior discussion concludes that intellectual property must have
some definable legal existence before any "rights" can be acquired by the
debtor.10 A debtor's good idea alone is not a "general intangible." Likewise,
the present assignment to the debtor of an "expectant" interest cannot yield
rights until the assigned property exists. Once the inventing debtor's
conception or the assignee debtor's expectant interest in captured in an
recognized form (e.g., a patent application), the issue is whether the debtor
acquires rights, not only in that first protected form, but in any subsequent
metamorphosis of that form into another protected form of intellectual
property." For example, a patent application is a form of intellectual
property to which a security interest can attach.'" If the debtor files a patent
application or acquires a patent application by assignment, does that debtor
have sufficient rights in the application itself as well as sufficient "rights" in
the patent that may eventually be granted for purposes of section 9203(l)(c). This example can be extrapolated further when one considers that
an undisclosed trade secret may take on a more documented form when it
becomes the subject of a patent application. The patent application, in turn,
may be transformed into an issued patent after the successful completion of
the patent prosecution process." The idea first protected as a trade secret
could evolve into public information protected under the Patent Act.
to Id.
1

12

'3

The continuation of a security interest in tangible property through various changes in
classification has been given judicial sanction. See, e.g., In re Robert Bogetti & Sons,
162 B.R. 289, 294 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) ("Once a security interest attaches to
described collateral, subsequent transmutations as to classification under section 9-109
do not defeat that security interest.") In re Walkington, 62 B.R. 989 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1986). These cases deal with changes in the use of existing tangible property, however,
not with new forms of property.
See In re Williams, 167 B.R. 77, 80-81 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1994) (No security interest in
a certificated security can be obtained until the stock is issued. However, the stock
subscription is a general intangible in which a security interest can be obtained and
perfected by filing.) Under the current precedent, a patent is not even the "proceeds" of a
patent application, however. The applicant does not obtain the patent by "disposing" of
the application within the meaning of U.C.C. section 9-306(1). In re Transportation
Design & Tech., 48 B.R. 635, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985). But see U.C.C. [Revised] §
9-102(a)(64) & § 9-315(a)(1)(adopting a substitution of value test for "disposition"). See
discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 9 at Section II(c)(2)(B).
The relative merits of the trade secret and the patent as alternative forms of protection for
the same technology are discussed in 1 P. Rosenberg, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §
3.07 (2d ed. 1990).
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A court could refuse to adhere to the title theory outlined in the last
section and rather, hold that the patent application itself does confer patent
"rights" on the debtor, or at a minimum "rights" closely related to the patent
which may eventually issue. Arguably, when an inventor files a patent
application, the filing of the application creates a one-year period during
which public disclosure or commercial use of the invention will not be a
statutory bar to obtaining the patent." This right might be viewed as a
significant right in the patent itself From that premise, a secured party could
successfully argue that its debtor acquires sufficient section 9-203 "rights" in
the patent from the time a patent application is filed.
In most cases this analysis may not be critical to a secured party as
long as the patent, if and when it is granted, can be considered the
"proceeds" of the patent application. This issue is discussed. The timing of
attachment under Article Nine and early acquisition of "rights" by the debtor
is often important in the context of the Bankruptcy Code. The Matter of
Transportation Design and Technology, Inc. illustrates the importance of
early "attachment" to a secured creditor."
In TransportationDesign, the secured party had a security interest in
all of the corporate debtor's "general intangibles," including those intangibles
acquired after the date of the security agreement. These intangibles
consisted of patents on wheelchair lifts that were assigned to the corporate
debtor by two of its former officers. The debtor was the titled owner of some
of these previously assigned patents at the time it filed for bankruptcy. One
of the points of controversy in the case, however, involved a patent on a
wheelchair lift that did not issue until after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
The application for this patent was filed by the inventors, the former
corporate officers, prior to the bankruptcy filing date. The issued patent itself
was never assigned to the bankrupt debtor. It does not appear that the patent
application was ever assigned either, the Court's eventual holding, however,
creates a great deal of confusion on this point.
The secured party's claim to this post-petition patent and the trustee's
opposition to that claim seem to be based on the assumption that the patent
eventually became the debtor's after-acquired "general intangible." The
trustee in bankruptcy sought to have this post-petition patent included in the
debtor's bankrupt estate and, at the same time, the trustee opposed the
secured party's claim to the patent as collateral. The trustee treated the patent
as after-acquired property of the debtor but argued that under section 552 of
the Bankruptcy Code the patent was "property acquired . . . by the debtor
after the commencement of the case," and therefore, "not subject to any lien
14

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1089 (Fed. Cir.

1

48 B.R. 635, 640, 40 UCC 1393, 1399-1400 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).

1983). The "filing date" of a patent application is defined in 37 CFR § 1.53(b) (1992).

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

485

resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the
commencement of the case.'",
The secured party countered with two alternative arguments: (1) the
debtor had section 9-203 rights in the post-petition patent prior to the
commencement of the case; and, (2) the post-petition patent was "proceeds"
of the pre-petition patent application under the section 552(b) exception from
the 552(a) bar to consensual after-acquired security under the Bankruptcy
Code.
The argument for early attachment seems based on the premise that
some "rights" in a patent can exist before it actually issues. If the inventors
agreed to assign the patent to the debtor, then arguably the debtor had
"rights" in the patent from the time of the agreement or from the date of the
patent application, whichever came later. Since the patent application was
filed before the petition, the security interest "attached" to the patent before it
was issued and before the bankruptcy petition was filed.
The Court in TransportationDesign might have simply rejected this
extravagant attempt to pre-date the debtor's rights in the patent by holding
that no "rights" in a patent can arise before the patent is issued. Rather, the
Court rejected the secured party's claim on the basis that it failed to prove
that the inventors ever agreed to assign either the patent or the patent
application to the debtor." It appears that the Court's conclusion not only
undermined the secured party's attempt to avoid the bar in section 552(a), it
also undermined any subsequent interest of the corporate debtor in the postpetition property. Nevertheless, the Court stated its conclusion in a way that
recognized the corporate debtor's interest. In the Court's words, the secured
party failed to carry the ". . . burden of establishing its security interest in
property of the debtor....."' While the Court's opinion avoided the time of
attachment issue with some questionable logic, the dicta in. Transportation
Design suggests that, if a patent has been applied for, a clearly established
agreement to assign the patent might give the assignee "rights in the
collateral" before the patent is issued. TransportationDesign leaves open
the possibility that a debtor could acquire rights in a patent from the time of
the filing of the patent application if the application was filed by the debtor.'9
6

48 B.R. at 650. See THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCE § 2:23
(2000); See also 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).

17

Id.

I8

Id.

'9

A 1992 District Court decision that arose out of a bankruptcy case concluded that an
after-acquired property clause covering "...contract rights...and patents now owned or
hereinafter acquired," gave the secured party an attached interest in the debtor/assignee's
patent application at the moment it was assigned to the debtor by the assignor.
Chesapeake Fiber Pkg. v. SebroPackaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 365, 368, 23 U.S.P.Q.
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Such an inference from the dicta in TransportationDesign would be
unfortunate, however. The baseline title theory should hold on these facts.
The Court should have disposed of the secured party's attempt to advance the
"attachment" time of its after-acquired property claim to the post-petition
patent by holding that no "rights" can arise in a patent until it issues. The
patent itself is still very contingent when the application is filed. 0 Unlike
identified yet undelivered goods, which have a certain existence, the patent
may never issue from the application. An alternative approach, recognizing
"rights" at full title (or at least equitable title in an existing right) should be
used as a guide to "attachment" when the collateral is federal intellectual
property.2' The debtor has no title in a patent until it issues in the debtor's
name, or until it is issued to another owner and the debtor acquires at least an
equitable title by transfer from that owner. The patent application is
properly viewed as a separate intangible asset of the debtor, not as a piece of,
or right in, the contingent unissued patent.
An innovation may be protected as a trade secret and as such be a
form of intellectual property collateral. However, the debtor's ownership of
a trade secret does not give the debtor "rights" in either a subsequent patent
application covering the same innovation or in the subsequent patent, which
may issue from the application." Under the authority of section 9-204, the
security agreement may provide that the debtor's subsequently acquired right
(e.g., an issued patent) in the same innovation passes automatically to the
secured party as after acquired property." Similarly, prior state law rights in
an unfixed work should not give the debtor rights in a federal statutory
copyright." In the same manner as patents, however, an after-acquired
property clause which covers "copyrights" should allow the secured party to
pick up both forms of intellectual property once the debtor's discrete rights in
each arise. 6
Trademarks present an interesting challenge for the secured party

20

21

22
23
24

25
26

1522, 1525&1528 (D. Md. 1992), aff'd, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28605 (4th Cir. 1993).
PTO, Managing Change For Global Challenges - Fiscal Year 1996: A Patent and
Trademark Office Review 100 (1997).
See Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F. Supp. 133,
19 UCC 2d 855 (W.D.N.Y 1992).
FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See Nye Tool & Machine Works v. Crown Die & Tool Co., 276 F. 376 (7th Cir. 1921).
Chesapeake Fiber Pkg. v. Sebro Packaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 365, 368, 23 U.S.P.Q.
1522, 1525&1528 (D. Md. 1992), aff'd, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28605 (4th Cir. 1993).
17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1994).
The preemption of Article Nine when federal intellectual property is involved is
discussed in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 9 at Part III.
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trying to measure the debtor's rights for attachment purposes. State common
law trademark protection depends on the debtor's adoption and use of a
distinctive mark. Normally, the debtor would acquire state law rights in the
mark before it was entitled to registration under the federal statute. 7
However, since the 1988 amendments to the Lanham Act, a debtor may
acquire inchoate federal trademark property rights under an "intent to use"
application before acquiring state common law rights through actual use.28
Under the Article Nine concept of "rights in the collateral" the
secured party should be able to claim an attached interest in the debtor's right
in a mark protected under an "intent to use" application before the mark
gives rise to any rights under state law. However, under section 10 of the
Trademark Act29 no "intent to use" application shall be assignable prior to the
filing of a verified statement of use unless the assignee succeeds to all or part
of the assignor's business. 0 In Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank,3' the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that an outright pre-use assignment
of an "intent to use" application to a lending bank as part of a larger loan and
security agreement is prohibited. The remedy greatly impacted both the
lending bank and the debtor. Although the Bank pleaded with the Appeal
Board to merely ignore the prohibited assignment of the intent to use
application and render their security interest ineffective, the Board found that
the proper remedy was to invalidate the debtor's certificate of registration. 2
27

15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).

28

15 U.S.C. 1051(b) (1988).

29

15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).

30

This restriction, designed to insure that the intention of the "intent to use" applicant is

31
32

bona fide and to prevent trafficking in marks was added by the Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988, Public Law 100-667 (102 Stat. 3935), November 16, 1988.
40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098 (1996).
40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1105-06. The assignment in Clorox was worded as an unconditional
transfer with an obligation on the assignee to reassign within 30 days after the obligation
was satisfied. The Appeal Board emphasized that the language of the assignment was
"outright, rather than conditional" Id. at 1103. This absolute assignment with a license
back and a duty to reassign on satisfaction is typical of the language in a collateral
assignment of a trademark. Because transfers of trademarks "in gross" without
associated goodwill are invalid, a present collateral assignment with a license back is a
problematic security device even when "intent to use" applications are not involved. See
Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See generally
Simensky, Enforcing Creditors' Rights Against Trademarks, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 569,
570-78 (1989). However, conditional assignments, in general, have been given a degree
of legitimacy by the PTO filing rules. 37 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.11 & 3.56 (1994). There is,
however, case law authority for the point that the internal largess of the PTO cannot
expand the narrow constructive notice limits on the section 1060 mandate to record
"assignments." In re 199Z, 137 B.R. 778, 782 at n.7 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1992). The
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However, the Board observed that a transfer of a mere Article Nine security
interest in a mark would not be considered an unconditional "assignment,"
33
and would not provoke the penalty for trafficking imposed in Clorox.
Intent to use applications can be properly taken as collateral under Article
Nine. A debtor with an "intent to use" application does have section 9-203
"rights" in a form of trademark property that can be transferred to one who
succeeds to the debtor's business or a portion thereof in the event of default,
foreclosure and sale. This transferable interest should be sufficient for
purposes of attachment under section 9-203. Because attachment is the
necessary predicate for perfection, an Article Nine security interest in an
intent to use application can be made safe against the strong-arm powers of
the trustee in bankruptcy.3" While there is some uncertainty about subsequent
purchasers of the intent to use application who are eligible assignees under
the Lanham Act because they also succeed to all or part of the debtor's
business,3" Article Nine perfection should be sufficient protection in this
36
situation as well.

33

34
35
36

1988 Trademark Revision Act made extensive revisions to the federal trademark
registration system. Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3938 (Nov. 16, 1988), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1053 et seq. (1994). An earlier version of the legislation contained a detailed
set of rules governing the recording and priority of security interests in federal
trademarks which would have preempted most of the Article Nine system. S. 1883,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b)-(f) (1987), 133 Cong. Rec. S 16548-49 (Nov. 19, 1987)
(unenacted). A recorded security interest was given priority over "interests subsequently
granted." Id. at § 10(b). This ambitious provision was dropped from the final enacted
version of the 1988 Act. In its current form, the Lanham Act makes no provision for
security interests. Again, the dependent nature of the typical trademark transfer, and the
absence of a title-related tradition around the taking of trademarks as collateral, make it
hard to find a "security interest" within the section 1060 concept of an "assignment."
Our domestic law prohibiting assignments-in-gross is in some jeopardy. Among the
many provisions of the NAFTA Treaty affecting intellectual property is Article 1708:11,
calling for the elimination of prohibitions on assignments-in-gross. North American Free
Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, art. 1708:11
[hereinafter NAFTA Treaty]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, art.
21 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. The implementing legislation is silent on the issue,
however.
H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 Cong. Rec. S16712-13 (1993)
(enacted). Without implementing legislation on NAFTA article 1708:11, assignments-ingross remain prohibited under U.S. law.
Roman Cleanser Corp. v. National Acceptance Co. of America, 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich 1984), aff'd 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1984).
See discussion supra at note 32.
U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(d). Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d). In light of the Clorox case,
it would be extremely unwise for the secured party seeking additional protection to take a
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Rights in Collateral as Affected by Derivative Title

(a)

BFPs of Federal Intellectual Property

In general, a secured party cannot have a right in collateral, which
extends beyond the debtor's interest or "right" in that collateral. This rule,
although not always applicable when the collateral is "goods," is universally
applicable when the collateral is the debtor's intellectual property.
A debtor can occasionally transfer greater rights in goods than the
debtor owns. Because possession of goods often equates with ostensible
ownership, the derivative title predicate sometimes gives way to exceptions
based in the concepts of fraud and estoppel." Within the language of the
Code itself, section 2-403 recognizes that a "purchaser" of goods may
acquire good title where the transferor's title is voidable due to the
transferor's fraud in acquiring possession in a prior transaction of purchase.38
Under U.C.C. sections 1-201(32) and (33), the secured party enjoys the
status of a "purchaser.13 The Article Nine cases interpreting section 9203(1)(c) occasionally apply these doctrines of fraud or estoppel in order to
provide the secured party with collateral rights in goods that are greater than
the debtor's actual ownership rights.4" While these principles of fraud and

37
38

39
40

title-bearing assignment of an "intent to use" application.
U.C.C. § 1-103.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(A person with voidable title has the power to transfer good title to a
good faith purchaser for value.); U.C.C. § 2-403(2)(A merchant entrusted with goods, of
the kind with which she normally deals, can transfer the rights of the entruster to an
ordinary course buyer.)
U.C.C. § 1-201(32)&(33).

Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, 236 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1975); Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Michigan Bank, N.A., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 745 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972). The debtor may
acquire rights in the collateral because the seller or owner has made it appear that the
debtor owns the goods and is therefore estopped to deny that the debtor has acquired
rights. Kinetics Technology International Corp. v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Tulsa, 705 F.2d
396, 36 UCC 292 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Pubs, Inc., 618 F.2d 432, 28 UCC 297 (7th Cir.
1980). Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 127 Ariz 70, 618 P.2d 240, 30 UCC
744, 749-50 (Ct. of App. 1980). Circumstances might suggest that a debtor in possession
of goods is not the true owner. Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208

N.W.2d 97, 12 UCC 849 (1973); In re Medomak Canning Co., 25 UCC 437 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1977) (debtor held under a bailment for processing the goods). See Ward, Defining
the Article Nine Security Interest: The Old Problem and a New Solution, 3 MAINE BAR J.
206, 208-210 (July 1988). Revised Article Nine expressly recognizes that section 9-203
collateral "rights" include "the power to transfer rights in the collateral." U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-203(b)(2).
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estoppel underlying section 2-403 are not limited to goods, the goods cases
provide the prototype for deriving principles of apparent ownership based on
possession. These voidable title and apparent ownership concepts are not
relevant to cases involving intangible property. In the case of a transfer of
intellectual property, record existence of titled rights is determinative.' With
an awareness of the voidable title cases involving goods, Revised Article
Nine recognizes that the debtor has rights in the collateral
whenever the
42
debtor has "the power to transfer rights in the collateral."
A debtor/transferee of a copyright or patent, for example, is subject
to a federal recording statute. These federal recording anchor the derivative
title principle in Article Nine. Unlike the ownership of goods, the secured
party's debtor must record or register under federal law in order to preserve
its ownership rights in intellectual property against subsequent parties.43 To
the extent that the debtor's unrecorded title may be defective, the derivative
rights of the debtor's secured party-will also suffer the same defect."
41

42
43

44

The "goods" related Articles of the U.C.C. specifically incorporate the idea of voidable
title. See U.C.C. § 2-403 & § 2A-304. Note, however, that these concepts have not been
included in those sections of the proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act [formerly Draft U.C.C. Article 2B] pertaining to the transfer of intangible rights. See
Draft U.C.I.T.A. § 2B-507(b) (Draft, February 1, 1999). Subsection (b) provides that a
transferee of a license acquires only those rights that the licensee was authorized to
transfer. This is an important principle under intellectual property law, which differs
from transactions involving sales of goods. It comes from the fact that one of the
property rights created under copyright law is the exclusive right to distribute a work in
copies. A transferee who receives a transfer not authorized by the rights holder does not
acquire greater rights than its transferor was authorized to transfer, even if the acquisition
was in good faith and without knowledge. The basic fact is that, as regards property
rights, if the transfer was unauthorized it was itself a violation of the property rights of
the copyright owner. The ideas of entrustment and bona fide purchase, which play a role
in dealing with title to goods, have no similar role in intellectual property law. Neither
copyright nor patent laws recognize concepts of protecting a buyer in the ordinary course
(or other good faith purchaser) by giving that person greater rights than were authorized
to be transferred. Copyright law allows for a concept of "first sale" which gives the
owner of a copy various rights to use that copy, but the first sale must be authorized.
Draft U.C.I.T.A. § 2B-507, Reporter's Note 2 (Discussion Draft, February 1, 1999).
Notwithstanding the Reporter's Note attached to proposed section 2B-507, estoppel
principles may still be applicable in cases where the real owner of an intangible right
acquiesces to the appearance of title in a pretending transferor without actual title. See,
e.g., TMT North America, Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 884-85 (7th Cir.
1997).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-203(b)(2)(Emphasis added.).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).
J. White & R. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-1 at 854 (4th ed. 1995)(The
common law "shelter" rule is grafted into Article Nine through the operation of section 1103 and section 2-403(1). It provides that a buyer gets as good a title as its seller had.)
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Article Nine "attachment," however, does not require invulnerable
title. When debtor's interest is unrecorded and thus vulnerable,'5 that debtor
may never the less acquire section 9-203(1) "rights" in patents and
copyrights sufficient for "attachment" and "perfection." The resulting
attachment, however, only gives a secured party an interest in the "rights"
which that debtor actually owns. If the debtor's failure to record in the
Copyright Office or with the PTO results in a later displacement of the
debtor's title in favor of a subsequent owner, the debtor's secured party and
the debtor's other creditor will also be displaced, notwithstanding an existing
"attachment" of the security interest. 6
For example, a debtor can acquire an assignment of a copyright.
Even though that assignment is not recorded, it gives the assignee/debtor
sufficient "rights" in the collateral to support an attached, perfected, security
interest in favor of a secured party whose security agreement and financing
statement cover "general intangibles." 7 Such "rights in the collateral" can be
displaced, however, if the assignee/debtor fails to properly record that
assignment within either the one-month or two-month grace period in section
205(d) of the Copyright Act. 8 If the assignee/debtor does not properly
record its newly acquired copyright ownership in a timely fashion, a later
assignee from the same assignor prevails if such later assignee records first
and takes the assignment "in good faith, for valuable consideration ... and
without notice."
A straight application of the Article Nine priority rules, without
taking the derivative title principle into account, could give priority to the
secured party. Under current section 9-301(l)(d) or Revised section 9317(d), it is the secured party, however, who prevails over subsequent
transferees or buyers of intangibles if its security interest is attached and

The effect that an underlying defect in the debtor's title to intellectual property can have
on the Article Nine priority rules is illustrated in THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL

§ 2:46 (2000).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1,supra note 9 at Section II(b)(3)(A).
PROPERTY IN COMMERCE

45

48

Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Financial Services, Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 6 U.C.C.
2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988)("We think the correct result is reached in this case by applying the
common sense notion that a creditor cannot convey to another more than it owns. Put
another way, the transferee, Allied, cannot acquire any greater rights in the beverage
business's assets than its transferor, BCI, had in them.") Id. at 1174, citing, U.C.C. § 2403(1). See also J. White & R. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-19(d) at
897-98 (4th ed. 1995).
17 U.S.C. § 204 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).

49

Id.

46

47

Volume 41 - Numbers 3 & 4

492

IDEA - The Journal of Law and Technology

perfected before the subsequent transferee or buyer gives value."0 A secured
party could argue that it prevails over the subsequent assignee if the security
interest is perfected when that subsequent assignee takes from the debtor.
The priority rule in Article Nine assumes that both the secured party and the
later competing assignee take from a common source debtor." In this
example, the priority rule in current section 9-301(1)(d) and Revised section
9-317(d) is trumped by the more general principle of the state law that a
secured party can assert no greater rights in the collateral than its debtor.
The rights of the copyright assignee displace the rights of the secured party's
unrecorded debtor under the federal priority rule in section 205(d) of the
Copyright Act. Consequently, the rights of the perfected secured party are
displaced under the derivative title predicate to the Article Nine priority
rules.'2
Similarly, the rights of a subsequent assignee taken from the original
assignor without notice, in good faith, and evidenced by a signed writing,
prevail over a secured party with a perfected security interest in the general
intangibles of an unrecorded assignee/debtor." Again, examining only the
Article Nine priority rule in section 9-301(1)(d) [Revised section 9-317(d)],
the prior perfection of the secured party points to priority as against the
subsequent licensee.' 4 However, because the rule in section 9-301(l)(d)
assumes that the security interest and the subsequent license have a common
source, the derivative title predicate controls. The secured party can have no
greater "rights in the collateral" than its debtor." The subsequent licensee's
right to defeat the secured party's unrecorded debtor under section 205(e) of
50

5"

U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d); U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d).
U.C.C. § 2-403(1). See Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Financial Services, Inc.,
852 F.2d 1162, 1174, 6 UCC2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988). See also U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-325,

cmt. 6.

5'

The same principle would hold to give priority to a subsequent secured party who filed
second in time but who's debtor displaced the title of the previously filed secured party's
debtor. See THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCE § 2:46 (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1994). Note that under the decision in National Peregrine, Inc. v.
Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990), a security interest
is a "transfer of copyright ownership" within the meaning of sections 101, 201(d) and
205 of the Copyright Act. See discussion infra Section III(b)(3)(B). Under Peregrine,
section 205(e) would also apply directly to the priority contest between a secured party
and subsequent licensee from the same debtor/licensor. Under section 205(e), a
subsequent good faith licensee who takes without notice and under a license evidenced
by a signed written instrument prevails over prior secured party of the debtor/licensor's if
the secured party has not recorded in the Copyright Office prior to the license. 17 U.S.C.
§ 205(e)(2) (1994).
U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(d).

55

U.C.C. § 2-403(1).

52
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the Copyright Act also gives it priority over the earlier perfected secured
56
party.
Note, however, that the same license example seems to produce a
different answer under the Patent Act because a subsequent innocent licensee
does not defeat a prior unrecorded patent assignment."
(b)

Debtor's Rights When Ownership Converges

The derivative title principle in Article Nine dictates the debtor
"rights in the collateral" when there is a convergence of several different but
dependent ownerships in a single intellectual property asset. It may be
challenging for a secured party to separate its debtor's "rights" in discrete
intellectual property collateral from the related rights of other parties which
enhance that debtor's property. This issue of converging interests within the
debtor's collateral is discussed in the second opinion of the Bankruptcy
Court
for the District of New Hampshire in the matter of C Tek Software,
8
Inc.
In C Tek II, the debtor granted a security interest in its copyrighted
software ("ClienTrak") to New York State Business Venture Partnership
[NYSBVP] 18 months before the debtor filed for relief under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Nine months before that debtor filed for bankruptcy,
it entered into an agreement with Intelligent Investment Systems [IIS] under
which IIS acquired exclusive sale and development rights in the copyrighted
software for ten years. After the agreement, IIS revised thousands of lines of
source code in the software. 9
In an adversary proceeding to determine the rights of both IIS and
NYSBVP in the revised version of the ClienTrak software, IIS conceded that
NYSBVP's security interest covered the copyright on the original software.?
However, IIS maintained that it, not the debtor or NYSBVP, owned the
changes and enhancements it made after entering into the distribution and
sales agreement. In response, NYSBVP argued that the language of its
56

57
58

17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1994).
6 WALKER ON PATENTS,§ 20:28 at 98 (1986).
127 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).

59

127 B.R. at 501-02.

60

In a prior decision in the same bankruptcy case, the court upheld the perfected status of
NYSBVP's security interest, which was perfected under the laws of New York, against
challenges from IIS and the debtor in possession. These challenges were based on
NYSBVP's failure to refile, or reperfect, its interest after C Tek's hardware moved to
Pennsylvania and C Tek's principal relocated in New Hampshire. In re C Tek Software,
Inc., 117 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) [hereinafter C Tek 1].
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security agreements covered these improvements as after-acquired property.
The C Tek H Court rejected the premise of NYSBVP's argument
stating that "the security interest did not attach to modifications made by IIS
under ... § 9-203(l)(c) because ... the debtor did not have any interest in
that collateral."6 The Court then discussed through the various changes IIS
had made to the software. Taken one at a time, these changes could be
called minor or cosmetic. When considered collectively, however, the court
found these changes sufficiently "original" to qualify for copyright protection
as a "derivative work.61 2 As a derivative work, these changes could indeed
be the property of IIS, not the property of C Tek.63 Apparently, if these
changes in the ClienTrak software had not qualified for protection as a
"derivative work," IIS would have had no rights in them. In such case, the
Court suggested the changes would have. to be treated as intangible
"accessions" that became part of the debtor's collateral and therefore, part of
the prior secured party's interest.6
The ownership concepts in section 9-203 are helpful in limiting the
metes and bounds of an after-acquired property clause as applied to a
copyright. The nature of the intangible right itself, however, makes the
application of the after-acquired property clause less critical for the secured
party. Unlike tangible accessions that may have stand-alone value after
being separated from its hosting "whole,"6 a derivative work cannot be
"removed" from the base work.' If the owner of the derivative work wants
to produce and sell its complete software package it must have a license from
the owner of the base work. C Tek did license IIS's development of the
software for ten years after it granted a security interest in the copyright to
NYSBVP. This exclusive license was a "transfer of copyright ownership."
The question that remains unanswered in C Tek H is who has priority
as between the conflicting transferees: the party with the prior security
interest in the base work or the party granted the the subsequent exclusive
license to produce derivative works. The answer in C Tek, II regardless of
whether the Copyright Act or Article Nine governs priority, seems to be that

61

62
63

SId.
65

127 B.R. at 502 n.1.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 507.
507-08.
U.C.C. § 9-314(4) & cmt. 2. Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-335(e)&(f).
17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994)("the copyright in a...derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.")
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the party with the prior security interest in the base work has priority. 7 IIS
conceded that it knew of the prior security interest when it took its exclusive
license from C Tek18 This tainting knowledge provides the basis for the
prior secured party's priority under both statutory schemes.69 If IIS's license
is cut off by the secured party's foreclosure on the base right, IIS wins the
battle for separate recognition of its derivative work property under section
9-203, but loses the war. Unlike the owner of a severable accession, IIS will
not be able to use its separate copyright in the derivative work without
coming to terms with C Tek's prior foreclosing secured party. 0

67

68
69

70

See also In re National Peregrine Entertainment, Inc., 1989 LEXIS 2469 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1989), rev'd, National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 116
B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990). See also discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 9
at Section III(b)(3).
In re C Tek Software, Inc., 117 B.R. 762, 763 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
The rule in U.C.C. section 9-301(1)(d) requires that a later transferee must give value
"without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected." U.C.C. § 9301(1)(d). See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d)("licensee" and "buyer" substituted for
"transferee"). See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 9 at Section
II(e)(2)(B)(i). Under section 205(d) of the Copyright Act, the answer is not as clear.
However, the last sentence in subsection (d) suggests that the later transfer does not
prevail, even if the earlier transfer misses the grace period for recording and thereafter
fails to record first, if such later transfer had notice of the earlier transfer. 17 U.S.C. §
205(d) (1994).
An exclusive license to prepare derivative works that does not have actual knowledge of
the security interest in the base work will still lose if the secured party is careful.
Perfection of the security interest under Article Nine before the licensee gives value
[U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(d)] coupled with filing under the Copyright Act within the grace
period or before the licensee files [17 U.S.C. § 205(d)(1994)] will cement the secured
party's priority. This result may tend to upset many exclusive licensees with authority to
prepare derivative works who make a considerable investment in building value on the
base copyright. See J.D. Brinson, The Copyright Act and Bankruptcy: Perfection,
Priorities,and Transfers, 1 J. OF B.R. LAW & PRAC. 337, 362-63 & n. 123 (1992).
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APPENDIX

A.

12 - U.C.C. ARTICLE NINE: PERFECTION

Perfection in Proceeds

Once attached, an Article Nine security interest stays with the
collateral when it is sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, unless the
secured party expressly or impliedly consents to the "sale or other
disposition" free of its interest.' When the secured party so consents, the
security interest in that collateral is extinguished.' Consent is usually present
when the debtor's collateral is an asset such as inventory or chattel paper that
is regularly sold and replaced as part of the debtor's business activity.
Regardless of whether the security interest in the original collateral survives,
however, the current language of Article Nine provides that such interest
continues "in any identifiable proceeds" of "the sale, exchange, collection, or
other disposition .

.

.

."I

The requirement in current Article Nine that

"proceeds" arise out of a "sale, exchange, or other disposition" is
problematic when intellectual property is exploited or enhanced. In order to
alleviate these problems, the "disposition" predicate for "proceeds" has been
eliminated from Revised Article Nine.
If collateral subject to a perfected security interest (attachment plus a
proper filing) generates proceeds under either version of Article Nine, the
original perfection automatically carries over into those proceeds for a short
period of time. Under current Article Nine, this automatic perfection lasts
for ten (10) days.' Under Revised Article Nine the period of automatic
perfection is twenty (20) days.' Perfection in the proceeds will continue
beyond the interim automatic period without a new filing covering the
proceeds if: (1) the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds, or (2) the
proceeds are collateral in which a security interest "may be perfected by
filing in the office or offices where the financing statement has been filed"
U.C.C. § 9-306(2). See also U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(a)(1)(The Revision language
expands the existing reference to "sale, exchange, or other disposition" in present section
9-306(2) to include a "lease" and "license" by the debtor.)
2

Id.

4

Id.
U.C.C. § 9-306(3).

5

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(c)(d)&(e). Curiously, unlike the current rule in section 9306(3) the Revisions provide no continuous perfection for second generation proceeds,
acquired with first generation cash proceeds, even where the original financing statement
contains a type indication that covers the second generation proceeds.
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that "covers" the original collateral.' Under current Article Nine, the income
stream from an assignment or other complete and permanent disposition of
an underlying intellectual property right would normally be viewed as a
general intangible, or in some cases an account., Under Revised Article Nine
this income stream would always be an account.8 As long as an existing
filing "covering" the original collateral exists in the appropriate office for
perfecting interests in newly generated accounts or general intangibles,
perfection in such proceeds should be continuous. Note that the existing
filing that "covers" the original collateral need not perfect the original
collateral. For example, a financing statement that "covers" federal
copyright collateral and is filed within the appropriate state's central file
should be effective to continue state law perfection in the income stream
"proceeds" even if the proper "state law" place to perfect the original
copyright collateral, under the "step-back" filing rule in section 9-302(3)(a),
is the Copyright Office.' Finally on the issue of priority, Article Nine
provides that whenever the order of perfection controls priority between
conflicting interests, perfection in the original collateral is also the date of

6

U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a). Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(c)(1)(B). Under the current
language, if second generation proceeds are acquired with "cash proceeds" from the
original collateral, perfection can be continuous if the original financing statement
indicates "by type" the property constituting the second generation proceeds. Id. This
continuous protection for second generation proceeds that fall within the collateral types
in the financing statement was not carried over into the language of Revised Article Nine.
U.C.C. § 9-106. See discussionPRELIMINARY REPORT # 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT
LEGAL RULES AND STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY
INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE

REFORMS Section II (a)(1)(C) (Cooperative Contract - U.S.P.T.O. and Franklin Pierce
Law Center 2000).
Income streams from licensing are "accounts" under the definition in Revised Article
Nine. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2). See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra
note 7 at Section I(a)(l)(D).
U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a),(4) & cmt. 8. If proceeds in the form of receivables generated by
the licensing of copyright collateral must also be recorded in the Copyright Office under
step-back in section 9-302(3)(a), then this recording of the full security agreement
document covering the original collateral under section 205(a) of the Copyright Act
should be viewed as the equivalent of filing a financing statement that "covers the
original collateral" under section 9-306(3)(a). This equivalence is made clear with
respect to the new filing "step-back" rule in section 9-311 (a)(l) of Revised Article Nine.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-311 (a)(1). Comment 6 to Revised section 9-315 expressly provides
that "compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in
Section 9-31 l(a)" is the dquivalent of the filing of a financing statement that covers the
original collateral within the meaning of the continuous perfection rule. U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-315, cmt. 6.
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continuing perfection as to the proceeds.'"
1.

Disposition Requirement

a)

Disposition of Original Collateral

The advantages of carried-over perfection are only available if new
property that comes to the debtor through or out of the original collateral is,
in fact, "proceeds." "Proceeds" arise, under the language of current section
9-306(1), only from a "sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition" of the
collateral." Whenever the debtor sells collateral for money or exchanges it
for other property, the required "disposition" is clearly present. Although the
extent of disposition required is not clear, there is authority for the position
that even a partial disposition of collateral will generate proceeds. In its
Commentary No. 9, the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code concluded that even when the debtor leases goods for a
short period of time, a "disposition occurs and the resulting account or
chattel paper is "proceeds."'2 The Board's Commentary interprets the word
"disposition" in current section 9-306(1) to include even a short term lease of
goods, on the theory that the debtor/lessor parts with some portion of the
debtor's property.'3 It must be noted, however, that the conclusion of PEB
Commentary No. 9 runs counter to a number of earlier cases holding that
only a complete or permanent disposition was capable of generating
proceeds.4 While Commentary No. 9 rejects this requirement of a complete
or permanent disposition, it does not "address other transactions (those
involving the licensing of intangibles in particular) where no disposition...
has taken place."' 5
10 U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) & 9-312(6)..

I

U.C.C. § 9-306(1).

12

PEB Commentary No. 9, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 3 (Clark Boardman

Callaghan) (June 25, 1992). The commentary relies on the common law rule that the
granting of a real estate leasehold interest constitutes a disposition of a portion of the
lessor's ownership interest in the leased estate. See, e.g., Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M.
696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982); Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 221 (1990).
13
14

"

Id.
In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 548, 15 U.C.C. 1041, 1047-48 (9th Cir. BAP
1991); In re S & J Holding Corp., 39 UCC 668, 669 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re
A.E.I. Corp., 11 B.R. 97,102, 31 UCC 1467, 1469-70 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re
Cleary Bros. Construction Co., 9 B.R. 40, 30 UCC 1444, 1445 (S.D. Fla. 1980).

PEB Commentary No. 9, supra note 12. The need for even a partial disposition of some
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Revised Article Nine addresses this licensing question by moving
sharply away from the "disposition" predicate for "proceeds." The 1992
Report of the PEB Study Group on Article Nine suggested that exchange and
replacement of the original collateral under section 9-306(1) should be
viewed as a singular idea.' 6 Under a test that looks at a resulting income
stream as a substitution for value lost in the original collateral, rather than on
the exchange of all or part of the res, royalties arising from the debtor's
nonexclusive licenses should qualify as proceeds.1 7 The Report of the Study
Group called for a revision of the "proceeds" concept that would either
broaden the definition of "disposition" or replace the definition with a
concept closer to substitution, in order to include royalties from the debtor's
licensing activities."8
In response to the charge of the Study Group, section 9102(a)(64)(A) of Revised Article Nine defines "proceeds" to expressly
include "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or
other disposition of collateral."' 9 The language seems to include whatever
the debtor acquires in exchange when any type of license of intellectual
property is created. That conclusion is not absolutely clear because the
concluding phrase of subsection (a)(64)(A), "or other disposition of
collateral," might be interpreted as a limitation on the prior enumerated
forms, in the sense that all activity listed must be some form of traditional
"disposition." If so construed, subsection (a)(64)(A) in the Revised Article
Nine definition might still fall under the shadow of the existing rule, making
only licenses of intellectual property that disposed of all or some part of the
underlying res capable of generating proceeds. However, "other disposition"
in the Revision need not reflect on the preceding enumerated means for
proceeds generation. Including all licenses of intellectual property within the
operation of the phrase "acquired upon the ... license" is certainly more in
line with the recommendations of the Study Group." Furthermore, even if
the revised language in section 9-102(a)(64)(A) refers only to licenses that

6

17
18

property "res" has been abandoned in Revised Article Nine. Revised Article Nine
defines proceeds to include "(1) whatever is acquired upon the "sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition of collateral; (2) whatever is collected on, or distributedon
account of collateral; and, (3) rights arising out of collateral..." U.C.C. [Revised] § 9102(a)(64)(A),(B)&(C)(Emphasis added).
PEB Study Group on Uniform Commercial Code Article Nine, Report 106 & 110
(December 1, 1992).
Id.at 110.
Id. at 26, 106 & 110.

,9 U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64).
20
See supranote 16.
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"dispose" of all or part of the underlying property, subsection (a)(64)(B)
further defines as proceeds "whatever is collected on collateral."' Income
received on a license that created no more than a personal right in the
licensee would arguably fall within the "collected on" language in Revised
section 9-102(a)(64)(B).
While Revised Article Nine expands the definition of proceeds so as
to include nearly all contractual exploitations of intellectual property, the
disposition predicate in current section 9-306 forces consideration of two
serious "proceeds" issues related to intellectual property collateral. First, it is
not clear under the current language of section 9-306(1) whether or to what
extent a security interest in a specific form of the debtor's intellectual
property will carry over as "proceeds" into a new enhanced form that was
derived from the original intangible collateral. The broad definition of
"proceeds" in the Revisions seems to embrace the notion of evolving
collateral rights. Second, as mentioned above, the current disposition
predicate seems to limit income stream "proceeds" of intellectual property
collateral to those generated by licensing that entails some "disposing" of the
debtor's underlying intellectual property res. While the Revised "proceeds"
definition seems to solve the licensing income problem, current law forces a
close examination of the property rules surrounding the debtor's licensing
activity.
b)

Disposition of a Maturing Right

From the debtor's conception of a single innovation, a trade secret, a
patent application, or an issued patent may finally evolve. The authors have
examined the argument that a debtor/owner might obtain sufficient section 9203 "rights" in some mature form of intellectual property, thus allowing a
security interest to "attach" to that mature form, from the moment it was
conceived of or had existence in some unmatured, unprotected or differently
protected form.22 As was suggested in that earlier discussion, the intellectual
property lawyer and the commercial lawyer would be well advised to view
each stage of protection as a separate and discrete form of property capable
of providing the secured party with attached rights only when each stage is
actually reached.3 Beyond this "inchoate attachment" argument, it is
possible to argue that when each separate form of intellectual property right
yields to the next form a section 9-306(1) "disposition" of the prior collateral

21

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(B).

22

See discussion in PRELIMINARY

23

Id.

REPORT # 1, supra note

7 at Section II(b)(3)(B).
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form has occurred. 4 Thus, while a debtor may not actually be able to acquire
"rights" in a patent application until the application is filed, that same patent
application once filed, could be viewed as the "proceeds" of an earlier trade
secret. [Remember that the perfection (including the date of perfection) can
carry over from the original collateral into the proceeds.,,] Similarly, the
subsequently issued patent could be viewed as the "proceeds" of its patent
application and the second generation proceeds of the earlier trade secret.
This argument that a "disposition" of collateral under current section
9-306(1) embraces the concept of maturing transmutation was rejected by the
Bankruptcy Court in the Matter of TransportationDesign and Technology,
Inc.6 Transportation Design held that a patent is not the "proceeds" of a
patent application because the issuance of the patent is not a "disposition" of
the application within the meaning of section 9-306(1). Despite the circular
reasoning, the Court seems to limit "disposed of' to acts of final and
permanent disposition analogous to a sale. 7 Under Transportation Design,
even though a trade secret is lost when a patent issues,28 it is not "disposed
of' in a section 9-306(1) exchange or other disposition.
TransportationDesign has been criticized for narrowly interpreting
the "disposition" requirement in current section 9-306(1). Defending their
comprehensive proposal for a "Federal Article Nine Text" covering federal
intellectual property, Professors Weinberg and Woodward argue that secured
parties using intellectual property as collateral may need protection against
the "risk of surprise metamorphosis." They suggest that Transportation
Design may not be the best interpretation of the current text of section 9306(1). If the protection of state trade secret law is "exchanged" for federal
patent protection, they argue, then the patent can be viewed as section 9306(1) "proceeds."30 Weinberg and Woodward ultimately recede from this
suggested argument, however, because "trade secrets are quantitatively
different from patents."'" They conclude that under the current Article Nine
language the underlying innovation gets new vestments when a patent issues
24

See the discussion in Weinberg & Woodward, Easing Transfers,and Security Interest
Transactionsin Intellectual Property:An Agenda For Reform, 79 KY. L.J. 61, 120-121

29

(1991).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supranote 7 at Section II(c)(1).
48 B.R. 635, 640, 40 UCC 1393, 1399-1400 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
In the case of goods, the Commercial Code defines "sale" as "the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
Weinberg & Woodward, Easing Transfers, supranote 24 at 121.

30

Id. at 117.

31

Id. at 118.

25
26
27

28
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and that these vestments are more than just an exchanged substitute for the
old trade secret cloth. While acknowledging this limitation in the current
Article Nine text, Weinberg and Woodward remain convinced that a secured
party should be able to trace a collateral right in a single innovation through
its different vestments. To that end, they urged the expansion of the
"proceeds" concept as set forth in current section 9-306(1) "to cover new
32
developments.
The definition of "proceeds" in the Revisions moves sharply in the
direction favored by Professors Weinberg and Woodward, and well beyond
any notions of replacement value. "Disposition" is no longer the centerpiece
of the proceeds definition under the Revisions. Revision section 9102(a)(64) defines "proceeds" to include "whatever is collected on . . .
collateral, as well as "rights arising out of collateral." Profits and other
enhancing derivatives from collateral seem to be included within this
definition.
c)

Disposition of a License

The language of TransportationDesign suggested that a license of
intellectual property that was not, in substance, an assignment or outright
transfer of ownership could not yield "proceeds" because the underlying
disposition of the intellectual property by the licensor/debtor would not be
final and permanent. While the result suggested by TransportationDesign
may be appropriate under those specific facts, the Court's reasoning
overstates the "disposition" requirement because, as already noted, even a
partialdisposition may satisfy current section 9-306(1).13 Although there is
conflict in the case law dealing with tangible property," PEB Commentary
32

33

Id. at 118 & 121.
In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 548, 15 U.C.C. 1041, 1047-48 (9th Cir. BAP
1991); In re S & J Holding Corp., 39 UCC 668, 669 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re
A.E.I. Corp., 11 B.R. 97,102, 31 UCC 1467, 1469-70 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re
Cleary Bros. Construction Co., 9 B.R. 40, 30 UCC 1444, 1445 (S.D. Fla. 1980). Not all
Courts have been rigorous about the section 9-306(1) "disposition" requirement. In re
Dettman, 84 B.R. 662, 665 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)(crop diversion certificates were
"substitutes" for grapes that were the product of vines that were pre-petition collateral).
But see In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 548, 15 UCC 1041, 1047-48 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1991)(rental income not proceeds).
Compare PEB Commentary No. 9, supra note 12 with; In re S & J Holding Corp., 42
Bankr. 249, 250 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984)(income generated from use of video machines is
not proceeds under section 9-306(1)); _n re A.E.I. Corp., 11 B.R. 97, 102, 31 UCC 1467,
1469-70 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Cleary Bros. Construction Co., 9 B.R. 40, 30
UCC 1444, 1445 (S.D. Fla. 1980)(security interest in equipment does not include lease
proceeds from rental of equipment unless the.lease itself is also collateral).
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No. 9 on section 9-306(1) concludes that a partial disposition of the
owner/debtor's underlying property right in goods should be enough of a
"disposition" to generate proceeds."
If a license transfers some part of the licensor's underlying right,
then a license of intellectual property would seem capable of generating
proceeds to the same extent as a lease of tangible property. Underlying
federal intellectual property law distinguishes a partial transfer of the
underlying intangible res from a mere personal right to use that res.
However, this underlying law is not always understood or correctly applied
within the appropriate state commercial statute.'
Almost infinite divisibility of the underlying intangible right is a
characteristic of copyright law. A copyrighted work is capable of being
divided into segments, each capable of separate ownership. 8 An exclusive
license of a copyright is a "transfer of copyright ownership" under the
Copyright Act. Therefore, the complete and permanent transfer of such an
ownership segment, as distinguished from a personal right to make limited
nonexclusive use of the copyright (a nonexclusive license), should generate
"proceeds" under the test suggested by the Permanent Editorial Board in its
0 For example, the transfer of exclusive movie rights
Commentary No. 9.1
under a copyright can generate "proceeds" because the copyright owner has
not just provided the transferee with immunity*from suit 4but has made a
complete and permanent disposition of a part of the copyright. '
In the case of a patent or trademark, however, a license is usually
just a contractual promise of immunity from an infringement suit. Even an
exclusive patent license does not convey an interest in the patent unless it has
the legal effect of an assignment." The exclusive patent license has that legal
35
36

37

38

39
40

41
42

PEB Commentary No. 9, supranote 12.
See, e.g., In re Quintex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991) This
distinction becomes even more critical in bankruptcy.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers on the holder of a copyright a bundle of
separate and distinct exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). The grant of one
exclusive right does not impair any of the other exclusive rights retained. See Columbia
Pictures Industries v. Redd Home, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984).
Compare: Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. 515 (1869) and Merck & Co. v. Smith, 155 F. Supp.
843 (E.D. Pa.), affd 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1957) with Shutes v. Cheney, 123 Cal App. 2d
256, 266 P.2d 902, 101 U.S.P.Q. 90 (1954). See also In re Simplified Information
Systems, Inc., 89 B.R. 538, 541 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
PEB Commentary No. 9, supranote 12.
Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Home, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984).
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252(1891). See also 6 WALKER ON PATENTS, § 20:3,
(1986).
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effect only when it is a grant of the "exclusive right to make, use, and vend
the invention throughout the United States, or in a specified part thereof, or
of any undivided part or share of that exclusive right." 3
Under current Article Nine language, the income stream from a
"license" would seem to be proceeds when the "license" transfers all or some
divisible part of the intellectual property." Most exclusive licenses and all
nonexclusive licenses are transfers of a much more limited nature, however.
The right conveyed to the licensee is more akin to a personal contract right
than a disposition of even a part of the underlying res."' The license protects
the licensee from a suit for infringement as long as use does not exceed the
contractual authorization." Such a license would not normally carry with it
any right that can be separated from the licensor's underlying res.'
In concluding- that a disposition of goods by "security lease" ' or
"true lease"4 9 creates section 9-306 proceeds, the Permanent Editorial Board
in its Commentary No. 9 distinguished the transfer of a partial property
interest from the case where only a personal "right to use" was transferred."
Under the theory of Commentary No. 9, if there is no disposition of the
goods, there can be no proceeds. Even though .a pure lease of goods results
in a section 9-306 disposition, most licenses do not qualify as a section 9-306
disposition because they leave the licensor's res undisturbed.
While the concept of transferred ownership might suggest a basis for
43

5

"

See Merck & Co. v. Smith, 155 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Pa.), affd 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir.
1957).
In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 689 (W.D. Tenn. 1987). See Weinberg and
Woodward, Easing Transfers,supra note 24 at 114.
Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1081; Public Varieties of Mississippi, Inc. v. Sun Valley Seed Co., Inc., 734 F.
Supp. 250 (N.D. Miss. 1990); BGT Enterprises, Inc. v. Gronholz, 406 N.W.2d 321, 323
(Minn. App. 1987); Harris v. Emus, 734 F.2d 1329, 222 U.S.P.Q. 466, 1984 Copyright
Dec. 449,453 (9th Cir. 1984).
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) & § 9-102(1)(a).

45

4

47

48
49

50

WALKER ON PATENTS, § 19:12 at 367 (1986).. A nominal exclusive license may have
the effect of a grant. See Control Components, Inc. V. Atlantic Richfield Co., 439 F.
Supp. 654, 655, 200 U.S.P.Q. 334, 334-35 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See also Moore v. Marsh,
74 U.S. 515 (1869); Merck & Co. v. Smith, 155 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Pa.), affd 261 F.2d
162 (3d Cir. 1957).

U.C.C. § 2A-102 & § 2A-103(1)(j).
PEB Commentary No. 9., supra note 12. See also In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R.
249, 39 UCC 668 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). But see In re Dettman, 84 B.R. 662, 665 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 1988)(crop diversion certificates were "substitutes" for grapes that were the
product of vines that were pre-petition collateral).
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excluding the earnings generated from nonexclusive licenses and many
exclusive patent licenses from section 9-306(1), there is an argument for
reading "disposition" more expansively when intellectual property is the
underlying res. The intellectual property which is disposed of might be no
more than a personal right in the hands of the debtor/transferor. Even when a
license is defined as a personal right which is not transferable without the
licensor's consent, it seems capable of supporting a security interest in the
first instance.' If the complete disposition of such an existing personal right
generates proceeds, creation of the personal right in the first instance ought
to be a proceeds-generating act as well.
The new proceeds definition in Revised Article Nine should bring all
licensing income under the "proceeds" definition. As the discussion in
Section II(c)(2)(A) explains,"2 income, even from a nontransferable
nonexclusive license should be "proceeds" under the new language in section
9-102(a)(64).3 It should apply either under the language of subsection
(64)(A) that expressly refers to "whatever is acquired upon the.., license..
• of collateral"'' or under the language of subsection (64)(B) that -includes
"whatever is collected on ... collateral.' 55
This new "proceeds" definition in the Revisions should also relieve a
problem that arises in connection with the mass-market licensing of software
and contemporaneous delivery of its embodiment. 6 With software, there is
an apparent unity of interest and right. The tangible physical property
embodies the intangible property. The tangible property is also necessary for
the effective use of the intangible property. 7 Software licenses are typified
51

52

53
54
55
56

57

In re Thomas Communications, Inc., 161 B.R. 621, 624-26 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1993).
The question of whether a security interest can be carved out of a governmental license
that prohibits assignment without consent is still an open issue. Compare: In re Ridgely
Communications, Inc., 139 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) with In re Tak
Communications, Inc., 138 B.R. 568 (W.D. Wis. 1992), affd 985 F.2d 916 (7th Cir.
1993). See also PEB Study Group on Uniform Commercial Code Article Nine, Report
178 (December 1, 1992).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 7 at Section II(c)(2)(A) in text
accompanying notes 201 to 206.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(A).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(B).
In re Bedford Computer Corp., 62 BR. 555, 567 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); In re C Tek
Software, Inc., 117 B.R. 762, 763 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990). Other cases holding that
software products are "goods" include: Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Advent Systems Ltd v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d
670 (3d Cir. 1991); RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1985);
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
So-called "commercial licenses" usually involve software imbedded in a disk or other
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by a characteristic, which marks intellectual property transactions as
dispositions of property. The intellectual property license is enhanced by
and embodied in physical property, which is generally delivered with the
license. With respect to this delivered physical embodiment some
"disposition" clearly occurs. According to some authority, such a disposition
cannot be prevented, even when the debtor/licensor employs language in the
licensing agreement reserving title to the embodiment." If such a reservation
is simply to secure a payment or the performance of license terms by the
licensee, it should be limited in effect to a security interest. 9 If the licensor
is deemed to reserve a security interest only, the title to the embodiment
passes to the licensee despite the title reservation language. ° Even if the
circumstance of the license suggests that such language should be given
effect as a lease of the underlying embodiment,' the resulting leasehold
interest that passes to the licensee would be a sufficient "disposition."62
However, unless the license transferred some part of the underlying

58

59

60
61

62

medium. These licenses may also involve the transfer of access codes and manuals
which make the software usable.
See, e.g.,_Microsoft Software License Card, Microsoft Flight Simulator for MS-Dos
Version 5.00 para.#4 (1993).
U.C.C. § 401(1) & § 1-207(37).
Id.
Whether title to the delivered embodiment can properly be reserved in the licensee
requires consideration of the entire transfer agreement and the type of market in which
the license is used. A title reservation by a commercial licensor who is paid in
installments and fairly expects return of the physical "copy" should be treated like a
lease. See Draft U.C.C. § 2B-501, Reporter's Note 3 (Discussion Draft, August 1, 1998).
On the other hand, the nature of single payment consumer transactions suggest that the
licensee has an unlimited right to possess the underlying embodiment or "copy." R.
NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1.18[1] (1992). Most of the cases on
the ownership of a "copy" arise under section 117 of the Copyright Act. Only the "owner
of a copy of a computer program" has section 117 rights to make a copy or adaptation
that would otherwise infringe. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). See Applied Information
Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 154-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)(Commercial
license with three separate payment periods creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
ownership of the delivered copy.); DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse
Communications, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359, 362-63, rehearing denied, 1997 LEXIS 10093
(E.D. Va. 1997)(Commercial license with single payment makes the transaction a sale of
the copy.) Section 2B-501A(a)&(b) of the proposed Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act [formerly proposed Article 2B of the U.C.C.] would allow the location
of title to copies to be determined by the "agreement." Draft U.C.I.T.A. § 2B501A(a)&(b) (Draft, February 1, 1999). "Agreement" is defined broadly in U.C.C.
section 1-201(3) to include course of dealing and usage of trade. U.C.C. § 1-201 & § 1205.
See discussioninPRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supranote 7 at Section II(c)(2)(A).
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intellectual property [not the case with a nonexclusive license], there is no
section 9-306(1) "disposition" of that intangible property sufficient to render
the return income to the licensor/debtor "proceeds. ' 63 Rather than focus on
the subtle dual nature of most pre-assembled software packages, some Courts
have tended to place the whole transfer transaction in one exclusive category
depending, to some extent, on the degree to which the transfer resembles the
sale of a "goods" product. The "proceeds" issue for the secured party
should be whether the underlying intellectual property collateral has been
disposed of by the debtor. The Court may treat the total sale and license
transaction like a sale of a product or a sale of goods. In this case the secured
party which has an interest in the debtor/licensor's "goods" (broadly defined)
arguably has a better "proceeds" claim to the income stream from the license
than the party with a security interest which is limited to the underlying
intellectual property that was retained.
Because software might mistakenly be classified as "goods" under
current Article Nine,'6 the commercial software financer should not limit its
security interest to the debtor's general intangibles and simply rely on the
proceeds right in section 9-306 to hold the resulting income stream. Even a
clause covering after-acquired intangibles might not pick up this income
stream if the Court decides that the unitary commercial license should be
treated as a sale of goods.6 In that case, the resulting income stream would
property
be classified as an "account, '67 thus making the intellectual
68
critical.
financer
accounts
existing
any
over
priority
financer's
As noted earlier in Section II(a)(1)(D), Revised Article Nine expands
the definition of an "account" to include "a right to payment of a monetary
obligation.. .for property that has been sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of . ... "69 Because royalties owed to the debtor on
63

64

65

66

67
6

69

A typical shrinkwrap term in a commercial software license provides that the buyer has
not purchased the software itself but has merely obtained a personal nontransferable right
to use the program. See, e.g., Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
Id.
See Nimmer, The Uniform Commercial Code ProposedArticle 2B Symposium:
Article 2B: An Introduction, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 211, 213-215
(1997)(software as "goods" cases.).
See cases cited supraat note 56.
"Software" is defined as a "general intangible" under the Article Nine Revisions,
however. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).

U.C.C. § 9-106.
The first-to-file on either the debtor's goods or the debtor's accounts would have priority
in the proceeds generated by the sale of the debtor's goods. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) & Official
Comment 8. See also U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(a)(1) & § 9-322(a).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2). The present definition of account includes only those
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intellectual property collateral are treated as "accounts" under Revised
Article Nine, parties lending on the strength of the debtor's intellectual
property collateral will have to be wary of account financers even if the
licensing of their intellectual property cannot be treated as a disposition of
goods. Under the Revisions, anyone financing the debtor's intellectual
property will have to file his or her security interest ahead of the debtor's
account in order to claim priority in royalties received from the licensing of
covered intellectual property. 0
Finally, the expanded definition in Revised Article Nine also
changes the proceeds rules as applied to cross-licensing agreements. Under
the current disposition of ownership test, most cross-licensing agreements
would not yield "proceeds" under section 9-306 unless the debtor/licensor
parts with some transferable property interest in the original intellectual
property collateral in order to acquire the other party's right to use.7' The
substitution of value test captured in section 9-102(a)(64) of the Revisions
will treat all license rights received by the debtor in exchange for rights to
use the debtor's own intellectual property collateral as "proceeds" of that
collateral.

rights to payment generated by the sale or lease of goods or the rendering of a service.
70

71

U.C.C. § 9-106.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-319(a)(1)&(b)(l).
Current section 9-306 does require that the proceeds themselves be a disposition of
property by the other party. Proceeds includes "whatever is received." As long as the
debtor parts with a transferable property,interest in the original intellectual property
collateral in order to acquire a right to use from the other licensor, the right to use under
the license received are "proceeds" of the debtor's original intellectual property collateral.

U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
72

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64). See also Superseded Draft U.C.C., Article Nine
Revisions - Reporters' Prefatory Comments at 5(f) (Proposed Final Draft, April 15,

1998).
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13 - LOCATION RULES FOR GENERAL INTANGIBLES

When the debtor's intellectual property collateral is defined as
"general intangibles," the proper place to file for perfection under current
Article Nine is "the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located . . . ."' The
current location rules require some analysis of the debtor's operation and
manner of doing business. Under section 9-103(3)(d), the debtor is "deemed
located at his place of business if he has one, at his 'chief executive office' if
he has more than one place of business, otherwise at his residence."' If the
debtor has only one location at which business with the public is conducted
however, the debtor lives and conducts financial affairs of the business from
a home office in a different state, it would be prudent to file the security
interest in the general intangibles in both states. If the home office is not
considered a "place of business," and the debtor has only one "place of
business" (the state in which the public operations take place) the location of
that business is the proper place to file a security interest in general
intangibles. If the home office is also considered a "place of business," it
will probably be considered the "chief executive office." The "chief
executive office" is the executive headquarters for the debtor's multi-state
operation, not necessarily the location which generates the largest business
volume? If the debtor clearly has more than one "place of business," it
would be prudent to file in all of those states which could be considered the
"chief executive office." If the debtor has ceased operations and has no
place of business, the debtor's residence is the proper location.5
2

U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b).
U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d). But see U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307. Under the "location" rules in
Revised Article Nine, a "registered organization," such as a corporation, is located in the
state under whose laws it is organized. In the case of a corporation this is the state of
incorporation. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(e). An "individual debtor" is located at his or
her principal residence. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(b)(1). A business debtor that is not an
individual or a registered organization is located at its "place of business" if it has only
one such place, and at its "chief executive office" if it has more than one such place.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(b)(2)&(3).
U.C.C. § 9-103, Official Comment 5(c). See J.A. Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Sheperd
Machinery Co., 665 F.2d 941, 949-50 ((9th Cir. 1982); In re Golf Course Builders
Leasing, Inc., 768 F.2d 1167, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 1985).
U.C.C. § 9-103, Official Comment 5(c). See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n., 116 B.R. 194, 198 (C.D. Cal. 1990)(The collateral consisted of
the debtor's library of copyright protected films. The secured party filed in Colorado,
California and Utah in an effort to make sure that it hit the debtor's location.
Unfortunately, the secured party did not record in the Copyright Office).
U.C.C. § 9-103. Cf In re C Tek Software, Inc., 117 B.R. 763, 770-71 (Bankr. D.N.H.
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Under the "location" rules of Revised Article Nine, a "registered
organization," such as a corporation, is located in the state under whose laws
it is organized. In the case of a corporation this is the state of incorporation.,
An "individual debtor" is located at his or her principal residence.7 A
business debtor that is not an individual or a registered organization is
located at its "place of business" if it has only one such place, and at its
"chief executive office" if it has more than one such place Location issues
are still of concern to secured parties, however, because those who own
rights in collateral often change their location. This change can occur when
the debtor's corporate structure changes (e.g., by merger) even if nothing
tangible moves. When the debtor who holds intellectual property collateral
changes location, perfection continues for either four months or one year,
depending on the nature and circumstances of the change.' However, the
secured party must file in the new location must occur before the Old
perfection expires under the law of the old location or before the grace period
expires, whichever is earlier.' If a new timely filing is not made in the new
location, perfection in the intellectual property is lost."

1990). But see U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(g)(location of registered organization in state
of organization continues after dissolution).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(e).

6

7
O

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(b)(1).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-307(b)(2)&(3).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-316(a)(2)&(3)& cmt. 2, Examples 1 and Example 4. See also
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-508(b).

,0 U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-316(g).
1

Id.
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14 - APPLICATION OF PRIORITY RULES

Secured Party vs. Lien Creditor

Under current section 9-301(l)(b), a security interest in intellectual
property is subordinate to the interest of a person who becomes a lien
creditor with respect to that intellectual property before the security interest
is perfected.' Under this rule the creditor with a judicial lien on intellectual
property should prevail over subsequent secured parties, as well as existing
but unperfected secured parties.' The contest between a priorsecured party

2

U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b)&(3). Compare U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(a)(2)("a person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest.. .is perfected and before a financing
statement covering the collateral is filed."). The added italicized language extends a
secured party's effective protection from the point of filing as it presently exists in
section 9-301(1)(b). Even under the current language of 9-301(l)(b), a prior secured
party with an existing and properly filed security interest covering after-acquired
property is effectively protected against the lien creditor from the time of a proper filing.
This result follows because a person cannot "become" a lien creditor until the debtor has
rights in the collateral that enable the attachment of the judicial lien. U.C.C. § 9-301,
cmt. 3. At the moment that the debtor acquires sufficient rights, however, the prior filed
secured party with an effective after acquired property clause is immediately perfected in
the acquired property. The best the "becoming" lien creditor can do is tie the filed
secured party with an existing agreement covering after-acquired property. But, in order
to subordinate the secured party under the present section 9-301(1)(b) language, the lien
creditor must "become" a lien creditor before perfection. A tie goes to the existing
secured party, so a lien creditor is effectively closed out of priority as soon as the secured
party with an after-acquired property clause files a proper financing statement. See
Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209, 212 (7th
Cir. 1969)("Thus we are presented with a situation where as soon as an account
receivable comes into existence and is sought to be attached by a lien creditor, it has
already become subject to a perfected security interest.") The language of the Revisions
carries the protective effect of filing a financing statement vis-a-vis the lien creditor one
step further, however. Under the language of Revised section 9-317(a)(2), a lien creditor
loses to a secured party who did not even have an agreement covering the property at the
time the competing judicial lien arose, as long as there was a filed financing statement
"covering" the collateral. The new rule essentially gives the secured party a first-to-file
priority over the lien creditor applicable even when the secured party has no existing
security agreement covering the collateral at the time the competing third party
"becomes" a lien creditor.
Compare: T.Ward, Ordering theJudicialProcess Lien and the Security Interest Under
Article Nine: Meshing Two Different Worlds, 31 ME. L. REV. 223, 231 (1981) with D.
Board, The Scope of Article Nine Is Only One Quarter as Great as Is Commonly
Supposed, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 951, 981-87 (1993).
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and a subsequent lien creditor is certainly the most important application of
section 9-301(l)(b) because "perfection" in this scenario has major
implications under the Bankruptcy Code.
The bankruptcy trustee who is charged with administering the estate
and distributing available assets to creditors, has the status of a hypothetical
creditor who acquired a judicial lien on the date of the bankruptcy petition.'
When Article Nine controls the question of "perfection," the rule in Section
9-301(1)(b) makes a security interest, which is unperfected as of the date of
filing the bankruptcy petition, avoidable. The unperfected security interest,
in this circumstance, is subordinate to the interest of the person who
"becomes a lien creditor."'
Article Nine perfection is also important in bankruptcy because it
marks the date on which many pre-bankruptcy transfers of security are
"deemed" to occur. Under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, transfers of
personal property (including intellectual property) to secure an antecedent
debt that occur within a specified pre-petition period (90 days, or 1 year for
"insiders") are generally "preferences" and subject to possible avoidance by
the trustee.' If the perfection of these transfers is delayed for more than ten
days after the actual transfer of the collateral, the transfer date will be
deemed to be the date of 'perfection."6 Section 547(e) of the Bankruptcy
3
4

6

11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988). See also 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (Supp. 1999)
Article Nine defines a "lien creditor" to include the "trustee in bankruptcy from the date
of the filing of the petition..." U.C.C. § 9-301(3). Accord U.C.C. [Revised] § 9102(a)(52)(C). Revised Article Nine gives priority to a secured party who does not even
have a security agreement covering the collateral when the lien creditor "becomes" such,
as long as the secured party has a proper filing "covering" the collateral. U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-317(a)(2). Although this first-to-file rule will help filed but "unattached"
secured parties in competition with real judicial lien creditors when the security
agreement arises after the lien creditor attaches, it will not help secured parties in
bankruptcy. The date of the petition marks the trustee's lien creditor status under section
544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code [11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994)], and post-petition
transfers of estate property are avoidable under section 549(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
[11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1994)].
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A)&(B) (1994). Note that under section 547(e)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code, no transfer occurs until the debtor has rights in the property
transferred. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1994). See T. Ward & J. Shulman, In Defense of the
Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial
Financing,61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 28-36 (1983). Even if state law dates the secured party's
priority over the lien creditor from the time a filing is made that covers the yet to be
acquired property of the debtor, such early state law protection cannot be used to pre-date
a transfer. The debtor must have rights in the collateral before a transfer can occur.
Although Revised Article Nine gives the secured party priority over the lien creditor
from the time of a filing "covering the collateral," [U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(a)(2)] that
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Code references other law7 because it defines perfection as the point when
the transfer of personal property collateral is protected against the ubiquitous
"lien creditor."8 If, under this perfection-sensitive timing rule, the transfer of
collateral under a security agreement is "deemed" to occur when the security
interest in the transferred collateral is perfected, rather than when the
agreement is executed and value is given, then in bankruptcy a new value
exchange can become a debt followed by a subsequent securing transfer of
collateral.9 These delayed transfers of collateral are preferential because they
are deemed to have occurred after the creation of the debt." In the language
of the Bankruptcy Code, they are transfers "for or on account of an
antecedent debt."" If, in addition, a transfer so delayed occurs within the
appropriate pre-petition preference period, and if allowing the transfer to
stand would increase the secured party's take in bankruptcy, the transfer is
generally a "preference." 2 Note that the same bankruptcy reference to
"perfection" that is necessary to determine time for purposes of
"antecedentness" can also mark the date of the transfer as either inside or

7

9
10

12

filing date cannot be used to date the debtor's transfer of collateral unless the debtor has
actual rights in the collateral on that date.
For security transfers of intellectual property governed by state law, the "other law" is
Article Nine. The perfection question should then center on whether or not the secured
party has properly perfected an interest in general intangibles by filing in the correct
office in the state where the debtor is located. See Chesapeake Fiber Pkg. v. Sebro
Packing Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 368-69 (D. Md. 1992)aff'd, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28605
(4th Cir. 1993); In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 638-39
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985). However, some forms of "embodied" or 'installed" intellectual
property (e.g. software) may be classified as goods under the current language of Article
Nine and will need to be perfected by filing in the correct office in the state where the
goods are located. See In re C Tek Software, Inc., 117 B.R. 762, 768-69 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1990). But see U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(42)&(75)("software" classified as a "general
intangible" under Revised Article Nine). When state law is preempted because a
particular federal intellectual property statute governs the priority between the secured
party and the lien creditor, the priority rules under that federal statute should be
referenced in order to decide the issue of bankruptcy "perfection." National Peregrine,
Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. 116 B.R. 194, 204-08 & n.17 (C.D. Cal.
1990).
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(l)(B) (1994).
S
U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A)&(B) (1994).
Id; See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994).
S11
U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994). See also 1 D. Epstein, S. Nickles, J. White, BANKRUPTCY
§ 6-19 at 572-76 (1992).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)&(5) (1994). Section 547(b) also requires that the debtor be
insolvent at the time of the transfer. However, the trustee has the benefit of a
presumption that the debtor was insolvent for 90 days preceding the bankruptcy petition.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(o (1994).
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outside of the pre-petition preference period.' 3
2.

Secured Party vs. Assigness and Licensees

a)

The Transferee Rule

Under the current section 9-301(1)(d), "a person who is a transferee"
of a general intangible has priority over a security interest "to the extent that
he gives value without knowledge of the security interest and before it is
perfected.""
An assignee of intellectual property qualifies as both a
"purchaser" under the presumption language in section 9-201 and a
"transferee" under the priority rule in section 9-301(l)(d)." Subsection (d),
therefore, provides the person who is such a transferee a kind of priority
exception from the section 9-201 presumption in favor of the security interest
as long as that person gives
value without knowledge of the security interest
6
and before it is perfected.'
The priority rule in section 9-301(l)(d) does not play out as neatly,
however, when a prior perfected secured party comes up against a later
licensee who takes no interest in the intellectual property. Such a licensee
seems to be less than a section 9-201 "purchaser"'7 and therefore is outside
the reach of the predicate presumption in favor of the secured party.'8
However, such a licensee is still a transferee and finds no comfort as against

13

'4

11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994). "For purposes of this section...a transfer is made ...(B) at
the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10 days..." 11
U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1994). See 1 D. Epstein, S. Nickles, J. White, Bankruptcy § 6-12

(1992).
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d). See also U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d).

5

"Transfer" is not defined in Article Nine. However, the definition of "purchase" in
section 1-201(32) is broad enough to include "any.. voluntary transaction creating an
interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32). Any transfer of an interest in intellectual
property appears to make the receiving party both a "transferee" and a "purchaser." The
presumption of priority provided by section 9-201 is effective against "purchasers of the
collateral and creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Transferees are not mentioned in section 9201. However, some transferees (those that take an interest in property) are included
under the definition of a "purchaser." U.C.C. § 1-201(32).

16

U.C.'C. § 9-301(1)(d).
U.C.C. § 1-201(32)&(33). Revised Article Nine includes an amended definition of
"purchase" in Article 1 that expressly includes a "security interest." U.C.C. [Revised] §
1-201(32).

'7

18 U.C.C. § 9-201.
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a perfected secured party under the language in section 9-301(1)(d).' 9 The
law outside of Article Nine does not help the nonpurchaser/licensee. A firstin-time secured party will argue that common law gives the licensee only
what the debtor had to license-rights subject to a perfected security
interest. 0 If the perfected secured party takes ahead of a subsequent
purchaser/licensee with ownership rights, it should have no less right against
a subsequent nonexclusive licensee who takes no proprietary right in the
intellectual property. The Preliminary Report of the ABA Task Force on
Security Interests in Intellectual Property concludes that a prior perfected
secured party would prevail against a subsequent licensee." This position
applies the section 9-201 presumption and the section 9-301(1)(d) exception
when the licensee is a purchaser with "an interest in property"22 under the
license. The ABA position logically
extends these provisions when the
2
licensee takes only a "personal" right. 1
The counterparts in Revised Article Nine to the current rules in
sections 9-201 and 9-301(1)(d) are found in Revised sections 9-201 and 9317(d). 4 Unfortunately, section 9-201 of the Revisions retains the current
language that brings only "purchasers" within the general presumption in
favor of the effectiveness of the security interest.25 Section 9-317(d) of the
Revisions, on the other hand, creates an exception from the 9-201
presumption that protects both innocent "licensees" and innocent "buyers" of
,9 U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d).

21

Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Financial Services, Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 1174
(9th Cir. 1988)(Because the Article Nine priority rules fail to address the issue of secured
parties with the same collateral but different debtors, the Court falls back on the
derivative title principal that a transferee's creditor can have no greater rights in the
collateral than does its transferee.)
Task Force On Security Interests in Intellectual Property, Business Law Section,

22

American Bar Assoc. (June 1, 1992). Note, however, that nonexclusive licensees in the
ordinary course are separately protected in Revised Article Nine under the language in
Revised section 9-321(b). See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-321(b).
U.C.C. § 1-201(32)&(33).

23

See generally, Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and

24

Priority Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1161-64 & 1178-82 (discussing the
relationship of the first-in-time principle and the notice filing premise of Article Nine). If
the first-in-time principle controls in the case of a subsequent licensee, the prior secured
party should prevail even if the security interest is unperfected. This specific priority rule
is taken up in the context of other provisions that might give more express protection to
subsequent licensees.
See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-201 (a) & § 9-317(d).

20

25

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-201 & [Revised] § 1-201(32)(definition of "purchase" amended to
expressly include "security interest").
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general intangibles against unperfected security interests." Although the
word "licensee" in section 9-317(d) is not defined, the rule seems designed to
protect all licensees, including nonexclusive licensees who would never get
title. The Revisions retain the same BFP-type qualifying conditions as the
current rule."
Both the current rule in section 9-301(1)(d) and the new rule in
section 9-317(d) of the Revisions should allow a priorperfected secured
party to prevail against a subsequent assignee and a subsequent
"nonpurchaser"/licensee of the debtor's intellectual property. Both versions
of the statute would be improved, however, if the definition of "purchaser,"
as that term is used in section 9-201 presumption, would include a common
licensee.
b)

Ordinary Course Licensees Rule

Revised Article Nine goes further than section 9-317(d), by
protecting nonexclusive ordinary course licensees against prior perfected
secured parties. Section 9-321(b) of Revised Article Nine gives priority to
the subsequent nonexclusive licensee of a debtor's general intangible who
takes from its licensor in the ordinary course against a prior perfected
security interest created by the licensor. This priority holds even when the
license is not authorized by the secured party and the licensee is aware of the
security interest."8 Note, however, that Revised section 9-321(b) retains the
26

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d). Although the Revisions do not define either "licensee" or

27

"buyer," the most recent draft of Revised Article 2 defines "buyer" as "a person that buys
or contracts to buy." "Sale" is defined in the Article Nine Revisions by reference to
Article 2, which requires a "passing of title." U.C.C. § 2-106(1). See also Draft U.C.C. §
2-102(3)("buyer") & § 2-102(27)("sale") (Discussion Draft, May 1, 1998). Revised
Article Nine also adopts the Article 2 definition of "sale" by reference. U.C.C. [Revised]
§ 9-102(b).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d).

26

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-321(b) Revised section 9-321(a) defines a "licensee in the ordinary
course of business."Revised section 9-321(b), as it was approved by the American Law
Institute in May 1998 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in July of 1998, protected all licensees in the ordinary course, not just
"nonexclusive" licensees. Apparently, the last minute change was prompted by pressure
from segments of the Copyright Bar that did not want the protection of section 9-321(b)
extended to exclusive copyright licensees. Recall that all exclusive licensees of a
copyright take a "transfer of copyright ownership." The logic behind the change is not
entirely clear. The broader protection of the prior language covered exclusive patent and
trademark license who do not necessarily take an ownership interest with such a license.
Furthermore, the prior language would not have protected, an exclusive copyright
licensees who took an "ownership" interest under what was essentially a horizontal
transfer of a capital asset because such a license would not be "in the ordinary course."
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restriction, borrowed from the analogous "goods" rule in Revised section 9320(a),29 that an ordinary course licensee only takes free of a security interest
created by its immediate licensor. If for example, the licensor grants an
unauthorized exclusive license to use the intellectual property while such
property is already subject to a perfected security interest created by the
licensor, the exclusive licensee takes subject to the perfected security
interest. If thereafter, the exclusive licensee grants a nonexclusive
sublicense, the nonexclusive licensee could not rely on section 9-321(b) for
protection against the secured party, even if the sublicense was taken in the
ordinary course. The nonexclusive sublicensee would not hold the
sublicense free of the original perfected security interest because that interest
was not created by its immediate ordinary course licensor.
c)

Authorized Transfers

The protection for transferees provided by the priority rules in
current section 9-301(l)(d) and Revised section 9-317(d) is augmented by
the Article Nine rule on authorized transfers of collateral. Assignees and
licensees of the debtor/licensor's intellectual property are protected against a
prior perfected security interest whenever the assignment or license is a
"disposition" that is "authorized" by the secured party. 3 Most assignees and
some licensees in the ordinary course will find protection under this rule
because these kinds of transfers are nearly always expressly or impliedly
authorized "free and clear of the security interest."3'
Current Article Nine section 9-306(2), protects subsequent assignees
more clearly than subsequent licensees because section 9-306(2) refers to an
authorized disposition. Recall from prior discussion that a section 9-306(2)
"disposition" has been interpreted to mean a transfer or exchange of some
underlying intellectual property. If an authorized licensee-even an
exclusive licensee-is merely buying a nontransferable personal right, rather
than making a disposition of property, the licensee would still seem to be
subject to the prior perfected security interest, even though the transfer was
authorized. This seems particularly unfair to these subsequent licensees. An
authorized license represents the licensor's effort to exhaust the value of
29

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-320(a).

30

U.C.C. § 9-306(2). It must be an express or implied authority to license "free and clear

of the secured parties security interest." U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3. See also, U.C.C.

31

[Revised] § 9-315(a)(1)(the revised language expressly requires that the secured party
authorize disposal "free of the security interest.")
Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 350
N.E.2d 590, 19 UCC 385 (1976); In re Tacoma Boatbuilding Co., 158 B.R. 19, 22
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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some particular aspect of the exclusive right that is the intellectual property.
If the prior secured party authorizes that attempted exploitation (expressly or
impliedly), it should have a right in the resulting income stream (proceeds),
but it should not have a right to upset the license if the licensor defaults.
Courts should opt for the broader notion of substitute value when defining a
"disposition" under current section 9-306 in order to protect these authorized,
but non-proprietary, licenses. 2
Revised Article Nine rejects the overly narrow definition of
"disposition" that has marked section 9-306 case law.3 The broader
"substitute value" notion of disposition in the Revisions will protect many
ordinary course licensees against even perfected secured parties because
many licenses will now be covered transfers expressly or impliedly
authorized "free of the security interest. .3

32

Revised Article Nine contains a broader definition of "proceeds" that embraces the
concept of substitute value. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(64). The new definition not
only makes the proceeds rule more accommodating to intellectual property, but it also
protects the limited rights of subsequent nonexclusive licensees against secured parties
who expressly or impliedly gave authority to license to the debtor. U.C.C. [Revised] § 9315(a). Section 9-315(a) adds the word "license" to the set of events that do not destroy
the security interest unless authorized. Under the Revisions, even when authorized
licensees take a mere personal right in the underlying intellectual property, they will take
free of any claim by the prior authorizing secured party. See also Superseded Draft
U.C.C. Revised Article Nine, Reporters' Prefatory Comments No.5(f) (Proposed Final
Draft, April 15, 1998).
See U.C.C. [Revised] §9-102(a)(69). See U.C.C. [Revised] §9-315(a); Superseded Draft
U.C.C. Revised Article Nine, Reporters' Prefertory Comments No. 5(f) (Proposed Final

Draft, April 15, 1998).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(a). Many prior secured parties expect that their debtor will
license technology covered under the security interest, and look to the debtor's licensing
income as the source of repayment. These prior perfected secured parties should lose to
subsequent licensees with respect to the licensed right because they have authorized the
exploitation of the collateral. However, if the debtor's intellectual property is used in
conjunction with its own in-house manufacturing or production activity, the secured
party should not be deemed to have authorized subsequent licensing activity. If the
debtor begins to farm out its intellectual property without seeking the secured party's
consent, authorization should not be presumed and the license should not be treated as
one in the "ordinary course."
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3.

Secured Party vs. Secured Party

a)

The First to File Rule

Priority conflicts between two non-purchase-money security
interests in the same collateral are not resolved by the order of perfection.
These common conflicts between secured parties are resolved by giving
priority to the first party to file a proper financing statement covering the
collateral.35 The order of filing is different from the order of perfection
because under Article Nine filing can occur before attachment and before
any of the elements necessary for attachment. 6
The recording and BFP rules in the federal intellectual property
statutes add another interesting and limiting dimension to the operation of the
Article Nine race priority rule. A debtor/owner of this property must also
record or run the risk that its underlying rights in the collateral will be
displaced in favor of a subsequent bona fide purchaser." The first-to-file rule
is premised on the assumption that both competing secured parties take their
security interest from the same debtor who has good title." When the
collateral rights of different debtors underlie the two competing security
interests, secured party priority will turn on the resolution of priority between
the underlying debtor/owners, not the order of filing between the secured
parties. 9

35

36

37
38

U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). The first-to-file rule is a residual rule that does not protect a party
who has filed yet remains unperfected when priority must be determined, because the
security interest has never attached. "So long as conflicting security interests are
unperfected, the first to attach has priority." U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b). See also U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-322(a)(1),(2)&(3).
U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).
Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Financial Services, Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 6
UCC2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988)("We think the correct result is reached in this case by
applying the common sense notion that a creditor cannot convey to another more than it
owns. Put another way, the transferee, Allied, cannot acquire any greater rights in the
beverage business's assets than its transferor, BCI, had in them.") Id. at 1174, citing,
U.C.C. § 2-403(1). See J. White & R. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2419(d) at 897-98 (4th ed. 1995). See also U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-325, cmt. 6. These
derivative title questions are examined in THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN COMMERCE §§ 2:20 and 2:46 (2000).

39

Id.
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b)

The Purchase Money Priority Rule

As the prior section illustrates, the secured creditor who wins the
race to the file holds an unusually strong position vis-a-vis other parties
interested in extending credit to the debtor. Article Nine qualifies the
strength of this first-to-file position by providing a kind of super-priority for
"purchase-money" security interests. These purchase-money secured parties
must provide the debtor with new value. Two kinds of credit extenders can
have purchase-money status. First, the status is afforded to the secured credit
seller on the property sold and retained as security. Second, any secured
party whose credit directly enabled the debtor to purchase the collateral has
"purchase-money" status to that extent."° Once a secured party satisfies
the
threshold test for purchase-money treatment, sections 9-312(3) and (4)
provide separate scenarios under which the purchase-money interest qualifies
for super-priority in the purchased property. This priority runs against both
prior and subsequent secured parties."
Current Article Nine permits the creation of a purchase-money
security interest in any "collateral. ' 2 Following up on this general reference
to "collateral," the priority rule in current section 9-312(4) creates an
exception from the first-to-file priority rule for the purchase-money secured
party with an "interest in collateralother than inventory."" Subsection (4)
provides:
A purchase-money security interest in collateral other than inventory
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its
proceeds if the purchase-money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter."
40

4
42

43

An interest in "collateral" sold is purchase-money if it is "taken or retained by the seller."
U.C.C. § 9-107(a). The enabling credit given by a nonseller also creates purchase-money
status in the collateral, but only if the value given "is in fact so used" to purchase the
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-107(b). See 2 G. Gilmore, §9.2 @ 781-782 (1965); J. White & R.
Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-5 at 859-60 (4th ed. 1995). See also U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-103(a)(2).
U.C.C. § 9-312(3)&(4).
U.C.C. § 9-107(a)&(b).
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (Emphasis added.) CompareU.C.C. [Revised] § 9-324(e).
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (Emphasis added.) The counterpart rule in Revised Article Nine,
section 9-324(e), applies to "goods other than inventory" rather than "collateral other than
inventory." The proposed rule limits subsection (e) purchase-money priority in proceeds
whenever these proceeds find their way into a deposit account controlled by another
secured party. See U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-324(e) & § 9-327. Finally, the ten (10) day
grace period under current law is extended to twenty (20) days under Revised Article
Nine. Id.
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Herein lies the problem with applying purchase-money priority to
intellectual property collateral. Subsection (4) makes "the time the debtor
receives possession of the collateral" the point from which the mandatory
purchase-money filing must be made in order to obtain priority over other
security interests. Most commentators interpret this reference to possession
in the section 9-312(4) priority rule to mean that those financing an
acquisition of intellectual property will not have purchase-money priority,
because they cannot "possess" the property. 5 Unfortunately, the language of
Revised Article Nine incorporates an even narrower notion of purchasemoney collateral. The definition of "purchase money collateral" in Revised
To
section 9-103(c) is limited to "goods" and supporting "software."'
qualify for a purchase-money supporting role, "software" must be part of an
to the purchase-money
integrated transaction and it must be incidental
47
interest in the goods in which it is embedded.
In a commercial environment, where more of the debtor's new value
opportunities will appear in the form of intellectual property, Revised Article
Nine should be revised to broadern the reach of purchase-money priority.
Instead of limiting the range of purchase-money status, the Permanent
Editorial Board should define "purchase money collateral" in section 9103(a) to include goods and general intangibles that are not "payment
intangibles."'4' Furthermore, the purchase-money priority rule in Revised
45

J. Honold, S. Harris & C. Mooney, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY
INTERESTS INPERSONAL PROPERTY

323 (1992); Grant Gilmore concluded that:

"Collateral other than inventory thus comes down to equipment.. .consumer goods.. farm
products which are purchased by a farmer..., and (but this is almost on a hypothetical
level) general intangibles." (Emphasis added.) 2 G. Gilmore, supra note40 at § 29.5 at
798 (1965).

46

47
48

See also James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates Capital Co., 491 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1974); In re
Automated Bookbinding Servs. Inc., 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972); North Platte State
Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d 1 (1972); In re Michaels, 156
B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993); In re Ivie & Associates, Inc., 84 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ga.
1988). These courts interpets, the phrase "receives possession" in 9-312 (4) separately
from possession as a mode of perfection as interpreted in 9-305.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-103(a)(1).
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-103(c) & § 9-324(f).
"Payment intangibles" are general intangibles "under which the account debtor's
principal obligation is a monetary obligation." U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(61). If
"payment intangibles" are excluded, then bringing general intangibles under the
definition of purchase money collateral in Revised section 9-103(a) will not bring
receivables along as well, because the definition of "accounts" has been expanded to
include all other commercially significant receivables [U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-102(a)(2)],
and the definition of a "general intangible" does not include an "account." U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-102(a)(42).
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section 9-324(e) should be amended to embrace "purchase-money collateral
other than inventory or livestock," and the grace period language in Revised
section 9-324(e) should be amended to read: ". . if the purchase-money
security interest in goods is perfected at or within ten days from the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral, or, in the case of general
intangibles other than payment intangibles, at or within ten days from the
time the debtor acquiresrights in the collateral."
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15 - PEREGRINE: THE COMPLETE PREEMPTION CASE

The Peregrine Holding

The narrow issue in Peregrine involved "perfection" of copyright
collateral and related receivables. In an earlier Bankruptcy Court decision,
the secured party, Capital Federal, sought to enforce a security agreement
covering film copyrights.' Capital had filed U.C.C. Article Nine financing
statements covering the collateral described in its security agreement in
several states. However, Capital did not record the security agreement or a
memorandum thereof as a "transfer of copyright ownership" in the Federal
Copyright Office. The debtor-in-possession (armed with the rights of a
bankruptcy trustee) moved the Bankruptcy Court to treat Capital's security
interest as "unperfected" in the absence of a Copyright Office recording. If
Capital's interest was not perfected under Article Nine, it would be
vulnerable to a lien creditor under section 9-301(1)(b).2 Because the debtorin-possession had the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor under section
544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Capital's security interest could be
avoided.' The controversy was framed in the Bankruptcy Court, as a filing
issue under the partial step-back rule in section 9-302(3).' The issue turned
on whether the state filings perfected the security interest for purposes of the
state law priority rule in Article Nine section 9-301(1)(b) or whether the
Copyright Act recording requirements displaced the otherwise appropriate
state filing under U.C.C. section 9-302(3)&(4).
In light of the partial step-back language in Article Nine section 9302(3)(a) and (4), the Bank's security interest seems to have been
unperfected as a matter of state law. As explained in Section 11(f)(3),
Official Comment 8 to section 9-302 clearly identifies the recording
provisions of the Copyright Act as "a statute ... of the United States which
provides for a national ... registration" within the meaning of the deferral

rule in section 9-302(3)(a). Subsection (4) of section 9-302 further provides
that compliance with such a displacing "statute of the United States"
1
2

3

116 B.R. at 198.
Under section 9-301(1)(b), an unperfected security interest "is subordinate to the rights of
...
a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1)(b).
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988).
In re National Peregrine, Inc., No. 89-01991-LF, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2469 at *9 (Bankr.
C.D. Calif. 1989).
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becomes the exclusive method of perfection. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy
Court ignored section 9-302(4) and concluded that, while Capital could have
"perfected" by recording in the Copyright Office, its U.C.C. filing was
sufficient to give it priority against the hypothetical lien creditor.' The
Bankruptcy Court decision seemed clearly mistaken regarding the effect of a
displacing national registry under the partial step-back in section 9-302(3)(a)
and (4), and the debtor in possession took an appeal to the District Court.
Recognition of a "partial step-back" of Article Nine filing rules in favor of
the Copyright Act's national registration would have provided a sufficient
basis on which to overturn the Bankruptcy Court and give the debtor-inpossession the right to avoid the Bank's security interest in debtor's
copyrights, because Capital's state filing was not effective under Article Nine
to perfect its security interest in the copyright.
Indeed, in reversing the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court that a
security interest in a copyright could only be perfected by filing in the
Copyright Office.' However, that point is clearly set out in the applicable
state law. Instead of recognizing the propriety of Copyright Act recording
under state law, the District Court made a federal case out the proper
perfection of a security interest in a copyright. The court passed on the
chance to pair the Copyright Office filing mandated by the partial step-back
in U.C.C. section 9-302(3)&(4) with the Article Nine priority scheme.7
According to the District Court, the partial step-back for filing was not
enough preemption. Relying on the complete step-back language in section
9-104(a) and the federal preemption doctrine,8 the Court concluded that all of
Article Nine was displaced by the Copyright Act, including its priority rules.
According to Peregrine,Article Nine did not control perfection or the rights
of any of the parties, including the bankruptcy trustee who stands in the
shoes of a lien creditor.'

6

7

9

Bankr. LEXIS 2469 at * 14 ("Therefore, filing in the Copyright Office is not necessary or
effective to perfect a security interest in copyrights, licenses, or the proceeds thereof,
against a lien creditor."). See also 116 B.R. at 201.
116 B.R. at 203.
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona did not pass up the chance in 1997,
however. See In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 522-23 (Bankr, D. Ariz. 1997).
116 B.R. at 202-03 & 199-201. The PeregrineCourt noted that the 1976 Copyright Act
created a federal recording system for copyrights and that the purpose of the system was
to "promote national uniformity." 116 B.R. at 199, quotingCommunity for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989). In cases involving copyrights and the
proceeds of copyrights (copyright-based receivables), the federal system is equipped to
handle both the consensual security interest and the nonconsensual levy. According to
the Court any competing recording system would hamper the nationwide effectiveness of
the federal scheme,. 116 B.R. at 204-08 & n.17.
116 B.R. at 205-07.
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Peregrine and Later Transfer

In order to displace the comprehensive Article Nine priority rules,
the Court applied a federal law, which covers the same interests otherwise
protected by section 9-301(1)(b) of Article Nine. Within the sparse language
of 205(d) of the Copyright Act, the Court found language, which handled the
conflict between the secured creditor and the "lien creditor" who was given
hypothetical life under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 10 The court's
construction of section 205(d) of the Copyright Act and resulting analysis of
the Peregrineopinion is not solid."
Ironically, the Peregrine holding that a complete step-back from
Article Nine was mandated provided Capital with an argument that would
have been unavailable under the Article Nine partial step-back priority
scheme. Capital argued that if the Copyright Act completely occupied the
priority field, it must have a rule protecting the lien creditor from prior
unrecorded transfers, or the unrecorded security interest would prevail in
bankruptcy.' 2 In order to find that Capital's security interest could be set
aside because it was unrecorded under the Copyright Act, the Peregrine
Court had to identify a priority rule in section 205(d) of the Act that
protected a later lien creditor against a prior unrecorded transfer of copyright
ownership. Such a rule is clearly set out in Article Nine section 9301(1)(b)." But, given the sparse priority rule language contained in section
205(d) of the Copyright Act, finding the functional equivalent of section 9301(1)(b) seemed like a tall order.
While the involuntary lien might very well be considered a "transfer
of copyright ownership" as broadly defined by section 101 and section
201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act, the priority rule for "conflicting transfers" in
section 205(d) does not seem to provide for involuntary transfers. Later
transfers which escape the grace period and are first recorded prevail against
prior unrecorded transfers only if "taken in good faith for valuable
consideration."" This language seemingly excludes an ordinary judgment
creditor whose involuntary lien is never taken in exchange for consideration
provided to the debtor and thus is never "for valuable consideration."'" The
10

116 B.R. at 205-06.

1

The lien creditor priority rule under Revised Article Nine is found in Revised section 9317(a)(2). U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(a)(2).

12

116 B.R. at 206.

13

U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).

14

17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).
It can be argued that a judgment creditor acquires no rights in a federal copyright still
owned by the author. Section 201(e) provides that:

15
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PeregrineCourt avoided this gap in section 205(d) priority by relying on the
hypothetical, and, in this case, artificialnature of the lien creditor's special
bankruptcy persona. Under section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee has the rights of a judicial lien creditor who also "extends credit to the
debtor" on the date of the petition. Based on this artificial, but unavoidable,
timing restriction, the Court concluded that the section 544(a)(1) lien creditor
did, in fact, "take" for "a valuable consideration" within the meaning of
section 205(d) of the Copyright Act.
This is nothing more than questionable finesse around the obvious
voluntary transferee-for-value language of section 205 of the Copyright Act.
Such logic also runs counter to the policy underlying the hypothetical
simultaneous credit extension used to limit the right described in section
544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code." The date of the credit extension in
544(a)(1) coincides with the birth of the lien so that the trustee cannot
advance the date on which the hypothetical lien creditor extended credit.
Without this restriction, the trustee might invent the date of a credit extension
to take advantage of the occasional state law giving rights to a creditor who
extends unsecured credit in the gap between the execution of another
creditor's security agreement and the recording or perfection of that interest."
This timing language was never intended to permit the trustee to promote the
simple lien creditor to the status of a voluntary for-value transferee.'8 Even if

"

1

When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual
author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting
to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the
copyright, or any exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title,
except as provided under title 11. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994). The purpose of this section
was to limit the extent of copyright control that the government of the former Soviet
Union could exercise over the dissemination of works by Soviet authors of which the
government did not approve. The language is much broader than the purpose behind it,
however. The language of this section can be read to prohibit any involuntary transfer of
an author-owned copyright outside of bankruptcy that relies on governmental action.
This reading of section 201(e) should be rejected. Although the parties failed to raise the
issue in Peregrine,the Court correctly limited section 201(c) to actions initiated by and
for governmental bodies. 116 B.R. at 205-206, n.16.
Capital argued that the trustee needed the status of a subsequent purchaser to find
protection under the priority rule in section 205(d). 116 B.R. at 206.
In Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955),
the Second Circuit held that the trustee, as hypothetical lien creditor under section 70(c),
could hypothecate a credit extension in the gap between the creation and perfection of a
chattel mortgage, even though the mortgage had been filed and perfected before the
petition date. The Supreme Court overruled Constance v. Harvey in Lewis v.
ManufacturersNationalBank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
4 Collier on Bankruptcy 544.02 at 544-11 to 544-13 (1986). See Paul Heald, Resolving
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the language of 544(a)(1) can be stretched as Peregrine suggests, the trick
works only when the hypothetically created lien creditor competes with the
secured party in bankruptcy; it does not make 205(d) applicable to real
involuntary liens that arise well after the debt is incurred under state judicial
lien law. In that very important sense, the priority scheme of section 205(d)
is incomplete. Despite the gap, however, Peregrinefinds the priority scheme
of section 205(d) sufficient to displace the priority rules in Article Nine.
The mischief that results from finding a lien creditor lurking in the
later transfer language of section 205(d) extends far beyond security interests
in copyright collateral. If federal law does indeed protect the lien creditor as
a "later for-value transferee," then all unrecorded transfers of copyright
ownership are vulnerable to the bankruptcy trustee after the grace period has
expired.'9 In some cases, these unrecorded or late-recorded transfers may
also be vulnerable as preferences under section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 0
C.

Peregrineand Security Interests in Receivables

Peregrinemandates that a security interest in copyright royalties, or
other receivables generated by a copyright, must be recorded under section
205 of the Copyright Act in order to be "perfected."2' Peregrine assumes
receivables generated by copyright collateral are so integral to the copyright
ownership rights transferred for security that they must also fall within the
preemptive shadow of the Copyright Act. While royalties are clearly
important to copyright owners, they do not arise naturally from the federal
statutory basis for copyright ownership. Instead they are the direct byPriority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 135, 144

20

(1993)(Copyright Act section 205(d) does not allow the debtor-in-possession to prevail
against an unperfected security interest.).
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) and § 546(b) (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)&(e) (1994).

21

National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 116 B.R. 194, 199

'9

(C.D. Cal. 1990). Applying only a partial step-back to Article Nine filing, the decision in
Avalon Software also mandates Copyright Office recording for copyright based
receivables. See In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 523 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
The underlying rationales in the two cases are not the same, however. Peregrineseems
to treat receivables as a necessary incident to copyright ownership underfederal law.
Avalon Software seems to treat royalties as "proceeds" under state law that are
unperfected if the copyright collateral is unperfected. With respect to the holding in
.Avalon Software, it should be remembered that section 9-306(1), in its present form,
requires that a license result in a "disposition" of copyright property before proceeds are
generated.
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product of private contractual agreements that have traditionally been the
domain of state law.22 Extending the reach of the preemption doctrine to
cover generated receivables in Peregrinemay be more questionable than the
use of preemption to displace Article Nine priority rules. 3
The underlying rationale for the Peregrineposition on receivables
seems to have been trumped by the Ninth Circuit in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v.
Hirsch.' In Broadcast Music the Court held that an assignment of the right
to receive copyright royalties was not a transfer of copyright ownership
under section 205(a) of the Copyright Act, and that such assignment did not
need to be recorded to defeat a subsequent tax lien. 5 The Ninth Circuit
refused to extend its holding expressly to transfers for security, and therefore
to Peregrine.6 However, the Ninth Circuit's statement that "[a]ssignments of
interests in royalties have no relationship to the existence, scope, duration or
identification of a copyright, nor to 'rights under a copyright"' seems to
undercut the premise behind Peregrine's extension of section 205
preemption to copyright-based receivables.
The Peregrine Court
viewed/characterized the security interest in copyright-based receivables not
only as a recordable transfer under the Act, but as a vulnerable recordable
transfer absent a recording under section 205(d) [remember Peregrinesaw a
complete preemption]8 Peregrine's conclusion that receivables not recorded
under section 205(a) and (c) lose to the lien creditor under section 205(d),
depends on the premise that such receivables fall within the broad definition
of a "transfer of copyright ownership." In Broadcast Music, the Ninth
Circuit found an ordinary assignment of such receivables did not fit within

24

Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979); McCoy v.Mitsuboshi
Cutlery, 67 F.3d 917, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1268 (1996)(licenses
conform to state law); Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up System, 871 F.2d
1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(patent license is a contract to be construed under state law).
See Robert Rotstein, Paul Heald's "Resolving PriorityDisputes in Intellectual Property
Collateral": A Comment, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 167, 182-83 (1993)(Proceeds derived
from copyright are not within the scope of section 106 of the Act and are not "workbased" assets for recordation purposes.).
"[Federal law] may not be invoked...merely because.. the property involved was obtained
under federal statute." Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933)(Brackets
added). See A. Haemmerli, supra note 668 at 1680-94. The article soundly refutes the
Peregrine assumption that federal preemption doctrine mandates section 205 recording
and priority apply to security interests in copyright receivables.
104 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 1997).

25

104 F.3d at 1166& 1168.

26

104 F.3d at 1166-67.

27

116 B.R.at.199.

28

116 BR.at 205-07.

22

23

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property
that definition. Assignments for security would seem to follow the same
logic.
D.

Peregrineand Perfection

In a classic example of understatement, Judge Koziniski noted that
"filing with the Copyright Office can be much less convenient than filing
under the U.C.C." Since a Copyright Office filing is accomplished by
reference to the registration number of an existing work. Recording a
security interest in the specific copyright assets of a debtor with a fluid
inventory of these assets (e.g., a film library) will involve "dozens,
As the actual inventory
sometimes hundreds, of individual filings.""
and sold or because the
bought
are
works
different
because
either
changes,
production of a final work must go through many stages with each stage
being a distinct work in its own right, the secured party will be required to
make a separate Copyright Office filing for each work added to or deleted
from the library. Article Nine, by contrast, provides a blanket notice filing
on all after-acquired property, thus giving the creditor a continuing, floating
lien on the debtor's copyright without the need for periodic updates.30
The link between recording and registration of an "existing work" is
not, however, a "Condition of Recordation" under section 205(a) of the
Copyright Act. Subsection 205(a) provides that '[a]ny transfer of copyright
-1
ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded ....
The only condition imposed on recording under subsection (a) is that the
is
document "bears the actual signature of the person who executed it, or ...
accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy of the
original, signed document."32 The link arises out of the language in section
205(c) and (d) governing effectiveness of a recording for purposes of priority
against subsequent transferees. Under subsection (d) only a recording "in the
manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c)" is good
against a "later transfer."33 In order for a security agreement to provide
"constructive notice" under section 205(c) (1) the recorded document must
"specifically" identify the copyrighted work so that it can be revealed to a
reasonable searcher by title or registration number, and (2) the work must
have been registered.- Because this definition of "constructive notice"
29
30

31
32

33
34

116 B.R. at 203.
U.C.C. § 9-204.
17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1994).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1994).
"...(2) registration has been made for the work." 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2) (1994) (Emphasis
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requires some prior specific identification of the work transferred by the
recorded document, in addition to registration of the work, an effective
Copyright Act recording cannot effectively reach after-acquired property.3"
If, under Peregrine,"federal law (the Copyright Act) preempts state methods
of perfecting security interests in copyrights and related accounts
receivable,"3 then all the notice filing methods of perfection in Article Nine
must yield to the transaction-specific rules of the Copyright Act. The
Peregrine view of preemption makes the debt financing of "works in
process," a movie in production for example, an intolerable legal gamble for
the secured party." Unless the secured party requires the debtor to capture
the unfinished collateral project in a sequence of titled "works" which can be
separately named, registered, and transferred in a series of recordable
documents, the recording provision of the Copyright Act provides no
"constructive notice" protection.
The connection between registration and recording may even turn
out to be time-sensitive, similar to the manner of real estate recording. While
a specific identification of the work in the recorded instrument is necessary
for an effective Copyright Act recording of a security interest, it is not clear
whether the essential section 205(c) registration of the copyright must
precede the recording in order for the recording to be effective "constructive
notice." The critical language of section 205(c)(2) states that "recordation..
. gives ... constructive notice ... but only if ... (2) recordation has been
made for the work."38 Under section 205(c)(2) the order in which registration
and filing of a security interest occur is critical to enforcement of the rights
which one seeks to protect. Registration, at some point in time, is clearly
necessary to provide "constructive notice." Furthermore, if the phrase "has
been made" in section 205(c)(2) looks back from the date of recording, then
a recorded security agreement would never be effective as constructive
notice unless preceded in time by an effective registration of the work.

3

36

37

38

added.).
17 U.S.C. § 205(c)&(d) (1994). Economically significant financing today tends to be
ongoing and fluid, not discrete. In ongoing financing, the transactional approach
involves considerably more expense than the notice filing approach because the
transactional approach involves multiple trips to the filing office, while notice filing
requires only one.

116 B.R. at 199.
See Steven Weinberger, Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: The Peregrine
Effect on the Orion PicturesPlan of Reorganization, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959,
975 (1993). (lending banks unable to properly perfect their security interests in the
debtor's unreleased films because the films had not been registered within the meaning of
section 205(c) of the Copyright Act).
17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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However, if "has been made" merely looks back from the date when the
recording is effective as constructive notice or from the time the constructive
notice issue becomes relevant, a recording prior to registration would be
effective as long as the work is eventually registered. In such a case,
however, the recorded document would only be effective as "constructive
notice" under subsection (d) from the time the work was "registered."
The Bankruptcy Court that was overruled by the District Court in
Peregrine subsequently described the controlling federal system for
recording copyrights as one "modeled on real property recording acts." 9
Dicta from that Court's opinion in In re AEG Acquisitions Corp. suggests
that recordation of a copyright mortgage 14 days before the registration of
the underlying copyright might render the recordation invalid because it
would be outside the "chain of title."0 In re AEG seems to prefer a literal
chronological reading of section 205(c)(2) - a reading which invalidates any
recording not preceded in time by a registration. This chronological reading
of section 205(c)(2) may not be compelled by the present language, however.
Even where there is an effective prior registration of the work, a
recording might be outside the chain of title if one or more of the prior
transfers leading to the debtor's title remains unrecorded or was not recorded
in the proper order. Nothing in section 205(c) requires such a chronological
reading of the constructive notice requirement and, in general, copyright law
requires only the recording of the transfer, which shows the transferee's
ownership rights.' Unlike real estate law, the Copyright Act does not seem
to expose the transferee of a registered copyright, who records outside the
title chain, to the risk of losing priority to a purchaser who does not locate
the copyright transferee's interest.2 Nevertheless, a security interest in a
copyright may be enough of a derivative right to suggest that transfers
necessary to locate ownership in the immediate debtor must be recorded
before a security interest is effective as constructive notice or is properly
perfected.
In re AEG Acquisitions Corp., 127 B.R. 34, 41 at n.8 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 161
B.R. 50 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993). Two of the works used as collateral in AEG were foreign
films. Since the 1988 Amendments to the Copyright Act, registration has not been a
prerequisite to maintaining an infringement action on a Berne Convention work. 17
U.S.C. § 411(a) (1994). The 1988 Amendments pertain only to infringement suit
prerequisites, however; the amendments did not dispense with registration as a condition
for constructive notice of a recorded transfer. 127 B.R. at 42; 161 B.R. at 57.
127 B.R. at 41 n.8. But see Sevarouski Am., Ltd. v. Silver Deer, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 1201
(D. D.C. 1982). Sevarouski involved the state of record title necessary to support an
infringement action.
41
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.02 at 12-59 & 12-60 (1993).
42 537 F. Supp. at 1204.
39

40
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In 1993, Congress considered eliminating the requirement of

registration as a constructive notice condition under section 205(c). 43 The

proposed Copyright Reform Act of 1993 would have provided constructive
notice stature to documents which "identify the'work ... so that it would be
revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number . .

."4

However, the Reform Act did not allow for the effective recording of
agreements covering after-acquired property, since the recorded document
still had to "identify the work." The Reform Act passed in the House of
Representatives in late 1993, but failed to win approval in the Senate.4'
As long as identification of the debtor's intellectual property right is
critical to an effective recording under section 205, a cautious lender should
not rely simply on filing a security interest in the Copyright Office unless the
copyright is registered. It would be prudent for the lender to ensure that the
record contains any other transfer document necessary to establish the
immediate debtor's ownership.
A further practical problem relates to the gap in time between the
"date of recordation" of a security interest filed at the Copyright Office and
the date on which the document is available for public viewing. The date of
recordation is the date when the document in proper form is received in the
Copyright Office. 6 "Recorded" documents are examined, numbered,
scheduled and cataloged before they are made available for the public record.
Prior to January 1994, the Copyright Office recording backlog averaged
about eight months from the time the document was received. Currently, this
"office delay" is an average of six months.47 When this "office delay" is
added to the 30-day look-back period, extending credit on the strength of a
copyright becomes a time-consuming process. The secured party will not
advance funds until the file is clear of possible assignees or secured parties
who could claim a prior execution and recording within the grace period.
Because recording dates from receipt of the recordable document in the
Copyright Office, the file cannot be considered clear until the grace period
and the "office delay" period have both passed. The language in section
205(a) of the Copyright Act, which links the importance of registration and a
recording "in a manner required to give constructive notice," is the basis for
43

45
46

47

The Copyright Reform Act of 1993, S. 373, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(b) (1994).

Id. (Emphasis added).
139 Cong. Rec. H 10308 (November 20, 1993).
37 C.F.R. § 201.4(e), § 201.25(e), §201.26(f). See also Copyright Office Circular # 12,
supra at note 393. But see 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.07[A][1] at n.5 and Patch
Factory, Inc. v. Broder, 586 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
Conversation between the author and Ms. Maria L. Llacuna, Copyright Document
Specialist, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (February 3, 2000).
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an argument that Article Nine is not preempted with respect to unregistered
copyrights." However, because Peregrineconcluded that the priority rules
in Article Nine are preempted by section 205(d), and subsection (d) applies
to all transfers of copyright ownership, registered and unregistered, that are
included in subsection (a), the argument runs counter to the preemption
doctrine as articulated by the Central District of California Court.4 1 In any
case, given the broad preemptive effect of section 205(a),1° the constructive
notice standard in subsection (c) will probably be seen as part of the
recording requirements for all copyrights, not a limitation on the reach of
preemption. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona has
rejected the registered-unregistered distinction in an opinion that adopts only
a partial step-back for Copyright recording.'
E.

Peregrine and Priority

The limitations on security interests inherent in the section 205
recording scheme are exaggerated when the priority rules in subsections (d)
and (e) are applied to secured party conflicts. The single transaction
structure, the long look-back period, and the built-in office delay that
characterize Copyright Office recording all work mischief in the operation of
the priority rule contained in section 205(d). First, section 205(d) has a very
different set of axioms for "transfers of copyright ownership" than those
provided for security interests in Article Nine. The first transfer executed,
rather than the first to file, has priority under the Copyright Act as long as
"constructive notice" of the transfer is given through a Copyright Office
recording within one month of its execution in the United States, two months
of its execution outside the United States, or at any time prior to a later
competing transfer." Otherwise, the later transfer has priority under the
Copyright Act if it is recorded first in a manner sufficient to give
constructive notice, 3 and if such transferee takes (1) in good faith, (2) for
A. Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law
Collide, 96 COL. L.REv. 1645, 1667-68 (1996).
49
See MaIjack Productions, Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 888 (9th
Cir. 1996).
so 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1994)("Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document
pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office....").
51 In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 522-23 (Bankr. D.Ariz. 1997). However,
Avalon Software views the constructive notice language in section 205(c) as part of the
filing, not priority, provisions of the Copyright Act. See discussion in THOMAS M.
WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE, § 2:81 (2000).
52
17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).
48
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valuable consideration, and (3) without notice of the earlier transfer.:
If the first secured party is also the first transferee from the debtorowner, the secured party has priority over all "conflicting transfers" as long
as the security agreement is recorded in the Copyright Office within 30 days
or 60 days of its execution, as appropriate. However, because the recorded
secured party can never be sure of the that it is the first transfer, the
subsection (d) look-back compels lenders to record and then wait out a
hypothetical prior party's "grace period" and the "office delay period"
between receipt of the hypothetical prior party's document and its inclusion
in the record." The secured party's commitment to loan in the security
must be conditioned on a clean file after these periods have
agreement
6
expired.1
The race-notice character of the section 205(d) priority rule and the
limitations imposed on the "between two transfer" scope make its application
awkward when the rights of successive secured parties must be sorted out.
Anytime more than two conflicting transfers are involved, the section 205(d)
rule can produce a circular priority problem."
The requirement that the subsequent transferee record "in such manner" obviously refers
only to the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), but not to
the 30-day or 60-day grace period. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.07[A][4] at 10-58
to 10-59 (1993).
17 U.S.C. § 205(d)&(e) (1994); 537 F. Supp. at 1203, 1204. When both transfers are
unrecorded, the first to execute seems to prevail under section 205(d) because the
preemptive priority of the second transfer is dependent on recording.
55 To the grace period (30 or 60 days), the secured party must add the "office delay"
between copyright "recordation" and the date on which the transfer document is actually
viewable. See supra text accompanying notes 686-688. Assume that the debtor executes
a security transfer to the secured party on June 2. If that document, in proper form, is
received in the Copyright Office on that same date, it will have a June 2 recording date as
well. However, if a conflicting transfer was executed by the debtor on June 1, the earlier
transferee will have priority over the secured party as long as the earlier transferee
records (document received in the Copyright Office) by July 1. However, because that
recording may not be known to the secured party until it appears on microfilm (one or
two months later) the secured party should not disburse funds or release goods until that
additional time beyond July 1 has passed.
Subsequent transfers are protected if they are "for a valuable consideration." 17 U.S.C. §
56

53

57

205(d) (1994).
The following fact pattern illustrates circular priority under section 205(d):
(i) On June 1, Copyright Owner executes security interest transfer to X.
(2) On June 10, Copyright Owner executes security interest transfer to Y.
(3) On June 15, Copyright Owner executes security interest transfer to Z.
(4) On June 30, Z records in the Copyright Office.
(5) On July 5, X records in the Copyright Office.
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The subsection (d) priority rule is double-qualified in a way that
makes it unclear who the winner is when the prior transfer does not make a
timely recording and, at the same time, the later transfer fails to met the BFPlike statutory qualifications. Whenever a prior executed interest fails to
record within the 30-day period (or 60-day period), a subsequent security
interest must record first and take in "good faith" and "without notice" to
qualify for priority under the last sentence of section 205(d). It is unclear
what the section provides when the first transfer fails to record within the
grace period and the later transfer records first but does not take in good faith
or without notice. The later transfer does not qualify under the "prevails"
mandate of the last sentence, but the earlier transfer does not qualify under
the rule protecting the first to execute, either. To "prevail," the first executed
transfer must either record within 30 days or "before... the later transfer."
The same problem arises whenever the later transfer is not taken for
valuable consideration. When the competing transfers are security interests,
the "without notice" and "for valuable consideration" conditions in the last
sentence of section 205(d) create a very different priority scheme from the
pure race provisions which control in contests between secured parties under
Article Nine. The cases under the Copyright Act seem to hold subsequent
transferees to a fairly rigorous inquiry obligation as part of the subsection (d)
"without notice" standard.,,
The "valuable consideration" requirement in subsection (d) adds the
further condition of either a present payment or an absolute obligation
incurred by the "later transfer" at the time of such transfer. 9 The "binding
promise to pay royalties" language was added as a qualifying "value" option
in 1976 because conditional obligations that were not in fact executed or
absolute did not satisfy the 1909 Act's definition of valuable consideration. 6
It is unclear how the "valuable consideration" qualification will be applied to
subsequent secured parties under the priority scheme mandated by
Peregrine. The "value" requirement for secured parties under Article Nine is
(6) On July 8, Y records in the Copyright Office. In this example, if we assume that Y
and Z took their interests in good faith, without notice and for valuable consideration: X
has priority over Y because, although X did not record within the 30-day grace period,
X's interest was executed first and X filed before Y. Y has priority over Z because,
between the two, Y executed first and recorded within the 30-day grace period. Z, the

last to execute, has priority over X, the first to execute, because X failed to record within
the 30-day grace period and, between the two of them, Z won the race to the Copyright

58

Office. The result does not change if some or all of the transfers in the example are
assignments or exclusive licenses rather than transfers for security.
3 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, § 10.07[A][2] at 10-54 to 10-56 (1993).

59

3

60

Id.

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §

10.07[A][3] at 10-56 (1993).
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satisfied whenever the security interest is taken for an antecedent debt."
Peregrinenotwithstanding, 62 the transfer of a security interest in a copyright
to secure an antecedent debt would not be taken for a "valuable
consideration" under section 205(d) of the Copyright Act.63 It appears that a
subsequent secured party who did not give "new value" would never be able
to trump a prior transfer, including a prior secured party, even when that
The best argument available to a
prior transfer is never recorded.
subsequent secured party who took the interest for an antecedent debt is that
once the subsequent interest is recorded in the Copyright Office before the
prior transfer, the priority contest becomes a tie because the prior transfer
seems to lose its argument for priority when it loses the race to record after
the grace period has expired." However, in the case of such a stalemate, the
Court may go outside the recording statute and award priority to the first to
execute.'
The priority rule covering priority between a transfer of copyright
ownership and a nonexclusive licensee in section 205(e) can be a trap for the
secured party as well. Under Peregrine,if a security interest in a copyright
is indeed a "transfer of copyright ownership," then the priority between such
a security interest and a nonexclusive license is controlled by section 205(e)
of the Copyright Act. Under subsection (e), the licensee prevails if the
license is evidenced by a signed instrument and is either: 1) taken before the
execution of the security agreement, or 2) taken after an unrecorded security
transfer, if the licensee takes in good faith and without knowledge.6 1 Unlike
61

U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) & § 1-201(44).

62

Recall that the Peregrine Court concludes that the hypothetical lien creditor under

63

section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code draws rights from section 205(d) of the Copyright
Act because such a lien creditor can be "deemed" a transfer taken for valuable
consideration. 116 B.R. at 207. Such "deeming" is made possible by the statutory
characterization of the hypothetical lien creditor in section 544(a)(1) as one who "extends
a judicial lien simultaneously at the "commencement of the case."
credit" and "obtains ...
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). See discussion supra Section III(b)(3)(B). In dicta, the Court also
notes that the lien of a judgment creditor "is deemed to be in exchange for the claim that
formed the basis of the underlying judgment, a claim that is extinguished by the entry of
the judgment." This reasoning is suspect. The judgment creditor's claim may merge in
the judgment but that does not provide the lien with "for value" status. Under that logic,
all judgment creditors might claim their liens were obtained for new value.
17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).

64 Id.
65

Id.

66

See Ice Music, Ltd. v, Schuler, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1454 (U.S.D.Ct. S.D.N.Y.
1996)(Under section 205(e), "[assignor] was not 'the owner of the rights licensed' at the
signed the Receipt....")
time [nonexclusive licensee] allegedly received money and ...
17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1994).

67
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the secured party, the nonexclusive license is not a transfer of copyright
ownership that invokes the writing requirement in section 204 of the
Copyright Act.68 Therefore, an oral transfer of a nonexclusive license is
effective.9 However, for such a nonexclusive license to have priority over
subsequent "ownership" transfers as well as prior unrecorded "ownership"
transfers, it must be evidenced by a signed writing." While section 205(e)
does not expressly date the nonexclusive license by the date of the
evidencing writing, there is case law to that effect.
In Ice Music, Ltd. v. Schuler7 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the execution of the necessary
writing evidencing the nonexclusive license must precede the ownership
transfer under 205(e)(1).11 If a prior oral license loses to a competing
ownership transfer at the time of transfer, a subsequent nonexclusive BFP
licensee would seem to suffer the same fate if the writing requirement is not
satisfied when the prior transfer is recorded under section 205(e)(2).
As explained in Part II(e)(2)(B), Revised Article Nine makes express
provision under state law for the priority of a security interest as against
conflicting licensees from the debtor licensor. Three principal priority rules
for secured parties and licensees can be derived from the Revisions:
1. A subsequent licensee prevails over any prior secured party to
the extent that the license was a disposition authorized free and
clear of the security interest.73 Furthermore, the Revised
definition of "proceeds"74 indicates that even a nonexclusive
68
69
70

71
72

73
74

17 U.S.C. § 101, "transfer of copyright ownership" (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 204 (1994).
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.02[B][5] at 10-25 (1993).
17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1994). Section 205(e) works better than Article Nine when the
nonexclusive license is a contingent one used to carry out the provisions of an escrow
agreement covering copyrighted source code. The escrow agent holds the source code as
security for the licensee against the licensor's performance of the main licensing
agreement. If Article Nine applied, this security interest in a source code license might
have to be filed as a "general intangible" in order to defeat a subsequent bankruptcy
trustee. Under the preempting copyright rule in section 205(e), however, no filing or
recording is necessary as long as it is a nonexclusive license in the source code that is
conditionally available on default. Only a writing is required.
42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (U.S.D.Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1454 (Under section 205(e), "[assignor] was not 'the owner of the
rights licensed' at the time [nonexclusive licensee] allegedly received money and ...
signed the Receipt...")
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(a)(1).
U.C.C. (Revised] § 9-102(a)(64)(A)("whatever'is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other dispositionof collateral ...")(Emphasis added).
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license can qualify as an authorized disposition."
2.

Even if the license is not authorized by the secured party, a
subsequent nonexclusive licensee in the ordinary course of
the security interest even if the licensee is.
business takes free of
76
interest.
the
of
aware

3. Even a subsequent licensee that does not take under an
authorized license or under the ordinary course rule will prevail
to the extent that it "gives value without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is perfected.""
Because Peregrine teaches that a security interest is a "transfer of
copyright ownership," 8 these rules appear to be currently displaced in favor
of the priority scheme in section 205(e) of the Copyright Act.79 Note that the
proposed "Federal Intellectual Property Security Act,"80 would remove the
priority conflict between the secured party and the nonexclusive licensee
from section 205(e) and make Article Nine applicable."
In re Avalon Software, Inc.

A.

The Avalon Holding

In a case decided seven years after the Arizona Bankruptcy Court, in
In re Avalon Software, Inc.Y concluded that a reconciliation of the Copyright
Act and Article Nine did not require complete preemption of Article Nine's
priority rules. Avalon Software finds that the partial step-back under U.C.C.
75

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-315(a)(1).

76

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-321(a)&(b).

79

U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d).
17 U.S.C. 101 (1994).
116 B.R. at 205.

80

Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property, Business Law Section,

8

American Bar Association, DRAFT, FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT
(March 1, 1999)[hereinafter referred to as TASK FORCE DRAFT - FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SECURITY ACT].
TASK FORCE DRAFT - FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT, supra note80 at

82

SECTION 4(a)(3).
209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).

77
78
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section 9-302(3)(a) and (4) is more compatible with the scope of federal
preemption. For the lending bank that failed to make any recording in the
Copyright Office, however, the distinction between full and partial step-back
was academic. The Court held that the bank's security interest in all the
debtor's copyrighted and copyrightable software was unperfected on the date
of the petition because it had not been recorded in the Copyright Office
under section 205(a) of the Copyright Act.83 However, after finding that the
bank's filing of a U.C.C. financing statement left copyright collateral
unperfected, the opinion departed from the complete preemption rationale of
the Peregrinedecision. Instead, Avalon Software relied on Article Nine
section 9-301(1)(b) (not section 205(d) of the Copyright Act) for the
proposition that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the trustee
asserting the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor)' In addition to
recognizing the vitality of U.C.C. priority rules, the Court also concluded
that the Article Nine concept of attachment was not preempted by the
Copyright Act.85
This more limited approach to preemption has its own problems. In
essence, Avalon Software concludes that section 205(c)'s proviso on
constructive notice (specific identification of the work in the recorded
document and registration of the work) is part of the displacing recording
requirements of the Copyright Act. Recall that the elements of constructive
notice under section 205(c) are not actually required in order to make a
subsection (a) recording.86 These requirements arise only within the context
7
of the Copyright Act's priority rule in section 205(d).1
If, contrary to
Peregrine,the priority rule in subsection (d) does not displace Article Nine
priority provisions, it can be argued that constructive notice under subsection
(c) should not be required if the security interest is otherwise properly
recorded in the Copyright Office under section 205(a). Nevertheless, Avalon
Software concludes that "ultimate perfection" depends upon registration of
the software product.88 The Avalon Software opinion sees registration as part
83

Id. at 523-24.

Id. at 521.
85 Id. at 522-23.
84

86

See discussion in PRELIMINARY

REPORT #1, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL RULES

AND STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS at

Section III (b)(3)(D) (Cooperative Contract - U.S.P.T.O. and Franklin Pierce Law Center

2000).
87

Id. It can even be argued that subsection (c)'s constructive notice requirement is not

88

critical to a recording for purposes of the nonexclusive licensee rule in subsection section
205(e).
209 B.R. at 522. Recorded documents that could not be tied to an existing registration
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of the secured party's U.C.C. section 9-302(4) "compliance" with the
national recordation system that displaces Article Nine filing under section
9-302(3)(a).8 '
This aspect of the partial step-back can be problematic. The
relationship between Copyright Act recording, with its attendant registration
requirement, and the controlling Article Nine rules on "attachment" is
unclear when after-acquired copyright collateral is involved. According to
Avalon Software, federal copyright law does not alter the secured party's
right to acquire an interest in the debtor's after-acquired copyright collateral
under an agreement executed before the debtor acquires rights in the
collateral. 90 Even if an after-acquired property clause is effective to create an
interest in the debtor's later-acquired copyrights, perfection requires
compliance with section 205(d) and (c) of the Copyright Act. 9' Avalon
Software suggests that the secured party could have recorded a security
agreement covering after-acquired copyright collateral and then, without the
need of a further recorded document, been perfected in such later-acquired
property by registering the new works as they came into existence. 9
However, constructive notice under subsection (c) requires more
than a recorded document with advance notice of a security interest and a
subsequent registration of the work. Subsection (c) requires that the
recorded document, or material attached to it, specifically identify the work to
which it pertains.93 A document in the form of a security agreement covering
after-acquired property could not satisfy the "specific identification"
requirement as to copyright collateral subsequently acquired by the debtor.
A subsequent registration of the new collateral does not cure the problem
with the prior recorded security agreement.9' Despite this confusing dicta in
Avalon Software, a secured party who wants perfection in after-acquired
property would be well advised to get the debtor to sign a new agreement
that specifically identifies the new work, register the new work, and record
the new agreement. While Avalon Software's partial step-back approach
may cause less preemption mischief than Peregrine, clearly one of the

89

would be harder to find in a typical copyright search.
209 B.R. at 521. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a),(4)& cmt. 8.

90

209 B.R. at 522-23.

91

Id.

92

"If Imperial Bank had merely done what the law requires - that is, to record evidence of

93
94

its security interest in the U.S. Office of Copyright - and had it made sure that the afteracquired property had been registered, it would have been found to be perfected." 209
B.R. at 523.
17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1994).
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pitfalls is the meshing of the facile Article Nine law on subsequent
attachment with single transaction document recording.
B.

Avalon and the Definitionof Collateral

While the Court in Avalon Software properly rejects the argument
that unregistered copyrights are not within the scope of section 205,9 the
opinion goes too far in its holding that all copyrightable collateral must be
recorded under the Copyright Act. 6 Under the current state of the law,
copyrightable software that has its principal intrinsic value as a trademark or
as a trade secret should be perfected by filing under the U.C.C.9 7 even if it is
also copyright protected. While the partial step-back approach seems more
consistent with the intended scope of section 205 of the Copyright Act, it still
requires that copyright collateral be distinguished from other valuable
intangible rights in works that may qualify for more than one form of
protection."

95
96

97

98

209 B.R. at 522-23.
209 B.R. at 523-24.
Trade secret software fits the definition of a "general intangible" under section 9-106.
See U.C.C. § 9-106.
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 86 at Section VI(b). An argument
against reform has been made by the Motion Picture Association of America. The
M.P.A.A. position is discussed in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 86 at footnote
754.
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APPENDIX 16 - WORLD AUXILIARY POWER

Copyright Act Does Not Preempt When the Copyright is

Unregistered
In December of 1999, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of California Arizona, faced another perfection of copyright collateral issue
under § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. In the case of In re World Auxiliary
Power Co.,' the debtor's collateral was its copyrights in drawings blueprints
and related software and it was clear from the record that none of the
copyright collateral was registered with the Copyright Office on the day that
the bankruptcy petition was filed. As was the case in Peregrineand Avalon
Software, the secured party made only an Article Nine filing-nothing was
recorded under section 205 of the Copyright Act. Unlike Peregrine and
Avalon Software, however, World Auxiliary Power held for the secured party
on the theory that Article Nine is not preempted (to any extent) when the
copyright collateral is unregistered. The court in World Auxiliary Power
found that the priority rule in 205(d) has no application to unregistered
copyrights because registration is one of the conditions necessary for
"constructive notice" and constructive notice is a condition of recording
priority. For good measure, the court also concluded that Copyright Act
recording does not preempt Article Nine filing when the copyrights are not
registered.'
The theory of World Auxiliary Power is that registration defines the
reach of Copyright Act recording and priority. While Peregrinegoes too far,
and cutting unregistered copyrights out of its preemption holding seems like
an appealing way to limit the decision, the distinction suggested by World
Auxiliary Power does not pass careful logical scrutiny. If indeed section
205(d) provides recording and priority only for registered copyrights
individual states could provide their own priority rules or even their own
alternative recording acts aimed at ordering disputes in all copyright transfers
(whether or not for security) as long as the copyrights remained unregistered.
This seems clearly contrary to the inclusive language in section 205(a) of the
Copyright Act setting out the range of transactions that are recordable. A
fair reading of section 205 as a whole suggests that registration is merely a
necessary condition for giving constructive notice of any transfer of
copyright ownership, whether or not it is registered at the outset. Congress

In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R. 149 (Bankr. N.D. Calif. 1999).
2

244 B.R. at 154-56.
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must have intended section 205 to serve as the recording rule for all
copyrights - both registered and unregistered.'
World Auxiliary Power supports the distinction on the premise that
the Peregrine holding could not, as a technical matter, be extended to
unregistered copyrights. The court opines that, unless the copyrights in
Peregrine had been registered, the hypothetical lien creditor [trustee under
544(a)(1)] could not have claimed priority as a "later transfer" that must give
"constructive notice" through section 205(d) of the Copyright Act.4
However, this argument does not credit either the range of ownership
transferees who can register a copyright or the make-believe nature of the
lien creditor as envisioned by Peregrine. In deciding that the lien creditor
was a protected later transfer under section 205(d), the Peregrine court
assumes the fact that a Copyright Office recording by the trustee had
occurred.' Of course, the bankruptcy trustee did not actually record
anything. The recording was "hypothetical"-merely part of the assumed
(some might say conjured) nature of the lien creditor constructed by §
544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. If registration is indeed a condition for
effective recording of all copyrights, and not a limit on the reach of
Copyright Act recording itself, the act of registering the copyright might also
be assumed as part of the trustee's fictitious § 544(a)(1) personality. As
noted above, Peregrine seems to go too far when it includes the involuntary
lien creditor in the class of protected "later transfers.' ' If, however,
Peregrineis right on this score and the involuntary lien creditor finds shelter
in section 205(d), then that same lien creditor would also seem to be vested
with sufficient "copyright ownership" to allow it to register the work so
acquired under section 408(a) of the Copyright Act.7 If a real lien
creditor/transferee could register an unregistered copyright in order to give
constructive notice of its recordable ownership interest under 205(a) and (c),

Note that section 205(a) provides that "[a]ny transfer of copyright ownership or other
document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the copyright office ....17
U.S.C. § 205(a) (1994). The scope language does not limit the scope of Copyright Act

6
7

recording to registered copyrights.
Unlike the Patent Act and the Lanham Trademark Act, a subsequent party does not
prevail as a BFP under the Copyright Act unless it wins the race to the section 205 record
and records in that record "in such manner [required to give constructive notice]." 17
U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).
National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R. 194, 207
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
See supratext accompanying notes 122 to 130.
17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994)("... the owner of a copyright or of any exclusive right in the
work may obtain registration").
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then the hypothetical lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code would clearly be able to assume as much as of the petition date.'
Finally, the result in World Auxiliary Power seems flawed even if
one accepts the Court's questionable first holding that Copyright Act priority
under the teaching of Peregrine is only extended to registered Copyrights.
The Court's second, and severable, conclusion that Article Nine filing is not
displaced by Copyright Act recording when the copyright is unregistered
also requires some very heavy lifting. On this second point the Court merely
refuses to be guided by the unequivocal reference to the Copyright Act as a
displacing registry under old U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a)&(4). 9 It may be that
intelligent speculation suggests that the drafters of old section 9-302 were not
as familiar with the scope and mechanics of Copyright Act recording as they
might have been. Nevertheless, the drafters clearly identified the 1909
Copyright Act as an example of a displacing registry and the 1976
amendments to the Copyright Act expanded the scope of this federal
recording even further. It is hard to argue with partial preemption, extending
only to Article Nine filing, where the authors of Article Nine themselves
conclude that a state filing on copyright collateral would be ineffective
because the proper recording locale is in Washington.
The language of Revised Article Nine would provide much more
support for World Auxiliary Power's second conclusion that state law does
not voluntarily yield its filing rules to the Copyright records. Under the
Revision language (now applicable in California but not applicable under the
facts of the case), eligibility for a filing deferral requires that the displacing
federal statute have "requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority
over the rights of a lien creditor .

. . ."I

However, if we accept the most

extreme teaching of Peregrine (as World Auxiliary Power purports to do)
even this new U.C.C. language invites a deferral on state filing. Remember
that Peregrine concludes that section 205(d) of the Copyright Act does
contain a priority rule that embraces the lien creditor."
Peregrinejustly deserves most of the criticism it gets. However, the
limit on preemption suggested by World Auxiliary Power is a conceptual and
statutory reach. Even if it can be justified as a matter of federal preemption,
it protects state law filing only until someone with ownership rights registers
the copyright (the debtor or any transferee or exclusive licensee). This
questionable distinction based on whether or not copyright collateral is

8

11

U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1998).

244 B.R. at 154-56.
10 U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-311 (a)(1).

9

H

116 B.R. at 203-04.
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registered is anything but a safe harbor for the secured party contemplating a
credit extension secured by copyright collateral.
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APPENDIX 17 - THE HISTORY OF THE BFP RULE

The current language in section 261 of the Patent Act has roots in the
patent legislation of the nineteenth century. The Patent Act of 1870 provided
in part: "That every patent or any interest therein shall be assignable in law,
by an instrument in writing; and the patentee or his assigns or legal
representatives may, in like manner, grant and convey an exclusive right
under his patent to the whole or any specified part of the United States, and
said assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, without
notice, unless it is recorded in the patent office within three months from the
date thereof."'
Because patents have always had the attributes of personal property,
Courts before and since 1870 have recognized and applied a common law
bona fide purchaser for value rule to protect subsequent patents transferees.
Under this venerable rule: "when a legal title holder of a patent transfers his
or her title to a third party purchaser for value without notice of an
outstanding equitable claim or title, the purchaser takes the entire ownership
of the patent, free of any prior equitableencumbrance."2
One example of an "equitable encumbrance" that is cut off under the
common law rule would be the prior assignor's right to have the assignment
rescinded for fraud, thereby recovering legal title from the assignee.' The

right of a party with a present contract right to compel an assignment, as
distinguished from a present assignment, is another judicially recognized
example of an equitable encumbrance on a patent.' Even before the first
Patent Act provision compelling recording, a bona fide purchaser had the

2

3
4

The Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870), amended and now codified at,
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991)(Emphasis
added.). FilmTec cites to the Hendrie v. Sayles, [98 U.S. 546, 549 (1879)] for the
proposition that a prior equitable encumbrance is cut off by a bona fide purchaser. 939
F.2d at 1537. The Federal Circuit recently applied the same common law bona fide
purchaser rule to protect an exclusive licensee in Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *10-11, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *10-11.
A present agreement to assign future inventions (as distinguished from a present
assignment of future inventions) vests equitable, not legal, title in the assignee.
Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Contrast
Arachnid with FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1991)(A present assignment of future rights vests legal title as soon as the patent or the
application come into existence.).
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right to trump these "equitable encumbrances." This common law right
existed outside the scope of the first Patent Act recording provision and such
right still exists outside the scope of its direct descendent, present section
261.1 However, the statutory recording scheme adds another element to the
protection afforded bona fide purchasers under the common law BFP rule.
Section 261, in the manner of its early predecessor, "goes a step further"
because it protects bona fide purchasers against prior legal interests that are
not properly recorded.6 When the forerunner of the present patent recording
statute was enacted, and then later amended, the chattel mortgage was
viewed as a transfer of legal title.' Historically, the chattel mortgage on
personality depended on the movement of title to the mortgagee for its
conceptual validity Because the chattel mortgage was a title transfer by
definition, a bona fide purchaser who sought protection from a prior
unrecorded mortgage looked to the recording statute, which extended to
unrecorded legal title transfers, for that protection.'

Hendrie v. Sayles, 98 U.S. 546, 549 (1879); 939 F.2d at 1573 (prior equitable
encumbrance cut off by a bona fide purchaser under separate common law principles).
6

939 F.2d at 1573.

8

1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.1 at 5&8, (1965).
1 G. GILMORE, supranote 7, § 1.1 at 8 n. 11.

9

Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1890).

7
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APPENDIX

18 - SECTION 261 THEORIES OF DISPLACEMENT

Section 261 of the Patent Act can be read to displace all or part of
Article Nine under one of three theories. First, if a title transfer is considered
a necessary federal incident to the creation of a security interest in a patent,
in some or all cases, the federal title model may preempt the title neutral
concept in Article Nine. Second, a security interest is a protected "purchaser
or mortgagee" under section 261, thus giving subsequent secured parties
rights against unrecorded patent transferees that they do not enjoy under
Article Nine. 2 Finally, the common law BFP rule (outside section 261) that
protects "purchasers" who take legal title to a patent against equitable
encumbrances is, in fact, federal common law that was never altered by
3
Article Nine's enactment in the various states.
A.

Preemptionand UnrecordedAssignments under the Patent
Act

Whether the Article Nine security interest is an assignment, grant or
conveyance that needs to be recorded under section 261, if the security
interest is a protected subsequent party, Article Nine's priority rule will yield
to the Patent Act anytime a transfer intended for security follows an
unrecorded assignment.
This hypothetical involving a priority dispute between a prior
unconditional assignee and a subsequent secured party makes the strongest
case for the partial preemption of Article Nine.' Section 261 provides that if a
patent assignee does not make a proper PTO recording within three months
of the executed assignment or prior to the date of any subsequent purchase or
mortgage, the assignment is "void" against the subsequent bona fide
"purchaser or mortgagee."5 Thus, the negative inference under patent law is
that the assignee has better rights in the patent than the subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee if the assignment is filed first or within three months of its
See discussion PRELIMINARY REPORT #1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL RULES

2

3
4

5

AND STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND PROPERTY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS at
Section III (C)(3) et seq. (Cooperative Contract - U.S.P.T.O. and Franklin Pierce Law
Center 2000).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1, supranote 1 at Section III(c)(4).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supranote 1 at Section III(c)(5).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).

Id.
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execution.6 In the case of the prior assignee matched against a subsequent
secured party, the prior assignee is squarely within the prior section 261
"assignment, grant or conveyance.", If the secured party is a protected
section 261 "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" as well, then inconsistent
Article Nine provisions will yield to section 261 of the Patent Act every time
the conflict is so formed. Recent section 261 case law concludes that the
"purchaser" protected under section 261 is the same "purchaser" protected
under the common law bona fide purchaser rule applied to patents.' As noted
earlier in section III(c)(1)(B), the Federal Circuit has recently used the
common law bona fide "purchaser" rule to protect an exclusive licensee who
took from the legal title holder in a transaction under which the licensor was
found to have "retained ownership."9 While a third party who takes an
interest in less than the exclusive right to make, use and sell may not be
protected," a consensual lien on the whole patent would seem to be sufficient
as long as a protected "purchaser" does not have to take ownership." A
secured party will qualify as a protected subsequent "purchaser" under
section 261 if the statutory rule covers the same ground as the common law
BFP rule applied by the Federal Circuit. As for current state law, a secured
party falls within the U.C.C. definition of a "purchaser" in sections 1201(32)&(33). 3 If the section 261 reference to a subsequent "purchaser or
mortgagee" mimics the common law BFP, 4 the reference may not be as titlesensitive as the "assignment, grant or conveyance" language that measures
the recording mandate of the same section." In other words, a secured party
Why Corp. v. Super Ironer Corp., 128 F.2d 539, 53 U.S.P.Q. 609 (6th Cir. 1942).

6

7
8

9
'0

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *10- 11 (Fed. Cir.
June 2, 1998)("...one who acquires an interest in a patent for valuable consideration from
the legal title holder..."); FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)("Both the common law rule and the statute [§ 261] contemplate that the
subsequent purchaser be exactly that - a transferee who pays valuable consideration, and
is without notice of the prior transfer.")(Emphasis and brackets added.).
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *2-3.
Weinar v. Rollform, Inc., 774 F.2d 797, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bailey v. Chattem, Inc.,
684 F.2d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 1982)
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *2-3 & *10- 11 (Harris was a bona fide purchaser for
value of an exclusive conditional license to make use and sell.).

12

Id.

3

U.C.C. § 1-201(32)&(33). Revised Article Nine is even more specific. U.C.C. [Revised]

'4

5

§ 1-201(32)&(33)("security interest" specifically included).
939 F.2d at 1573.

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 1 at Section III(c)(1)(C).
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seems to qualify as a protected "purchaser" under section 261 of the Patent
Act whether the security interest is itself6 an "assignment, grant or
conveyance" that must record or risk avoidance.'
If the language "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" in section 261
refers only to the title-bearing mortgagee ancestors of the Article Nine
security interest, as some have argued, the recording provisions of section
261 do not preempt Article Nine.'7 If a secured party is a "subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee," the applicable section 261 priority rule conflicts
with the Article Nine priority provision in section 9-301(1)(d). Article Nine
section 9-301(1)(d) provides that an unperfected security interest in general
intangibles is subordinate to the right of a transferee who gives value for the
rights without knowledge of the unperfected security interest therein.'8
Assuming that U.C.C. section 9-301(l)(d) applies to potential
security interests because that do not exist, as well as those that exist but
remain unperfected,'9 then state law would award priority to the prior
executed assignee whether or not the assignee filed with the PTO. 0 Again,
under section 261, the secured party would win if the prior assignee failed to
record with the PTO prior to the date of the security agreement, or within
three months of the executed assignment.2 Section 261 should displace the
Article Nine priority rule in section 9-301(1)(d) in the case of a prior
assignee and subsequent secured party.
1.

Non-Statutory Federal BFP

As noted earlier, an Article Nine "security interest" can be viewed as
a contingent agreement to assign in the future and thus transfers equitable
title to the secured party. 2 If a security agreement does create equitable title
16
17

18

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
If the secured party must qualify as a subsequent "mortgagee," and that word retains its
pre-U.C.C. "title" armor, then the protected interests described in section 261 do not
include the Article Nine security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-301(d).

20

The controversy concerning the scope of Article Nine's third-party priority rules is
discussed in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supranote 1at Section II(e)(2)(B) et seq.
See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d)("a person who is ... a transferee"). See also U.C.C. [Revised] §

21

9-317(d).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).

'9

22

Note, Recording Security Interests in Patents: Accepting A TraditionalFederal System
To Preserve the Policies Of Patent Law, 2 B.U.J.SCI.&TECH.L. 15 para. 34 & 35 (1996).
A present agreement to assign future inventions (as distinguished from a present
assignment of future inventions) vests equitable, not legal, title in the assignee.
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in the secured party, then under common law principles applied in patent
cases a bona fide purchaser of rights from the legal title holder without
notice, cuts off the equitable title.23 If this bona fide purchaser rule survives
as some form of "federal common law," then an argument for preemption
exists, even if security interests do not fall within the "assignment, grant or
conveyance" language of section 261 of the Patent Act.' However, recent
Federal Circuit Court cases seem to trace this common law bona fide
purchaser principle to state law as it is applied to the transfer of federally
created property.2 Old state common law governing bona fide purchasers in
conflict with the equity of secured parties has yielded to Article Nine. 6
Under Article Nine the BFP, without actual or inquiry notice, still could not
cut off the secured party's right if the secured party properly filed under
Article Nine."
2.

Priority
a)

Scope of Patent Act Priority Language

Because the rule appears to exclude involuntary transfers, including
the judicial lien creditor, only two possible priority conflicts might fall
within its language. As some of the case law has suggested, the language
can be read to control some or all of the conflicts between security interests
in patent rights and assignments of those same rights. If the security interest
transfer itself is viewed as "an assignment, grant or conveyance, then the
section 261 priority rule might be construed to cover conflicts between
secured parties when patent rights are the subject collateral.

23

24
25

Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A prior
assignor with the right to have the assignment rescinded for fraud has equitable, not
legal, title prior to the actual court ordered rescission. Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v.
Loebach, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *10-11, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 at *10-11; FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d
1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
The FilmTec Cir. Court cites to Hendrie v. Sayles, [98 U.S. 546, 549 (1879)] for the
proposition that a prior equitable encumbrance is cut off by a bona fide purchaser. See
939 F.2d 1568 at 1537. HeidelbergHarris,Inc. in turn relies on FilmTec. i.e. 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11490 at *10. The Supreme Court's pre-Erie decision in Hendrie v. Sayles
relies on state law principles of derivative title and bona fide purchaser status rather than
any uniquely federal policy. See 98 U.S. 546 at 551-52. See also In re CFLC, Inc., 89
F.3d 673, 678-79 (applies federal common law where it is important to preserve federal
patent policy).

26

U.C.C. § 9-203, cmt. 5.

27

U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d). AccordU.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(d).
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Secured Party vs. Assignee

Even if the security interest transfer is not an assignment, grant or
conveyance that must be recorded under section 261, a subsequent secured
party has a strong claim to the status of a "subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee" who may be protected against prior assignments that must record
within three months of execution.28 This section 261 protection for the
Article Nine secured party comes with several qualifying limitations.
First, in order to have priority, the later security interest must be
"without notice" and "for valuable consideration. 2 9 The "valuable
consideration" requirement has already been discussed in the context of the
Copyright Act limits on the protection against unrecorded transfers afforded
to subsequent interests." A subsequent security interest taken to secure an
antecedent debt may not qualify. A second hurdle to the subsequent secured
party's priority is the "without notice" requirement in section 261. The
"notice" referred to in section 261 is broader than actual notice. As it
includes constructive and inquiry notice as well.'
Whenever a prior assignee does not record within the three-month
period, the BFP secured party has priority as long as the security agreement
attaches before any late recording by the assignee. Unlike under section
205(d) of the Copyright Act, recording is not relevant to the subsequent
party's section 261 rights against a prior unrecorded assignment.
Even when the subsequent secured party gives new value and cannot
be chargeable with notice, section 261 presents major problems as a priority
rule. Because of the three-month look-back any secured party is vulnerable
to a potential prior unrecorded assignment for that time. As further
complication assignments sent to the PTO are deemed "recorded" under
section 261 from the time of "receipt," not from the time they are available
for inspection." The "office delay" which occurs between receipt of a
recordable document and its availability to the searcher may be as much as
two months. 4 Therefore, a subsequent secured party who gives new value
and takes without notice is still not safe relying on the state of the PTO
28

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note I at Section III(c)(4).

29

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).

30

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supranote I at III(b)(3)(E).

31

FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1574, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508, 1512-13
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(unpublished).
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994), with 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).

32

33
3

See 37 C.F.R. § 3.51 (1994).
See discussion in Preliminary Report #1, supra note 1 at Section III (a).
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record until the three month look-back and the office delay period both pass.
The case in which a true assignment, grant or conveyance pre-dates a
security interest is the best example of the Patent Act's displacement of the
priority rules in Article Nine." However, as the discussion in Section
III(c)(3) et seq. explains, the case law to date opines that federal recording
may also be36critical when the security interest is executed before a competing
assignment.
When the security interest is executed before a competing
assignment, section 261 permits a much more generous time frame for
recording than the otherwise applicable Article Nine rule in U.C.C. section
9-301(l)(d). Under section 9-301(l)(d), the secured party would lose to the
subsequent purchaser of a general intangible if the purchaser "gives value
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected." 37 That
same secured party prevails against a subsequent patent assignee who takes
without knowledge as long as the secured transaction takes title-bearing form
(e.g., conditional assignment) and is recorded in the PTO within three
months of "its date."'" Of course, a secured party does not know if it is prior
or subsequent with respect to its own executed documents. The Patent Act
poses an awkward recording and priority vehicle for lenders.
If the prior secured transaction takes the form of a security interest
3
and is recorded with the PTO as a discretionary document,"
it will provide
inquiry notice to all who resort to the PTO file under the designated patent
number or application number."° Therefore, in many cases, the filing of a
security agreement will have the same priority effect as the filing of a
conditional assignment. However, only the constructive notice assured by
section 261 in the case of title-bearing "assignments" will bind those
creditors and purchasers who do not resort to the record.4' A subsequent
assignee of a patent or patent application who did not check the PTO file
35

See discussion supra in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note I at Section III(c)(4).

36

See 83 B.R. at 782; 48 B.R. at 639. But see Holt v. United Statesj3 UCC 336, 339

37
38
39

40

41

(U.S. Dist. Ct., D.C. 1973); Tollinger v. Ithaca Gun Company, Inc., 555 N.Y.Supp. 2d
908, 9 10-11 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1990).
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d).
"Its date" is usually but not always the document execution date. 37 C.F.R. § 3.21.
The mandatory cover sheet must refer to the specific patents by patent or application
number. See 37 C.F.R. § 3.11 & § 3.31 (1997).
Security interests are equitable interests that encumber the legal title to a patent. These
interests survive a subsequent assignment if the assignee is on inquiry notice that the
equitable interest exists. See FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 157374, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note at Section III(c)(1)(C).
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before the transfer would not be on inquiry notice and would not take subject
to the security agreement. Although such a subsequent assignee would
usually resort to the record, not all creditors do.
c)

Secured Party vs. Secured Party

The logic of extending both the "assignment, grant and conveyance"
language and the "purchaser or mortgagee" language to cover secured parties
leads to the conclusion that section 261 also preempts the Article Nine rules
on priority between secured parties. 2 Instead of determining priority based
on the first-to-file 3 a proper financing statement, the first secured party to
take an assignment of an existing patent or patent application will prevail as
long as that party records under section 261 within three months, or before a
transfer to the subsequent secured party." Remember, the prior secured
party's interest cannot be recorded until a patent application is either
executed or filed. 5
A subsequent secured party need not record at all, but can only
prevail when the prior party remains unrecorded after the grace period and is
unrecorded at the time the subsequent secured party's interest attaches. Even
then, the subsequent secured party will not prevail unless it is bona fide and
for !'valuable consideration.""
The bona fide or "without notice" qualification has an interesting
wrinkle that could arguably restore some significance to Article Nine filing
when the priority conflict is between secured parties. Under section 261,
notice includes "constructive notice" and "inquiry notice" as well as "actual
notice. 47 But, constructive notice cannot refer to 261 recording of an
A prior recorded
assignment because that would be redundant.
42

43

But see Weinberg & Woodward, Easing Transfers, and Security Interest Transactions
and IntellectualProprty: An Agendafor Reform, 79 KY. L. REv. 61, 67 n. 27 (1991).
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). The date of the assignment is not always the document date.
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 1 at footnote 529.
The application number must normally be included. However, "[i]f an assignment is
executed concurrently with, or subsequent to, the execution of the patent application, but
before the patent application is filed, it must identify the patent applicationby its date of
execution, name of each inventor, and title of the invention so that there can be no
mistake as to the patent application intended". 37 C.F.R. § 3.21 (1997)(Emphasis
added.).
46
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). See FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 157374, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
47 Id.
45
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assignee/secured party prevails over a subsequent taker by express proviso."8
If "constructive notice" could include a preempted Article Nine filing a prior
unrecorded secured party might take priority over a subsequent taker if the
secured party had filed a financing statement. Although the patent cases on
"notice" are very broad,' 9 they probably cannot support such an extension.
The logic of such a constructive notice holding would force all subsequent
parties, not just secured parties, to check the appropriate state file as well as
the PTO records - thus defeating the policy behind a partial preemption.
If a secured party is a section 261 protected "purchaser or
mortgagee," the Article Nine concept of notice filing between secured parties
would seem to be completely preempted under the Otto Fabric and
TransportationDesign interpretation of section 261, because a security
interest would
have to be formed as a present "conditional" assignment, and
0
recorded.'
In addition, after-acquired patent property would be a problem under
section 261. Under Article Nine, priority between secured parties in afteracquired property goes to the first to file." If section 261 preempts Article
Nine, priority goes to the first title-bearing assignment, if properly recorded
within the grace period. A proper recording cannot occur, however, until the
application is either executed or filed.'2 Once the assignment of an
application, is properly recorded, the assignment will be applied against
patents granted from the application including patents granted from
divisional applications" and continuation applications." Patents granted
from continuation in part applications" and substitute applications 6 will not
follow a recorded assignment of the original application, however, because
the original only gives the assignee rights to subject matter common to both
48

49

50
"
52

53

54

55
56

"...unless it is recorded... prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage." 35
U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
See FilmTec Core v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 at 1573-74.
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1,supra note I at Section III(c)(3)(C) et seq.
See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) & cmt. 4.
See 37 C.F.R. § 3.21 (1997).
35 U.S.C. § 121 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53, § 1.60 & § 1.62 (1997). See also Manual of
Patent Examing Procedure [MPEP] § 201.06 (1998).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.53, § 1.60 & § 1.62 (1997); MPEP, supra note 53 at § 201.07. "In the
case of a division or continuation, a prior assignment recorded against the original
application is applied to the division or continuation application because the assignment
recorded against the original application gives the assignee rights to the subject matter
common to both applications." MPEP, supra note 53 at § 306.
37 C.F.R. § 1.53 & § 1.62 (1997). See also MPEP, supra note 53 at § 201.08.
MPEP, supranote 53 at § 201.09.
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applications."
A debtor with only equitable title in a patent or patent application
may have sufficient "rights in collateral" for Article Nine attachment
purposes, 8 but a present assignment of only equitable rights does not bring
the secured party/assignee within the constructive notice scope of section
261.1 Similarly, an assignment of a security interest is only a discretionary
document unless it is accompanied by an assignment of all the debtor's right
title and interest, subject to a condition subsequent of defeasance when the
secured debt is paid.60
TransportationDesign is an example of a case where the
debtor granted the secured party an interest in after-acquired patents.
Under Article Nine, the secured party's prior filing of a financing
statement naming the collateral by type provides priority against any
later security interest even as to property not yet in existence.61 That
priority would not be available under the preempting provisions of
section 261 of the Patent Act. Instead, priority would attach to the
first interest created and its progeny, but only if there is an existing
application to record.62 This limitation on the capacity of section 261
to function as a notice filing statute puts an intolerable burden on the
financing of ongoing research and development.

58

MPEP, supra note 53 at § 306. Compare this extension with the more limiting concept
of Article Nine "proceeds." See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 1 at
Section II(c)(2).
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 1at Section II(b)(3)(A).

59

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supranote 1 at Section III(c)(1)(C).

60

61

See, e.g., Agreement Between Precision Engine Products Corp. and Bank of New York Grant of Security Interests (Patents), PTO ASSIGNMENT BRANCH RECORDS Reel/Frame
No. 7297/0185 (Recorded: Feb. 10, 1995).
See U.C.C. § 9-204(1); U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-204(a).

62

See 37 C.F.R. § 3.21 (1997).

57
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APPENDIX 19 - WATERMAN. V. MACKENZIE

In Waterman v. Mackenzie, the inventor/licensee of a fountain pen
holder ("Waterman") brought suit to enjoin an alleged infringement. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower Court's decision that the equitable action
failed because title to the patent resided in a conditional assignee.' The
diverting conditional assignment was intended as security for a note signed
by Waterman and his wife. Prior to the conditional assignment, Waterman
(the then owner of the patent) transferred the patent title to his wife,
reserving back an exclusive license. The conditional assignment, executed
by Mrs. Waterman to secure the note, was then made subject to patentee's
license.' The Court affirmed the dismissal of Waterman's bill because a
licensee without title cannot sue for infringement.' The Court rejected
Waterman's argument that the conditional collateral assignment did not pass
title to the conditional assignee.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's conclusion in Waterman v.
Mackenzie that the conditional assignee had "title," confirmed by a proper
recording, really amounted to a holding that all unrecorded transfers for
security are "void" as to subsequent parties under 261 because they must be
conceived as "title" transfers as a matter of federal law.' Instead of positing a
federal title theory for security transfers, the case seems to conclude that the
particular conditional assignment fell within the provisions of the Patent Act
because it was, in fact, cast into a title mold under the then extant state law
and state equity practice.' In a particularly telling sentence, the Supreme
Court concludes the conditional assignee "must be held entitled" to the
incidents of title, "unless otherwise provided in the mortgage."6 The clear

2
3
4

5
6

Id at 261. After the decision in the Supreme Court the licensee/inventor joined the title
holding the conditional assignee as a defendant and successfully asserted his right to sue
for infringement. The second time was a charm because an infringement suit can be
brought by a nontitle-holding licensee if the title holder is an infringer who cannot sue
himself. Waterman v. Shipman, 55 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1893).
d.at 253.
Id. at 261.
The cases to date have not read Waterman to mean that the concept of a title-based
chattel mortgage preempts the Article Nine concept of a security interest as a matter of
federal law. See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920-21 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1999); Citibank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988); In re
Transportation, Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
138 U.S. at 258-59. See also 239 B.R. at 920-21.
138 U.S. at 260. See also Curtiss v. U.S. 13 U.S.P.Q. 400,411 (Ct. Cl. 1932).
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suggestion is that this transfer for security (the one before the Court in
Waterman) presumes title under the existing state law, but another such
transfer might effectively reserve most, if not all, of the rights of ownership
in the transferor. Title passed to the conditional assignee in Waterman v.
Mackenzie because of the extant state law conceptualizations about the need
to transfer title in a chattel mortgage, not because of any necessary logic
derived from the federal Patent Act. When Waterman v. Mackenzie was
decided, the only security devise recognized for this type of personality was
a form of the chattel mortgage. Legal title was the state law "concept" (some
might say "fiction") used to define the right of the mortgagee to prevent
waste of the asset. Unless this concept of legal title, as then recognized
under state law, was somehow converted by the Supreme Court into an
exclusive federal common law devise for protecting the mortgagee, the
Article Nine security interest that carries no title should not be compelled to
record under section 261 of the Patent Act. If a security interest is not "[a]n
assignment grant or conveyance" within the meaning of section 261, the
secured party properly attached and perfected by filing under state law would
prevail over a subsequent assignee of the patent even if the security interest
was never recorded in the Patent Office.7 While this more limited reading of
Waterman v. Mackenzie has obvious analytical appeal, its application to
modem Patent Act practice would no doubt weaken the integrity of the PTO
assignment records. Probably for that reason, this restricted view of
Waterman v. Mackenzie has minimal support in the case law.8

8

Holt v. U.S., 13 UCC 336, 338-39 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. 1973). Priority would be based on
U.C.C. § 9-201 & § 9-301(l)(d). Section 261 of the Patent Act would not trump the
U.C.C. priority because the security interest would not be considered "an assignment,
grant or conveyance" under the federal priority rule. See also In re Cybernetic Services,
Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920-21 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). Cybernetic Services finds that section
261 deals only with transfer of title transactions and that a security interest is not title
dependent. 239 B.R. at 921. However, the Court also opines that an assignee of a patent
would take free of a security interest that was not filed in the Patent Office. 239 B.R. at
920, n.8.
See cases cited supra at note 4.
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APPENDIX 20 - RECENT PATENT ACT PREEMPTION CASES

A.

TransportationDesign

In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., holds that an
Article Nine local filing is effective to perfect a security interest in patent
collateral against the bankruptcy trustee asserting lien creditor status under
section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.' As part of this holding, the Court
observed "the grant of a security interest is not a conveyance of a present
ownership right in the patent and, . . . is not required to be recorded in the
Patent Office."' However, dicta in the opinion makes the case for a "partial"
priority preemption. Transportation Design relies on Waterman v.
Mackenzie for the following conclusion: ". . . a bona fide purchaser holding
a duly recorded conveyance of the ownership rights in a patent or a
mortgagee who has recorded its interest as a transfer of title with the Patent
Office will defeat the interests of a secured creditor of the grantor or
who has not filed notice of its security interest in the Patent
mortgagor
4
Office."
Apparently, the Court, relying on Waterman v. Mackenzie finds the
basis for a narrow preemption of both thefiling andpriority rules in Article
Nine whenever the rights of an assignee or titled mortgagee, that has
recorded, are in conflict with the ordinary security interest.' Under section
261, if a prior assignee (or conditional assignee) fails to record within three
months, it must record before the execution of a subsequent purchase or
mortgage in order to prevail over such subsequent interest.' The above quote
from Transportation Design notwithstanding, as long as the subsequent
purchase or mortgage is bona fide it need never record in order to assert
priority over the prior unrecorded assignment. If the secured party is

2

3
4
5

48 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994).

48 B.R. at 638.
48 B.R. at 639.
As noted in Preliminary Report #1, there is a strong argument that neither section 261 nor
Waterman v. Mackenzie support the "partial preemption" priority rule the Court proposes.
See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL
RULES AND STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY
INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE

6

REFORMS at Section III (C)(3)(B) (Cooperative Contract - U.S.P.T.O. and Franklin Pierce
Law Center 2000).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
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assumed to be prior in time under the dicta in TransportationDesign, then it
must record its interest in the Patent Office. However, unless the security
interest is recorded as a title document, it will not fall within the constructive
notice mandate of section 261.1 Therefore, the conclusion when Waterman v.
Mackenzie is applied is that one must create a security interest by assignment
to assure priority vis-a-vis a subsequent assignee. Waterman v. Mackenzie is
not dead!' The alternative of filing an ordinary security agreement (a
possible construction of the TransportationDesign dicta) with the PTO as a
discretionary document may provide "inquiry notice" to those who access the
file, but it will not be statutory constructive notice to all. Despite the
confusing dicta in TransportationDesign, the Patent Act seems to require a
title document for constructive notice purposes and, while the bona fides of
the subsequent party are relevant under section 261, recording by the
subsequent party is not.'
TransportationDesign fashions an approach to partial preemption
that departs from the partial and full step-back concepts contained in Article
Nine."' Under the two-stage deferral approach suggested by Article Nine, the
first question is whether recording in the Patent Office was a complete and
exclusive substitute for Article Nine filing under section 9-302(3)(a)&(4). If
If the secured party took and recorded a security agreement instead of a title-bearing
conditional assignment, it would not get the absolute record protection afforded a
recorded conditional assignment. In the parlance of the Patent Act, a "security
agreement" would convey a "lesser" equitable right to the secured party that would not
qualify as an "assignment, grant or conveyance" subject to section 261. 239 B.R. at 92021; 48 B.R. at 639. However, the "without notice" condition for bona fide purchaser
status in 261 protects even equitable interests when the subsequent purchaser is
chargeable with "inquiry notice" of the equitable right. Hendrie v. Sayles, 98 U.S. 546,
549 (1879); FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Those who searched the patent record after the discretionary recording of a security
agreement should take subject to the security interest created thereby. Because some
actual knowledge may be necessary to trigger inquiry notice, those foolish subsequent
purchasers who buy without resort to the record, as well as subsequent involuntary takers
such as lien creditors who never rely on the record, may not be subject to the prior
"security agreement" recorded only with the PTO.
8
"[W]here a federal statute, such as the Patent Act, governs one area or interest which the
secured creditor wishes to protect (e.g., ownership), then the federal statute pre-empts
any other method of protecting that interest and is conclusive on the manner of protecting
that interest. In other words, if the secured creditor wishes to protect itself against the
debtor transferring title to the patent to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee who properly
records, then the secured creditor must bring its security interest (which is not ordinarily
a transfer of title) within the provisions of the Patent Act governing transfer of title to
patents." 48 B.R. at 639-40.
9
Id.
10 See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1,supra note 5 at Section 11(f).
7
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the Patent Act "provides for a national registration" within the meaning of
section 9-302(3)(a), then Article Nine filing is neither "necessary or
effective." "Compliance" with the federal statute then becomes the exclusive
method of "perfection" under section 9-302(4).2 Section 9-302 makes no
provision for the partial displacement of the Article Nine filing provisions.
If the filing rules are displaced as a mode of perfection by operation of
section 9-302, they are displaced in all cases where perfection is important to
priority. 3 However, because Transportation Design ignored the section 9302(3)(a) approach, the preliminary issue of "national registration" for
security interests under the Patent Act is never directly addressed. Instead,
the Court decides half of the section 9-302(3)(a) issue indirectly by
concluding that state "perfection" works at least against the lien creditor
under U.C.C. section 9-301(1)(b).
While preemption, even partial preemption, is federal law and
operates apart from Article Nine notions, the jerry-built "partial filing and
priority preemption" theory in the Transportation Design dicta is
troublesome. It may not be a reliable guide to the scope and function of the
priority rule in section 261 of the Patent Act."
B.

ChesapeakeFiber

Even though the dicta in TransportationDesign is flawed, it has had
some influence. Relying on TransportationDesign, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland in Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro
Packing Corp.'5 applied section 261 to resolve a challenge by the original
assignor of a patent application to the security interest held by the bankrupt
assignee's secured party. The assignor argued that the secured party was
unperfected without a PTO recording and thus subordinate to the assignor
whose subsequent "reacquisition" made it a protected section 261
purchaser." The Court in Chesapeake Fiber found for the secured party only
because the original patent assignor could not qualify as a subsequent section
261 "purchaser," not because section 261 did not apply.'7
U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(lst sentence) (Emphasis added.).
12

U.C.C. § 9-302(4).

'3

Id.

14

See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT #1, supra note 5 at text accompanying footnote

591 to 600.
Is
16
17

143 B.R. 360, (D. Md. 1992), aft'd, 8 F.3d 817 (4th Cir. 1993).
143 B.R. at 368.
143 B.R. at 369. Arguably, the assignor could have protected its rights in the assigned
patent with a security interest that might have qualified for purchase-money priority. See
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C.

Otto Fabric

Three years after TransportationDesign, the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas held that a security interest in a patent was
"perfected" against an imaginary lien creditor from the time it was properly
filed under Article Nine, rather than from the time it was recorded with the
Patent Office. The holding in City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric,Inc."
is also accompanied by dicta that sends a mixed message about the scope of
federal preemption.
Unlike Transportation Design, the moment of "perfection" was
important in Otto Fabric because it was triggered/controlled by the
Bankruptcy Code. Under section 547(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,
"perfection" marked the "deemed" date of the security transfer for purposes
of the 90-day period for avoiding preferences." Except for the issue of when
it was "deemed" to have occurred, the transfer for security in Otto Fabric
satisfied all the other requirements for a preference that was avoidable by the
bankruptcy trustee under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.20 If the
transfer date was marked by the local U.C.C. filing, it would not be
avoidable because it would fall outside the 90-day pre-petition "preference
period" in section 547(b)(4)(A).2' If perfection was marked by the later
federal PTO recording, however, the security transfer would be avoidable
because it would fall within the 90-day preference period.
The Otto Fabrics Court held that state law and the secured party's
Article Nine filing applies conclusively, but not exclusively, to resolve the
question of "perfection" in favor of the secured party. Alternatively, the
Court held that if the Patent Act did preempt "the field of filing," section 261
offers no protection for lien creditors or trustees invested with lien creditor
status.2
As in TransportationDesign, the Otto Fabrics Court ignored the
Article Nine structure that conceives of a partial deferral as a "filing"
deferral under U.C.C. section 9-302(3)(a) and (4). While federal preemption
need not follow the guidelines suggested in the preempted state statute, the

18

,9

the prior discussion of this aspect of the Sebro case supra at note 476. See, e.g., Haraway
v. Burnett, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 at *2-3, 33 UCC2d 1256 (1997)(Assignor of
patents retains security interest in them to secure assignee's obligation to make sales
contract and royalty payments).
83 B.R. 780, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1719, 5 UCC2d 1459 (D. Kan. 1988).

20

11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B)& (e)(1)(B).
83 B.R. at 782.

21

11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1994).

22

83 B.R. at 782.
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Otto Fabricsapproach seems tied to three inconsistent conclusions.
The first flawed conclusion in Otto Fabric is that a PTO recording
would be equally as effective as an Article Nine filing to defeat the
hypothetical lien creditor under state law. 3 The second flawed conclusion is
that if section 261 of the Patent Act "completely preempted the field of
filing" its substantive provisions would leave the lien creditor, who could
have priority under Article Nine, with no federal law basis for priority
against the secured party. 4 Finally, testing the complete opposite thesis, the
Court observed that a security ihiterest is not a conveyance of title or
ownership rights under the recording mandate of section 261.25
As to the Court's first observation on the applicable state law, the
rules in U.C.C. section 9-302(3)(a) and (4) do not comprehend
deferral
filing
If the Patent Act recording displaces under section 9recording.
double
completely under section 9-302(4). On the other hand,
it
displaces
302(3)(a),
create a national registry, which supplants Article
not
did
Act
Patent
the
if
filing with the PTO would not protect against
purposes,
for
"perfection"
Nine
law. On the federal side, no reasonable
state
under
least
at
the lien creditor,
would allow the secured party to
261
of
section
take on the language
"perfect" its interest against the involuntary lien creditor by recording in the
Patent Office.27 Involuntary transfers are not even mentioned in the text of
section 261. If a section 261 recording did provide priority against the
involuntary lien creditor under federal law, state law covering the same
ground would surely be preempted and a U.C.C. filing would not even be an
alternative way to gain priority over the lien creditor.
This observation about the narrow field of play in section 261 leads
to the Court's second flawed conclusion. If federal law did in fact control,
the Court concluded that it would leave the lien creditor without any
statutory priority. Any hypothesis based on complete preemption by section
261 seems an unlikely alternative holding. Assuming the Court's reference
to complete preemption of the "field of filing" really envisions complete
preemption of Article Nine, then it may be true that section 261, does not
require recording to defect the lien creditor. But as Peregrinefelt compelled
23

24

25
26

27

After upholding U.C.C. based perfection against the lien creditor, the court volunteers the
statement that "recording an assignment [in the PTO] would also protect the assignee
against the claims of a subsequent lien creditor." 83 B.R. at 782.

83 B.R. at 782.
83 B.R. at 782-3.
"Perfection" here means the time when the transfer beats the lien creditor under section
547(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1994). See U.C.C. § 9301(l)(b); U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-317(a)(2).
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
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to conclude,28 complete federal preemption of Article Nine can hardly be
mandated unless the displacing federal recording scheme
acknowledge/recognizes lien creditors.,9
At the other extreme, the title-related dicta in Otto Fabric deals even
the partial preemption theory a final blow. Emphasizing the theory's
"partial" nature, the Court noted that a security interest is not like a collateral
assignment. Relying on Holt v. U.S.,3" the Court used the following language
to conceptualize the creditor's security interest:
"To require a federal filing and thus a collateral assignment to
perfect a security interest in a patent seems inconsistent with the modem
notion that a grant of a security interest need not include the conveyance of
title or ownership rights. 3'
Of course, the problem with this statement is that it goes too far in
describing the "partial" nature of the preemption. Once the security interest
is placed outside the "assignment grant or conveyance" language in section
261, the secured party's priority even as against subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees would be controlled by Article Nine, not by the federal Patent
Act.
As was the case with TransportationDesign, Otto Fabric seemed to
base its holding on a patchwork notion of "partial preemption." Once again,
the Court's attempt at guidance in the dicta is very confusing.
D.

Cybernetic Services

In re Cybernetic Services, Inc.,32 a recent decision from the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, follows the lead of both Transportation
Design and Otto Fabric in concluding that Article Nine perfection is
sufficient against the lien creditor. Here again, however, the Court's dicta
touched on priority between the assignee and the secured party and paints an
uncertain picture of this priority contest. Although the Court observed that a
security interest is not the kind of title-bearing transfer envisioned by the
"assignment, grant or conveyance" language in section 261, it also agreed
with TransportationDesign that an assignee would defeat a secured creditor
28
29

30

116

B.R. at 205.

Revised Article Nine purports to limit any federal statute that would displace the U.C.C.
filing provisions to a statute "whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining
priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt...." U.C.C.
[Revised] § 9-311 (a)(1).
Holt v. U.S., 13 UCC 336, 338-39 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. 1973).

31

5 UCC2d at 1463.

32

239 B.R. 917 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999).
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"who has not filed notice of its security interest in the Patent Office."33
E.

Summary of Preemption Cases

If we focus on the narrow holdings of the four cases discussed
above, Cybernetic Services, Otto Fabric and Transportation Design all
arguably stand for the proposition that the Patent Act does not render an
Article Nine filing for "perfection" ineffective against the lien creditor. For
purposes of Bankruptcy Code avoidance and preference law, this is the
critical issue. In that contest, local Article Nine filing controls on both the
perfection and the priority issue. Although Otto Fabric is not as clear as
either Transportation Design or Cybernetic Services on what may be
preempted by section 261, all three cases indicate that the secured party must
record a security transfer, in title form, under section 261 of the Patent Act in
order to defeat a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee." Despite this overrated
reliance on Waterman v. Mackenzie," this limited Patent Office recording
requirement will likely prevail as a matter of transactional policy. Courts are
and should be concerned about the integrity of the Patent Office files. The
PTO file is relied on by potential buyers or assignees who need to know the
state of a patent title. If a security interest must, in the context of subsequent
title takers, be formed into some title-bearing assignment, then potential
buyers and assignees are relieved of the burden of searching undetermined
state U.C.C. files before safely acquiring an ownership interest in a patent.
Given the level of uncertainty, a cautious lender must do it both ways, at
least for now. Prudence suggests that the secured party file a "financing
statement" under state law and also requires that the debtor execute a "title"
document that can be recorded in the Patent Office as either a patent
mortgage or a conditional assignment.

33

239 B.R. at 920-21 & n.8.

34 239 B.R. at 920, n.8; 83 B.R. at 782; 48 B.R. at 639.
35 See discussion in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1, supra note 5 at Section III(c)(3)(B).
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APPENDIx 21 - ANALYSIS OF

UCC FILING PROCEDURES FOR SELECTED
STATES

A.

New Hampshire - Current System

Current System (New Hampshire)
1.
Paper form UCCI is completed and sent to the New Hampshire
Secretary of State's office along with associated fees. This form contains
debtor and creditor names and addresses as well as the type of filing.
Collateral is also listed on this form. The state records the date and time of
receipt, assigns a unique identifying number and stores the physical forms in
a filing cabinet system.
Form UCC3 is used for amending, assigning, continuing and partial
releases of UCC filings.
To request a search, form UCC1 1A is completed and sent to the
Secretary of State's office. A manual search of the files is performed by
employees of the Secretary of State's office and results of the search are
mailed or faxed to the requestor.
2.

New Hampshire - New System

A new information management system is currently being developed
jointly between the state of NH and a contractor. Acceptance Criteria and
Specifications" describes in detail the scope and structure of said system.
According to Assistant Secretary of State, Anthony Stevens, the software is
at the alpha testing stage. It is expected to be in beta usage mode by the end
of May 2000 and in use by the summer of 2000.
In summary, the new information management system requires that
the standardized National Financing Statement Form UCC1 be completed
and sent in paper form to the New Hampshire Secretary of State's office
along with associated fees. The state then enters the information into an
electronic information system/database per the method described in
"Amendment-UCC Image Enablement."
Form UCC3 will continue to be used for amending, assigning,
continuing and partial releases, however, this information will be entered
into the information system per the procedure described in the Image
Enablement amendment as well.
Form UCCI IA will still need to be completed to request a search. The state
will search the database and send the results to the requestor. According to
Mr. Stevens, outside access to the database is not anticipated.
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B.

Data Structure of New Information Management System
1.

2.

3.

Identification Numbers.
Each initial financing
statement is identified by its file number. A record is
created in the System for each initial financing
statement and all information comprising such
record is maintained in such system. Such record is
identified by the same information assigned to the
initial financing statement. A UCC document other
than an initial financing statement is identified by a
unique file number assigned by the filing officer. In
the System, records of all UCC documents other
than initial financing statements are linked to the
record of their related initial financing statement.
Type of document. The type of UCC document
from which data is transferred is identified in the
System from information supplied by the remitter.
Filing date and filing time. The filing date and
filing time of UCC documents are stored in the
System. Calculation of the lapse date of an initial
financing statement is based upon the filing date.

4.

Identification of parties. The names and addresses
of debtors and secured parties are transferred from
UCC documents to the System using one or more
data entry or transmittal techniques. In the System,
each party has a status of active or inactive and a
designation as an individual or organization.

5.

Status of financing statement. In the System, each
financing statement has a status of active or inactive.
Page count. The total number of pages in a UCC
document as maintained in the System.

6.
7.

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Presentation Media Indicator. The source from
which the document record was created in the
System (e.g., paper, EDI, a global change). This
should be a one-byte field, and representative values
shall be as follows: If a filing record is created from
the global filing program, place a "G" in the field. If
a filing record is created from paper, place a "P" in
the field. If a filing record is created from an EDI
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transmission place an "E" in this field. This field
will be used in later development of the UCC
information system.
8.

9.

10.

Lapsed Indicator. An indicator by which the UCC
Management System identifies whether a filing has
lapsed. It is not absolutely necessary to have a lapse
indicator as long as the requested search results can
be obtained in a timely manner.
Comment Field. Each initial filing record shall
have the ability to have multiple comment fields.
The comment fields shall be 50 bytes in length. The
comment field or fields shall be used by the State to
record administrative remarks as they relate to the
lien. These fields shall be accessible from the system
maintenance options only.
NH Special Field. A special field may be used by
amendments that were filed without being assigned
their own filing numbers. There are some UCC
liens that have not been assigned a unique filing
number for each associated UCC 3. These UCC 3's
currently have the same number as the UCC 1. It
has been anticipated that this field could be used in
some manner to solve this problem when doing data
conversion. Another possible solution could be to
add a -1, -2, etc. behind each sequential UCC'3 that
have the same number as the associated UCC 1.
This would have to be coordinated with the final
design of the numbering system and integrated with
the use of check digits, if used, and the current or
future maximum length of the file number field.

11.

Lapsed Date. A date is maintained by which the
System identifies when and if a financing statement
will lapse.

12.

The accounting
Transaction Number Field.
transaction number related to the receipt of payment
associated with the filing.
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C.

Florida

The State of Florida allows for the filing of UCC's using paper form
UCC1 and amending using paper form UCC3. Completed forms are sent to
the Department of State, Division of Corporations for their input into the
computer system by department personnel.
Additionally, the state allows for electronic filing, amending and
searching via the Internet at no cost. To those with an active account,
Electronic filing and amending forms can be accessed at
https://ccfss 1.dos.state.fl.us/corpweb/efiling/onlmenu.html.
The UCC
database can be searched by anyone with a web browser at site
http://ccfcorp.dos.state.fl.us/corpweb/inquiry/lienmenu.html.
D.

California

Completed filing form UCC 1 must be brought to an office of the
Secretary of State. If the form cannot be brought in by the filer, a service
company must be retained to do so. Information from these forms is entered
into California's electronic database system.
California uses Form UCC2 for amending, assigning, continuing and
partial releases of UCC filings. Again, such filings must be done in person.
If the filer is unavailable, a service provider must be hired.
A request for information is made by submitting form UCC3. State
employees perform the search as requested and report the results to the
requestor via mail or fax.
E.

Arizona

Arizona's system for filing, amending and searching UCC's is very
similar to that of California's. Forms UCCI for initial filing and UCC2 for
amending are sent to the state office where state workers enter the
information into their electronic database.
For searching, form UCC3 is sent to the state for them to perform a
search of their database. The results are returned to the requestor.

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

575

APPENDIx 22 - RECORDING (STATE) SYSTEM FOR TRADEMARKS (NEW
HAMPSHIRE AND OTHER SELECTED STATES)

A.

New Hampshire

An application form needs to be completed and sent to the Secretary
of State's office along with the $50.00 filing fee. Application instructions
for registering trade/service marks in New Hampshire are as follows:
APPLICANT may be an individual, partnership, or
corporation. Use full name. If a New Hampshire
corporation, it must appear in the N.H. Secretary of
State's files.
DESCRIPTION OF MARK: Describe mark fully,
both wording and design or pictorial features such as
logo. It must be clear from this description and the
specimens exactly what is to be registered, or the
application will be rejected.
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS OR SERVICES
should describe what the mark is being applied to.
CLASS: Enter one class only on each registration;
see list below.
MARK APPLIED TO should describe how the mark
is to be used, i.e. on labels attached to goods,
displays such as advertising, etc.
DATES OF FIRST USE: These are the dates the
mark was first used 1) anywhere and 2) in New
Hampshire. The dates may be the same, but cannot
be in the future.
SIGNATURES (by an officer if a corporation or
partner if a partnership) MUST BE NOTARIZED.
ENCLOSE $50 AND THREE IDENTICAL
SPECIMENS OR FACSIMILES ON PAPER.
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NOTE: A mark may not be registered if it consists
of or comprises the flag, coat of arms, etc. of the
United States, any state or foreign country, or the
name, signature, or portrait of any living individual,
except with written consent. A mark that is merely
descriptive of goods or services may not be
registered unless it has become distinctive of the
applicant's goods or services. The Secretary of State
may require proof of continuous use for five years as
evidence that the mark has become distinctive. See
RSA 350-A:2 for further restrictions.
B.

California

From web site www.ss.ca.gov/business/ts/ts.htm, "The Secretary of
State's Office maintains registration and all updates of trademarks and
service marks used in California, making this information accessible to the
public upon request."
Pages
one and two
of the online
document,
www.ss.ca.gov/business/ts/forms/tm-100.pdf describe the registration
requirements of filing trade and service marks in the State of California.
Pages three through six of the document are the actual forms for filing.
C.

Massachusetts

Procedures describing the filing of trademarks in Massachusetts are
found on site http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/sec/cor/cortmsm/tmsminf.htm.
The trademark or service mark application (submitted in duplicate)
shall contain the following information:
1. the name of the applicant;
2. the business address of the applicant;
3. whether the applicant is an individual partnership, corporation,
union or association;
4. if a corporation, the state of incorporation;
5. a description of the mark;
6. a description of the goods or services in connection with which
the mark is used;
7. the class number of the goods or services (see the classifications
of goods and services supplied below) (this may be left blank on
the application);
8. a statement of how the mark is used;
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9. the date of first use of the mark by applicant or predecessor in
Massachusetts and anywhere;
10. identify any predecessor and describe use by predecessor; and
11. a statement that the applicant is the owner of the mark and that
no other person has the right to use the mark in the
Commonwealth either in identical form or in any form so similar
as thereto as to deceive or be mistaken for.
The application must be signed by the applicant or by a member of
the firm or an officer of the corporation, or association. Applicant's signature
must be notarized. Staple or clip three specimens of the mark to the
application. Do not glue or tape them. Specimens larger than 3"x3" will not
be accepted.
The fee for filing a mark is fifty dollars ($50.00) payable by cash,
check or money order to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The term of registration is ten (10) years. The owner will be notified
to renew his registration within six months prior to the expiration of the term.
(http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/sec/cor/cortmsm/tmsmfrm.htm).
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APPENDIx 23 - RECORDING (FEDERAL) SYSTEM FOR
TRADEMARKS

"A TRADEMARK is either a word, phrase, symbol or design, or
combination of words, phrases, symbols or designs, which identifies and
distinguishes the source of the goods or services of one party from those of
others." (Basic FactsAbout Registering a Trademark,USPTO)
The filing process is manual or electronic (see below). In the manual
process, PTO form 1478 has to be filed for each application along with the
filing fee ($325 per filing) and a drawing of the mark.
The Patent and Trademark Office has developed a new Trademark
Electronic Business Center ("TEBC") as part of their E-Commerce initiative.
TEBC offers three services:
1. Trademark Electronic Application System ("TEAS"). Two
alternatives for filing are provided. The first approach, e-TEAS,
is an electronic, online filing system where applicants can attach
an electronic image of design marks along with online credit
card payment. The second approach, PrinTEAS, involves
completing the application online, printing, and mailing the form
along with the filing fee and a copy of design mark.
2. Trademark Electronic Search System ("TESS"). TESS provides
a web-based interactive search capability.
3. Trademark Application registration retrieval ("TARR"). TARR
is a web-based interactive system, which provides information
about pending and registered trademarks obtained from the
USPTO's internal database.
Online Information Resources
www.uspto.gov
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/tm.html
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/tmebc/index.html
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APPENDIX 24 - PROPOSED TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM

SOLUTIONS

Ideal Technological Solution

User 1

User 2

User N

Connected via Internet

Volume 41 - Numbers 3 & 4

582

IDEA - The Journal of Law and Technology

Next-best Solution
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Proosed Solution

User F

User 2

User N
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25 - PENDING FEDERAL REFORMS

A comprehensive discussion of pending federal reform proposals as
of February 1, 2000 is contained in PRELIMINARY REPORT # 1: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURES GOVERNING THE PERFECTION AND
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS at section IV, pages 166-188.

APPENDIX 26 - THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY UPON A FIRM USING PATENTS
AND TRADEMARKS AS COLLATERAL
by Lois R. Lupica*
© Lois R. Lupica 2001

INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an orderly process for the
distribution of a debtor-in- bankruptcy's assets. This process has the effect
of altering many of the procedural and substantive rights and obligations of
the debtor, as well as of the debtor's creditors. Parties asserting a property
interest in assets of a debtor in bankruptcy, however, must rely on nonbankruptcy law to determine the nature and extent of their property
interests. The most commonly asserted interest by creditors involved in a
bankruptcy are security interests.
Security interests are consensual liens that arise at the inception of
a credit transaction. While security interests are enforceable between parties
to the credit transaction and as against third parties at the moment of their
creation, secured parties must "perfect" their interests for their interests to
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S.
1981, Cornell University; J.D. 1987, Boston University School of Law.
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survive a bankruptcy filing. The importance of the concept of perfection
of security interests in bankruptcy cannot be overstated. An unperfected
security interest can be avoided by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy for the
"Perfection for purposes of the
benefit of the bankruptcy estate.
Bankruptcy Code means priority against the ordinary creditor with ajudicial
lien (the lien creditor).
The body of non-bankruptcy law most often implicated when
personal property is used as collateral is the state law captured in Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Article 9 went through a major
revision in 1998. Both the "old" and "revised" versions of the Article
outline the rules for perfecting security interests in personal property
collateral, and define the priority rights held by secured parties. Primary
among the priority rights defined in Article 9 is the rule that a security
interest that is perfected by a proper state notice filing has priority over the
creditor with a competing lien (the lien creditor). The priority rule for lien
creditors is just one of many rules in Article 9 designed to provide clear and
certain rights to all parties in competition with security interests in all forms
of personal property. Intangible personal property falls within the broad
jurisdictional scope of Article 9.
The scope of Article 9, however, is not absolute. To the extent
that Article 9 is preempted by another body of federal law, the preempting
law governs the issue of how to establish a "perfected" security interest.
Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act include recording and transfer
provisions. Both of these provisions protect subsequent purchasers against
unrecorded assignments. It does not appear from the face of either statute,
however, that the ordinary lien creditor qualifies as a protected purchaser.
The preemptive force of these statutes remains uncertain, however, because
some courts have defined the concept of protected transferee very broadly
when dealing with federal recording provisions.
This uncertainty takes on greater urgency when the debtor, as owner
of the intellectual property, files for bankruptcy protection.' Bankruptcy
provides an acid test for the efficacy of non-bankruptcy law perfection of
security interests; unperfected security interests are subject to avoidance in
bankruptcy. The following sections outline the central effects of bankruptcy
upon a firm using patents and trademarks as collateral.

See http://www.thestandard.com/article/displa listing, in what is called the "Dot-com
Flop Tracker" internet companies that have failed).

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

587

PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS

A.

Perfection Put to the Section 544(a) Avoiding Powers
Test

Non-bankruptcy legal regimes outline the methods for the transfer
of interests in patents and trademarks - namely the Patent Act 2 and the
Lanham Act.' Both of these federal statutes provides a method of
documenting and recording interests in intellectual property by the specific
property number assigned by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. A
structural element common to these statutes is their linkage of the concepts
of transfer and title.
Financiers seeking to take a security interest in most types of
personal property look to Article 9, which dissociates the concept of title
and security interest transfers and provides an efficient and streamlined
method of attachment and perfection of security interests. Article 9 states,
subject to certain specified exceptions, that it governs "any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments,
general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts. .

. ."'

As comprehensive in

scope as Article 9 is, it also recognizes its potential for displacement, in
deference to the federal intellectual property regimes. Both the Patent Act
and the Lanham Act address the issue of transfer of an interest in
intellectual property, but do not specifically mention, in the language of
Article 9, the issues of creation, attachment, perfection and priority of
security interests. Moreover, Article 9 simply provides that if another body
of law governs these matters, then Article 9 steps-back or is preempted.
Section 9-104(a) of old Article 9, known as the "step-back" provision reads:
This Article does not apply to a security interest subject to
2

4
5

Section 261 of the Patent Act states, "An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void
as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, without
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months
from its date or prior to the date of subsequent purchase or mortgage." 35 U.S.C. § 261
(1994).
Section 1060 of the Lanham Act reads in part: An assignment shall be void as against
any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months after the date thereof
or prior to such subsequent purchase. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).
U.C.C. § 9-102 (1996).
U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1996).

Volume 41 - Numbers 3 & 4

588

IDEA - The Journal of Law and Technology
any statute of the United States to the extent that such
statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties
affected by transactions in particular types of property.'

Moreover, old section 9-302(3)(a) states that an Article 9 filing "is
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject
to "a statute . . . of the United States which provides for a national or
international registration ... or which specifies a place of filing different
from that specified in this Article."' The Official Comment to section 9302(3)(a) states:
Subsection (3) exempts from the filing provisions of this
Article transactions as to which an adequate system of
filing, state or federal, has been set up outside this Article
and subsection (4) makes clear that when such a system
exists perfection of a relevant security interest can be had
only through compliance with that system (i.e., filing under
this Article is not a permissible alternative).'
Revised Article 9 also provides for the preemption of its provisions
by federal statute in sections 9-109(c)(1) and 9-31 1(a)(1)., It should be
noted that the new filing preemption language in section 9-31 l(a)(1) does
not direct perfection or filing questions towards a statute of the United
States unless that statute contains a priority rule for lien creditors.
It is not apparent, however, from the text of either "old" or
"revised" Article 9 nor from the law addressing the title and transfer of
interests in patents and trademarks, exactly which legal regime governs the
attachment, perfection and determination of priority of security interests
in patents and trademarks. This is of concern because the issue of
perfection of security interests in patents and trademarks is at the heart of
many of the fundamental issues that arise in a debtor-with-intellectualproperty's bankruptcy.
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, its trustee becomes interested
in determining whether any 'non-bankruptcy claimed rights (such as
6

7
8
9

Id.
U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1996).
U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1996) cmt.
U.C.C. [Revised] § 9-311(a)(1).
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perfected security interests) are vulnerable to defeat." The trustee has the
power, under § 544(a) of the bankruptcy code, to upset the interests of an
unperfected creditor, thereby limiting the creditor's ability to receive the
full measure of what they are owed in the debtor's bankruptcy." As the
cases discussed below illustrate, perfection of security interests for § 544(a)
purposes is the most common context for the questions about perfection.
The issue of perfection of security interests also arises in the context of the
trustee's avoidance powers pursuant to section 547 (preferences) and section
548 (fraudulent conveyances). Preferences and fraudulent conveyances in
the context of transfers of interests of patents and trademarks will be
discussed in Part III.
(i)Perfection of Security Interests in Patents
The Patent Act states that the "assignment, grant or conveyance"
of an interest in a patent "shall be void against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee" unless the assignment, grant or conveyance is recorded in the
PTO within three months from its date, or prior to the date of such
purchase or mortgage.2 While this provision is designed to address the issue
of the steps necessary to be taken to effectuate a transfer of interest in a
patent, it is not clear the extent to which this provision preempts Article
9 when the transferred interest at issue is security interest.
The court in In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 3
addressed the question of whether the section 261 of the Patent Act
preempts Article 9 with respect to transfers of security interests in patents.
The court stated that the language in the Patent Act providing for the
recordation of an assignment speaks to the issue of a transfer of title and
to

The trustee ... may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation
incurred by the debtor that is voidable by (1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the
case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all
property in which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists; 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)(1997).
Under Section 541(a)(3), interests recovered under § 550 become property of
the estate.
Section 541(a)(3) reads: (a) ... [The] estate is comprised" of all of the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held: (3) Any interest in property that the
trustee recovers under section ... 550... of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1997).

12

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).

'3

In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
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does not include within its meaning the transfer of a security interest. The
Transportation Design court concluded that only an Article Nine filing
protects the secured party with an interest in a recorded patent against the
bankruptcy trustee. The court did note in dicta, however, that recording
under section 261 of the Patent Act is necessary to protect the secured
party against subsequent assignees of the patent, including a secured party
that characterized its security interest as a "conditional assignment."
Following the lead of Transportation Design, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel in In re CyberneticsServices, Inc., held that only an Article
9 filing was sufficient to perfect a security interest in a patent. In this case,
the debtor owned a patent for a video signal collection device. Creditor had
a security interest in all of debtor's assets, including "general intangibles"
and filed a financing statement to perfect its security interest in the Article
9 filing office. No financing statement filed or recordation of a transfer of
interest was made in the Patent office. Upon debtor's bankruptcy, creditor
moved for relief from the automatic stay in order to enforce its security
interest in the patent. The trustee opposed this motion and argued that the
creditor's security interest in the patents was unperfected and therefore
avoidable because the transfer of interest was not recorded in the Patent
office.
The BAP determined that to establish priority against involuntarily
lienholders, including the trustee in bankruptcy, the creditor must perfect its
interest pursuant to the terms of Article 9. A recording with the Patent and
Trademark Office is insufficient to provide constructive notice of a transfer
of a security interest. The court continued by observing that in defining
transfer of ownership, in contrast to the Copyright Act, the Patent Act does
not use words such as "mortgage" and "hypothecation" in addition to the
term "assignment." ' Accordingly, the Patent Act does not preempt Article
14

Section 101 of the Copyright Act reads: A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive licenses, or any other conveyance, alienation or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license. Section 205 (c) & (d) read: (c) Recordation as Constructive
Notice. - Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons
constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if-(1) the
document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains
so that, after the document is indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be
revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work; and
(2) registration has been made for the work. (d) Priority Between Conflicting Transfers.
- As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded,
in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one
month after its execution in the United States or within two months after its execution
outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later
transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if
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9 to the same extent that the Copyright Act does. The Patent Act
however, does provide priority rules for subsequent mortgages and
purchasers, and thus no such transfer is effective against such parties in the
absence of a recordation of the transfer in the PTO.
The case of City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric,Inc,5 offers an
illustration of the adverse consequences that can befall creditors who are
confused by the language of the Patent Act and its relationship to Article 9
and the Bankruptcy Code. In Otto Fabric,Creditor recorded a transfer of
an interest in debtors patents in the Patent Office within 90 days of debtor's
bankruptcy. It had also previously filed an Article 9 financing statement,
outside of the 90 day period. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the
security interest ought to be avoided as a preference since a recordation of
creditor's interest was made during the preference period. The bankruptcy
court held, in reliance on the comments to section 9-302 stating that "the
The
federal patent assignment statute occupies the field of filing."
bankruptcy court concluded that the recordation of the security interest in
the Patent Office perfected secured creditor's interest, and because such
perfection was within 90 days of bankruptcy, the transfer was an avoidable
preference.'6 The bankruptcy court also observed that a "single and absolute
system of securing a creditor's interest in patents as collateral" was
preferable, and this conclusion was supported by case law.' "Requiring both
federal and U.C.C. filing to perfect a creditor's interest in a patent would be
contrary" to the purpose of Article 9, which is to provide "a rational and
convenient filing system for security interests."'"
The District Court disagreed with the bankruptcy court's findings
First, the court
and conclusions citing several independent grounds.

is
16

taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to
pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer. 17 U.S.C. § § 101, 205 (c) & (d)
(1994).
City Bank and Trust, Co. v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780, 781-82 (D. Kan. 1988).
In re Otto Fabric, Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).

18

The Bankruptcy Court cited in support of its conclusion that a patent may be assigned
as collateral for a loan Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 260 (1891); Magnuson
Industries, Inc. v. Co-Rect Products, Inc., 676 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1981); Railex
Corporation v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119 (D. D.C. 1966). It further
observed that two circuits have noted that the patent assignment statute "does not
require recording to support the validity of an assignment, except as to subsequent
purchasers or mortgagees without notice, and by implication recognizes the validity
as to all others." Citing, Why Corporation v. Super Ironer Corporation, 128 F.2d 539,
541 (6th Cir. 1942); John Tuman & Sons, Inc. v. Basse, 113 F2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1940).
In re Otto Fabric,Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).

19

City Bank and Trust v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780.

17
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observed that the "federal statute does not expressly state that one must file
an assignment with the Patent and Trademark Office to perfect a security
interest .... If Congress intended to preempt the field of filing, it could have
said so."' 9 Second, the language of Section 261 of the Patent Act says that
recordation in the Patent Office is necessary to protect against the interests
of a "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" and makes no mention of lien
creditors. Thus, the court continued, the federal statute leaves open "a state
filing to protect one's security interest in a patent against a lien creditor."20
Finally, the court concluded, "to require a federal filing and thus a collateral
assignment to perfect a security interest in a patent seems inconsistent with
the modern notion that a grant of a security interest need not include the
conveyance of title or ownership rights."2'
(ii) Perfection of Security Interestsin Trademarks
Similar to the Patent Act, the Lanham Act provides for the
recordation of assignments of trademarks, together with trademark holders'
goodwill.
The Lanham Act, however, does not define the term
"assignment" and as is the case under the Patent Act, it fails to expressly
provide a system for perfecting security interests in trademarks. Because of
the absence of such a specific provision, courts have held that Article 9 of
the U.C.C. is the body of law governing the issue of how one perfects a
security interest in a trademark -- while acknowledging that this subject
"involves a trap for the unwary."22
The court in In re Together Development Corp., in examining this
issue, looked at the historical antecedents to the term "security interest" in
order to determine whether an "assignment" would generally be thought of
as a security interest. The court observed that, in 1946, the year the
Lanham Act was passed, most security interests were referred to as "chattel
mortgages" or "conditional sales." Prior to the enactment of Article 9 in
the early 1960's, most non-possessory pledges of interests in personal
property were called "mortgages" or "hypothecations." An assignment was
deemed to be a transfer of a different nature.
The court continued by examining the reference in the Lanham Act
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

In re Together Development Corporation, 227 B.R. 439, 440-441 (Bankr. D. Mass.

1998).
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to phrase "successor to the business," concluding that Congress must have
had in mind "an outright assignment in the context of the sale of an entire
business of which the trademark is a part." Moreover, the court noted the
express reference in the Copyright Act to the transfer of "mortgages" and
concluded that the Lanham Act's language concerning the transfer of
interests fails to provided a method of perfecting security interests in
trademarks.23 Thus, the court concluded, Article 9 governs the issue of
perfection of security interests in trademarks.
This position is consistent with the progeny of cases that have
consistently held that the Patent Act does not preempt Article 9 and that
the Article filing office is the proper place to perfect a security interest in
trademarks. In Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co.,24 the court
held that a security interest in a trademark is properly perfected by filing
under Article 9, and such a transfer of interest is not equivalent to an
assignment, which must be recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office. In
In re 1994 Inc., the creditor recorded its interest in the PTO, as well as filed
an improper financing statement under Article 9.2" The court, in finding
secured creditor's interest to be unperfected, held that the Lanham Act does
not preempt Article 9 because it does not expressly include provisions for
recording security interests within its scope.26
B.

Characterization of Intellectual Property when used
as Collateral

Another concern central to the issue of the proper steps for
perfection of security interests is how to characterize specific types of
intellectual property for commercial law purposes. To illustrate, it is not
necessarily clear how to properly characterize computer software. A
prospective lender seeking to take a security interest in such software must
first determine whether this software is copyrightable, patentable or
protected as a trade secret, or characterized pursuant to Article 9, as
"intangibles," or "ordinary goods."27 If a copyright has been registered
24

Id. at 441.

25

Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).

26

In re 199z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).

27

See id.

28

Moreover, if software is embodied in goods that are normally used in more than one
jurisdiction, the software, if deemed to be an Article 9 asset, may be deemed to be
"mobile goods." If the intellectual property embodied in the software is deemed to be
general intangibles, the secured party must file a financing statement in the state where
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describing, with specificity, the software, then the place to register and thus
perfect a security interest may be the Copyright Office. If however, a
business method patent has been registered with the Patent and Trademark
office, it may be deemed to be a general intangible, with the perfection
location dictated by Article 9.2"

The extent to which the software is determined to be copyrightable
or patentable in the first instance, as well as how one perfects a security
interest in an unregistered copyright, or in after acquired copyrights remains
unclear. The number of unanswered questions that are raised by this one
commercial scenario make the collateralization of many potentially
patentable materials an uncertain venture and accordingly, creditors
particularly vulnerable in bankruptcy.
AVOIDANCE OF SECURITY INTERESTS AS PREFERENCES AND FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES

A.

Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy

Another important bankruptcy context for the confusion over
perfection is found in the area of preference law. The Bankruptcy Code
allows for the avoidance of certain preferential transfers made upon the eve
of bankruptcy. Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a two-step
inquiry to determine whether a given transfer qualifies for preferential
avoidance. Section 547(b)29 sets forth seven elements that must be

29

30

the debtor is located. Cases have held that software products are to be as "ordinary
goods," thus requiring a state law filing in the place where the "last event occurs on
which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected." It
should be noted that Revised Article 9 overrules the "software as ordinary goods" case
law and defines software as a general intangible. Financing statements with respect to
general intangibles are to filed in the place the debtor is located, which in the case of
an organized entity, is in its place of organization. See Revised U.C.C. § § 9-102(a)(42)
& (75), 9-307(b) & (e) (1999).
See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(1997). Under revised Article 9 the place to file with respect to all
collateral is debtor's "location," which is defined for corporate debtors as its state of
organization. See Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 307 (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) reads: [T] trustee may avoid the transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property B
(1) to or for the benefit of creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was
made;
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established to prove an avoidable preference. These elements include (i) a
transfer," (ii) of an interest in the debtor's property, 3' (iii) to or for the
benefit of a creditor," (iv) for or on account of an antecedent debt,33 (v)
made while the debtor was insolvent,"4 (vi) made on or within 90 days of
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made B
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if B
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
3

32

33

34

35

(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provide.
Section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines transfer to include: ... every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1997).
Accordingly, the perfection of security interests, title transfers, and payments to
creditors all fall within the definition of "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code..
In order to be subject to preference avoidance, the transfer must be of property the
debtor.
Section 101(1 0)(A)of the Bankruptcy Code defines "creditor" as "an entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning
the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1997). "Claim" is broadly defined as a "right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured
or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (1997). Because one of the stated justifications
for preference avoidance is to ensure equitable treatment among similarly situated
creditors, it follows that the transferee have the status of a creditor with a claim to
debtor's bankruptcy estate.
The Bankruptcy Code does not specifically define the term "antecedent debt." Cases
have determined that for a debt to be antecedent pursuant to § 547, the transfer must
come after the date of the incurrence of the debt.
The classic definition of an insolvent debtor is one whose liabilities exceeds it assets.
§ 101(32) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvent" as a "financial
Section
condition such that the sum of the entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1997). The insolvency test is
property, at fair valuation...
applied on the date the transfer is made. If a debtor is solvent at the time of the transfer
in question, and later becomes insolvent and is insolvent at the time of bankruptcy, the
insolvency test is not met, and the transfer is not vulnerable to preferential avoidance.
The timing rules of Section 547(e) come into play in determining a debtor's solvency
at the time of transfer, because the date a transfer is made may be determined with
reference to the §547(e)(2)(B) grace period. Section 547(0 sets forth a presumption of
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bankruptcy" (vii) that enables such creditor to receive more than they would
receive under a chapter 7 distribution.3" If the trustee proves all seven
elements," the trustee has established its prima facie case for a preference,
and the transferee then has the burden of proving that one of the Section
547(c) exceptions applies.3" Section 547(c) describes eight different
insolvency during the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f)
(1999). This provision's legislative history explains the impetus behind the enactment
of the presumption of insolvency during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy:

36

37

38

39

Given the state of most debtor's books and records, such a task is nearly impossible.
Given the financial condition of nearly all debtors in the three months before
bankruptcy, the task is also generally not worth the effort. Rarely is a debtor solvent
during the three months before bankruptcy. Thus, the preference section requires the
trustee prove a fact that nearly always exists yet never can be proven with certainty...
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977).
The burden is placed on the creditor to rebut this presumption, which likely will
involve an examination of debtor's books and records and a valuation of its assets. In
the case of a challenge to a transfer made to or for the benefit of an insider beyond the
90 days prior to bankruptcy, the trustee is not granted the benefit ofapresumption, and
must prove insolvency with reference to the debtor's records.
Any transfer challenged as a preferencemust be made, if to a non-insider, within 90 days
prior to debtor's bankruptcy filing. Transfers are potentially avoidable if made within
one year of bankruptcy if the transferee is an "insider." "Insider" is defined under the
Bankruptcy Code to include, a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the
debtor, a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, a general partner of the
debtor, or a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control.
If the debtor is a corporation, an insider is deemed to be a director of the debtor, an
officer of the debtor, a person in control of the debtor, a partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner, a general partner of the debtor, and a relative of a general partner,
director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1997).
The final focus of the preference analysis is "upon whether the creditor would have
received less than a 100% payout in a Chapter 7 liquidation." See Smith v. Creative
Financial Management, Inc. (In re Virginia-Carolina Financial Corp.), 954 F. 2d 193,
193 (4th Cir. 1992). This test requires a comparison between the value of what the
creditor received as a result of the transfer, and what the creditor would have received
in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation, absent the transfer. This is measured "not by
what the situation would have been if the debtor's assets had been liquidated and
distributed among his creditors at the time the alleged preferential payment was made,
but by the actual effect of the payment as determined by when bankruptcy results." See
id, citingPalmerClay Products v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227,229 (1936). Ifthe value of what
was actually received is greater than the amount the creditor would have received in a
liquidation, the hypothetical liquidation test is satisfied.
In the case of a chapter 11, a debtor in possession. ". .. a debtor in possession shall
have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title,
and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties... of a trustee serving in a
case under this chapter." See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1997).
Not all transfers made while the debtor is insolvent are deemed under the bankruptcy
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circumstances in which an otherwise avoidable preferential transfer is
granted a safe harbor from avoidance. These circumstances include (i) a
contemporaneous exchange for new value," (ii) a transfer in the ordinary
course of business," (iii) a transfer in connection with an enabling loan," (iv)

a transfer followed by a subsequent advance of new value, 2 (v) transfer made
in connection with a floating lien, 3 (vi) statutory lien transfers, 44 (vii)

transfers to satisfy domestic relations debts,3 and (viii) transfer made in
small consumer transactions." While each of the seven section 547(b)
elements must be present in order to find a preference, the transfer need
only qualify under one of the section 547(c) safe harbors to be saved from

avoidance.
To aid the trustee in its pursuit of avoidance, Section 547(f) sets
forth a presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the
bankruptcy filing; a presumption that may only be overcome by the
transferee's proof of sufficient evidence of solvency. 7 Subsection 547(e)
outlines the governing rules that define when a transfer is deemed to be
made. 8
The time of the transfer relative to the time the debt was incurred

40
41

42

code to be preferential. Some transfers are deemed beneficial, notwithstanding the
bankruptcy process. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) - (8) (1997) Section 547(g) reads: "For
purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a
transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against
whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability
of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section." See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1997).
See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(1) (1997).
See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(2) (1997).
See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(3) (1997).

43

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(4) (1997).

44

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(5) (1997).

,

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(6) (1997).

46

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(7) (1997).

46

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(8) (1997).

48

49

This presumption only aids the trustee in cases where the transfer is made during the
90 days- before a bankruptcy filing. For transfers made to insiders more than 90 days
(but less than one year) before bankruptcy, the burden is the on trustee to prove
insolvency, in the absence of a presumption. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(t) (1997).
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1997). In addition, § 547(a) provides the definition of
"inventory", "new value" and "receivable." See 11 U.S.C. §§§ 547(a)(1), (a)(2) & (a)(3)
(1997).
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is of critical importance to a preference analysis. When filing or
recordation is necessary to "perfect" the transferee's interest, Section
547(e)(2)(B) is implicated. Because of the requirement that the transfer
must be on account of an antecedent .debt, the focus of the timing analysis
is on whether there is a "gap" between the incurrence of the debt and the
time of the transfer. The "antecedent debt" test is satisfied if the debt is
incurred before, or antecedent to the date the transfer. 9
Section 547(e)(2)(B) sets forth a ten day grace period within which
transfers of interests may be perfected. With respect to security interests,
this grace period begins on the date of attachment." If the transfer is
perfected within the grace period, the date of the attachment will be deemed
to be the date of the transfer." If, however, the transferee perfects its
interest beyond ten days from the date of attachment, the transfer is deemed
to take place on the date of perfection. 2 If due to confusion and
uncertainty as to how to perfect a security interest in patents or trademarks,
the perfection is delayed beyond ten days from the date of the security
interest attachment, the transfer is deemed to be a transfer "on account of
an antecedent debt." If this happens within 90 days of a bankruptcy filing,
the transfer is a preference subject to avoidance under § 547(b). 3
The case of City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric (discussed
above) provides a telling illustration of the trouble a creditor with an interest
in patents or trademarks may find itself in when its debtor files for
bankruptcy - even if it properly perfected its interest outside of the 90 day
preference period. While ultimately reversed by the District Court, the
bankruptcy court initially found that the recordation of a transfer of an
interest in a patent in the Patent Office within the 90 day preference period
50

51

52

53

4

The justifications for the preference rules support the necessity of the requirement of
transfers made on account of antecedent debt. If a debt is incurred contemporaneously
with a transfer, there is no depletion of value from the estate as a result of such transfer.
If creditors contribute value commensurate with their receipt of transfers of value, other
creditors are not subject to harm.
... A transfer is made.. .(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time,..
.11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1997).
If the section 547(e)(2)(A) grace period has not expired at the time bankruptcy is filed,
the transferee may perfect its interest within the three month grace period without
violating the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1997).
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1997).
Notwithstanding the satisfaction of each of the section 547(b) elements ofapreference,
the transfer could still be saved if it falls within one of the "safe harbor" exceptions of
section 547(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1997).

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

599

was a preferential transfer. It appears in this case that the secured creditor
was unsure as to the proper place to file to perfect its security interest, and
thought the prudent course was to take a "belt and suspenders" approach.
While not ultimately fatal to its interest in the collateral, it took two
written opinions to reach the ultimate conclusion that the proper place to
perfect a security interest in a patent is the Article 9 filing office.
B.

Transfers of License Interests as Preferences

As noted above, to qualify as a-preference, a transfer must be on
account of an antecedent debt. The date a debt is deemed to have been
incurred turns on a non-bankruptcy law determination. When intellectual
property is transferred as collateral or loan repayment or to otherwise
secure an obligation, the debt is deemed to arise once the obligation becomes
enforceable." Debts incurred in connection with absolute assignments of
intellectual property are deemed to arise at the time title or control is
transferred. When intellectual interests are licensed, However, the time the
debt is incurred is less straightforward.
If one looks at an intellectual property license as analogous to a real
estate lease, the debt would be deemed to have been incurred
contemporaneously with each periodic payment transfer. Accordingly, each
transfer of a license interest would be on account of a contemporaneous
debt.
An alternative view of a license for the use or exploitation of a
patent or trademark, however, has the potential to raise some troubling
preference issues. If the language of the license, or the context, suggests a
one-time transfer of rights in exchange for periodic payments, then the debt
would be deemed to have been incurred at the time the license agreement was
entered into. Thus, each license payment would be considered a transfer on
account of an antecedent debt. If a debtor files for bankruptcy during the
term of the license agreement, any payments made (on account of an
antecedent transfer of rights) within 90 days of bankruptcy are subject to
avoidance as preferences.
C.

Avoidance of Fraudulent Conveyances

Fraudulent conveyances are transfers prior to bankruptcy, made
with either actual fraud, or with what is known as constructive fraud. When
55

City Bank v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780, 781-82 (D. Kan. 1988).
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a debtor is in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the power
to avoid transfers qualifying as fraudulentunder two independent provisions.
Section 544(b) allows the trustee to avoid any transfer "by the debtor that
is voidable under applicable law by a creditorholding an unsecured claim that
is allowable."" What this means is that any transfer that could be avoided
by a creditor under state fraudulent conveyance act can be avoided by the
trustee in bankruptcy' This provision allows the trustee to avoid transfers
made within the state-law "look-back" period -- which can be as long as four
years. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy gives the trustee powers to avoid
fraudulent transfers without requiring that there be an unsecured creditor
with an avoidable claim in bankruptcy." The section 548 "look-back"
period is one year.
Section 548 fraudulent conveyance law may be implicated when
patents and trademarks are used as collateral for reasons similar to those
discussed with respect to preferences. For there to be a fraudulent transfer,
there must be a transfer of an interest -- and the transfer of a security
interests qualify under this provision. If the security interest transfer is
perfected within the "look-back" period, the transfer, if meeting the criteria
for avoidance under section 548 or under state fraudulent conveyance law,
is subject to avoidance. If due to confusion and uncertainty as to how to
perfect a security interest in patents or trademarks, the perfection is delayed
and spills into the look-back period, the transfer is vulnerable to defeat by
the trustee as a fraudulent conveyance.
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11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1997).
To use section 544(b), there must be a creditor with an allowable claim in
debtor's
bankruptcy that could have avoided the transfer under state law.
Section 548(a)(1) reads: The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or
within one year before the date of filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily-(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or (B) (i)
received less than a reasonably equivalent in value in exchange for such transfer or
obligation and (ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, o9r was about to engage in business or
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital; or (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. 11 U.S.C. §
548(a) (1997).
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APPENDIX 27 - DEFINITIONS
Accessions Accounts -

Account debtor After-acquired -

Property clause

Assignment Attachment -

Goods that are physically united with other goods in
such a manner that the identity of the original goods is
not lost. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)
A detailed statement of the mutual demands in the
nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out
of contracts or some fiduciary relation. Black's Law
Dictionary 18 (6 th ed. 1990)
The person who is obligated on an account, chattel
paper or general intangible. U.C.C. § 9 - 105(1)(a).
A clause in a mortgage providing that any property
acquired by the borrower after the date of the loan and
mortgage will automatically become additional
security for the loan. Black's Law Dictionary 61 (6th
ed. 1990)
The act of transferring to another all or part of one's
property, interests, or rights. Black's Law Dictionary
119 (6' ed. 1990)
When the three basic prerequisites of a security
interest exist (agreement, value, and collateral), the
security agreement becomes enforceable between the
parties and is said to "attach". Black's Law Dictionary
126 (6 th ed. 1990)

Bona fide
purchase rule -

Chattel paper -

When a legal title holder of a patent transfers his or
her title to a third party purchaser for value without
notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title, the
purchaser takes the entire ownership of the patent, free
of any prior equitable encumbrance. This report p. 121
A writing or writings which evidence both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of
th
specific
1990) goods. Black's Law Dictionary 237 (6 ed.

Commercial
Tort claim -

Condition
Precedent
Constructive - Notice

All business-related tort claims that do not involve
personal injury or death.
A condition which is to be performed before some
right
dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent
thereon is performed. Black's Law Dictionary 293 (6th
ed. 1990)
Such notice as is implied or imputed by law, usually
on the basis that the information is a part of a public
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Derivative title -

Dicta Financing Statement Federal Intellectual
Property Securities
Act (FIPSA) -

General intangible -

Goods Instrument -

Lanham Act Lien creditor -

Mask works -

Perfection -
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record or file, as in the case of notice of documents
which have been recorded in the appiopriate registry
of deeds or probate. Black's Law Dictionary 314 (6th
ed. 1990)
The common-law principle, codified repeatedly in the
U.C.C., that a transferee of property acquires only the
transferor's rights therein. Black's Law Dictionary
444 (61h ed. 1990)
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the
resolution or determination of the specific case before
the court. Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6 h ed. 1990)
A document setting out a secured party's security
interest in goods. Black's Law Dictionary 631 (6 th ed.
1990)

A comprehensive package of amendments to the tract
recording provisions of the Copyright Act, the
Lanham Act, the Patent Act and the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act. This report p. 12
Any personal property (including things in action)
other than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and money. Black's
Law Dictionary 684 (6th ed. 1990)
All things that are moveable when a security interest
attaches. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)
A negotiable instrument or any other writing that
evidences a right to the payment of a monetary
obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease,
and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is
transferred by delivery with any necessary
endorsement or assignment. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)
Federal statute enacted in 1946 which revised federal
trademark law and registration process. Black's Law
Dictionary 880 (6th ed. 1990)
One whose debt or claim is secured by a lien on
particular property, as distinguished from a "general"
creditor, who has no such security. Black's Law
Dictionary 923 (6th ed. 1990)
Term referring to the set of templates or "masks" that
together make up the design of a semiconductor chip.
The chip manufacturer uses these masks in a
photographic depositing and etching process to build
up the three-dimensional structure of the chip. This
report p. 15
In secured transactions law, the process whereby a
security interest is protected, as far as the law permits,

Proposal for Security Interests in Intellectual Property

Preemption Doctrine -

Priority Proceeds -

Purchase-money
security interest -

Security Interest -

Service -

Software Uniform Commercial Code -
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against competing claims to the collateral, which
usually requires the secured party to give public notice
of the interest as by filing in a government office.
Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (6 hed. 1990)
Doctrine adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court holding
that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed
to local, character that federal laws preempt or take
precedence over state laws. Black's Law Dictionary
117 (6 h ed. 1990)
In bankruptcy, refers to secured claims that by statute
receive more favorable treatment than other unsecured
claims. Black's Law Dictionary 1194 (6th ed. 1990)
The following property:
A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition of collateral;
B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on
account of, collateral;
C) rights arising out of collateral;
D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims
arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or
interference with the use of, defects or
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the
collateral; or,
E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the
extent payable to the debtor or the secured party,
insurance payable by reason of the loss or
nonconformity of , defects or infringement of
rights in, or damage to, the collateral. U.C.C. §9102(a)
One which is taken or retained by seller of item to
secure its price or taken by person who advances
funds to enable one to acquire rights in collateral.
th
Black's Law Dictionary 1235 (6 ed. 1990)
A form of interest in property which provides that the
property may be sold on default in order to satisfy the
obligation for which the security interest is given.
th
Black's Law Dictionary 1357 (6 ed. 1990)
Duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another,
the former being bound to submit his will to the
direction and control of the latter. Black's Law
Dictionary 1368 (6th ed. 1990)
A computer program and any supporting information
provided in connection with a transaction relating to
the program. This report p. 25
One of the Uniform Laws drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioner's on Uniformed State
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Valuable consideration -

Venture capital -

41 IDEA 297 (2002)

Laws and the American Law Institute governing
commercial transactions. Black's Law Dictionary
1531 (6t ed. 1990).
A class of consideration upon which a promise may be
founded, which entitles the promisee to enforce his
claim against an unwilling promisor. Black's Law
Dictionary 1550 (6th ed. 1990)
Funding for new companies or others embarking on
new or turnaround ventures that entails some
investment risk but offers the potential for above
average future profits. Black's Law Dictionary 1556
(6 tb ed. 1990)

